Comparative analysis of French and British public opinion on the EU, 1992-2001 by Balestrini, Pierre
COtnparative Analysis of French and 
British Public Opinion on the EU, 
1992-2001 
by 
Pierre Philippe aalestrini 
Submitted for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy 
Department of Political, International and Policy Studies 
School of Arts, Communication and Humanities 
University of Surrey 
September 2007 
© Pierre Philippe Balestrini 2007 
ABSTRACT 
Public opinion on European integration has been studied extensively. However, 
much of the work has been conducted on an aggregate national level or individual 
level across nations without taking detailed account of the specificities of each 
member state, even though these distinctive features can be essential to explaining 
public views. The dissertation offers a comprehensive, comparative analysis of 
French and British public opinion on the EU from 1992 to 2001, in a period of 
significant changes brought out by integration. In particular it examines the effects 
of national and individual utilitarian appraisals on EU support and considers whether 
attachments to particular socio-economic models structure preferences for EU 
policy. By extensively reworking and testing Eurobarometer data, the thesis 
corrects some previous distortions, offers a more rigorous treatment of the effect of 
utilitarian explanations on EU support than past research has done and provides 
some methodological enhancements. It is thus demonstrated that in a context of 
increased visibility and politicisation of the EU in France and the UK, utilitarian 
appraisals played an ever-increasing part in moulding attitudes towards the EU, 
while affective EU support eroded - especially in France, where it had been more 
developed. The significant drop in support for EU membership and for further 
integration in France and the United Kingdom resulted from discontent with the 
perceived contribution of the EU to national and individual economic and social 
situations. This also reflected the fact that majorities in both countries favoured a 
change in the political direction of the EU to cater for their own policy concerns. 
The French preferred a widely integrated EU based on regulated capitalism with a 
high level of social protection, where the principle of European preference was 
enforced. The British preferred a model of loose intergovernmental association of 
nations, where neo-liberalism and free trade rules prevailed. In the light of these 
findings the dissertation concludes that EU policy makers need to devise flexible 
modes of integration whilst achieving positive outcomes in the socio-economic 
sphere if they are to satisfy both national pUblics. 
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1- INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Introduction 
The process of European integration is today at an advanced stage. The European 
Union's institutions, through their regulatory power over commercial, economic and 
social activities, largely influence the environment in which firms, public institutions 
and individuals evolve. Thus the EU's decisions are not only more and more visible 
but can have far reaching consequences on people's lives, from the monetarization 
of the Euro (and its consequences, for example, on pricing decisions), planned EU 
enlargement, standardization of technical product and process norms to European 
citizenship. The decisions of the EU sometimes arouse public interest and often 
represent fertile grounds for the expression of passions by the opponents and 
supporters of European economic, political and social integration. Discussion fora 
about the future of the EU abound, some organized by the EU institutions 
themselves, prompted perhaps by esprit democratique but also by concern over the 
lack of public enthusiasm for European integration. 
Support for the European integration process is not unanimous across Europe, as 
recent polls have shown from Denmark to Italy, but also in France and the United 
Kingdom. European civil society seems to be divided between pro-integrationists 
and anti-integrationists, pro-Euro and anti-Euro. The legitimacy of the EU is a field 
in which many writers have engaged (see for example Beetham and Lord (1998), 
Gabel (1998)). However the study of public opinion on EU integration has 
frequently been conducted on an aggregate national level or individual level across 
nations but without taking into much consideration the economic, political, cultural, 
social and historical specificities of each member state, which can influence opinion. 
The present study of British and French public opinion stems from this necessity and 
reality. 
The choice of Britain and France as the focus for this research is justified by the 
similarities and differences that they share. These differences and similarities are as 
true today as they were in the study period. As far as the similarities are concerned, 
they include the fact that these are two large member countries of the EU both in 
terms of population, political and economic power. They both have approximately 
60 million inhabitants in 2005 (Eurostat, 2007) and have similar GDP per head, 
$28223 and $27048 for the UK and France respectively in 2005 1 (OECD, 2007a). 
They contribute to the EU budget in the proportion of around 17% for France and 
12% for the UK2 (The European Commission, 2007) and have the same voting 
rights and number of representatives in the institutions of the European Union. They 
are also both old members of the European Union although France is a founder 
nation of the European Community. They both have networks of bilateral and 
multilateral links with other states, including countries associated with their 
respective colonial pasts. Furthermore, in both Britain and France there are deep 
political divisions between pro- and anti-European currents of opinion - as 
evidenced by national or European elections and referendum results as well as by 
general political debate and commentary in the media, although the opposition to 
European integration in France is now more confined to the political periphery. 
France and the United Kingdom nevertheless diverge in a number of respects. They 
have different economic and social traditions, one more collective (France) and the 
other one more individual (the United Kingdom). Thus the government sector in 
France accounts for 54.5% of the wealth produced against 44% in the UK (as a 
percentage of GDP) in 2005 (The European Commission, 2006); France counts a 
higher number of civil servants and higher tax pressures - 45.7% for France against 
38% for the UK as a percentage of GDP in 2005 (The European Commission, 2006) 
- and the French central government intervenes more in the economic and social 
sphere - for example the working week limited to 35 hours. The Index of economic 
freedom - using factors such as trade policy, fiscal burden of government, 
government intervention in the economy, monetary policy, capital flows and foreign 
investment, banking and finance, wages and prices, property rights, regulation and 
informal market - confirms this state of affairs by placing France at the 44th world 
rank and the United Kingdom at the 5th world rank in 2006 (The Heritage 
I These figures are calculated at the price levels and purchasing power parities (PPPs) of 2000. When 
measuring the GOP per inhabitant in current prices and PPPs, the differential between the United 
Kingdom and France is greater: respectively $32860 and 30266 in 2005 (OECD, 2007b). In terms of 
GOP per head, the United Kingdom has caught up with France at the end of the study period and 
overtook it afterwards. Both countries' GOP per capita remains though relatively comparable. 
2 This relies on gross contributions to the EU budget and does not take account of receipts received 
back from the communities, for example in the form of European funding. 
Foundation - The Wall Street Journal, 2007). Furthennore, according to Hofstede 
(1991) following his research on IBM employees in different countries, Britain 
appears more individualistic (ranked 3rd with a score of 89) compared to France 
(ranked 10111 th with a score of 71). In addition, France has a relatively high power 
distance3 (score of 68) for a developed country, compared with a score of 35 for 
Britain. 
The selection of Britain and France is also motivated by the fact that they have 
different records of economic, social and political outputs over the last fifteen years, 
and European elections are frequently the object of discussion focusing on domestic 
issues rather than European ones, more especially in France. Thus for example, the 
unemployment rate in France is higher than in the United Kingdom, 9.7 and 4.8 
respectively in 2005 and has been higher for the last fifteen years - and even for 
most of the last two decades (Eurostat, 2007). The economic difficulties in France 
were associated with frequent changes of governments and political majorities in the 
same period, this contrasting with the relative political stability in the United 
Kingdom. Moreover the different national economic, social and political records of 
the two nations may be at the source of the differences in public attitudes to 
European integration, which represent one of the overarching hypotheses in the 
present research, namely that dissatisfaction with national institutions and their 
outputs may motivate support for European integration. 
The differences between British and French public opinion towards EU integration 
are particularly interesting as the French public is more in favour of EU membership 
and further integration but more opposed to EU enlargement than the British. 
Furthennore, despite these differences, both publics include substantial opposition 
to, and support for, EU membership and further integration. The data below 
illustrate this in the study period (Eurobarometer, 1992-2001)4: 
3 Power distance refers to the degree of inequality between people in physical and educational tenns 
(i.e. from relatively equal to extremely unequal). Thus, the lower the power distance in a society is, 
the more individuals will expect to participate in the organizational decision-making process 
(Hollensen, 2004). 
-l Please see tables in appendix 1.1. 
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• Support For EU Membership 
Figure 1.1: EU Membership: Good Thing - Bad Thing 1992-2001 
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Source: Eurobarometer 
In the United Kingdom, 43% of respondents say EU membership is a good thing 
and 25 .2% a bad thing (differential of + 17.8) compared to 54.3% a good thing 
and 14.6% a bad thing in France (differential of+39.7). The differential 
between the two countries is in favour of France, that is to say +21.9. 
Furthermore the respondents who say that EU membership is neither good nor 
bad are similar in percentage in both countries , 31.1 % (France) and 31.8% 
(United Kingdom). 
• Country Benefit From EU Membership 
Figure 1.2 : Country Benefit From EU Membership 1992-200 1 
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Source: Eurobarometer 
In the United Kingdom, 35 .8% of respondents answered that the UK benefited 
and 42.9% that it did not benefit (-7.1) from EU membership compared to 46.1 % 
benefited and 33% not benefited in France (+13 .1). The differential between the 
two nations is again favourable to France, that is to say +20.2. The percentage 
of respondents who answer "Don't Know" to this question is relati vely similar -
but high - in both countries, that is to say 20.9% and 21 .3%. 
• Euro: For or Against 
Figure 1.3 : Support for the Euro 1992-2001 
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Source: Eurobarometer 
In the United Kingdom, 29.8% of respondents are for the Euro and 57 .6% 
against (differential = -27.8%) compared to 62.8% for the Euro and 30% against 
in France (+32.8%). The differential between the two nations is favourable to 
France and particularly high with + 60.6. However, the percentage of 
respondents who answer "Don ' t know" to this question is higher in the United 
Kingdom than in France, 12 .5% versus 7.2%. 
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• Enlargement: For or Against 
Figure 1.4: Support for EU Enlargement 2000-2001 5 
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Source: Eurobarometer 
In the United Kingdom, 36.3% of respondents are in favour of European 
enlargement and 34.6% against (+ l.7) compared to 37% in favour and 48 .2% 
against in France (-11 .2%). The differential between the respondents in the 
United Kingdom and France is thus +12.9%, with the former being more in 
favour of EU enlargement. However the percentage of people who answer don ' t 
know is higher in the United Kingdom than in France, 29.1 % versus 14.8% 
respectively. 
5 Thi s questi on is only ava il abl e in 2000 and 200 1. 
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Figure 1.5: Enlargement, Priority for the EU 1997-2001 6 
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Source: Eurobarometer 
In the United Kingdom, 29.9% of respondents are of the opinion that 
enlargement is a priority for the EU against 53.4% not a priority (-23 .5) 
compared to 18.1 % a priority and 75 .3% not a priority in France (-57 .2) . The 
differential between the respondents in the United Kingdom and France is thus -
33 .7, with the latter seeing enlargement even less ofa priority for the EU . 
Respondents in both nations do not consider enlargement as an EU priority. 
However the percentage of people who answer don ' t know is higher in the 
United Kingdom than in France, 16.6% versus 6.6% respectively. 
(, This question is onl y ava il able from 1997 to 200 I. 
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• Preference For European Unification Speed 
Figure 1.6: Desired European Unification Speed 1992-2001 
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Source: Eurobarometer 
The mean for the United Kingdom's preferred European unification speed is 
higher than for France, respectively 3.92 and 3.20 (l equals "runs as fast as 
possible" and 7 "standstill"). This indicates that British citizens wish to see EU 
integration proceed slower than French citizens. Furthermore the mean for 
British respondents is beyond the mid-point (that is to say 3.5) while the one fo r 
French respondents is below the mid-point. 
These results confirm the common assumption that the United Kingdom seems more 
eurosceptical than France, although in both nations, there is a significant coex istence 
of pro- and anti-European feelings among citizens, corroborated by the las t 
European election results which saw both pro- and anti- European politica l parties in 
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France and the United Kingdom obtain parliamentary representation (Mellows-Facer 
et aI, 2004). The fact that citizens in the United Kingdom seem rather more 
eurosceptical and those in France rather more pro-European highlights the 
importance of a systematic, thorough-going comparison between the related public 
opinions towards European integration, especially given that France and the United 
Kingdom are of similar political, economic and population size. 
The choice of the study period, that is to say from 1992 to 2001, is justified by the 
fact that this period coincides with significant developments in the European 
integration process made possible by inter alia the Treaty of Maastricht, the Treaty 
of Amsterdam and the Treaty of Nice. These treaties bringing significant changes in 
the lives of European citizens from the monetarization of the Euro (and its 
consequences for example on pricing decisions), planned EU enlargement, 
standardization of technical product and process norms, '" to European citizenship 
and embryonic European home affairs policies. The selection of this ten year period 
is also motivated by the fact that the related countries, that is to say France and the 
United Kingdom, have had a different record of economic, social and political 
outputs in the related period and European elections are frequently dominated by 
discussions on domestic issues rather than European ones, in France but also in the 
United Kingdom. It is motivated by the fact that ten years is an adequate period to 
appreciate the effects of perceived and actual national economic, political and social 
output records of the related member states on French and British citizens' opinions 
about European integration but also to appreciate the nature and direction of the 
European changes (considering their sheer importance) on people's lives. The ten-
year period is adequate to carry out time-series analysis. As this study is solely 
based on the period from 1992 to 2001, extrapolation of conclusions and 
implications drawn from the current study to the post 2001 period should be 
exercised with caution. 
1.2 Research Objectives 
Breaking away from much of the previous research which followed a cross-national 
perspective, the present research takes full account of the national cultural, 
10 
historical, economic, social, and political specificities which shape public opinion on 
European integration. It aims to study and explain the differences between British 
and French public opinion in the period from 1992 to 2001. It will investigate and 
test whether the utilitarian argument at individual and national levels and citizens' 
preferences for particular social and economic models explain support for European 
integration. More specifically, public satisfaction or dissatisfaction with the 
performance of national institutions and its hypothesized relationship with support 
for European integration (hypothesis I) will be examined, as will the citizen's 
individual benefit extracted from European integration (hypothesis II). Furthermore 
the hypothesized relationship between citizens' preferences for regulated capitalism 
and support for integration in the case of France, and the hypothesized relationship 
between citizens' preferences for neo-liberalism, coupled with opposition to 
integration in the case of the United Kingdom (hypothesis III) will be studied. The 
research aims to explore and understand these contrasting views on Europe so that it 
can make some small contribution to policy-direction within the EU. As this study 
is solely based on the period from 1992 to 2001, the application of conclusions and 
inferences drawn from this study to the post 2001 period should be exercised with 
caution. 
1.3 Thesis Structure 
The present thesis consists of 8 chapters. Chapter one outlines the research problem, 
its importance, the rationale behind the study and the research objectives. Chapter 
two critically reviews the European integration process from the perspective of 
political actors and citizens. The completion of the single European market and the 
Maastricht Treaty marked the end of the permissive consensus in member states. 
European integration and its policies became, from the 1990s, more visible, 
politicized and contested by political parties, social movements, interest groups and 
citizens. Citizens' attitudes towards the European Union are nevertheless developed 
in the national economic, political, historical, social and cultural contexts, and are 
more utilitarian than affective. EU support is thus conditional on the economic, 
social and political performance of the nation state, rather than on the perfonnance 
ofEU institutions themselves. Furthermore, citizens develop values and policy 
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preferences in the political order of their country, which will influence their EU 
attitudes - more specifically, drawing comparisons between the political order or 
policies of their country and the political order or policies of the European Union. 
Chapter three discusses and justifies the methodology. Besides the novelty of doing 
a systematic Franco-British comparative study in the period from 1992-2001 -
relying on creative hypotheses - the present thesis corrects some previous 
distortions, offers a more rigorous treatment of the effect of utilitarian explanations 
on EU support than past research and provides some methodological enhancements. 
Thus, the effect of utilitarian explanations is considered in relation to evaluations 
both of current EU membership and of further European integration at both the 
individual and aggregate data levels. Evaluations of current EU membership are 
measured through the use of both EU benefit and membership dependent variables 
which provide a more accurate and discriminating appraisal of current EU 
membership support, capturing in the process a fuller range of underlying attitudes. 
The utilization of the seven point future integration dependent variable specifies 
views in a more precise way than the dependent variables used in other studies. 
Where possible, middle category answers ("don't know" and "neither good nor 
bad") are also integrated into the statistical treatment - providing methodological 
enhancements in comparison with earlier research. The mixture of aggregate and 
individual data level analyses involving a range of diverse data, combined with the 
mutual reinforcement and complementarity of hypotheses tested in the study, is not 
only suited to the objectives and purpose of the research but also enhances its 
validity. Moreover, the present analysis incorporates not only the study of 
attitudinal patterns (that is to say citizens' perceptions of European and national 
economic, social and political factors) but also of the relationship between actual 
economic, social and political data (such as, for example, inflation rate, GDP growth 
rate, crime rate and social expenditure per head of population) and integration 
support. Finally, another benefit of the current research is that it encompasses 
meticulous and exhaustive statistical modelling and subsumes original variables (or 
new ways of operationalising variables) in the analysis: for example integration of 
immigration, crime, bureaucracy, tax burden in hypothesis I, incorporation of varied 
subjective economic performance evaluation variables in hypothesis II, and 
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integration of a comprehensive range of policies operationalised in a novel manner 
with directional content of policies in hypothesis III. 
Chapter four presents an analysis of the background economic, social and political 
environments in France and the United Kingdom. This analysis revealed that both 
France and the United Kingdom see a role for the EU but that they each have a 
different view of what form the EU should take. This reflects their dissimilar 
national economic, social, societal and political experiences in the study period. 
Thus French public opinion showed relatively strong support for European 
integration in the period from 1992 to 2001. Nevertheless, this support fluctuated 
with France's economic and social difficulties - especially from 1992 to 1997 and 
from the second part of2000 - and with the perceived role played in these 
difficulties by European integration - more particularly, by the development of the 
EU on a model that was deemed too liberal, deregulated and excessively open to 
world competition. Utilitarian assessments seemed to increasingly erode affective 
feelings towards integration. As regards British public opinion, it was and still is 
less well disposed towards European integration than its counterparts in other EU 
countries (including France) and the tendency increased from 1992 to 2001. The 
growing reluctance with regard to the United Kingdom's EU membership - and 
more especially towards further European integration - can be explained by a 
perceived divergence of the EU economic and social model with the predominant 
British model of free markets, individualism, national sovereignty and national 
interest. It can also be explained by the comparative success of the British model 
which was perceived to be threatened by a European Union that was deemed 
undemocratic, bureaucratic, more interventionist and somewhat value disenhancing, 
but also by the perceived threat that the EU brought to British national identity, and 
by the lack of real party competition on European integration. 
Chapters five, six and seven present the analyses of data and the discussion of 
results. It is thus seen that in the context of France and the United Kingdom, 
utilitarian appraisals playa part in forming citizens' opinions about the EU and that 
citizens use national proxies to express attitudes towards the EU. Amidst the greater 
visibility and politicisation of the EU issue in the study period, utilitarian 
assessments gained increasing importance. In chapters five and six, relationships 
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were thus found between citizens' EU support and the perfonnance of national 
political institutions in socio-economic, societal and political tenns (hypothesis I), 
and between citizens' support for integration and individual benefits extracted from 
European integration (hypothesis II) in both the French and British contexts. 
Both countries in the study period experienced a significant drop in support for EU 
membership and for further European integration, although the fall was lower 
among French respondents. This significant drop was the result of discontent with 
the perceived contribution of the EU to the national and individual economic and 
social situation. It reflected the fact that both countries favoured a change of 
political direction of the EU to cater for their own policy concerns. The analysis of 
findings for hypothesis III in chapter seven confinns this. Hence, whilst the results 
of hypotheses I and II have demonstrated that the utilitarian argument can certainly 
be a vector of support for current EU membership and future European integration in 
both the French and British contexts - more so in the French case - this vector of 
support is ultimately defined by the principle of subsidiarity and the type of EU 
model French and British citizens favour. For the fonner, it is defined by a 
preference for a widely integrated EU based on a regulated capitalist model with a 
high level of social protection, and where the principle of European preference is 
espoused, whereas for the latter the preferred model is a loose intergovernmental 
association of nations where neo-liberalism and free trade rules prevail. 
Finally, chapter eight sets out the conclusions, political and policy implications, 
research limitations and recommendations for future research. The results of the 
present research have highlighted the fact that much of the previous research has 
offered an excessively simple view of the relationship between citizens and the EU. 
The nature of EU support itself - current EU membership and further European 
integration examined separately - the specific policy aspect considered - for 
example crime level, unemployment and corruption - and the domestic economic, 
cultural, historical, social, political environment in which these are interpreted and 
connected, have not been considered sufficiently. Although individuals may not 
have a sophisticated knowledge of the EU, they are able to use infonnation shortcuts 
from their social and political environment to express their attitudes towards the EU. 
The literature has perhaps over-emphasized the influence of political parties on 
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voters. The growing visibility and impact of the EU on citizens in the 1990s 
increasingly enabled citizens to be less dependent on party cues and to see for 
themselves the policy consequences of European integration. The utilitarian 
argument can certainly be a vector of support for current EU membership and future 
European integration in both the French and British contexts - more so in the former 
- but this vector of support is ultimately demarcated by the subsidiarity principle 
and the type of EU model favoured by French and British individuals. 
In the light of the findings in this thesis concerning the primacy of the utilitarian 
dimension in public opinion and the problem of compatibility between the types of 
European integration models favoured by different national publics, EU policy 
makers need to undertake the daunting task of devising flexible modes of integration 
which satisfy different national publics but also achieve positive outcomes in the 
economic, social and societal sphere. The interaction between these two 
complementary legitimators of European integration is made more complex by the 
nature of the relationship that they entertain with one another. The relationship 
between performance and European integration model type is one of only partial 
compensation between each element, as both are complementary to the legitimacy of 
the EU for national publics. Thus a deficiency in the type of integration model 
followed can be partly offset by performance, and vice versa. The relationship 
between the related criteria of EU legitimacy is also one of partial displacement for 
national public opinion: resolving a legitimacy deficit in one area can displace the 
problem onto another - thus resolving a performance problem by extending the 
EU's scope into adjacent functional areas or increasing the use of majority voting in 
the council of ministers may exacerbate a legitimacy deficit in the type of European 
integration model favoured by national publics. Furthermore, managing the EU 
justification criteria is made even more difficult by the fact that the size of 
membership of the EU entity and the scope of its authority are continually changing. 
The management of these dilemmas requires skilful public policies with national 
populations - rather than intra-European elites - as the addressees of legitimacy 
claims. 
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2- LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1 Introduction and Hypotheses 
The conundrum of whether the European Union (EU) is or will be a real community 
of Europeans, among both proponents and opponents of European integration is 
recurrent nowadays. The existence of such a community is especially significant as 
it conditions the viability and perenniality of the European integration project itself. 
If it is difficult to justify the existence or foundation of this community on the basis 
of a common ethnicity (Smith, 1992) or on the basis of social communication 7 alone 
(Deutsch, 1966; Deutsch et aI., 1967), Howe (1995) contends that community is 
bound by primarily the individual's belief that others are of the same community 
and in this echoes Parsons' proposal (1966) that in a modem liberal society the ideas 
binding a people are increasingly detached from the concrete elements of their lives. 
Howe (1995) points out that the emergent European loyalty comes from the 
instrumental integration, still ongoing,8 and the incremental acquisition of important 
trappings of statehood by conferring rights that define people as Europeans, for 
example the rights to work and reside in other EU countries, the emergent European 
constitution. The instrumental integration is tantamount to the utilitarian EU support 
of the general public demonstrated by Gabel (1998a). 
Howe (1995) acknowledges the fact that the conditions for acceptance by people of 
European integration revolve around the degree of affinity between communities -
reflected in ethnic ways, social mores and political values - and the balance of 
power within the proposed union, the latter being judged more important. For 
European nations, the fear of cultural, economic and political obliteration is 
markedly reduced by the absence ofa hegemon. Lijphart (1977:55-62) has raised 
the same point with respect to plural societies within states: the distribution of power 
and more specifically the absence of a dominant power, can have a decisive 
7 Social communication is here understood as the ability to communicate effectively over a wide 
range of subjects with members of one large group rather than outsiders. 
8 In other words, nations and people participate in the EU project by virtue of their mutual self-
interest. 
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influence on the sense of security of minority groups, this determining ultimately 
their co-operation or intransigence. 
The EU is at an advanced stage of integration and encompasses a myriad of policies, 
from the environmental policy, social policy, agricultural policy, industrial and 
transport policy to economic and monetary union (EMU) and even the embryonic 
foreign policy and home affairs. Yet it seems propitious here to examine how 
citizens determine their attitudes towards European integration and explore how the 
political order and policies of the citizens' member state influence citizens' attitudes 
towards European integration. This chapter shows that amidst a greater visibility, 
politicisation and protest regarding European integration and its policies in the 
1990s, citizens' attitudes towards the European Union are developed in the national 
context, and are more utilitarian. Furthermore it is argued that citizens develop 
values and policy preferences relating to the political order of their own country, 
which will influence their EU attitudes. More specifically citizens draw 
comparisons between the political order and policies of their own country and the 
political order and policies of the European Union. This chapter has informed the 
development of the following hypotheses which will be tested in chapters 5, 6 and 7: 
• Research Question I: Is there a relationship between citizens' support for 
integration (or opposition to integration) and citizens' dissatisfaction with 
national political institutions' performance (or satisfaction with national political 
institutions' performance) in socio-economic, societal and political terms? 
It is hypothesized: 
HI There is an inverse relationship between citizens' levels of satisfaction with 
national political institutions' performance - pertaining to the national economic, 
political, social and societal situation - and citizens' support for European 
integration in France and the United Kingdom (thus, the higher the satisfaction with 
national performance, the lower the support for European integration). 
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• Research Question II: Is there a relationship between citizens' support for 
integration and citizens' individual benefits extracted from European 
integration? 
It is hypothesized in the context of both France and the United Kingdom: 
HII There is a relationship between citizens' support for integration and citizens' 
individual benefits extracted from European integration 
• Research Question III: Do inclinations towards a socio-economic model 
structure EU policy preferences of French and British citizens? 
It is hypothesized: 
HIlI While a preference for 'regulated capitalism' is associated with support for EU 
integration in France, a preference for a 'neo-liberal' socio-economic model is 
associated with opposition to EU integration in the United Kingdom. 
2.2 European Integration: From the Permissive Consensus to its End 
2.2.1 Permissive Consensus and Electoral Connection 
As Slater (1982) implies, national politics matters in the relationship between 
publics, elites and the European community. As an after-effect of the second world 
war, there has been a high affective sentiment of the general public towards western 
European integration from the 1950s which also coincided with a period of strong 
economic growth. This period was marked by a permissive public consensus about 
Europe coinciding with "consociationalism" - in other words consensus politics - of 
the national elites in the building of Europe. From the 1960s, there was however 
less consensus among European Community (EC) elites (between national elites and 
pan-integrationists), an example of which would be the French opposition to the 
United Kingdom's (UK) entry in the EC and the increased use of majority voting at 
the community level. 
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On the side of public opinion, there has been a lack of interest and ignorance about 
the EC from the outset. Thus, many scholars (lnglehart, 1971; Lindberg and 
Scheingold, 1970; Moravcsik, 1991; Stavridis, 1992) have argued that political elites 
have been able to pursue unification because the European public has been generally 
positively predisposed towards integration as EU policies were perceived as too 
technical and had minimal direct impact upon individual citizens. The public 
opinion therefore favoured integration but hardly knew what it was. Even with the 
greater visibility of the Community with time, that is to say with more European 
policies, the institutional structure of the Community - especially the increasing 
importance of the Council and defence of national interests - has continued to 
orientate the public to expect results from their national governments, this may have 
contributed to less public interest for the community. 
Religion as Support olEU integration 
Nelsen et al. (2001) found that religious identity and commitment9 affect EU 
support. Running regression analyses with Eurobarometer data from the 1970s 
through to the 1990s 10, they found that catholics have been far stronger supporters of 
European integration than protestants, especially nominal (attend church once a year 
or never) and conventional (attend church a few times a year) adherents, and that the 
devout (attend church once a week or more) in both religious traditions have been 
more in favour of the integration process than have nominal adherents. This is 
explained by the fact that the clergy in both denominations is more pro-European. 
The effects of religion appear to survive both longitudinal and intensive cross-
sectional analyses incorporating alternative explanations for support for the EU, that 
is to say religion works in concert with other influences such as political 
engagement (knowledge and interest), partisanship, ideology, post-materialism, and 
socio-demographic variables. This finding may be important for France and the 
United Kingdom, in the sense that France is predominantly a catholic country and 
9 Church attendance being considered as a strong indicator of religiosity (Jagodzinski and 
Dobbelaere, 1995). 
10 More specifically Eurobarometer data from the following years: 1973, 1978, 1989-1992, 1994 and 
1998. 
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the United Kingdom a protestant country, and as such religious attachment of each 
nation can partly explain their respective attachment to European integration. 
Although Christianity may be "dramatically universalist" (Tinder, 1989:233), 16th 
century events still shape the way protestants conceive of Christian unity. The 
struggle against roman spiritual and political hegemony fostered the reformation's 
reliance on the nation state, created a distrust of international Catholicism and 
encouraged a link in the protestant mind between national sovereignty and true 
religion. Fogerty (1957) and Haas (1958) asserted that European integration in the 
1950s was largely a Christian Democratic project led by devout catholics such as 
Konrad Adenauer, Robert Schuman and Alcide de Gasperi while more recently 
devout catholics such as EU Commission President Romano Prodi (Balzan, 1999), 
Portuguese Prime Minister Antonio Guterres (The Economist, 1999) and former 
German Chancellor Helmut Kohl (Schlaes, 1997) have supported further European 
integration. It must be noted that religious sentiment, in particular catholic 
sentiment, in Europe is today slowly declining (Jagodzinski & Dobbelaere, 1995) as 
is its political and social role (Leroy & Lyman, 1995) and as such may erode the 
Europeanist sentiment of citizens. It must be noted that Eurobarometer semi-annual 
surveys have ceased to collect data on the religious belonging and practice of 
European citizens inter alia to take account of the decline of religion in Europe. 
However other factors such as the utilitarian perspective as discussed later in the 
literature review, may also be used by citizens as a justification for support for 
further integration and this increasingly in the future considering the decline of the 
catholic religion among citizens. 
Electoral Connection Theory 
Using 1989 European Election studies,11 it has been found that political parties tend 
to embrace positions on EU integration in line with the average position of their 
voters (Van der Eijk and Franklin, 1991). There were however some discrepancies 
between MSI (Italy), PCF (France), Regenboog (Green-Left alliance in the 
II European Election studies are surveys of voters and of party elite/candidates carried out at election 
time, just after the European Parliament election. 
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Netherlands), FN (France) and their electorates, the latter displaying more pro-
European positions. 
Echoing Van Der Eijk and Franklin's (1991) results, using European Election 
Studies of 1979 and 1994 and relying on the responsible party model, Schmitt and 
Thomassen (2000) showed that on the grand direction of EU policies (easy 
issue/policy ends), party voters and party elites share similar views on the question 
of more or less integration (strong correlations of 0.83 (for 1979) and 0.84 (for 
1994) were reached). Party voters were found a little less integrationist than party 
elites as they are also a little less on the left than party elites. This contrasts with 
policy means (specific EU policies) where voters are less in agreement (correlations 
of 0.50 according to specific policies) with party elites because they are not as well 
informed and knowledgeable about the likely consequences of a particular EU 
policy - for instance Economic and Monetary Union, Open Borders - they are thus 
more insecure about change of the status quo. Using elites' and voters' views on the 
European integration dimension in 1979 and 1994, concurrent observations at the 
other level are the best predictor: for instance elites' integrationist views in 1994 are 
associated with voters' integrationist views in 1994 and vice-versa. On the left-right 
dimension, the determinants of voters' views in 1994 are the previous elite positions 
(here 1979); in other words left-right orientations of voters are shaped not by current 
but former elite positions. The implication of this finding is that voters are more 
likely to learn their party's left-right position at some earlier point, in a politically 
formative phase (socialization effect). With regard to integrationist views, using 
standardized regression estimates, it was found that voters seem to have a somewhat 
stronger impact on party elites than vice-versa (that is to say 0.51 against 0.21), 
reflecting in this the work of Carruba (2001) around election time. 
The critique that one can formulate about these results is that the surveys used - that 
is to say European election studies - are carried out around election time, just after 
the European Parliament (EP) elections, political parties thus adapting their 
manifestoes (in EP elections) to voters' views as they are afraid of sanction votes. 
This being said, in national elections, inexplicably, voters' views are explained by 
former (not current) party elite views. The responsible party model is used as the 
framework for Schmitt and Thomassen's (2000) research. Schmitt and Thomassen's 
21 
(2000:319) writes "this model assumes that competitive and cohesive parties exist; 
that voters have policy preferences and perceive the policy options on offer 
correctly; and that voters in the end base their electoral choice on these preferences. 
If these conditions are met, the process of political representation should result in a 
close match between the preferences of party voters and the policies of parties". 
These assumptions are perhaps partly unrealistic, especially if two elements are 
taken into consideration: party euroscepticism is at the periphery of politics, at least 
in France; and the lack of knowledge of voters on EU handicaps their interpretation 
of what is on offer. 
Some researchers (Slater, 1983; Niedermayer and Sinnott, 1995), echoing studies on 
American public opinion on foreign policy issues (Rosenau, 1961; Converse, 1964; 
Neuman, 1986) have found that citizens lack interest in and a sophisticated 
knowledge of the integration process, which suggests that public opinion regarding 
integration is superficial and transitory. However individual citizens use readily 
available informational cues and short-cuts from their social and political 
environment to infer their own policy preferences (Conover and Feldman, 1989; 
Popkin, 1991; Kuklinski and Heariy, 1994; Huckfeldt et aI., 1995; McKuen et aI., 
1989; Page and Shapiro, 1992 and Erikson et aI., 2002). The mass media, 
politicians and interest groups supply the public with cheap information by 
condensing complicated political information into simple and easily understood 
messages. Given that the media and national elites generally focus on the national 
implications of issues and more specifically on the benefits and costs of integration, 
national public support for integration may vary with national differences in the 
value of European integration - the research of Gabel and Palmer (1995) shows this. 
As hypothesized later in the literature review, this also means that if the media and 
political elites are reticent towards integration for economic and social reasons, the 
public may also be more sceptical about the EU: the UK may be an example of this. 
Using Eurobarometer data from 1977 to 1992 and party manifesto data,12 Carruba 
(2001) found that Stimson's (1991) "policy mood" theory applies to European 
integration, that is to say there is an electoral connection between political elites and 
I~ Party manifesto data was measured by the percentage of pro-European statements minus the 
percentage of anti-European statements in election year. 
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public opinion on European integration issues, the former conforming close enough 
to public preferences - although the strongest determinant of party position is short 
term economic impact (exports/imports per industry weighted by the fraction of the 
given nation's employment in that sector) and relative EU budget transfers. It must 
be noted that on average the political elites are found to be more pro-European than 
public opinion. The elites, while respecting the electoral constraint, use the slack 
available to promote integration. 
Wessels (1995) using party platform positions and a number of survey measures 
(such as EC membership and European unification questions) over the period from 
1973 to 1991, also found an electoral connection at election time although position 
of party on European integration can influence party supporters' view on it when 
mobilizing their supporters. However Wessels (1995) problematically relies upon 
lags - party supporters' evaluation of membership and of European unification was 
just considered nine months before election, and three months before and after the 
election - to show the possibility of reverse causation, that is to say political party 
influencing public opinion's position on integration. This is known as cue taking 
theory (political elites shape weakly held preferences through their policy positions). 
However if cue-taking is occurring, previous election platforms would contaminate 
the findings for the current period. This stresses the importance of political parties' 
mobilizing their supporters at election time and beyond as a vector of support for 
European integration as EU issues are generally not high on the list of priorities of 
citizens although, if there is a belief that national economic and social issues can be 
helped by European integration, it is hypothesized that citizens' support will happen. 
The weakness ofCarruba's (2001) study is that the study was done until 1992. Yet 
1992 with the Maastricht Treaty marks the end of the permissive consensus. This 
raises questions: did the political elites stop paying attention to post 1992 popular 
preferences? If so, why would they do this when public interest was high? Or, did 
the increasing salience of EU policy after 1992 reduce the slack in electoral 
constraint, and did the elites simply not compensate adequately for that fact? Was 
European integration, as pursued, tantamount to a politically correct project which 
was increasingly distant from citizens' aspirations? 
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2.2.2 End ofPennissive Consensus and Pro-European Stance of Party Elites 
The politicisation of the completion of the single European market in 1993 and the 
project of economic and monetary union in 1992, both with direct economic and 
social implications on electorates' lives, aroused the interests, concerns or 
enthusiasm of the political world, socio-economic circles and the civil society. This 
politicisation of the European integration issue coincided with a generally poor 
socio-economic situation in Europe. The Maastricht Treaty was subject to 
ratification votes in a number of member states. The ratification process was 
directly submitted to the electorates via a referendum in some countries like Ireland, 
Denmark and France or submitted to a parliament vote in countries like the United 
Kingdom and Gennany. The Maastricht Treaty was advertised quite broadly in 
member states and was the source of divisions within and between political parties 
and industrial circles. The domestic political situation also inspired these divisions. 
The ratification itself by referendum was difficult in countries like France which 
narrowly ratified the Treaty or Denmark which first refused the ratification, only to 
ratify it later under a different fonnat. The ratification process was also difficult in 
countries such as the United Kingdom, which ratified the Treaty via the 
parliamentary route. The United Kingdom, where the government at the time was 
headed by John Major, had subjected the ratification of the related Treaty to a vote 
of confidence in order to secure a positive vote. 
These divisions left durable marks on political parties but also on the electorates 
towards the European integration process. Thus Aspinwall (2002) has shown that 
public opinion except for foreign policy did not account very much for the position 
of national governments on ED matters at the 1997 intergovernmental conference on 
the future of the EU. Public opinion came well behind party preference and party 
ideology. Party preferences (on EU integration) appeared as the first detenninant 
with ideology as the second detenninant of government preferences. Public opinion 
seemed only to influence governmental preferences on integration for foreign policy 
and defence because of historical and cultural theories of preference formation. The 
national experience is salient here. In the other domains, public opinion seemed to 
have little influence on governmental preferences on integration, this state of fact 
24 
may be linked to the fact that the electorate is uninterested in and uninformed about 
community affairs and thus follow the lead of their preferred party as suggested in 
the British case (Nugent, 1992). Wessels (1995) also suggests that parties are 
responsible for mobilizing the support of their constituencies on European 
integration. 
The use of datasets collected at different times is though moreover a methodological 
weakness in Aspinwall's (2002) research. For public opinion data, Aspinwall 
(2002) used 1997 Eurobarometer survey, for party preference data he relied on 
Ray's (1999) expert survey of level of party support for integration carried out to 
1996 and finally for party ideology Huber and Inglehart's (1995) expert survey 
placing parties in Left-Right space carried out in 1993 was utilized. 
The Dimensionality of the EU Policy Space eclipsing the Independence-Integration 
issue 
Using manifesto studies between 1979 and 1994, Hix (1999a, 1999b) identified two 
salient dimensions within the EU to explain party position, namely left-right 
positioning on socio-economic issues and independence and integration. 
Nevertheless Hix (1999a, 1999b) has shown that since the early 1990s in the wake 
of Maastricht, the main European political parties, that is to say PES (socialists), 
EPP (Christian Democrats) and ELDR (liberals), do not compete on the integration-
independence dimension. Thus they all, especially the socialists, have moved to 
adopt a pro-European stance. There has been a will from these parties to stabilize 
the system and safeguard acquired party groups' positions although there are 
differences between party elites and party members regarding European integration 
VIews. 
The core of EU politics is a triangular party system where Liberals (ELDR) and 
Christian Democrats (EPP) are differentiated on the libertarian-authoritarian 
dimension with the former focusing on democracy issues and the latter on moral 
issues; and Liberals (ELDR), Christian Democrats (EPP) and Socialists (PES) divide 
on intervention and free market issues. Conservatives, especially the British 
Conservatives, stood further to the right and were preoccupied with independence 
issues. Therefore, in the European political space, alliances between two or more 
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political groups materialize depending on the issue and the salience of the particular 
Issue. 
To echo this, Attina (1990), Kreppel (2000), Noury (2002) and Kreppel and Tsebelis 
(1999) have shown a high level of political group cohesion with European 
Parliament members voting according to ideology - that is to say party group 
membership - and not according to nationality. Aspinwall (2002) echoed this and 
found, using expert surveys - relying on Ray's (1999) data for party preferences and 
Huber and Inglehart's (1995) data for ideology - that left-right ideology is a better 
predictor than nationality of party views on integration. Thus as (party) ideology 
goes away from the political centre, party views become more eurosceptic. There 
were though small differences between left and right but a move to the left was 
found to be more anti-European than a move to the right. 
However Ray (1999) in an expert survey of party positions confirmed that parties on 
average, became increasingly pro-European over the period 1984-1996 but also 
showed the salience of the issue as well as underlined the existence of intra-party 
divisions. Hix et al. (1999) have shown through an analysis of roll-call votes that 
both the left-right and the pro-/anti-Europe dimensions are salient in EU politics but 
that the voting behaviour in the European Parliament is structured more by the first 
dimension. The location of parties on the traditional left-right dimension is 
primarily defined by redistributive socio-economic issues rather than by regulatory 
and European issues. 
However Pennings (2002), through a thematic content analysis of national party and 
European party groups' manifestos at the 1999 European Parliament elections, 
disagreed with Hix (1999a) and argued that the EU policy space varies on more 
dimensions than the left-right and independence-integration dimensions, advancing 
for example the ethical and environmental issues. He also found significant 
programmatic differences between and within European party groups. Thus, the 
Christian Democrats (EPP), being a mixture of centre and right political parties, 
divided on social conservatism and social service expansion; the liberals (ELDR) are 
not homogeneous over the democracy issue; the socialists (PES) appear more 
cohesive than the Christian Democrats (EPP) but the differences tend to be small 
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while social conservatism - including law and order and social hannony - is a 
source of division within the Socialists (PES), the Christian democrats (EPP) and the 
Liberals (ELDR). To deal with these divisions, a middle-of-the-road policy is 
pursued by each European party group and its individual common platfonn. The 
three most centrist party groups show significant differences between their election 
manifestos, especially on social conservatism and democracy issue, accounting for 
13.1 % of variance (tested with factor analysis) and 12.8% respectively. 
The literature presents somewhat contradictory views on party group cohesiveness 
relying on three types of cohesiveness, namely organisational cohesiveness (expert 
opinions), voting cohesiveness and programmatic cohesiveness. The degree of 
cohesiveness of one and the same party can differ depending on the type selected 
although the three main European political groups do not appear to compete on the 
integration-independence dimension. As discussed later in the literature review, the 
lack of competition between the mainstream parties on this dimension is reflected in 
the national arena of member states such as France and the United Kingdom 
although for the latter the Conservatives have embraced a more eurosceptic stance 
on European integration since 1997 compared to the Labour Party - the latter tries to 
avoid exposure on this issue fearing internal divisions and unpopularity and focuses 
rather on domestic issues. 
2.3 Increased Salience of EU Issue and Policies 
For the past fifty years, the European Union and its predecessors have helped to 
shape the politics of constituent countries. In the era following the Single European 
Act and the Maastricht Treaty, the EU has been altered into a multilevel polity in 
which European issues have become important not just for the member states' 
governments but also for political parties, political groups, interest groups and 
citizens within those states. The EU has become a more openly contested arena for 
political parties, interest groups and social movements (Hooghe and Marks, 1999; 
Imig and Tarrow, 2001; Marks et aI., 1996). Domestic contestation to trade 
negotiation is driven by sectoral economic interest. Thus Moravcsik (1998) argues 
at length that government policy on European integration mainly amounts to the 
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efforts of producer groups - employers in import and export competing sectors - to 
achieve advantageous trade policies. European integration can also be viewed as an 
extension of domestic politics. In other words, domestic politics influences and is 
influenced by European integration. Traditionally for foreign policy issues, there is 
more freedom of action granted to governments as voters have no clear preferences 
but relations between the EU and its member states are fast ceasing to be seen by 
citizens as low salience foreign policy matters (Van Der Eijk and Franklin, 2002). 
2.3.1 Cognitive Mobilization Surpassed 
Research on public opinion in the USA found that the dynamics of attitude 
formation are different for particular sections of the population (Zaller, 1992; 
Sniderman, 1993, p.224; Knight, 1985 and Stimson, 1975). The constraints on 
citizens' choices over particular issues, for example self-interest, ideology and 
values, affect citizens' political judgments differently depending on their political 
awareness, cognitive skills and information. Cognitive mobilization refers to a 
citizen's ability to process information at a high level of abstraction relying on a 
high level of political awareness and well developed skills in political 
communication (Inglehart et aI., 1991; Hewstone, 1986; Inglehart, 1970a; Inglehart, 
1970b). It is tantamount to the ability to understand the abstract process of EU 
integration, associated with people with a higher level of education and more well 
informed about the EU (lnglehart, 1970a; Inglehart, and Reif, 1991 ; Janssen, 1991). 
As cognitive mobilization increases, the European Union and the topic of integration 
become more familiar and less threatening (lnglehart et aI., 1991; Janssen, 1991) and 
as a result, support for integration increases. Inglehart et aI. (1991) even argued that 
cognitive mobilization could account for the evidence in support of the human 
capital and income hypotheses: in other words, those with higher status occupations 
and incomes tend to be better educated, better informed about politics and more 
politically active than the rest of their compatriots. Gabel (1998a) - using the 
questions frequency of political discussion (highest integration support found for 
"occasionally" answer), frequency of persuasion (highest integration support found 
for "rarely" response) and the EU membership variable as the dependent variable as 
in studies done before - refuted the cognitive mobilization theory by finding that 
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cognitive mobilization is related to integration support in a curvilinear manner, as 
citizens with the highest level of cognitive mobilization express relatively low 
utilitarian support. 
Hix (1999b) found that education, age and infonnation about the EU are indicators 
of support for the EU, especially the latter (stronger than the other two). Higher 
level of education and infonnation about the EU increased support for the EU until 
1992. Then in 1992, utilitarian interests became stronger detenninants of support 
for integration in the 1990s, perhaps because of the onset of recession and the 
concomitant decline in post material values. Furthennore policies such as the 
completion of the single European market in 1993 and the monetarization of the 
Euro have made European integration more visible to citizens, a European 
integration initially involving negative activities of removing tangible barriers to 
trade and involving, in the 1990s (up to today) the construction of joint policies in 
ever salient areas. Citizens can thus perceive some of the concrete social, political 
and economic consequences of these policies on their life and on the national social, 
economic and political situation. Although knowledge about European integration 
varies from one citizen to another one but also from one member state to another 
one,13 citizens tend to take cues and short-cuts from political actors, media and self-
involvement communities (for example workplaces) in the member state where they 
reside. These consequences are often instrumentalized by political parties and 
media to convince citizens to support a particular stance on European integration. 
The Stability Pact pertaining to EMU influences for example the management of 
social and welfare policies of member states through the limitation of public deficits. 
Thus the refusal to adopt the Euro by the Swedish electorate by referendum in 2003 
was partly motivated by the fear (instrumentalized by the Swedish Social 
Democratic Party to entice a "no" vote to the Euro) that EMU would jeopardize the 
generous social policies followed by Sweden's successive governments (The Times, 
15 September 2003). This reason along with the fear of loss of national sovereignty, 
national identity and cultural identity, also motivated the Danish refusal to adopt the 
euro in 2000 (Buch and Hansen, 2002). 
13 The Danish electorate has been found to have the best developed views on European integration 
(Van Der Eijk and Franklin, 2002). 
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The increased visibility of European policies together with its accrued politicisation 
in countries such as France, Denmark and the United Kingdom has made the 
European issues more salient although especially at election time for national and 
European elections, there is a tendency of mainstream political parties especially in 
the case of France and the United Kingdom to circumvent the European issues to 
focus on domestic issues to avoid divisions both within political parties and in the 
sympathizing electorates (Van Der Eijk and Franklin, 1996). The focus on domestic 
issues at European elections can also be interpreted as a lack of saliency and will be 
discussed later in the literature review. Furthermore the influence of parties on their 
supporters can be to this extent important. Political parties can influence their 
supporters for low saliency issues in the short-term and can also do so for high 
saliency issues in the long term but this depends on the endurance of citizens' 
preferences (Franklin, 2002; Swenson, 2002). 
The saliency issue is also linked to whether the verdict at referendums on European 
integration, as in the case of Denmark, is contaminated by domestic issues such as 
the popularity of incumbent governments proposing the referendum (Franklin, 
Marsh and McLaren, 1994; Franklin, Marsh and Wlezien, 1994; Franklin, Van Der 
Eijk and Marsh, 1995). Svensson (2002) contested the notion of such 
contamination. Voting at national elections also has an impact on European 
integration in so far as national representatives participate in European councils,14 
and the electorates may be conscious of this. Thus three studies by Evans (1998a; 
1999a and 1999b) demonstrated that voters' perceptions of the Conservative Party's 
position on European integration influenced its electoral support during the 1990s. 
Evans (1998a; 1999a) showed that voters' perceptions of the Tories' 
mismanagement of the exchange rate mechanism (ERM) crisis hurt the Tories' 
electoral support. Evans' (1998a; 1999b) and Scheve's (1999) studies indicated that 
EU issues even serve as a new electoral cleavage in the United Kingdom and France. 
Evans (1998a; 1999b) demonstrated that at the 1997 British national elections, 
voters' positions on the EU were independent of the traditional determinants of vote 
14 The EU has a triumvirate for EU decisions, which consists of the Council, the European 
Parliament and the European Commission. 
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choice, namely the left and right dimension, and that voters' support for EU 
membership influenced their vote choice in national elections. 
Scheve (1999) showed that at the 1997 British general election and 1995 French 
presidential election vote choice depended on the proximity of a party's position on 
EMU to that of the voter, independently of the left-right dimension. In the French 
case, this issue was responsible for the success of the Front National and other small 
parties in the first round of the elections. Clark and Hallerberg (2000) and Della 
Sala (1997) moreover described how with a quasi-fixed exchange rates system (such 
as ERM) and fixed exchange rates system (such as EMU), national governments 
forfeit control of their monetary policy. These systems and their implications have 
been publicized in the media and the electoral results seem to indicate that the 
electorates have taken these into account when voting. Furthermore in a study based 
on 1996 Mega-survey Eurobarometer data, Gabel (2000) found that citizens' support 
for EU membership has an effect on party choice at the next general election 
controlling for left/right positioning in France as in most other EU member states 
except the United Kingdom. The main limitation of the related study is that it was 
only done at one point in time. 
2.3.2 Saliency of the European Domain and Public Responsiveness to Policy 
Change 
Franklin and Wlezien (1997) have found, in their study of Eurobarometer data from 
1971 to 1994, that with the advancement of integration, citizens are more responsive 
to policy. In other words as the salience of the European domain has increased, 
public responsiveness to policy has followed. Citizens have adjusted their relative 
preference for European policy according to their preferred level of policy and 
European policy itself. Therefore the salience of the policy domain will also act on 
the citizens' preferred level of policy and by extension on their relative preference 
for European policy. The announcement of the creation of a single European market 
and the launch of a single currency can have an effect on public opinion before they 
are actually implemented. The immediacy of the public's response tho policy 
change is quite striking though it has been found in other domains (Wlezien, 1995; 
1996). Thus, in the United States, it was shown that decisions to increase or reduce 
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public spending in salient areas have measurable effects on public opinion over the 
course of the policy-making process itself long before the actual expenditure is 
increased or is reduced (Wlezien, 1996). However the methodology used by 
Franklin and Wlezien (1997) has important weaknesses in the sense that the 
European policy variable is measured in quantitative terms and not in qualitative 
terms - the end of the period studied though coincides with two important events in 
European integration - the salience of the EU issue is thus assimilated with time. 
Furthermore the unification variable used in the related research, is perhaps not the 
best measure of public preference for greater or lesser degree of unification as it is 
also a measure of preferred form of unification. 
Protests in the streets about European integration are also an element of salience of 
EU policies. Although protests involving domestic issues and policies represent still 
the large majority of protests, there has been a growing share - superior to 5% - of 
protests involving the EU, European issues and policies from 1984 to 1997, these 
protests having especially increased since the Maastricht Treaty (Imig, 2002). This 
5% figure is probably an underestimate in so far as Imig (2002), in his research, 
chose a conservative operationalisation of European protest in which a media report 
had to link - within the first sentence - a protest with the EU. It is also suggested 
that actors still think in national terms as claims are often made against national 
domestic targets although national institutions may be directly or indirectly 
influenced by the policies followed by the EU. 
Imig (2002) also shows that the largest proportion of contentious politics 
surrounding European integration involves occupational groups, farmers and 
workers in particular. For a discussion of the growing euroscepticism of French 
farmers in the 1990s, please see Thompson (2003). Furthermore there is a clustering 
of European protests around left political causes and in opposition to the European 
integration project which suggests that in the eyes of those groups which are 
launching direct action, further European integration is relevant in so far as it 
influences domestic and economic life. People have fought to protect their jobs and 
families against restructuring that they fear will threaten their way of life. The 
dispute here is perhaps limited to social movements and therefore influence its 
members and sympathisers but is also of a nature to influence citizens in general as 
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these protests are well publicized. Citizens are more prone to be attentive to 
information which may affect their livelihood. 
Furthermore the saliency of the EU, for national governments - more especially in 
the case of the United Kingdom and France - is reflected by the fact that they each 
have a centralized national EU policy unit, which coordinates their responses to the 
EU (Lequesne, 1993, 1996; Harmsen, 1996; Wright, 1996). Cole and Drake (2000) 
have even emphasized the increased Europeanization of the French polity, especially 
in the second period of the 1990s. Ladrech (1994:70) defined Europeanization as 
"an incremental process reorienting the direction and shape of politics to the degree 
that EC political and economic dynamics become part of the organisational logic of 
national politics and policy-making". Jospin's government was willing to trade 
subsidiarity for sovereignty and thus refused to isolate Europeanization from a 
broader domestic agenda of reforms. Europeanization under Jospin's government 
took the form of an independent variable - inflicting change in policy areas such as 
the opening of the telecommunications, air transport and energy markets - and 
represented a source of emulative policy transfer and learning such as EMU 
permitting it to copy the German monetary policy management (Cole and Drake, 
2000). Nevertheless Jospin suspected the European central bank ofneo-liberalism 
and tried to counterbalance it with employment programmes. There were also, at 
times, attempts by both the plural left and the political opposition led by Chirac to 
shift the blame for unpopular decisions on to Brussels, for example for the high 
VAT rate for restaurant services. The Europeanization of the French polity can echo 
a salience of the European domain for citizens as they are induced to see the 
relevance of European integration on the management of the political, economic and 
social spheres and thus the effects on their lives. 
2.4 Primacy of the National Perspective over EU Issues and Policies 
2.4.1 Domestic Politics Matter in European Elections and Referendums about 
European Integration 
In a Eurobarometer aggregate level study from 1973 to 1997, Christin and Hug 
(2002) found that constitutional provisions for referendums, as in Ireland and 
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Denmark, led to citizens being more supportive of European integration. They 
argued that voters should be more satisfied with policy outcomes if a referendum is 
allowed - in the case of required referendums or non-required referendums initiated 
by political opposition - until the next treaty. The rationale behind this is that when 
a government has to submit a European treaty to popular vote - referendum - it 
provides a ratification constraint to government (Putnam, 1988) and provides more 
bargaining power to government (Schneider and Cederman, 1994; Milner, 1997). 
Christin and Hug's (2002) result echoes the research of Gerber (1996, 1999) - for 
referendums on parental notification laws for teenage abortions and the death 
penalty - which found that referendums lead to policies closer to the voters' 
preferred policy. Similarly Christin and Hug (2002) results suggested that voters 
more strongly support European integration immediately after a referendum vote: 
they thus found positive results for the United Kingdom's 1975 referendum, and the 
Danish 1986 and 1992 referendums. These results echo Dalton and Duval's (1986) 
research, which found a link between public events - more specifically for UK 
accession referendum and the 1979 European elections - and support for European 
integration although the effect decreases month after month after the impact. 
Eichenberg and Dalton (1993) and Gabel and Palmer (1995) also found that 
referendums in the UK (1975), Denmark (1986) and Ireland (1987) and the 1979 
European elections lead to more support for European integration. 
The limitations to Christin and Hug's (2002) research are that they rely on scant 
empirical evidence and that policies decided on in a referendum are assumed to be 
represented solely in one-dimensional space by voters. It is though likely that 
Treaties on European integration are perceived by voters in more than one 
dimension and include elements that only remotely relate to the content of the treaty. 
Several studies reported that opinions toward European integration correlate with 
partisan allegiance. Left/centre/right ideology and party loyalists are found to vote 
in accordance with the party position (Hug & Sciarini, 2000; Gallagher, 1996; Pierce 
et aI., 1983), including voting at referendums. However many voters have been 
found to ignore the position of their political party over integration issues, division 
within political parties - in the case of factions - helping to explain this (Svensson, 
1984). 
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In addition to partisanship, recent research has focused on incumbent popularity and 
voter assessment of government performance as a relevant variable influencing 
public support for European integration (Franklin, Marsh and McLaren, 1994, 1995; 
Franklin, Van Der Eijk and Marsh, 1995). The latter study concerned the Maastricht 
Treaty referendum rejection in Denmark, which reflected rejection of incumbent 
government rather than independent judgment of the electorate on integration issues. 
The mass tends to be uninformed & disinterested to form independent opinions on 
integration issues and shows a willingness to endorse the elite-driven integration 
project dependent on trust vested in them. Hug & Sciarini (2000) in their analysis of 
European integration referendums suggest however that this relationship depends on 
the institutional context and is stronger if the referendum is binding and is initiated 
by government. 
Franklin, Marsh and McLaren (1994) argued that referenda are fought for partisan 
advantage. The preoccupations of national parties being their prospects at 
forthcoming national elections, they tend to leave governments to push for 
ratification of European treaties, this turning the treaty ratification into a contest of 
popularity of governments and other heads of state. In the cases of France, Ireland 
and Denmark, referenda over the Maastricht Treaty further illustrated this. 
Mainstream national parties were divided into factions over European issues, so they 
tended to avoid discussing them in public and shifted to short term national issues 
rather than long term European considerations. Consequently the 1992 French 
referendum was nearly rejected, partly due to unpopularity of Francois Mitterrand, 
while Ireland found a majority to ratify the Treaty on European Union partly 
because of the popularity of its government and the first Danish one (in 1992) was 
rejected because of the Danish government's unpopularity (Van Der Eijk and 
Franklin, 1996). It would be though misleading to discount completely the 
electorates' suspicions or preferences towards or against the Treaty on European 
Union. 
Svensson (2002) objected to the characterisation of Danish voters made by Franklin 
and others who expounded the thesis that on issues of low salience, referendum 
votes tend to follow party lines. He found evidence that the Maastricht Treaty was 
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an issue of high salience to Danish voters - implying that they have a well-
developed opinion about European integration - who have decided on the issue 
alone at successive referendums and therefore ignored any role for the popularity or 
lack of popularity of governments in the referenda result. Franklin (2002), 
following Svensson's critiques, refined his position and contended that the extent to 
which the verdict rendered by a referendum called by the government is 
contaminated by the government standing depends on: 
1. The extent to which voters bring to bear deep-seated knowledge and enduring 
preferences. 
2. The extent to which non-government parties are united in opposition to 
government's position on the referendum proposal. 
3. The closeness of the political balance of forces on the question at issue: in the 
case of a close fought contest, the contamination of the result is likely. 
It must be noted that the British ratification of the Treaty on the European Union via 
the parliament in 1993 was also subject to the influence of the domestic political 
process with most Labour Members of Parliament although in favour of the Treaty 
voting against, leaving the Conservative government to obtain virtual unanimity 
(within the Conservative parliamentary ranks) in favour of the Treaty15 (Franklin 
and Curtice, 1996). What must be kept in mind is that in referenda, the government 
has a specific role in putting a referendum before the people and/or making public 
recommendations on how to vote, and this action itself can increase the probabilities 
that voters see these as opportunities to support or oppose the incumbent 
government. Schneider and Weitsman (1996) called this the punishment trap. 
Lately, the 2005 referendums on the EU constitution in Spain, Luxembourg, France 
and the Netherlands exemplified this. Government parties are eventually crucial in 
securing a majority in favour of EU Treaty revisions as significant proportions of 
opposition party supporters go to the "No" side whether mainstream opposition 
parties' leaderships campaign in favour or against the EU Treaty. While the Spanish 
and Luxembourg government parties succeeded in mobilizing the majority on which 
15 Prime Minister Major only secured a positive vote for the related Treaty by subjecting it to a vote 
of confidence in his government. 
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they had come to power and won the referendum, the French and Dutch government 
parties failed to do so and lost the referendum (Crum, 2007). 
European Elections and Domestic Concerns 
If the results of referendums on European Integration can be as much linked to 
support for national governments as to support for the EU (Franklin et ai., 1994, 
1995), evidence has also been offered that European Parliament elections are second 
order elections in which voters express domestic concerns (Reif and Schmitt, 1980; 
Van Der Eijk and Franklin, 1991, 1996), and that national concerns remain 
important elements in individual citizens' evaluations of the EU (Gabel & Palmer, 
1995; Anderson, 1995; Anderson & Kaltenthaler, 1996). Lancelot (1986) 
summarized the conditions in which voters participate more actively in elections 
when they perceive the political utility of their vote, which presupposes: 
1. that the problems appear important to them. 
2. that they have the possibility of choosing among several options. 
3. that political competition influences the designation and orientation of political 
power. 
When viewed in this manner, European elections represent the least favourable 
conditions for participation because Europe's problems are not at all or very little 
known or understood and thus cannot be perhaps perceived as important. The 
complexity of European institutions and the lack of understanding of the functions 
of the parliament may not give the electorate the impression that they are bestowing 
any form of power on those they elect. 
European elections are perhaps not really European themselves as the processes they 
display are national political processes (Van Der Eijk and Franklin, 1996). Thus 
they play no role in deciding who governs the country (Reif, 1985) although the 
European Parliament has currently more power than it used to have before the 
1990s. The same party system animates them with generally the same political 
parties although there are some exceptions such as in Denmark where some parties 
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proposed European policies and only competed in European elections. The 
concerns, which are appropriate to national elections, will affect behaviour in 
European elections - incumbent national government parties usually suffer losses 
due to public disapproval of government performance - and they are generally seen 
by the electorate as a means to give an electoral warning to the main parties (Reif, 
1985; Van Der Eijk and Franklin, 1996). 
This may partly explain why small parties often do better in European elections than 
in national elections. It is thus interesting to note that in the European elections of 
1989, 1994, 1999 and 2004, in France, more radical parties in the political periphery 
have done well: Front National in 1989, 1994 and 2004, Philippe De Villiers's 
Mouvement Pour La France in 1994, 1999 (the latter election was fought along side 
Charles Pasqua) and 2004 often campaigning on national issues (Ysmal and Cayrol, 
1996; Benoit, 1997; Grundberg et aI., 2000; Mellows-Facer et aI., 2004). The 
electoral system in place - proportional representation system - favours the 
representation of small parties as the voter is liberated from strategic constraints -
the so called useful vote - and the influence of local leaders. It is thus revealing that 
in the 1989 European elections more people voted for the Front National than if it 
was a general national election (Ysmal and Cayrol, 1996). In the context of the 
United Kingdom, the Greens did well in 1989 and the UK Independence Party in 
1999 and 2004 but it is the main opposition party to the government of the day 
which have done especially well- Labour in 1989 and 1994, Conservatives in 1999 
and to a lesser extent 2004 (Butler and Westlake, 2000; Mellows-Facer et aI., 2004). 
European Parliament elections serve as a marker and can even change the dynamics 
of future national elections: thus if European Parliament elections are before and 
close to national elections and if governing parties attract fewer votes than expected 
in European Parliament elections, governing parties will also attract less votes at 
subsequent national elections (Gabel, 2000). 
In most countries European elections are not fought on European issues because 
most mainstream parties within EU member states agree that European unification is 
beneficial to their country and therefore wish to de-politicize the European issue. 
This attitude is also motivated by the fear of the parties' leadership to expose the 
divisions within the related parties. It is thus symptomatic that the single currency 
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was little or not at all discussed in the political campaigns pertaining to the 1994 
European elections, this despite the fact that it was often one of the first 
opportunities post Maastricht Treaty for the electorate to give an opinion on this 
issue of significant importance for the member states (Van Der Eijk and Franklin, 
1996). In the case of the United Kingdom, uncharacteristically European issues 
played a role in the 1989 European elections. This was so because the European 
issue - more specifically the Social Charter - identified with an existing traditional 
national issue of division between the Labour Party and the Conservative Party, that 
is to say the role of government in guaranteeing social conditions for all. It is also 
an issue, which was perceived by the electorate as having a direct influence on their 
life. It must be noted that economic concerns of people, lack of popularity of the 
incumbent government, the politicised division of the Conservatives on the Social 
Charter and concern for the environment also played a role in the related elections 
(Franklin and Curtice, 1996). 
Another political determinant of integration support is the degree of domestic 
opposition and support for democratic capitalism. Gabel (1998) used the variables 
pro-stabiliti 6 and threat to stability!7 to test this at the aggregate level. He found 
that there were no significant differences in integration support between supporters 
and opponents of democratic capitalism when the threat to democratic capitalism is 
zero. However among the supporters of democratic capitalism, the level of 
utilitarian support for integration is positively related to the level of public threat to 
democratic capitalism in their nation at that time if these parties that oppose 
democratic capitalism represent a minority of the electorate. 
Ray (2003a) found that the relationship between incumbent support and pro-
European Union attitudes is a conditional one, which appears primarily when 
referendums are held on European topics or during European Parliament election 
years. At other times, there is a weak positive relationship between incumbent 
support and support for the current European Union!8 - perhaps because the current 
16 The pro-stability variable was operationalized as a dummy variable: 0 for opponents and 1 for 
supporters of democratic capitalism based on the following Eurobarometer question: "who would you 
vote for ifthere was a general election tomorrow?". 
17 The threat to stability variable was operationalized in the same way as the pro-stability variable (for 
each point, 0 or 1) multiplied by the percentage vote won at the last two elections. 
18 The country's EU membership evaluation question was used here as the dependent variable. 
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EU empowers political parties and preserves the political and economic status quo 
(Gabel, 1998a) -, and a significant negative relationship between incumbent support 
and support for further integration of the EU. 19 
These findings highlight the importance of national parties in the mental calculus of 
voters and for the latter a relatively sophisticated understanding of the political 
consequences of the institutions of the European Union. Thus for referendums on 
the European Union, some supporters of incumbent government wish to avoid 
embarrassing political party (ies) but for questions of further integration, they appear 
reluctant to risk weakening the national executive through political reform. Ray 
(2000) had previously established for EU-Ievel policy-making, that individuals who 
enjoy advantageous national policy outcomes, tend to oppose European-level policy 
in those areas of greatest interest to them. Along the same line, Sanchez-Cuenca 
(2000) found that the more influence individuals feel they have over their national 
governments, the slower their desired pace of integration. This can be especially 
important from the point of view of France and the United Kingdom with both 
different objective and subjective -latter tantamount to voters' opinions on these-
economic, social and political results. 
However Ray's (2003a) results ascertained, as Dutch and Taylor (1997) did, that 
factors such as party positions on European integration and ideology are more 
important than incumbent support. Only when support and opposition to Europe are 
quite evenly balanced, can incumbent government support make a meaningful 
difference. In an analysis of expert party positions and public opinion on European 
integration - based on year 1984, 1988, 1992 and 1996 -, Ray (2003b) found that 
political parties do influence their partisan on the issue of European integration but 
that this effect is conditional and independent of European elections and 
referendums. The influence of a political party on their electorate on the issue of 
European integration is a function of the issue saliency to the party, internal party 
unity on the related issue, the level of disagreement among political parties on the 
related issue, individual's party attachment and interest in political matters. It must 
be noted that coinciding with party splits arising from the acrimonious Maastricht 
19 The unification question and desired speed of unification question were used here as dependent 
variables. 
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Treaty debate, the effect of party unity on the electorate was not significant any 
longer in 1992 and gave way to the EU issue saliency. A key weakness of Ray's 
(2003b) research is though that current EU membership and further integration have 
not been dissociated and treated separately in the analysis. 
2.4.2 Socialisation Process and Nested Identities 
The socialisation process and nested identities of member states can contribute to 
explain citizens' support for European integration. Thus the length of membership 
of a country in the European Union (EU), through the socialization process, is one of 
the most powerful determinants of general integration support, both at the individual 
level and the level of countries (Anderson & Kaltenthaler, 1996; Anderson & 
Reichert, 1996). The timing of EU entry and length of membership - the latter 
echoing Inglehart's and others' study - explain variation in national public support 
for European integration. Anderson and Kaltenthaler (1996) found that the timing 
of entry was the most important predictor of support for integration before 
unemployment and length of membership respectively. This seems to indicate that 
the circumstances of membership (operationalized as the level of support for EU 
integration when entered in the EU) and length of membership (with the exception 
of unemployment for the latter) are more powerful predictors of support for the EU 
than economic conditions. However the authors indicate that there is a levelling off 
of support in the ED for the older EU members which may make the effects of 
domestic economic conditions more important in the future (post 1993) to explain 
support for EU integration. Furthermore differentiation by dimensions of 
integration can also be important: thus the focus on EU economic and military 
cooperation was viewed positively by German public opinion but negatively for 
European political union, that is to say the establishment of an EU government 
(Rattinger, 1994). 
The degree of identification with Europe must be differentiated from the study of 
support for European integration although these two issues are related. It is thus 
logically and empirically possible to identify strongly with Europe but not see a 
need for the development of a supranational political structure. A contrario it is also 
possible to strongly support European integration without strongly identifying with 
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Europe. The identification with Europe may also obviously lead to support for 
European integration, this is tantamount to the affective dimension to European 
integration. In a case study of Spain, Medrano and Gutierrez (2001) found that in 
line with Turner's and Tajfel's social identity theory (Turner, 1975; Tajfel, 1981, 
1982; Turner, Sachdev and Hogg, 1983) and Lawler's identity preference theory 
(1992), the more positive the images of Europe are, the greater the degree of 
identification with Europe. They also demonstrated that confirming Calhoun's and 
Brewer's nested identities theory,20 regional and national identities are compatible 
with a European identity in Spain when they are not portrayed and seen as 
threatening each other. 
In line with Angelucci (1993), Vetik (2003) and Kritzinger (2003) who pointed out 
that attitudes towards the EU are developed in the national economic, political, 
historical and cultural context, the role of positive group images in fostering 
identification with groups, that is to say Europe, and compatibility of nested 
identities depends on them not being portrayed as threatening each other, the 
national context in which these identities are constructed is crucial. The national 
media, and the political and economic circles may playa crucial role here. In 
Medrano's and Gutierrez's (2001) research, it was shown how historically up until 
today the European Union has been portrayed in the national context as a political, 
economic, social and cultural model to break away from the Franco dictatorship. It 
must be noted that confinning Janssen's (1991) study, the related researchers also 
found a positive relationship between education, cognitive mobilization and 
European identity. 
National Identity and European Integration 
The premise of social identity theory is that "who one is" depends on which groups 
one identifies with. This brings about a group loyalty which can be extremely 
powerful in shaping views towards political objects (Massey, 2002; Sears, 1993 and 
Sniderman et aI., 2004). The strongest territorial identities are national and such 
identities can constrain preferences towards European integration. National identity 
20 Calhoun's and Brewer's nested identities theory relates to the individual's need for differentiation 
and inclusion/equivalence. 
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can be defined as "the intensity and the type of the relationship towards the nation" 
(Blank et aI., 2001:7). Further insight into the concept of national identity is brought 
by Tsygankov (2001: 15) who defines national identity as "a cultural nonn that 
reflects emotional or affective orientations of individuals toward their nation and 
national political system". 
National identity relates therefore to an individual's intensity of positive attachments 
to her/his nation. The stronger the bond that an individual feels towards the nation, 
the less likely that individual will approve of measures that decrease national 
influence over economics and politics. The growth in the scope of the European 
Union in the realm of economics, politics and culture, which have previously been 
under the sole control of the nation-state, impinges on this view of the nation. The 
concept of national sovereignty is here predominant, and more particularly the loss 
of sovereignty brought about developments towards a single currency and the 
establishment of a European Central Bank and the European Court of Justice, a 
common foreign and defence policy,21 as well as the harmonisation of certain policy 
areas such as sales taxes but also the increased primacy of European law. As 
discussed in chapter four, the political discourse of party factions and political 
parties in France and the United Kingdom22 focuses partly its opposition to 
European integration on grounds of threats to national identity and sovereignty 
21 The greater integration of the European security and defence policy during the period from 1998 to 
today - with the development of common political, military institutional and operational capabilities, 
including the concept of European military assistance and solidarity clause in case of armed conflicts, 
terrorist attacks or natural or man-made disaster enshrined in the project of European constitution -
but also the emergence of important international foreign and security issues from 1999 (more 
strongly from September 200 I) - such as the Kosovo war in 1999, terrorist attacks of September 
2001 (in the USA), March 2004 (in Madrid) and July 2005 and 2007 (in the United Kingdom), and 
the Iraq War (from 2003) - are likely to have increased the salience of foreign, security and defence 
policy issues for national publics. This may make the further development and realization of a 
European foreign, security and defence policy more difficult today - especially for particular policy 
decisions, for example, involving the deployment of military troops - as national publics will 
increasingly act as a constraint on the development and realization of the related policy. The fact 
that decision-making in the field of foreign, defence and security policy is subject to unanimity rule 
in the EU, may well reinforce this constraint as national publics are provided with ample channels of 
influence to constrain European integration in this field via their respective national governments 
(Oppermann and Hoese, 2007). However, a key weakness in Oppermann and Hoese's (2007) 
analysis is that the latter is rather descriptive and solely conceptual. 
22 More specifically factions within RPRIUMP or even PS and political parties in the political 
periphery such as MPF, FN, RPF, MDC, PC in France, and factions within the Labour Party and the 
Conservative Party (from 1997, the leadership of the Conservative Party adopted though a more 
eurosceptic stance) and political parties in the political periphery such as the United Kingdom's 
Independence Party in the United Kingdom. 
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(Wallace, 1995; George, 1998; Edwards, 2001; Cole et aI., 2005; Grundberg et aI., 
2000). 
In much of the literature, national traditions have been used to explain different 
levels of EU support between member nations (for example Eichenberg and Dalton, 
1993; Deflem and Pampel, 1996) but the inclusion of measures of national identity 
in statistical analyses to explain EU support is more rare: Kaltenthaler and Anderson 
(200 I) - the latter in the context of support for the common currency - McLaren 
(2002, 2007a, 2007b), Carey (2002), Luedtke (2005), Llamazares and Gramacho 
(2007),23 De Vreese and Boomgarden (2005), Christin and Trechsel (2002), Marks 
and Hooghe (2003), De Vries and Van Kersbergen (2007), Hooghe and Marks 
(2005) and Kostakopoulou (2001). While De Vreese and Boomgarden's (2005), 
Luedtke's (2005), Kessler and Freeman's (2005), Lahav's (2004) and McLaren's 
(2002, 2007a24) studies have demonstrated the link between anti-immigration 
sentiments, general hostility towards other cultures and reluctance about European 
integration, the relationship between importance of national identity and reluctance 
about European integration was shown by Kaltenthaler and Anderson's (2001), 
Carey's (2002), Christin and Trechsel's (2002), Luedtke's (2005), Marks and 
Hooghe's (2003), De Vries and Van Kersbergen's (2007), McLaren's (2007b), 
Kostakopoulou's (2001) and Hooghe and Marks' (2005) studies. De Vries and Van 
Kersbergen (2007)25 even found that exclusive national identity and the vote share 
of eurosceptic rightwing extremist parties interacted and decreased EU support. 
Hence, the electoral strength of these parties was found to mobilize citizens' feelings 
of exclusive national identity against the EU and the integration process. Along the 
same line, they uncovered that both citizens' feelings of economic anxiety and of 
exclusive national identity decrease EU support. 
23 Llamazares and Gramacho (2007) unearthed a relationship between citizens' views of the EU - not 
EU support itself - and exclusive national identity in Greece, Portugal and Spain. More specifically, 
they found that eurosceptic views are conditioned by fears that the EU threatens national cultures. 
This result is remarkable considering that there are no strong partisan divisions regarding European 
integration, and that no radical right has attained electoral success in Southern Europe. 
24 McLaren's (2007a) research relates to EU enlargement. She has found that public opinion's 
opposition to Turkish membership of the EU is based on the perceived threat of Turkey to national 
economic and social resources but also to national culture and way oflife (of EU countries). Mass 
migration from Turkey to some of the EU member states was found to amplify these perceived 
threats. 
25 De Vries and Van Kersbergen's (2007) analysis was though only carried out using Eurobarometer 
data from one year, namely 2003. 
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National identity with its corollary of economic and political values plays an 
important role in citizens' attitudes to EU accession and integration in Central and 
Eastern European (CEE) countries. Vetik et aI. (2006) and Rohrschneider and 
Whitefield (2006) have found that Central and Eastern European citizens are much 
more likely to make judgments about European integration based on their 
underlying political and economic values than on expected material payoffs. 
Instrumental explanations of EU support are thus preceded by value-based 
explanations there. Citizens' economic and political values in central and Eastern 
Europe, unlike in the West, are often incompatible with markets and to some degree 
with liberal democratic values pursued by the EU. In this perspective, citizens in 
post-Communist societies continue to endorse economically socialist ideals (Fuchs 
and Roller, 1998; Miller et aI., 1995). These values nourish euroscepticism in the 
related nations. The EU for some Central and Eastern European citizens is 
considered as a Western hegemonic aggression against their values and therefore a 
threat to the national identity of their country. This feeling of aggression is 
facilitated by the facts that CEE member states are economically, socially and 
politically weaker than older EU member states, and that the EU joining terms for 
CEE nations have been dictated by the EU (Watson, 2004; Ellman, 1997). As a 
result of this, the identity balance between oneself (CEE nations) and the other (the 
EU) is clearly tilted towards the identification need with the other (the EU) and 
totally away from the differentiation need from the other. This identity imbalance 
triggers a reactive identity to reinforce the collective worth of oneself (CEE nations) 
against the other (the EU), taking the form of euroscepticism (Vetik et aI., 2006). If 
France and the United Kingdom are not in the same economic, political and social 
situation as CEE nations, the question of the type of EU model pursued and its 
compatibility with French and British individuals' underlying socio-economic 
preferences arises. The relationship of the type of EU model pursued with 
instrumental explanations of EU attitudes also deserves examination. 
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2.4.3 EU Support and the Utilitarian Perspective 
2.4.3.1 Post-materialism Surpassed 
Citizens' priorities are of two types: concerns about economic and physical security 
(materialist values) and concerns about human rights, the environment and quality of 
life issues (post materialist values). Economic prosperity and peace, after the 
Second World War, have superseded class-based materialist values with post-
material values such as environmentalism, women's and minorities' rights, 
democratic participation and nuclear disarmament (lnglehart, 1977a). Because 
younger age cohorts - also better educated and more highly paid individuals - are 
more post-material, Inglehart (1970b and 1977b) proposed that support for European 
integration should be higher in younger groups. However most recent studies 
(Janssen, 1991; Andersson & Reichert, 1996; Gabel, 1998a) have reported that age 
has no effect and post-materialistic values no or little effect on evaluations of EU 
membership. Thus, Anderson and Reichert (1996) found that materialists in later 
member states for the years 1982, 1986 and 1990 were more supportive of European 
integration while for the years 1982 and 1990 post-materialists in the original six 
member states were supportive of European integration. 
Gabel (1998a) - using the Eurobarometer question: what should be the nation's 
goal? Maintaining order; fighting rising prices; protecting freedom of speech; giving 
people more say in government decisions - discovered that materialists are more 
supportive of integration than post-materialists. As Anderson and Reichert (1996) 
implied, changes in national and international political and economic environment 
and changes in EU integration stance across time may influence the importance (or 
non-importance) and significance of these factors and others as predictors of 
citizens' support for EU integration. For the terminology, it must be noted that the 
terms "Post-materialist values" would be referred to today as sustainability values. 
The approval of materialism as an element of support for European integration 
orientated the researchers to explore the utilitarian perspective of support for the 
integration process. It therefore implied that the explanations pertaining to the 
utilitarian perspective posited that citizens' attitudes towards integration are not 
stable. Dalton & Eichenberg (1991) posited that citizens' support for integration 
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reflected evaluation of his or her personal and national economic situation. 
However both Inglehart and Dalton & Eichenberg's theories have not fared 
particularly well under empirical scrutiny (Anderson & Reichert, 1996; Inglehart et 
aI., 1991; Janssen, 1991). Much of the evidence is methodologically suspect, 
questions for example were not checked for validity and the associations also rarely 
controlled confounding factors. 
Eichenberg and Dalton (1993) found that inflation was the most important predictor 
of support for European integration26 followed by intra-EC export trade. The 
direction of the coefficients for these variables denoted that the higher the inflation 
rate is, the lower support for European integration there is and that the higher a 
country's exports to other EU countries - in percentage of total export - are, the 
more support for European integration there is. Unemployment and Gross Domestic 
Product (GDP) index were not statistically significant although they were in the 
predicted direction. But the authors claimed that in the aftennath of Maastricht, the 
debate about the community's role in promoting national growth, increasing 
awareness of the economic importance of the EC may encourage citizens to place 
greater weight on the community's growth and employment perfonnance. In a more 
recent cross-national aggregate study covering the period from 1973 to 2004, 
Eichenberg and Dalton (2007) found nevertheless that the effect of inflation and 
intra-EC export trade on EU membership support was no longer statistically 
significant in the post-Maastricht period (1992-2004).27 Eichenberg and Dalton 
(2007) connected this result with the lack of cross-national aggregate citizens' 
support for the EU integration of education, cultural, currency management and 
health and social policies.28 They thus argued that this was a sign that in evaluating 
EU membership, citizens were not only concerned about the evaluation of their 
country's national economic perfonnance but also by distribution matters, and more 
especially by the effect of EMU and the Euro - with its budgetary implications - on 
the welfare state.29 
26 The Common Agricultural Policy (CAP); VAT financing of revenues and European Monetary 
System (EMS) have an impact on prices. 
27 Unemployment and GOP index were also found not statistically significant in the related period. 
2H And even decline during the period of most drastic decline in support for EU integration generally 
( 1991-1994). 
29 One of the key weaknesses of the cross-national aggregate analysis of Eichenberg and Dalton 
(2007) is that they only considered a limited number of independent variables - not always 
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Anderson and Kaltenthaler (1996) in their study of public opinion from 1973 to 
1993, found that unemployment and inflation respectively were the two most 
important economic factors before GDP growth. Gabel's work (1998) contradicted 
these results, finding an inverse relationship. Dutch and Taylor's (1997) results 
based on a national aggregate level study from 1973 to 1989, contradicted these 
results. They found that when the relationship between national economic 
conditions and EU support was controlled with the elite-driven diffusion effect30 -
using in the process a lagged EU support variable - there was very little evidence to 
suggest that macro-economic fluctuations affect support for the European Union. 
Lagged EU support variable was found to be statistically significant but Log GDP 
per capita,31 incumbent government support, UK incumbent government support, 
unemployment and inflation were not found to be statistically significant. Dutch 
and Taylor (1997) argued that it was because the EU was not involved in shaping 
monetary and fiscal policies at the time of the study and conceded that if the 
researchers focused on subjective measures of economic performance, the results 
may be different. 
For the purpose of the present study, it is propitious to examine first whether EU 
support itself in France and the United Kingdom has increased or not throughout the 
nineties - if it is so, a lagged EU support variable should be used - and second to 
test whether there is a relationship between EU support and macro-economic 
performance, controlling for incumbent government support. This control is 
probably less necessary in the period studied - that is to say the nineties - insofar as 
the EU has a greater influence on the economic policies followed by national states, 
following the implementation of the Maastricht Treaty. However the national states 
retain a role in the economic policies followed, both through the EU influence they 
can exert via the European council and through their own national policies. Citizens 
operationalised in the most effective manner, for example, intra-EU trade concentration only 
considering exports to EU countries and discounting therefore imports from EU countries. The 
operationalisation of the dependent variable - net EU membership support - discussed in the 
methodology section is another key weakness. 
30 National elites became increasingly pro-European in the 1980s, which affected the electorates' 
view on EU integration. 
31 Parametric statistics require normally distributed variables. As the variable GOP per capita was not 
normally distributed, it was transformed into the logarithm (Log) of GOP per capita to satisfy this 
requirement. 
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may be conscious of this as economic decisions tend to be well publicized in the 
media. It is also possible that because the issue of integration may be too abstract 
and difficult to understand, citizens use national proxies. 
Eichenberg and Dalton (1993) also showed that the insularity of the UK decreased 
the level of support for the EU compared to other countries like the Netherlands or 
even France in the 1980s which became more pro-European than earlier, that is to 
say than in the 1960s. It must be noted that according to them, European Parliament 
elections - especially the first one in 1979 - and referendum years coincided with 
stronger support, explained partly by the fact that the media talked more about 
European integration. Furthermore they reported that net return from the EC budget 
had no impact on public opinion, except for the United Kingdom. It must be though 
noted that Anderson and Reichert (1996) found that for both the original six member 
states and later member states,32 net EC budget return was a significant positive 
predictor of EU support. 
2.4.3.2 Utilitarianism at the Fore 
Gabel (1998a) demonstrated that public support for integration is linked to a 
utilitarian perspective - although a minority affective perspective is also recognized 
- based on the economic and political consequences of integration and individual 
gains drawn from it. Gabel (1998a) terms this the policy appraisal model. In 
contrast with Eichenberg and Dalton (1993), Gabel (1998a) contends that citizens 
evaluate EU membership according to its commercial benefit regardless of general 
economic conditions. Nevertheless, he has also shown that citizens' appraisal of the 
general actual national economic situation can also playa role in the evaluation of 
integration itself, this will be discussed below. Gabel made three assumptions: 
1/ The structure of public attitudes towards integration 
Gabel contends that EU citizens structure their attitudes towards integration 
according to the Eastonian model of public support for governing institutions 
(Easton, 1975, 1965): that is to say affective allegiances to institutions and utilitarian 
appraisals of institutional outputs and performance. 
32 Years measured were 1982, 1986 and 1990, without supplying details for each individual country. 
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2/ Citizens in utilitarian appraisals are self-interested. International political 
economies shape domestic politics which impact on people's interests (Eichengreen 
and Frieden, 1994; Frieden, 1991; Rogowski, 1989; Gourevitch, 1986). 
3/ EU citizens form these utilitarian appraisals without a sophisticated understanding 
of the economics and politics of integration. EU citizens are thus generally 
uninformed and unconcerned about EU integration and EU politics but citizens use 
cheap information, in their social and political environment, information stemming 
from informed elite, interest groups, associates and the media. 
Gabel's analyses support two important conclusions: 
Firstly, few EU citizens - that is to say 15 to 20% - demonstrate strong affective 
allegiances to the EU but affective support is generally stable over time. According 
to Easton (1975), affective support derives from socialization and from accumulated 
positive utilitarian appraisals of governance. He (1975:445) also conceded "If 
discontent with performance continues over a long enough time, it may gradually 
erode even the strongest underlying bond of attachment". 
Secondly, due to low levels of affective allegiances, utilitarian evaluations should be 
an important determinant of most citizens' level of support for European integration. 
Depending on their socio-economic situation - including education, income, 
occupational skills and proximity to intra-EU borders - citizens differ in their ability 
to benefit from the primary consequences of integrative policy. The market 
liberalization pertaining to the EU integration offers more opportunities for people 
with human and financial capital. It must be noted that Gabel (1998a) also tested the 
intra-professional differences and found that the lower the relative wages for 
unskilled workers were between countries, the more the utilitarian support is high. 
The rationale here is that with the EU, there are more opportunities of movement 
and more to gain from integration. He also found that the higher the skills of 
professionals and executives are, the more support for integration there is. The 
rationale for this is that with higher skills come greater productivity and in tum 
greater opportunities with integration. Utilitarian evaluations are increasingly 
related to support for integration as affective supranational allegiances weaken. It 
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must be noted that sectoral interests can also playa role. Thus, in the context of the 
2000 Danish referendum on EMU and the Euro, it was found that public sector 
employees tended to vote against the adoption of the Euro compared to private 
sector employees as they perceived that EMU through the Stability Pact and policies 
of tight monitoring and control of public deficits would threaten their jobs. It was 
also found that while the worker and white-collar vote - the latter tending to vote in 
favour of EMU and the Euro - is significant on its own (Jacobsen et aI., 2001), if the 
private and public sector employment is included, it cancelled out the effect of 
worker and white-collar vote (Buch and Hansen, 2002). Hooghe et al. (2007) 
echoed Gabel's results and found that occupation shapes attitudes on EU 
membership - individuals with human capital being more supportive of EU 
membership. However, they found that this effect is only direct to some degree as 
the effect of occupation on EU support is mediated by income, attitudes towards 
economic protectionism, attitudes towards immigrants and national pride.33 Hooghe 
et aI. (2007) also uncovered that the effect of occupation (and identity) on EU 
support varies across countries. Political framing by political parties influences the 
related effect. This effect is thus found greater when political entrepreneurs succeed 
in connecting feelings of economic and cultural threat with latent unease about 
European integration. Hooghe et aI. (2007) report that referenda may provide 
opportunities for such entrepreneurship. 
In his research, Gabel (1998a) used confirmatory factor analysis and linear 
regression models with Eurobarometer survey data. Survey questions identified as 
utilitarian questions incorporated evaluation of EU membership & national EU 
benefit, and for the affective survey questions, European identity, EU solidarity and 
European unification - although the latter was also found to subsume a utilitarian 
component. He also examined if utilitarian and affective attitudes correlate with 
specific integrative measures such as single European currency and common 
defence. In his research on France and Germany, Schild (2001) echoed Gabel's 
findings when he uncovered a positive correlation between the sense of European 
identity and one's evaluation of the country's EC membership. This is in contrast 
with national identity, which tends to be more affective-based. 
JJ Hooghe et al. (2007) used 2003 International Social Science Survey data and structural equation 
modelling in the process. 
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Macro-economic models of expectations 
As indicated earlier, it must be noted that there are also macro-economic models of 
expectations which hypothesize that support for EU membership is influenced by 
the economic performance of member states, measured in terms of GDP growth, 
unemployment and inflation, although empirical evidence to date has not 
consistently supported such models (Eichenberg and Dalton, 1993, 2007; Anderson 
and Kaltenthaler, 1996). Support for EU integration has been found to co-vary with 
the level of trade with other EU countries, as well as net national returns from the 
EU budget and CAP subsidies for farmers (Anderson and Reichert, 1996) but 
Eichenberg & Dalton (1993) found that the net return from the EU budget had no 
impact on public opinion support except for the United Kingdom. This latter study 
is important in the sense that contrary to Gabel's study (1998a, b) who focused 
solely on the effects of market liberalization - that is to say individual 
competitiveness - the redistributive, protectionist, and socio-democratic 
commitments of the EU - for instance structural funds - can playa part in the 
support of opinion for EU integration. Thus in the context of Ehin's (2001) 
empirical study of public support in Central and Eastern European countries to join 
the EU, it was found that poor people and unemployed people supported EU 
membership. 
Hence Dutch and Taylor (1997) in their aggregate-level research based on 
Eurobarometer data from 1973 to 1989, found that at the regional level of a country, 
regions with a higher average education and higher regional GDP per capita offered 
a higher EU support. They even demonstrated that taking into account the elite-
driven diffusion effect through a lagged EU support variable, regions with a higher 
average education, a lower regional unemployment rate and a higher national 
unemployment rate were more supportive of EU membership34 although to a lower 
extent than without the elite-driven diffusion effect. As a result the theory of 
comparative advantage seems to justify EU support but decline with the elite driven 
diffusion effect witnessed in the 1980s. Furthermore they found that targeted 
34 The Lagged EU support variable was found to be statistically significant as well, and have the 
largest unique effect on EU support. 
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spending - that is to say ED's regional development funds - did not bring more EU 
support. In fact the regions receiving these funds were less supportive of European 
integration. Nevertheless, in the context of Northern Ireland, McGowan and 
O'Connor (2004) found that the receipt of European structural funds contributed to a 
more positive public view of the EU in this region than in the United Kingdom as a 
whole. McGowan and O'Connor (2004) conceded that the bordering and historic 
links of Northern Ireland with one of the strongest supporters of European 
integration, namely the Republic of Ireland, also played a key part in the more 
positive attitudes of Northern Irish citizens towards the EU. 
Gabel (1998a) found that the economic reliance on economic interdependence 
explains EU support more now although in older member states, external and 
internal political concerns35 still count but less so with time passing by. He found 
that controlling for length of membership and macro-eco aggregates - such as real 
GDP, inflation, unemployment - does not modify the results and still sees economic 
interdependence and World War II deaths per capita explaining support, although 
the effect of the latter on ED support declines with time. Gabel (1998a) showed that 
citizens' appraisal of the general national and personal economic situation can also 
playa role in the evaluation of integration. Thus, consistent with Dalton and 
Eichenberg (1991), Carey (2002), Gabel and Whitten (1997), Llamazares and 
Gramacho (2007), McLaren (2007b), Hooghe and Marks (2005) and Vreese and 
Boomgarden (2005), it was found that positive perceptions of national and personal 
economic conditions increased the level of utilitarian support but that considering 
the objective national economic situation - measured by unemployment, inflation 
and GDP growth - poor macro-economic conditions lead to increased level of 
support for integration - this independent of length of EU membership of countries. 
The latter research outcomes contradicted the results elicited by Eichenberg and 
Dalton (1993) and Anderson and Kaltenthaler (1996) who uncovered a positive 
relationship between good national economic conditions and level of support for 
integration. George (1985) offers a potential explanation for this finding: European 
integration is economically appealing because economic conditions are bad. 
35 Economic reliance on economic interdependence was measured by EU trade balance and EU trade 
dependence indicators. External and internal political concerns were respectively gauged by World 
War II deaths per capita and strong political opposition to democratic capitalism. 
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European national leaders have found it increasingly difficult to control their 
economy in the context of the globalisation of market trends and have had to endure 
unacceptable levels of inflation, unemployment and growth. Closer economic 
integration with other EU nations is seen as a way of regaining some of this lost 
control over their economies and therefore the national elites influence mass opinion 
to support European integration under these conditions. 
There is a paradox in the sense that citizens increase their level of support when they 
perceive that the economy has improved but decrease their support when economic 
conditions have actually improved. It is possible that citizens, in forming 
evaluations of the national economy, consistently misperceive economic conditions. 
Alternatively traditional measures of economic conditions, namely unemployment, 
inflation and GDP growth, may not capture aspects of the economy relevant to 
citizens' evaluations of economic conditions. These results are comparable to the 
ones obtained by Sanchez-Cuenca (2000), that is to say the worse the opinion of 
national political institutions, the more need for Europe and therefore the more 
support for integration and vice-versa. These outcomes are perhaps especially 
relevant to the study of the United Kingdom and France as one country (the former) 
appears to be doing better economically speaking and is more eurosceptic than the 
other one (the latter). 
2.4.3.3 Influence of the Nation-State on Individual Support for the European Union 
Kritzinger (2003) demonstrated that the nation-state is a key actor in increasing or 
decreasing support for European integration. In other words, rejoining Gabel 
(1998a), Sanchez-Cuenca (2000), Van Kersbergen (2000), Anderson (1998), Janssen 
(1991), Hooghe and Marks (2005), Vreese and Boomgarden (2005) and Dalton and 
Eichenberg (1991), citizens' perceptions of national economic and political factors 
influence the level of support for European integration. This implies that citizens do 
not assess the performance of European and national level separately but tend to use 
national proxies to express attitudes to the European Union. The evaluation of 
European institutions and the EU is thus endogenous or conditional upon the 
evaluation of the nation-state in terms of its economic and political performance 
because citizens lack an understanding of the European political system and 
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knowledge regarding the EU: the EU is seen as too distant, too complicated, too 
abstract to be understood independently. Attitudes towards the EU are developed in 
the national economic, political, historical and cultural context (Angelucci, 1993). 
This contrasts somewhat with Gabel (1998a), Eichenberg and Dalton (1993) and 
Sanchez-Cuenca (2000) who believe that citizens use information shortcuts to 
understand the EU and form independent views: EU events and policies determining 
and influencing citizens' attitudes towards European integration. 
According to Kritzinger (2003), the European integration support is therefore 
conditional on the economic and political performance of the nation-state but this 
process in the case of France and the United Kingdom, was found to have a negative 
relationship for political factors, that is to say that when citizens' are unhappy with 
the political performance of the nation-state, they support European integration and 
vice-versa. The related process was found to show a positive relationship for 
economic factors, that is to say that when citizens perceive the national economy to 
be performing well, they will increase their support for European integration. It 
must be noted that for Germany and Italy, the processes for economic and political 
factors were found to exhibit a negative relationship, that is to say when citizens' are 
unhappy with the economic and political performance of the nation-state, they 
support European integration. 
The national environmental context contributes greatly to shaping public opinion's 
stance towards European integration and the nature of European treaties plays a part 
in this. In other words, people's EU opinions are likely to be shaped by the political 
and economic environment that significant EU treaties also help to create. Thus, the 
Treaty on European Union (TEU) was perceived as having greater impact on 
people's lives and as eroding national sovereignty, and coincided with a period of 
economic and social difficulties which culminated in a decrease of aggregate EU 
support in the post Maastricht era (Ciftci, 2005; Eichenberg and Dalton, 2007). 
Brinegar and Jolly (2005) also argued that citizens' attitudes towards European 
integration are influenced by their country's configuration of political-economic 
institutions, factor endowment and other national contextual influences in a study 
based on 1996 Eurobarometer data. Citizens thus make socio-tropic evaluations of 
the EU by taking into account how the outcomes of choices made under their home 
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institutions will be affected by greater European integration. They thus found that 
the citizen's skill level mainly affects support for European integration through the 
frame of national contextual factors, such as factor endowments and varieties of 
capitalism. Low-skilled workers in economies with an abundance of low-skilled 
labour (such as Belgium, Spain, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and the United 
Kingdom) were found in the related study to welcome European integration, 
whereas low-skilled citizens in nations with a scarcity of low-skilled labour (such as 
Denmark, Germany, France, The Netherlands, Austria, Finland and Sweden) are 
likely to be more eurosceptical because protection benefits the owners of scarce 
factors of production. Low skill (high skill) endowment was defined there as 
whether the country's percentage of the population completing secondary education 
is below the EU mean (above the EU mean). Albeit using different data and not all 
the same countries,36 Hooghe et al. (2007) also found support for the factor 
endowment theory, with individuals with higher levels of human capital in countries 
where skilled labour is abundant being found to be more supportive of EU 
membership. 
Brinegar and Jolly (2005) uncovered that low skilled workers in residual welfare 
states (such as the United Kingdom), in conservative Christian welfare states (such 
as France although the latter has a more mixed political economy) and especially in 
social democratic welfare states (such as Sweden) tend to support European 
integration more than high skilled workers in the related welfare states. These 
results were justified by the following: residual welfare states' high skilled workers 
are more eurosceptical because of a preference for lower taxes; high skilled workers 
in social democratic states are more eurosceptical because of a fear for their more 
generous welfare states which permit investment in specific skills and high 
economic openness; and high skilled workers in Christian welfare states fear that 
their investment in specific skills will be threatened by further European integration 
but this to a lower extent than the same individuals in social democratic welfare 
states as they represent the median welfare state in Europe. Furthermore, Brinegar 
and Jolly (2005) unearthed that the general effect of ideology is even more 
36 Hooghe et al. (2007) used 2003 International Social Science Survey data. Data from the following 
countries were used in the related analysis: Slovak Republic, Poland, Hungary, Czech Republic, 
Portugal, Spain, France, Switzerland, Finland, Austria, Sweden and Norway. 
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dramatically conditioned by the national context than skill. Thus they discovered 
that support for European integration fell significantly as respondents' ideology 
shifts to the right in residual welfare states and increases significantly as 
respondents' ideology shifts to the right in social democratic welfare states. In 
conservative Christian welfare states, the decrease for EU support was found to be 
rather weak as respondents' ideology shifts to the right. European integration was 
therefore considered as a perceived threat to the welfare state in existence for 
individuals with right ideological opinions in residual welfare states and those with 
left ideological views in social democratic welfare states. 
Whilst studies such as Ciftci (2005) and Brinegar and Jolly (2005) attempt to 
account for the influence of national context on individual-level factors towards 
European integration attitudes and are valuable to identify common denominators of 
EU support across nations, they do not take into account sufficiently the cultural, 
historical, economic, social, societal and political specificities of each nation which 
can be however key to explain public opinion's views about European integration. 
As a result, these inter-country approaches can only give a too broad, imperfect and 
sometimes inaccurate explanation of individual attitudes toward European 
integration. Thus, as discussed in chapter six, the results obtained by Brinegar and 
Jolly (2005) for skill level and factor endowment as for skill level and welfare state 
type are found to be contradicted by the present study in the context of the United 
Kingdom and France. Schmidt (2006) and Taggart (2006) - the latter in the context 
of the 2005 Dutch and French referendums on the European Constitutional Treaty-
have moreover underlined that a full understanding of European politics required an 
understanding of all distinct, individual countries. The present study acknowledges 
this reality and pays tribute to it. 
2.4.3.4 Political Basis of Support for European Integration 
Sanchez-Cuenca (2000) proposes the theory that popular support for European 
integration is the consequence of the interplay between supranational and national 
politics. Thus by demonstrating that support for the EU37 is dependent on national 
37 Support for the EU is measured here by the variable, desired speed of European integration. 
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economic corruption index and social expenditure - controlling for GDP per capita 
of country - and at the individual level, dependent on trust in national government 
and ED commission, on perceived people influence on decisions by national 
government and EU institutions, and finally on perceived EU membership benefit 
for country, he contends that the higher citizens' opinion of the functioning of 
supranational institutions and the lower that of national institutions, the greater the 
support for integration. This is explained by the lower the opinion of the national 
political system, the lower the opportunity cost of transferring sovereignty to 
Europe. The study was done both at the aggregate and individual level. It must be 
noted that the measure of national economic corruption used is only economic and 
therefore does not include abuse of political influence - for instance misuse of or 
excessive centralization of power. His detailed conclusions are the following: 
II Support for integration will be highest when the national variables are at their 
minimum values and European variables at their maximum values. 
21 Support will be second highest when the national and the European variables are 
at their maximum values. 
31 Support will be second lowest when the national and European variables are at 
their minimum values. 
41 Support will be lowest when the national variables are at their maximum levels 
and European variables at their minimum ones. 
When the national EU membership benefit variable38 intervenes in the prediction, 
for each of the four cases, support for integration should be greater when the benefit 
variable takes its maximum value than when it takes its minimum one. 
This theory is especially interesting in the sense that France is a more corrupted 
country than the UK as per national economic corruption index, has higher means of 
desired rhythm ofEU integration39 than the UK but higher social expenditure than 
the latter. This will necessitate testing. In addition other national and supranational 
trust and democratic indicators - such as for example national unemployment rate, 
38 Question: country benefited from EU membership? 
39 This indicates that French citizens wish to see EU integration proceed faster than British citizens. 
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crime, tax rate and bureaucracy - could be added to the analysis. The related theory 
supports the view that European identity does not exist in itself and cannot be used 
to justify European integration at the individual level but rather lends support to the 
view that European identity seen as a collective will to integrate Europe is based on 
complex economic and political calculations. The creation of a demos - understood 
as a sense of being involved in a common project and forming part of a single 
community - is therefore endogenous to these calculations rather than exogenous to 
the EU institutions. 
However Wood (2002) through Germany shows the gap between the German elite 
and the mass about the European integration process. If the SPD-Green coalition 
government advocated and organised the development of European citizen 
democracy through an extension of petition rights and referendum to different public 
fields, the right was however not extended to EU issues and thus no referendum was 
organised on the Euro or on the EU enlargement (a parallel can be drawn here with 
France). The German electorate's opposition to enlargement parallels the decrease 
in support for the EU. There is thus an increasing disillusionment with politics and 
the workings of representative democracy on domestic issues and extended to EU 
issues. This situation may be mirrored in France. 
2.4.3.5 Theory of Double Allegiance 
The theory is based on a utilitarian or evaluative perspective of attachment to EU 
integration. European integration depends on a double allegiance, consisting of a 
primary allegiance to the nation state and its political allegiance based on Rokkan's 
(1975) theory of state formation consisting of 4 phases: 
- V Penetration or state formation - political, economic and cultural unification at 
the elite level; 
- IV Standardization or nation building - masses incorporated in the developing 
system (widespread feelings of identity with the political system); 
- IIV Participation - increasing participation of people in the political system, 
extension of political rights; 
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- IV/Redistribution - expansion of the state through extension of social rights. It 
relies on a trade-off between security (and prosperity) offered by the state - that is to 
say territorial, physical, psychological (sense of belonging), economic and social 
support - and support and allegiance of people. A secondary allegiance, derived 
allegiance to the EU, exists only to the extent that European integration helps enable 
nation states to provide the resources upon which primary allegiance hinges. EU 
integration cannot depend on European identity as in the national state case and thus 
cannot be paralleled with Rokkan's theory of state formation as it is elite-driven. 
Milward (1997: 11) defines allegiance as "the range of all those elements which 
induce citizens to give their loyalty to institutions of governance, whether national, 
international or supranational". Van Kersbergen (2000:5) reformulated it from the 
public's point of view as "the willingness of a national public to approve of and 
support the decisions made by a government, in return for a more or less immediate 
reward or benefit to which the public is entitled on the basis of it having rendered 
approval and support". Allegiance is superior to legitimacy as the latter is incapable 
of maintaining allegiance. 
EU support has declined since 1991 because of worsening expectations about 
national economic and social security - the vote in European elections is moreover 
dominated by domestic issues as discussed above. Van Kersbergen (2000) notes 
that it may be difficult to preserve double allegiance via social policy as an 
instrument of statecraft, when the European welfare state regimes are increasingly 
embedded in the internal market and the two-tier system of European social policy-
making. Three kinds of constraints are already restricting national social policy-
making: 1/ obligations in international law to enable cross-border mobility of labour; 
2/ growing interdependence with actors in other national systems; 3/ competition 
between national systems for mobile production factors (Streeck, 1996). 
Streeck (1995, 1996) sees "neo-voluntarism" emerging as the central characteristics 
of the post-welfare state social policy regime in Europe. Neo-voluntarism can be 
tantamount to a lower grade of social policy to fit with market imperatives. Neo-
voluntarism is a type of social policy that tries to do with a minimum of compulsory 
modification of both market outcomes and national policy choices, that is to say 
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minimal supranational regulation and re-regulation and high horizontal 
interdependence. Streeck (1995:424) adds "neo-voluntarism allows countries to exit 
from common standards if their polity or economy will not sustain them". 
Moreover, further integration and in particular, monetary union through monetary 
rigidity, stability pact and interdependence, can threaten national welfare states and 
so, more especially the double allegiance. 
2.4.3.6 Micro- and Macro-level Economic Expectations Model to Explain Support 
for the Euro 
Van Everdingen & Van Raaij (1998) explain support for the Euro in terms of the 
expected macro-economic effects of the Euro on unemployment, inflation, and 
economic growth, and in terms of the expected micro-level effects on individual 
savings, job security and personal income. They find that attitudes towards the Euro 
appear to be positively influenced by expectations of both macro- and micro-level 
gains. In a 1994-1997 Eurobarometer aggregate level study of citizens' attitudes 
towards the common European currency policy, Kaltenthaler and Anderson (2001) 
found that attitudes towards the single currency were driven by collectively based 
considerations of the costs and benefits associated with it as well as the interaction 
of European-level politics and the domestic politics of member states. For the 
former, pre-EMU inflationist countries, countries with high pre-EMU 
unemployment and high intra-EU trade,40 and for the latter, younger countries (in 
terms of year of formation of nation state and national history) and older member 
states ofEU and EMS are found to be more supportive of EMU and the single 
currency - political and socialization perspective. It must be noted that using the 
other dependent variable - that is to say currency decided by the national 
government or jointly within the European Union -, the independent variables have 
the same effects - except the intra-EU trade variable which is no more significant-, 
but are weaker than with the other dependent variable. The reason may be that 
EMU and the single currency as a dependent variable is a more specific question 
making respondents' general predispositions more clearly split. 
40 The effect for intra-EU trade on EMU and the single currency was found though to be modest. 
61 
The results elicited here are consistent with the ones of Gabel (1998a) and Sanchez-
Cuenca (2000) and confirm that the decision to support the adoption of EMU and 
the single currency relies on a self-interested calculus focused on the well-being of 
the nation state. Thus, if the nation shows poor economic performance, the support 
for the EU and its policies is greater and vice-versa, this even when controlling for 
length ofEU membership and age of nation state (which moreover also have their 
own unique effect). The latter two variables relate to the socialization process and 
nationalistic feelings. 
2.4.3.7 Rational Choice Institutionalist Perspective 
Hix (2007) has recently tried to sketch the basis of a rational choice institutionalist 
framework for understanding parties', citizens' and interest groups' attitudes 
towards the EU. He contends that actors' support for European integration is a 
function of expected policy outcomes: an actor will form an opinion about the EU 
on the basis of whether action at the EU level will produce policies that are closer to 
his or her preferred policies than existing policy outcomes at the domestic level. He 
adds that party leaders and interest groups are much better informed than citizens 
and therefore cue citizens about how EU actions relate to their own preferences. Hix 
(2007) advances six propositions which, he believes, are valid across countries: 
1/ voters and parties on the extreme left and extreme right are more likely to be 
eurosceptic than are centrist voters and parties; 
2/ citizens and interest groups who support governing parties are less likely to be 
eurosceptic; 
3/ where a member state's domestic policy regime is to the left (right) of the 
European average, voters and parties on the left (right) are more likely than voters 
on the right (left) to be eurosceptic, and vice versa; 
4/ voters and parties in domestic systems that have majoritarian systems of 
government are more likely to be eurosceptic than voters and parties in domestic 
systems with consensus systems of government; 
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5/ voters and parties on the left were more eurosceptic in the 1970s, 1980s and 
2000s, whereas voters and parties on the right were more eurosceptic in the 1990s; 
6/ voters, parties and interest groups in large member states have become more 
eurosceptic; 
While Hix (2007) provides a utilitarian framework to attempt to explain actors' 
views about European integration, his global approach has a number of weaknesses. 
Hix's (2007) analysis is rather descriptive but he does acknowledge that his 
approach is too simple to explain all the relationships that shape actors' views. His 
cross-national analysis does not take into account adequately the specificities of each 
national member state which may influence actors' opinions on European 
integration. Some of his proposals travel badly across countries: the research results 
of the present thesis substantiate this. Proposition 2 is less true in the United 
Kingdom context as Labour and Conservative parties incorporate a substantial 
number of party supporters and interest groups which are eurosceptic. Proposition 3 
works a little better for the United Kingdom than for France. Despite the fact that 
the latter's domestic policy regime is to the left of the EU average, left voters and 
parties but also right voters and parties (in mainstream parties) in France tend to 
support the EU although they wish to see a greater place for social policies and 
regulated capitalism at the European level. In turn, despite the fact that the United 
Kingdom's domestic policy regime is to the right of the EU average, right voters and 
parties but also centre and to a lesser extent left voters and parties (in mainstream 
parties) in the United Kingdom tend to be more reserved towards European 
integration. Proposition 4 is less applicable to France. French voters and parties are 
thus not more euroceptic than voters and parties in countries such as Austria, 
Finland or Germany which have domestic systems with consensus systems of 
government. In addition, although both France and the United Kingdom have 
domestic majoritarian systems of government, French voters and parties (in 
mainstream politics) are significantly more pro-European integration than British 
ones. Proposition 5 does not quite square with France and the United Kingdom as 
not only British right voters and parties but also British centre and even to a lesser 
extent left mainstream parties and voters have grown more eurosceptic through the 
1990s and early twenty-first century. French right mainstream party leadership 
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tended to be in favour of European integration and has grown even more so in the 
second part of the 1990s and early twenty-first century. French Left mainstream 
party leadership, whilst being pro-integration, wish to see the EU adopt a more 
regulated capitalism as centre and right mainstream parties do. Furthermore in the 
1990s and early twenty-first century, French mainstream left and right (as centre) 
voters are not so much against European integration but in favour of an integrated 
EU along the line of regulated capitalism. 
Another limitation of Hix' s (2007) perspective is that it tends to be too party-centric 
and under-estimate voters' own opinions on European integration. Hix (2007) thus 
over-emphasizes the influence of political parties on voters. The growing visibility 
and impact of the EU on citizens from the 1990s have increasingly enabled citizens 
to be less dependent on party cues and see for themselves the policy consequences 
of European integration. A further flaw of Hix' s (2007) framework is that it over-
focuses on utilitarian explanations of parties and voters' attitudes to the Europe issue 
and leaves other contributory factors aside. 
2.5 Dimensionality of the EU Political Space 
Comparativists explore European integration as an extension of domestic policies. 
They take domestic politics as their point of departure and inquire into how 
domestic politics influences, and is influenced by European integration. The 
application of comparative models to European integration has thus directed interest 
towards how existing patterns of domestic contestation structure orientations on 
European integration. An important building block is Lipset and Rokkan's (1967) 
argument that political actors have an incentive to interpret new issues in light of 
existing cleavages such as the Left/Right ideological dimension. The rationale 
behind this is that it is costly for political parties to abandon existing cleavage 
structures as parties attract ideologically motivated activists, they build strong 
institutional ties to particular constituencies and develop reputations for particular 
programmes and policies (Marks and Wilson, 2000; Scott, 2001). It is also easier to 
achieve a stable political equilibrium in a political space that is dominated by a 
single dimension due to the median voter theorem than in multidimensional political 
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spaces (Hinig and Munger, 1997). Decision-makers tend to interpret new 
information in light of what they already know, implying a tendency to 
accommodate new issues to old cleavages (Steenbergen and Lodge, 1998). In this 
section, the dimensionality of the EU political space is analysed from the position of 
a variety of actors to assess whether the dimensionality of EU political space is 
actor-specific or not and therefore establish the nature of contestation in the EU and 
a fortiori in France and the United Kingdom. 
2.5.1 Dimensions that Structure Citizens' EU Policy Preferences 
2.5.1.1 Hooghe-Marks Model 
Using confirmatory factor analysis of Eurobarometer survey data, Gabel and 
Anderson (2002) found that citizens structure their EU policy preferences according 
to the Hooghe-Marks model. The Left/Right dimension in the economic - laissez 
faire-intervention - and social - Libertarian-Authoritarian - sphere and the national 
sovereignty/integration dimension are related to each other. Thus Left positions on 
the socio-economic dimension are related to supranational positions on the 
sovereignty dimension to form a policy characterized by regulated capitalism. By 
extension, right positions on the socio-economic dimension are related to national 
independence positions on the sovereignty dimension to form a policy characterized 
by neo-liberalism (Hooghe and Marks, 1999). Although this was not tested across 
time and perhaps there are differences for each member state, it appears propitious 
to test it in the context of France and the United Kingdom as successive 
governments in France for the last twenty five years have intervened more in the 
economy and regulated more social aspects (for instance labour markets) and also 
especially in the 1990s have been more in favour of European integration. This 
contrasts with the successive governments in the United Kingdom, which from the 
Thatcher years to the twenty-first century, have been more inclined to liberalize the 
economy and de facto deregulate markets, reduce social rights to bring more 
flexibility to labour markets and show more reservation in the European integration 
process. In other words, the regime in France can be qualified as regulated 
capitalism and the one in the United Kingdom as neo-liberalism. Besides political 
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parties, social movements, interest groups and media can also playa role in 
influencing the electorate. 
2.5.1.2 Theory of Political Order and Policies of the Member State and Perceptions 
of Political Order of the EO as Determinant of Attitudes to the EO 
Some earlier studies have found that the impact of political values on EO attitudes is 
slight with notable cross-national differences (Anderson and Reichert, 1996; Gabel, 
1998a; Steenbergen and Scott, 1998). In her study of 1994 Norwegian referendum 
results, using principal component analysis, Saglie (2000) proposed as determinants 
of the attitudes to the EU, the importance of the political order and policies of the 
member state41 and how the perceptions of the EO's political order and policies 
compare with this. This could explain why political parties with similar ideologies 
have divergent opinions about the EO but more globally this could explain why 
people, across and within countries, have different attitudes towards the EU. Saglie 
(2000) advocates that cross-country research on attitudes to the EO should rely on 
voter perceptions, elite discourse and the policies and political orders of individual 
member states and the EO. 
At the 1993 Norwegian national election, one year before the referendum, the EU 
issue was salient and became a domestic issue (Aardal and Val en, 1997) but not 
through the mechanisms described by Franklin, Marsh and Wlezien (1994: 117) who 
claimed "In domains of low salience such as foreign policy, we might expect 
opinion to be coupled to those on domains of high salience, such as governments' 
handling of the economy". Norwegian accession was discussed as a domestic issue 
because the choice between membership and outsideship would affect several 
domestic policies. The popularity of parties did not lead to a "yes vote" at the 
referendum. In the context of the 1994 accession referendum in Norway, Saglie 
(2000) showed a polarisation of attitudes to the EO across political parties between 
the Yes and No camp with a standardization of arguments used within each camp 
(across parties). There was no confrontation between the left and the right but social 
41 In the political order ofhis/her land, the citizen develops values and policy preferences, for 
instance social democracy which advocates equality, redistribution and government regulation of the 
market. 
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democratic arguments were more present in the referendum campaign. He also 
demonstrated that cross-pressured voters42 agree with some arguments used by their 
political party - as influenced by elite discourse of their party. It must be noted that 
the anti-EU stance in Norway is not limited to the political periphery but is the fact 
of well-established political parties from the political centre (Saglie, 2000). A 
parallel can be drawn with the Conservative Party in the United Kingdom. 
In a study done at the aggregate level, Hooghe (2003) analysed variation in patterns 
of EU support across EU policies. Elites - both European and national elites - were 
found more enthusiastic about European integration than citizens. Nevertheless 
when particular policy areas - that is to say how authority should be distributed 
between the EU and national governments - were examined, the answer was less 
equivocal. Elites and public opinion were found to be similar in that they were not 
in favour of Europeanizing high spending policies such as health, education or social 
policy as this could destabilize vested interests and disrupt policy delivery -
distributional logic. Yet Hooghe (2003) found that citizens contrary to elites wished 
to counterbalance the single market policies with its corollary of insecurity and 
uncertainty borne out of increased competition, with Europeanisation of 
employment policy, social policy, cohesion policy, environment and industrial 
policy. Elites were found not to agree with this and only wished to Europeanize 
policies along the line of a functional rationale - that is to say where positive 
externalities can arise out of it as for example currency, third world aid, 
immigration, environment and defence management. In the related study, it must 
be noted that the United Kingdom, contrary to other nations, was found to be the 
least favourable country to Europeanize the social model- the latter concerns social 
inclusion, employment, environment, research and regional policies. This result 
may be linked to the influence of policies of more neo-liberal nature that British 
citizens have been used to since the Thatcher era. The demand for social protection 
in other countries - and thus regulated capitalism - may come from particularly 
citizens who have skills that are specific to a particular firm, industry or occupation: 
with high asset specificity, individuals are more vulnerable to labour volatility 
arising of the single market (Iversen and Saskice, 2001). Two of the main research 
.t~ Those who have opinions on EU accession in disagreement with their political party. 
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limitations of Hooghe's (2003) study are that datasets with different years were used 
in the analysis 43 and that the model was not tested across time. 
In a study from 1990 to 1994, Voessing (2005) analysed inter-nationality variation 
in patterns of citizens' EU support across a composite index of eight EU policies 
ranging from currency to security and defence, including education, environment, 
press standards, health, science and foreign policy. Significant differences across 
national publics were found on the desired scope ofEU activities as on ideological 
opinions. Preferences towards the desired scope of EU activities varied though 
more strongly across national publics than towards ideological views. This study 
also found a decline in the importance of nationality and the corresponding cross-
national differences over time. Furthermore, while Great Britain was uncovered as 
on the right of the ideological spectrum and more opposed to supranational 
regulation, France was revealed as on the left of the ideological spectrum and more 
in favour of EU regulation. 
2.5.1.3 Gender Gap Theory 
Nelsen and Guth (2000) have found that a modest (statistically significant) gender 
gap exists in the EU as a whole, with women being less enthusiastic about the EU 
than men. The largest statistically significant gaps are found in Sweden, Norway, 
the United Kingdom and Ireland. Mean EU support of women in France is also 
smaller than men but it is not statistically significant. Using measures of political 
distance, women's values, ideology, economic vulnerability and national tradition to 
explain male and female attitudes to the EU, women's attitudes are more sensitive to 
knowledge about the EU44 and to economic pessimism - traditional role of women 
as care givers worried about market liberalisation - than men's. Men's attitudes are 
determined more by interest in politics - and thus more sceptical about the EU -
traditionalist values, ideology and working class status. Welfare state benefits do 
not seem to push respondents in one direction or the other (not statistically 
significant) . 
43 1996 for the national elite survey; 2001-2002 for the European elite survey and 2000 for the 
citizens' survey (Eurobarometer). 
44 They tend to have less knowledge about EU and domestic politics. 
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Nelsen and Guth (2000) also examined differences that emerge when respondents 
are grouped by welfare states. Langan and Ostner (1991), Leibfried (1993) and 
Duncan (1996) identified four welfare states, namely the Scandinavian model, the 
Latin Rim model, the Bismarckian model (France's model) and the Anglo-Saxon 
model (the UK's model). The Bismarckian model maintains the traditional roles of 
male worker and female care-giver through preference for money transfers over 
service provision and for families over individuals. The Anglo-Saxon model gives 
women the choice of staying home or competing on the same terms - but without 
the same resources - as men in the labour market. 
A few interesting differences in welfare types and gender evaluations of the EU 
were uncovered. Thus, traditionalist values have a negative influence on EU support 
for men in the Bismarckian regimes and for both genders in the Anglo-Saxon 
regimes, where defending traditional family values is often tied to defending 
national autonomy. Family size - examining the number of children - has a positive 
influence for both genders in the Bismarckian countries but a negative influence 
among Anglo-Saxon males. The political distance theory - measured by interest in 
politics, interest in EU politics, knowledge of EU politics and TV news usage -
holds for both the Anglo-Saxon and Bismarckian regimes. In both the Anglo-Saxon 
and Bismarckian countries, economic pessimism works in a negative direction for 
both genders but to a greater extent for men than for women. The conundrum, in the 
context of the United Kingdom, is to establish whether the social policy promoted 
by the EU is perceived by British citizens as giving them more economic security 
and translates itself into more support for the EU. 
2.5.2 Dimensions that Structure Political Parties' Positions 
2.5.2.1 National Parties and EU Positions 
According to Johansson and Raunio (2001), the following factors can influence 
national party positions on European integration: 
- Basic ideology linked to economic policy. This has to do with the degree of 
interventionism wished in the economy. Hence, for example, Social Democrats who 
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were initially predominantly opposed to or lukewarm about European integration as 
they viewed it as neo-liberal, became increasingly pro-integrationist during the 
1990s. Social Democrats supported the Economic and Monetary Union and 
favoured the strengthening of the EU's social agenda. This reflected their shift 
towards the political centre - particularly in economic policy - and their gradual 
realization that Keynesian economic policies at the national level were not sufficient 
to combat the excesses of capitalism (Cafruny, 1997; Geyer, 1997; Johansson, 1999; 
Ladrech and Marliere, 1999). 
- Public opinion. National parties are attentive to core party supporters and interest 
groups. 
- Factionalism. Parties can be internally divided over European issues, both at the 
elite and rank and file levels. Such internal dissent can lead to factionalism or issue 
groups. Hine (1982:38-39) defines factions as "solidly organized, disciplined, self-
aware groups, enjoying a relatively stable and cohesive personnel over time". Issue 
groups instead seek to influence the way in which power is exercised (by others) on 
given questions. Perhaps in the context of European integration, the latter is more 
current. 
- Leadership influence. The views of the party leader may have a strong influence 
on the official party line and party supporters. Research has indicated that the 
policies of the party leadership, for example on whether to join EMU, can wield 
considerable influence among the rank and file, persuading them to follow the elite 
opinion (Wessels, 1995). This is partly explained by the lack of knowledge of party 
supporters on EU matters, this enticing them to look for advice or cues from party 
leaders. In France, Mitterrand used his position to pursue his European goals 
(Guyomarch, 1995; Wood, 1997). In the United Kingdom, successive Labour 
leaders, Neil Kinnock, John Smith and Tony Blair were crucial in converting their 
party from open hostility to the community to "constructive engagement" (Daniels, 
1998). 
- Party competition. The main priority of national parties is domestic policies. 
Government parties are expected to be more pro-European. Anti-EU postures may 
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weaken the chance for political parties of gaining government office (Christensen, 
1996, 1998). 
- Trans-national links and membership of europarties discussed later in the literature 
reVIew. 
- The development of integration. Considering the increased importance of the 
European Union, parties can hardly afford to ignore the Union any more. Parties 
may re-evaluate their policy depending on whether they view the Union as an 
opportunity to achieve their objectives - as discussed above with the social 
democrats -. The integration is also shaped by events happening outside the union, 
which have an impact on the European policies of national parties. Thus, the 
dismantling of the Soviet Union and the increasing economic globalisation may 
have contributed to Finnish parties becoming warmer to joining the European 
Union. 
In their analysis of Sweden and Finland from 1990 to 1999, relying on party 
documents, parliamentary votes, statements by leading party figures, public opinion 
surveys, direct observation and interviews, Johansson and Raunio (2001) found that 
the strongest explanatory factors of party responses to European integration were for 
Finland, party competition and leadership influence, and for Sweden, public opinion 
and factionalism. Furthermore, focusing on government-opposition dynamics, 
Raunio (2007) showed that in Nordic EU countries, euroscepticism has been kept 
out of the political party mainstream by institutional factors, such as the use of direct 
democracy (referendums),45 and the channelling of eurosceptical voting into 
European Parliament rather than national elections. 
Using Eurobarometer and expert survey data from 1984 to 2002, Steenbergen et al. 
(2007) have found that party elites both respond to (bottom-up effect) and shape 
(top-down effect) the views of their supporters. These effects were found to work 
together strongly: 
- when the EU issue is salient to the party; 
45 Especially in Sweden and Denmark. 
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- when there is low intra-party dissent; 
- when parties incorporate a large number of opinion leaders (operationalised by 
constituents who are interested in politics and with a power of persuasion); 
- when inter-party dissent on the EU issue is high (albeit bottom-up effect is here 
stronger); 
- in proportional representation political systems (albeit bottom-up effect is here 
stronger) and in non-election years. 
Furthermore Steenbergen et al. (2007) uncovered that party supporters influenced 
their party elites: 
- when the issue salience to the party is low; 
- when there is high intra-party dissent;46 
- when the country has a EU referendum. 
Finally Steenbergen et al. (2007) found that the mass-elite linkage has declined over 
time for mainstream parties and justified this by the fact that mainstream parties 
attract fewer opinion leaders. They contended that this problem could be sorted out 
if these parties had more able leaders or took clearer policy positions. However one 
can wonder whether this connection is not the result of the fact that citizens 
increasingly understand the consequences of European integration and develop 
independent views on it. 
In line with Ray's (2003b), Evans and Butt's (2007) and Steenbergen et al.'s (2007) 
findings, Gabel and Scheve (2007) found that internally divided parties weaken the 
influence of the party cues on their supporters. Nevertheless, while Ray (2003b), 
Evans and Butt (2007) and Steenbergen et al. (2007) explained this effect by the fact 
that partisans more or less ignore noisy signals from their parties, Gabel and Scheve 
46 This result was moreover echoed by Evans and Butt's research (2007) who found that in the 1990s, 
intra-party division on the EU issue as the reversal of the position of the main political parties -
Labour and the Conservative Party - on the related issue have contributed to an increasingly voter-
driven process to EU attitudes. 
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(2007) contended that party supporters take their cue from those elites in the party 
who share their interests, values and political predispositions as suggested by 
Zaller's (1992) account of elite influence on opinion formation. Gabel and Scheve 
(2007) unearthed that independent of inter-party variability on the EU issue, intra-
party dissent increases variation in support for integration among party supporters. 
In other words, intra-party dissent drives substantial dispersion of opinion rather 
than congruence towards the party's official position on European integration. This 
finding is especially important in the context of the current research: the growing 
internal party dissent in mainstream parties such as the Conservative Party up to 
1997 and to a lesser extent in the Labour Party, RPR and PS cumulated with a 
greater inter-party variability on the EU issue (especially in the United Kingdom) 
may have contributed to a greater politicisation of the EU issue and the expression 
of eurosceptic views contaminating in tum public opinion. 
Using an expert survey, Hooghe et al. (2002) found that Left-Right and new politics 
dimensions structure contestation on European integration among national political 
parties. Thus, as far as the Left-Right dimension is concerned, as political parties 
move away from the political centre, especially those on the extreme left and right, 
they tend to adopt eurosceptic positions. The rationale for this is twofold: 
1. As Scott (2001:6) writes "within the constraints imposed upon them ... each 
party attempts to strategically manipulate the European integration issue ... to 
meet its goals". Thus, parties that are unsuccessful in the existing structure of 
political contestation, that is to say parties with weak electoral support or those 
that are locked out of government, have an interest in restructuring contestation. 
2. The second reason is ideological. The EU being primarily a market liberal 
project mitigated by some measures of regulated capitalism, extreme parties do 
not only contest EU policies but the EU construct itself. The radical left is 
eurosceptic, anti-system and perceive the EU as a capitalist bloc with capitalistic 
goals - market deepening. Even with a regulated capitalism, the EU will not 
provide the kind of policies radical leftists deem essential to curb market forces: 
that is to say public control over capital inflows, extensive public investment in 
industrial policy, a statutory right to work and a reduction of the working week. 
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Social democratic parties used to be more eurosceptic in the 1980s but have become 
more in favour of European integration in the 1990s as they perceive European 
integration as a means to advance social democratic goals in a liberalizing world 
economy (Hooghe and Marks, 1999; Katz and Wessels, 1999; Ladrech, 1997). Thus 
in 1984, the largest pool of euroscepticism - measured according to electoral 
strength - came from social democratic parties, the British Labour Party being 
among those. Nowadays, social democratic parties support European integration 
although there are factions within and outside these parties who are doubtful of 
European integration and of its hindrance of national sovereignty. There is thus a 
faction within the British Labour Party which is for instance against the adoption of 
the Euro. Along the same line, Jean-Pierre Chevenement broke away from the 
French Socialist Party because of inter alia his disagreement over European 
integration and the Euro and formed a new political party called Mouvement Des 
Citoyens. The recent 2005 referendums on the EU constitution have moreover 
shown that Social Democrat opposition parties (but also other mainstream parties 
such as Christian Democrats and Liberals) have followed their pro-integration 
ideological orientations and joined the government on the side of the EU Treaty 
even though they were liable to factionalization, especially in France with the Parti 
Socialiste (Crum, 2007). 
Furthermore centre right and right political parties support European integration but 
oppose environment, cohesion and employment policies that regulate capitalism 
(Hooghe et aI., 2002). Hooghe et aI. (2002) observed that the new politics 
dimension, represented on the left by the GAL pole and on the right by the TAN 
pole, explains more national party positions on European integration than economic 
left-right. While the GAL pole combines greenness (or ecology), alternative politics 
(induding participatory democracy) and libertarianism, the TAN pole combines 
support for traditional values, opposition to immigration, and defence of the national 
community. The TAN pole is summarized by Hooghe et aI. (2002) as the 
traditional/authoritarian/nationalism pole. New right parties are highly eurosceptic. 
For new right parties, European integration combines several threats to the national 
community, that is to say immigration, foreign cultural influences, cosmopolitan and 
international elites, and also reduces the authority of national states - reduced 
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national sovereignty (Boerzel and Risse, 2000; Caporaso, 1996, 2000; Hooghe and 
Marks, 2001; lachtenfuchs and Kohler-Koch, 1995; Stone Sweet and Sandholtz, 
1997). 
The radical right champions national sovereignty, supports intergovernmental ism, 
and rejects the supremacy ofEU law over national law. The views of the radical 
right on Europe are an extension of their basic orientation. In the words of Le Pen 
(cited in Shields, 1995:27) "my European program is an exact extrapolation of the 
national program of the Front National". National Front rejects Schengen rules and 
wants to re-establish full French control over its borders to keep out international 
crime, immigration and terrorism. This is echoed by French Gaullist Charles Pasqua 
(Rassemblement Pour La France) and Philippe de Villiers (Mouvement Pour La 
France) (Flood, 1997; Hermet et ai., 1998; Messina, 2001). Euroscepticism is also 
linked to traditional values. The EU through the EU Charter of Fundamental rights 
at the Nice intergovernmental conference, is seen as threatening the natural family 
and the Christian heritage. 
It must be noted that when Conservatives display a TAN inclination - that is to say 
defend national culture, national community and national sovereignty against the 
influx of immigrants, against competing sources of identity within the state and 
against external pressures from other countries and international organisations - they 
tend to be eurosceptic. The British Conservative Party and the French Gaullists to a 
lesser extent tend to display such an inclination (Baker et ai., 1997; Flood, 1997; 
Sowemimo, 1996). Based on a content analysis of newspaper data in national 
election campaigns of the 1990s and early twenty-first century in six European 
countries, Kriesi (2007) partly echoed this research outcome and uncovered that 
euroscepticism among political parties is not only essentially guided by opposition 
politics (in other words, strategic political considerations), but also by ideological 
considerations. Thus he found that Conservatives and/or the new populist right, 
especially in the United Kingdom and Switzerland, have restructured party 
competition by mobilizing themselves against European integration, and articulating 
this euroscepticism in economic terms as much as in cultural terms. This new 
cleavage has been particularly successful in the United Kingdom and Switzerland as 
it resonates with deep-seated national anxieties. In line with the mass-elite linkages 
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demonstrated by inter alia Ray (2003b) and Steenbergen et al. (2007), the salience of 
European integration in a given country is though not independent of the 
mobilization efforts undertaken by Conservatives and the new populist right. 
The GAL pole - especially the French Greens - has itself become more 
integrationist as it touches environmental protection, strengthening of democracy 
(via the European Parliament) and liberalization of immigration law. 
2.5.2.2 EU Political Groups and EU Positions 
Based on a study of manifestos of four European political groups - PES (Party of 
European Socialists), ELDR (European Liberal, Democrat and Refonn Party), EPP 
(European People's Party) and EFGP (European Federation of Green Parties) - at 
the European elections of 1979, 1984, 1989, 1994 and 1999, Gabel and Hix (2002) 
uncovered that the EU political space is similar to the domestic left-right dimension 
in content. Thus, on economic issues on the EU agenda, the differentiation between 
EU political groups is based on left-right ideology. However on the speed and nature 
of European (economic) integration, the differentiation between European political 
groups is less consistent. All groups have, at some point across the twenty-year 
period in the study, supported European integration. Thus, while European 
Socialists have become more pro-integration in the second period of the study, the 
European Christian Democrats and Conservatives have become less so in the same 
period. Over the twenty-year period, Gabel and Hix (2002) found that the Hix-Lord 
model with its two unrelated dimensions of Left-right and independence-integration 
applied: 
- Left anti-integration - PES in 1979 and EFGP in 1999 
- Left pro-integration - European Socialists in 1999 
- Right pro-integration - EPP and ELDR in 1979 
- Right anti-integration - EPP and ELDR in 1999 
They also found that the Hooghe-Marks model- regulated capitalism (PES) and 
neo-liberalism (EPP and ELDR) - worked in 1999. The main limitation of Gabel 
and Hix (2002) analysis is that not all parties are members of a European political 
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group (political groups such as the Front National are excluded from the analysis) 
although most of the key players in the political world belong to such a European 
group. Another limitation is that internal conflicts within European political groups 
are ignored in the study of European party manifestos. 
In a study based on roll-call votes of members of the European Parliament for the 
third legislature (from September 1989 to July 1994) and a large part of the fourth 
legislature (from September 1994 to December 1997) for any types of decisions 
(assent, cooperation, consultation, etc.), Noury (2002), partly echoing Gabel and 
Hix's (2002) research, demonstrated that there are two dominant dimensions in the 
European Parliament voting space where legislators vote according to political party 
affiliation. The first one is left-right dimension and the second one is pro- and anti-
European integration. These two dimensions were found to be stable and 
represented more than 90% of legislators' voting outcomes. In addition, it was 
found that there are two additional dimensions which are related to national identity 
- namely one dimension linked to the British legislators' more reserved political 
position on European integration that the researcher called Euroscepticism (although 
the Dutch and Scandinavian legislators' political positions were not too far from 
them) and the other one linked to the North-South cultural division in Europe-. 
However these two additional dimensions are characterized by less explanatory 
power and more instability. Noury's (2002) research results have thus shown that 
European Parliament legislators vote more and more according to their political 
party affiliation rather than according to their national delegations. The French 
legislators seem here to be more affected by this than the British ones, which can 
have consequences on the respective electorates and their preferences and vice-
versa. 
The ideological differences between European political groups are sometimes even 
put aside. Thus Kreppel (2000), having studied roll-call votes of members of the 
European Parliament from 1987 to 1996, found that socialist (PES) and largely 
Christian Democratic party groups (PPE) formed frequent voting coalitions. These 
two groups vote together especially on final proposals rather than amendments. 
Kreppel (2000) justifies this grand coalition by technical and pragmatic reasons. 
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Voting rules47 and a general desire to increase European Parliament power through 
unified action48 have explained partly this coalition. Though it must be kept in mind 
that the coalition is not formed a third of the time regardless of reading or procedure 
(co-decision or cooperation). Depending on the legislative subject - for instance 
legislation on workers and workplace -, some cooperation does not happen as there 
are ideological disagreements between political groups. The change of majorities at 
the European Parliament since the 1999 European elections partly modified the 
coalition: thus the largely Christian Democrat group (PPE), which gained the 
majority of seats in 1999 has rotated with the Liberals (ELDR) to have the president 
of the European Parliament in their rank. These two events seem to give substance 
to the technical and pragmatic reasons for the formation of such coalitions but also 
to ideological reasons, the Liberals on the economic aspects may be closer to the 
positions of the largely Christian Democrat group (PPE) than the socialist group 
(PES). 
2.5.3 Convergence in the Structure ofEU Positions 
As Marks and Steenbergen (2002) imply, the positions of political actors, be they 
national parties, European political groups, social movements or ordinary citizens -
the latter are not though generally opinion leaders on EU issues - are structured 
rather than random. There is also a convergence in the structure of EU positions. 
Thus, the left-right dimension underlies opinions, stances and behaviour of citizens, 
social movements and political parties. A second dimension - a new politics 
dimension - emerges as a powerful predictor of national party positions on 
European issues (Hooghe et aI., 2002). However this dimension is highly correlated 
with the Left-Right dimension and therefore lends support to the Hooghe-Marks 
model (Hooghe and Marks, 1999,2001) ofEU political space although it is also 
consistent with the one-dimensional model, that is to say Left-Right and 
Independence-Integration forming one dimension but with Left-Right element being 
dominant. The convergent patterns in the structuring of EU positions suggest that 
47 That is to say absolute majority required for second round of co-decision and cooperation 
procedures. 
~s The European Parliament is most influential when it presents a unified front to the other EU 
institutions. 
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parties, citizens and social movements evolve in a common space, which is the 
minimum requirement for political representation. Furthermore, as far as the nature 
of Left-Right is concerned, it was found that EU positions of national political 
parties are explained by both economic Left-Right and Libertarian-Authoritarian 
Left-Right. However Libertarian-Authoritarian Left-Right appears a more important 
dimension (Hooghe et aI., 2002). Authoritarianism is closely associated with 
nationalism, and euroscepticism has a nationalistic branch. 
2.5.4 Euroscepticism in France and in the United Kingdom 
2.5.4.l Definition and Nature of Institutional Euroscepticism 
Euroscepticism is an encompassing term that "expresses the idea of contingent or 
qualified, as well as incorporating outright and unqualified opposition to the process 
of European integration" (Taggart, 1998:366). Euroscepticism carries the meaning 
of doubt and distrust on European integration and became of current use in Britain 
and in France in the 1990s. Now it is a trans-national phenomenon as it is used in 
other European countries. Euroscepticism is an old phenomenon, which especially 
came to light in the EC accession debate of Britain, Denmark and Greece in the 
1970s and early 1980s but also came to light under the De Gaulle years, the latter 
being opposed to a highly integrated, federal superstate in favour of a loose, 
confederal Europe of nations (Burban, 1993; Fysh, 1997; Shields, 1996). A renewed 
impetus of Euroscepticism appeared over the debate of the Maastricht Treaty - and 
continues today - which transferred an important aspect of national sovereignty, that 
is to say monetary sovereignty, to a supranational body. The Maastricht Treaty 
provided the catalyst to opposition to European integration and further integration 
(Franklin, Marsh and McLaren, 1994). Euroscepticism has given rise to claims of a 
legitimacy crisis in the EO in terms of democratic deficit, issues of transparency and 
accountability of decision-making processes, appropriate balance between 
intergovernmental and supranational competencies, respective spheres of EO, 
national and sub-national governance, impact of EU issues on domestic policies and 
national party systems and questions of collective identity (Hix, 1998; Hedetoft, 
1998; Schmitt and Thomassen, 1999; Beetham and Lord, 1998; Banchoff and 
Mitchell, 1999). 
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Euroscepticism is not an ideology as it does not offer a comprehensive, potentially 
universalisable view of man and society. It is though rather a component of other 
ideologies, and not an ideology as such as it encompasses negative ideas about EU 
integration. In other words it raises issues and uncertainty about the EU. Within the 
framework of utilitarianism, popular level of euroscepticism fluctuates with 
political, economic and social circumstances. However euroscepticism can live 
without the utilitarian concept. Euroscepticism - expression of neo-nationalist 
school of thought - is a broad church from the extreme right to the extreme left. It 
cuts across traditional divisions and creates paradoxical affinities as it has to do with 
the future of nations and make common cause. Flood (2002) notes that there are 
different degrees and kinds of euroscepticism: 
- AI stop further integration 
- Bf revisionism: 
1. Can be to reverse integration 
2. Can be for member state withdrawal from the EU 
3. Not entering the EU 
There are no watertight compartments as far as these positions are concerned, they 
evolve with time. Euroscepticism is not to be confounded with refonnist views. 
The latter are committed to EU integration and its continuance but want 
improvement. Taggart (1998) offers an alternative view of euroscepticism with the 
following three different positions towards the EU: 
1. Integration itself opposed (including the EU). 
2. Not opposed to EU integration in principle but considers it to be too inclusive -
European countries are too diverse. Often framed in tenns of "states-rights" 
(Bogdanor, 1989). 
3. Not opposed to EU integration but considers it to be too exclusive (geographical 
and social exclusion). 
In the same way, Taggart and Szczerbiak (2002:7) distinguish between two types of 
euroscepticism, hard and soft: 
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"Hard euroscepticism is where there is a principled opposition to the ED and 
European integration and therefore can be seen in parties who think that their 
countries should withdraw from membership, or whose policies towards the ED are 
tantamount to being opposed to the whole project of European integration as it is 
currently conceived". 
"Soft euroscepticism is where there is not a principled objection to European 
integration or ED membership but where concerns on one (or a number) of policy 
areas lead to the expression of qualified opposition to the ED, or where there is a 
sense that national interest is currently at odds with the ED's trajectory". 
These definitions have the merit of distinguishing among varieties of eurosceptic 
thought but tend to ignore positive attitudes about the ED. However Conti (2003) 
expands Taggart and Szczerbiak's (2002) groupings in a more positive direction, 
identifying two forms of pro-ED integration, namely functional Europeanism where 
there is no principled support for European integration but rather pragmatic approval 
of the ED, and identity Europeanism for a principled commitment to European 
integration. Furthermore Kopecky and Mudde (2002), building on the distinction 
between European integration as an ideal, and the European Dnion as an existing set 
of institutions, describe euroscepticism as one of four ideal types produced by 
intersecting orientations towards the European Dnion - ED optimism/pessimism-
with orientations towards the idea of European integration - Europhilia/Europhobia. 
This produces four ideal types: Euroenthusiasts who support both the ED and the 
ideal of ever closer union; Eurorejects who oppose the ideal of integration and the 
reality of the ED; Europragmatists who do not support integration but view the ED 
as useful; and Eurosceptics who support the idea of integration but not its realization 
through the current ED. This conceptualization has the great advantage of 
separating out Europe from the actual ED and thus inscribes itself into an 
evolutionary perspective of European integration which reflects current political 
debates, as for example the ones around the potential harmonisation of taxes across 
Europe or the entry of Turkey into the EU. 
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Building on Taggart and Szczerbiak's (2002) categories of hard and soft 
euroscepticism, Lees (2004) adds three additional dimensions of eurosceptic 
contestation: 
- Opposition to the deepening integration process - such as reactions to real or 
perceived threats to nationhood and national sovereignty, critiques of institutional 
performance or opposition to the outcomes of particular policy areas - and hostility 
to the widening of the European Union - enlargement issues based on social and 
economic concerns and/or ethno-cultural ones. 
- Sustained or heresthetic nature of eurosceptic contestation. The former entails 
eurosceptic ideas forming an integral part of a political party's programmatic 
identity while the latter involves the adoption of eurosceptic ideas by otherwise pro-
European parties for short-term tactical reasons (Lees, 2002; McClean, 200 I and 
Riker, 1982). 
- Eurosceptic contestation officially sanctioned by the leadership of a political party 
or confined to a faction of it. 
Lees' categorisation of party-based euroscepticism seems more specific than 
previous groupings of euroscepticism. A key limitation of the model used by Lees 
(2004) is that only contestation of current/signed EU treaties are retained as 
eurosceptic contestation, ignoring in this the evolutionary nature of European 
integration necessarily instrumentalized by political parties. 
Wessels (2007) studied the inter-relationship between euroscepticism and European 
identity.49 Using Easton's concept of political support, Wessels (2007) found that 
European identity is a strong buffer against euroscepticism. However, this does not 
imply that individuals that identify themselves with the EU cannot be eurosceptics. 
Thus, Wessels (2007) identifies three types of eurosceptics: 
- Critical Europeans who combine EU identity with scepticism. Critical Europeans 
demand improvements of the EU. 
49 This study was though not done across time and relied on EOS Gallup Europe Post European 
elections 2004 data. 
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- Adamant eurosceptics who combine euroscepticism with no attachment to the 
European political community. Adamant eurosceptics demand a stop or end to 
European integration. 
- Eurosceptics who are indifferent towards the European political community and 
who view EU performance negatively. 
Wessels (2007) uncovered that eurosceptics amounted to 32% of European citizens 
and there were more adamant eurosceptics than critical Europeans. Nevertheless, a 
great variation across countries was found, ranging from 46% (eurosceptics) in 
Great Britain - 28% in Franceso - to 10% in Luxembourg. Finally, he unearthed 
that eurosceptics of any type were less politically informed, less interested in 
politics, and less educated than the average citizen but conceded that if public 
discourse about European integrations1 becomes negative, even the most receptive, 
politically active, and politically capable citizens may tum their backs on European 
integration. Only their European identity may prevent this for a while. 
Krouwel and Abts (2007) argue that the concept of euroscepticism is inappropriate 
for grasping the complexity of EU attitudes at the mass level, and offer an 
alternative two-dimensional conceptual framework to deal with the variety of 
citizens' attitudes towards Europe. This conceptualisation combines both the targets 
and the degree of popular discontent towards the EU and European integration. The 
first axis differentiates between attitudes towards the authorities, the regime and the 
community, while the second axis differentiates attitudes according to their degree 
of reflexivit/2 and negativism. By combining these two dimensions, a sliding scale 
of political attitudes is charted, which runs from trust in the main political 
institutions and goals of the EU, via scepticism to more negative orientations 
ranging from political distrust, cynicism and alienation. Krouwel and Abts' (2007) 
conceptualisation of euroscepticism tends nevertheless to over-emphasize the 
50 Great Britain was found to have 29% of adamant eurosceptics versus 6% of critical Europeans and 
France, 13% of adamant eurosceptics versus 8% of critical Europeans. 
:; 1 Discourse in the media, school and of opinion leaders. 
52 The degree of reflexivity includes three elements: a) the level of monitoring of the political 
environment, b) the degree of openness to evaluating relevant information and c) the extent of 
differentiation between the targets. 
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rejection of European integration altogether as the sole manifestation of extreme 
political views. 
Variation of euroscepticism (different versions) depend in which ideology it is 
embedded - between and within left and right, differences between left and right 
between France and the United Kingdom. But areas of common ground across the 
ideological spectrum include the following (Flood, 2002): 
- the EU on the way to becoming a superstate absorbing independence of its member 
states. 
- the EU seen as undemocratic, bureaucratic, inefficient and largely unaccountable to 
the people of its member states but making it more democratic not considered as the 
solution because it would involve further transfer of national sovereignty. 
- EMU and European central bank considered economically ruinous and remove 
member states' control of their finances, taxation and national economies. 
- consider it unacceptable that European laws have primacy over national laws and 
political activism of the European Court of Justice reinterpreting treaties and other 
European legal instruments in a federalist direction. 
- regard as unacceptable to base a common foreign and security policy on qualified 
majority voting (QMV). This could lead to division - different national interests 
and lives of nationals of member states involved in these fields. See as undesirable 
that Western European Union should be subsumed as the integrated defence arm of 
the EU. 
- judge that obsession with deepening integration increases difficulty of widening 
(could have political, economic and ethnic chaos in central and eastern Europe). 
- advocate a community of free independent nations engaged in cooperative 
intergovernmental relationships with each other and the rest of the world. 
Euroscepticism of the left attacks the EU on the grounds of its commitment to liberal 
capitalism, deregulation, free trade and globalisation. It is also hostile to American 
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economic power and the EU's acquiescence to a neo-liberal world order. It opposes 
the EU's subordination to American military domination of the world and is more 
generally against the EU adopting any role in defence policy (other than 
peacekeeping duties) in virtue of its anti-militarism. Finally, the left is attached to 
national sovereignty. Euroscepticism of the right and extreme right focuses heavily 
on defence of national sovereignty and of intergovernmental ism. The right (except 
some neo-corporatist groups on the neo-fascist ultra-right) denounces its insufficient 
liberalism, its excessive regulation and intervention, attack the Schengen Treaty and 
the opening of internal borders - which is linked to the immigration problem which 
in tum is linked to welfare problems, jobs, dilution of national culture and 
immigrants' integration problem -, defend national identities against EU 
homogenisation. There are differences between the British right - atlanticist, pro-
NATO, free trading beyond the EU and in favour of enlargement - and the French 
right - perhaps more anti-American, European or national protectionist and anti-
NATO. In the second part of the 1990s, the hyperglobalist eurosceptical strand 
within the British Conservative Party has moreover reinforced its position in the 
party objecting to further European integration and even pointing to a renegotiation 
of the United Kingdom's position in the EU. This opposition to European 
integration is rooted in the belief that the EU is a threat to the preservation of British 
sovereignty, national identity and the traditional liberal global order (Baker et aI., 
2002). 
Taggart (1998) identifies four ways in which euroscepticism manifests itself in 
Western European political parties: 
- Single issue Eurosceptical parties 
- Protest based parties with Euroscepticism 
- Eurosceptical factions in existing parties 
- Established party with Eurosceptical position 
Examples of the first category include the MPF, RPF & IE, MDC in France and UK 
Independence Party in the UK. FN, MNR, PC and Greens in France belong to the 
second category as the Green Party in the UK. In the third category, Labour in the 
UK and the Conservative Party until recently will enter into this category. Finally 
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the current Conservative Party and the Democratic Unionist Party in the UK belong 
to the last category. Euroscepticism as an ideological appendage to a more general 
systemic critique seems to be the most pervasive form of party based euroscepticism 
in Europe, more especially in France. Taggart (1998) and Sitter (2001) argue that 
protest parties use their position on the EU as one means to differentiate themselves 
from the established parties, that ideology plays a part in euroscepticism (national 
versus global views; collective versus individual views but some exceptions, 
regionalists are pro-European) and that eurosceptic factions within dominant parties 
can be explained by ideological, organisational or leadership factors as reflected by 
Hine (1982) and Graham (1993). 
Party-based euroscepticism is a reflection of government-opposition competition. 
Party positions on EU integration reflect party strategy in the pursuit of policy, 
office and votes (Sitter, 2004). Euroscepticism is a distinctly marginal phenomenon, 
rarely encountered in the political mainstream of the EU 15. Ideological extremity 
from political centre appears as the best predictor of a political party's position on 
European integration - the more away from political centre, the more eurosceptic the 
party is - followed by incumbency - socialization effect: party in power becomes 
more pro-European - and vote share - the more votes the political party attracts, the 
more pro-European it is likely to be (Ray, 2004, 2007). However, it must be noted 
that the following parties in the United Kingdom and France represent outliers 
departing from this model: the UK Independence Party (hard eurosceptic party but is 
located on the ideological centre of the political scene), the Conservatives (soft 
eurosceptics with a pro-European minority attracting a large share of votes), the 
Labour Party (short of being pro-European but has large share of votes and is in 
office), and the RPR - now called UMP (pro-European party with a eurosceptic 
faction, currently in office and attracting a large vote share). 
However, in May 2004, the leadership of UMP adopted a more eurosceptic stance 
under the influence of party members who voted no to the entry of Turkey in the EU 
and pronounced themselves for a referendum on the EU constitution. The adoption 
of eurosceptic ideas by this otherwise pro-European party was nevertheless for 
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short-tenn tactical reasons - and thus of heres the tic 53 nature - to reduce the number 
of votes going to MPF, RPF&IE and especially FN at the European elections of June 
2004. The government headed by Jean-Pierre Raffarin (and subsequently by 
Dominique De Villepin) as Jacques Chirac, French President, remained though 
favourable to both European projects during and after the 2005 referendum 
campaign on the EU constitution. Over the same timescale, for similar tactical 
reasons, Tony Bair, British Prime Minister and Leader of the Labour Party, had first 
decided, under the pressure of the unpopularity of the project of European 
constitution and the increased popularity of Conservatives' views on Europe in the 
UK, to submit the final project of constitution to referendum and to defend in the 
preparation of the final draft of the European constitution a less euro-expansionist 
position. After the "no vote" in the French and Dutch referendums on the EU 
constitution, the British Labour government declared the current EU constitution 
proposal dead. 
The first-past-the-post (FTP) electoral system in the United Kingdom seems to 
shape EU politics in the UK rather than perhaps historical experience, domestic 
economic and social interests to explain British attitudes towards the EU. Building 
on Aspinwall (2000), Hix and Lord (1997) and Taggart (1998), Usherwood (2002) 
shows that the FTP electoral system leads to anti-centrist views on Europe of 
governmental political parties as opposed to proportional electoral systems which 
keep anti-EU views at the periphery of the political scene - in other words not in 
government. The John Major government in the period 1992-1997 epitomized this 
phenomenon, exacerbated by the problem of a small parliamentary majority. 
Moreover, Aspinwall (2004) argues judiciously that the level of democratic 
legitimacy in European policy-making is higher under the FTP electoral system than 
it would be under a proportional representation electoral system as the fonner 
ensures the participation of both eurosceptics and europhiles in the development of 
government preferences on European integration. Aspinwall (2004) nevertheless 
concedes that the negative political rhetoric on integration - used by party leaders to 
help manage the factions in their party - may well influence British public opinion 
53 The late William H. Riker invented the term "heresthetic". Heresthetic can be defined as "the art 
of setting up situations - composing the alternatives among which political actors must choose - in 
such a way that even those who do not wish to do so are compelled by the structure of the situation to 
support the heresthetician's purpose" (Riker et aI., 1996:9). 
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towards a more negative view of European integration. Whilst party management 
constraints partly explain British governments' preferences on integration, 
Aspinwall (2004) tends to largely disregard the influence that public opinion may 
have on these preferences. 54 The rather descriptive methodological approach 
followed by Aspinwall (2004) appears though a weakness. 
In the UK, the anti-European views are not only present in governmental parties but 
are also present in cross-party or apolitical movements - like for example the 
Conservative Bruges Group, the European Foundation, New Europe Group, 
Business for Sterling - which facilitate a clearer individual positioning on Europe 
and a greater mastery of the European issues but fail to show a united front because 
of the diversity of backgrounds of those opposing EU integration and a continual 
change of organisational structures. This externalisation of the debate on European 
integration leads to a radicalisation of political views. However despite this 
radicalisation of views on European integration at the level of movements and to a 
lesser extent of parties, public opinion remains more ambivalent, placing Europe as 
not the most important issue although in the period 1997-2001 becoming the third or 
fourth most important issue behind the NHS, Education and unemployment. 
According to more recent (2007) polls, the importance of Europe as an issue for 
public opinion has though decreased (Mori, 2007). 
2.5.4.2 Euroscepticism and Public Attitudes 
The heartland of support for European integration is to be found among the 
generally more informed classes (Evans, 1995; Evans, 1999b; Gabel, 1998a and 
Hix, 1999b). However, opposition to the EU in Britain is not just confined to the ill-
informed. According to the EU knowledge quiz scores (Evans, 1998b), it is the case 
that people who want Britain to leave the EU are less informed than those who do 
not. Those who want Britain to stay in the EU but try to reduce the EU powers are 
54 Yet Aspinwall (2004) admits that the party management variable cannot explain that although 
Tony Blair had a large parliamentary majority in 1997 and 2001 - and could therefore bypass the 
eurosceptic faction in his party -, he did not take Britain into the Euro. Aspinwall (2004) point~ out 
that some combination of resistance by the Chancellor of the Exchequer (Gordon Brown), media 
hostility and a negative public opinion may be able to account for the reluctance of Tony Blair to take 
that step. 
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more infonned than those who either wish to increase the EU powers or those who 
wish to have full integration. The media may be a source of influence on citizens' 
political attitudes. Dalton et aI.'s (1998), Herr's (2002) and Bartels' (1993) studies 
have thus found that the media influenced political attitudes, particularly voting 
preferences in the US. Research in the British context has also found that the media 
asserts influence on political attitudes and behaviour but that these effects are 
relatively small (Norris et aI., 1999; Newton and Brynin, 2001). On media influence 
on attitudes towards European integration, Norris (2000) uncovered that when an 
attentive public receives extensive media coverage of an issue that displays a 
consistent directional bias, the media are likely to have an impact sufficient enough 
to change public attitudes at the aggregate level. Norris (2000) found a strong 
association between negative press coverage of monetary union and decreasing 
levels of aggregate support both for the Euro and the EU in general. Norris (2000) 
did though qualify this conclusion by pointing out that the direction of causality in 
the relationship between media coverage and aggregate public attitudes on monetary 
union could not be established. 
However Carey and Burton (2004) unearthed that during the 2001 British General 
Election campaign, the media and the main political parties had small independent 
effects on public attitudes towards EU membership and the potential adoption of the 
single currency. These effects were found greater when voters received the same 
messages from both their party and their newspaper. More specifically, Carey and 
Burton (2004) discovered that the pro-EU press (such as The Independent) had less 
influence in affecting the attitudes of its readers than the anti-EU press (such as The 
Sun, The Star, The Daily Mail and The Times) with its readers, especially for the 
issue of the adoption of the single currency. This was explained by the hard 
eurosceptic line that the anti-EU press took on the single currency which contrasted 
with the lack of intensity of support of the pro-EU press for the Euro. In connection 
with this argument, Carey and Burton (2004) found that the effects on public 
attitudes were the greatest when Conservative identifiers received confirmatory 
influences by also reading an anti-euro newspaper. 
The results of Norris (2000) and Carey and Burton (2004) echo somewhat the ones 
of De Vreese (2004) in the context of the 2000 Danish referendum on the Euro who 
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uncovered that negative media coverage on government and political leaders 
influenced negatively public views on the overall performance rating of political 
leaders, this especially for politically less involved respondents, and contaminated 
the Euro referendum vote. These results are also echoed by Brettschneider et al. 
(2003) who found that media coverage on the Euro focusing first on the Euro-Dollar 
exchange rate decrease from the beginning of 1999, and then on the advantages of 
the Euro at the end of200l influenced public opinion's evaluation of the Euro in 
Germany, first negatively and then positively. Nevertheless Brettschneider et al. 
(2003) unearthed that although citizens' attitudes towards the Euro were influenced 
by the media, citizens were even more strongly influenced by their general opinions 
of the European Union. Along the same line, in the context of Denmark, De Vreese 
and Boomgaarden (2006) unearthed that citizens exposed to a considerable level of 
news coverage with a consistent positive evaluative direction on the EU enlargement 
endorsed the media view. In the related research, prospective economic evaluations, 
incumbent government support, age and anti-immigration attitudes were though 
found more important predictors of EU enlargement support. 
De V reese (2007) showed how exposure to specific and different news media 
content led to differential changes in EU attitudes for different individuals. Drawing 
on experimental data, panel surveys and media content analyses in Denmark and the 
Netherlands, De Vreese (2007) thus demonstrated how news media, by framing 
Euro-politics as an arena for strategically operating, self-serving politicians,55 can 
fuel public Euro-cynicism and -scepticism. However, this effect was found to be 
conditional upon the pervasiveness of strategically framed news reporting, and 
depend on the level of political sophistication56 of the individual. In the Netherlands 
where there was a high level of strategically framed news reporting, it was found 
that individuals with a high political sophistication were more likely to be cynical 
and sceptical about European integration. A contrario, in Denmark where there was 
a low level of strategically framed news reporting, individuals with a low political 
sophistication exposed to EU news were more likely to be cynical and critical about 
European integration. 
55 Strategic news reporting is defined as news that focuses on winning and losing, is driven by "war 
and games" language, emphasizes "performers, critics and audiences", focuses on candidate style and 
~erceptions, and gives weight to opinion polls (Jamieson, 1992). 
6 In other words, on the level of political interest of the individual. 
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Euroscepticism in the United Kingdom is partly driven by the media giving more 
coverage to eurosceptic ideas, partly reflecting the divisions on European integration 
in British political parties. Anderson and Weymouth (1999) and Seymour-Ure 
(2002) moreover underlined the overwhelmingly eurosceptical nature of the British 
press, which contrasts with the more pro-European nature of the French mainstream 
press (De Vreese et aI., 2006; Grundberg et al. 2000; Perrineau and Ysmal, 1995; 
Kriesi, 2007). This situation echoes the increased politicisation of the EU 
membership debate and the decline in EU support in Poland in the late 1990s which 
coincided with the appearance of more eurosceptic political forces with the help of 
some large media such as radio Maryja, although the increased politicisation of the 
EU membership was focused not so much on EU entry itself but on the conditions of 
entry of Poland in the EU. The decline ofEU support in Poland was due to socio-
economic concerns of the electorate partly exacerbated by Polish governments' 
attempts to shift the blame for unpopular decisions on to Brussels (Szczerbiak, 
2001). 
Taggart (1998) underlined the fact that there is little relationship between public 
level of euroscepticism and public support for euroscepticism. Thus, in France, 
protest parties command more votes than public opposition to European integration 
(as evidenced by eurobarometer surveys), domestic concerns explaining more 
support for these protest parties whereas in the UK it is the reverse although since 
1997, the Conservative Party has taken a more eurosceptic stance. This relative lack 
of popularity of European integration in the UK may reflect the way British history 
education is unravelling (Daddow, 2004, 2006). The latter tends to present an 
uncritical view of national history - supported by politicians such as Margaret 
Thatcher and the correlated relative inactivity of British historians in the public 
sphere to question British history - this helping to serve the construction of national 
identities via the glorification of imperial, martial and royal history. Thus history 
education taught in the UK focuses on the period to around the second world-war 
much more than contemporary history. Somewhat echoing Daddow (2006), Smith 
(2006) follows a historic long tenn perspective and explains English euroscepticism 
by the strong sense of national identity of England which derives from its insular, 
geographical situation, the early development of a centralised English state, the 
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concomitant growth of a unified English legal system and especially national 
protestant covenantalism. He argues that it is the fusion of a dissenting religion 
(Protestantism) with a national identity that was tightly knit with a monarchical state 
of its own that proved crucial for the subsequent shaping of English attitudes to 
Europe, as well as to outsiders in general. Contrary to France, English Protestantism 
opposed the dominant ecclesiastical international hierarchy and doctrine of the time 
(Catholicism) and a long time thereafter. This dissenting, oppositional national 
religion tied to the masthead of a sovereign nation, became the defiant symbol and 
expression of that absolute sovereignty, breaking away from the trans-territorial 
realm of Catholic Christendom. Despite the weakening of the catholic spiritual 
roots in Europe, Catholicism continues today to shape European identity-
consciousness and influence perceptions of Europe (including France) in relation to 
others. Catholic Christendom, even through its more secular contemporary versions, 
embraces cultural diversity within unity. It preaches in the process the values of 
liberty under the rule of law but also of diversity within an overarching unity - a 
conception that can lead to the increasing subordination of national sovereignty, if 
not identity, to a supranational and trans-territorial European Union under a 
bureaucratic High Authority, in which each of the levels of loyalty and identity play 
their allotted roles. It is a conception that accords well with the old French ideal of a 
grande nation with its mission civilisatrice and its post-revolutionary ideals of 
exporting liberty, reason and enlightenment across the continent. 
2.6 Conclusion 
The completion of the single European market and the Maastricht Treaty marked the 
end of the permissive consensus. European integration and its policies appeared 
from the 1990s to be more visible, politicised and contested. To this extent, the 
politicisation of the completion of the single European market in 1993 and the 
project of economic and monetary union in 1992, both with direct economic and 
social implications for electorates' lives, aroused the interest, concern or enthusiasm 
of the political world, socio-economic circles and civil society. This politicisation of 
the European integration issue coincided with a generally poor socio-economic 
situation in Europe. Citizens' attitudes towards the European Union are nevertheless 
92 
developed in the national context. They are also more utilitarian. Thus, citizens 
assess the economic, social and political performance of the nation state to express 
attitudes towards European integration rather than evaluate the performance of EU 
institutions themselves. In other words, EU support is conditional on the 
performance of the nation state. 
Furthermore citizens develop values and policy preferences in the political 
environment of their country, which will influence their EU attitudes. More 
specifically, they draw comparisons between the political order and policies of their 
country and the political order and policies of the European Union. As found in the 
context of CEE nations, citizens' underlying political and economic values and 
policy preferences seem to moderate the relationship between utilitarian appraisals 
and EU attitudes. Although France and the United Kingdom are not in the same 
economic, political and social situation as CEE nations, the question of the type of 
EU model pursued and its compatibility with French and British individuals' 
underlying socio-economic preferences arises. The relationship of the type of EU 
model pursued with instrumental explanations of EU attitudes also deserves 
examination. 
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3- METHODOLOGY 
3.1 Introduction 
As discussed in the previous chapter, the core aim of this thesis is to investigate how 
British and French citizens structure their opinions and preferences on EU 
integration with particular focus on utilitarian arguments. This will be investigated 
by carrying out a statistical analysis of Eurobarometer data surveys for the period 
from 1992 to 2001. This chapter justifies and details how the research will be 
managed. Thus, firstly, the research approach will be discussed. Secondly, the pros 
and cons of Eurobarometer data surveys will be examined. Thirdly, methodology 
used by previous studies will be reviewed. Fourthly, the selection and 
operationalization of variables will be considered. Finally the selection of statistical 
tests and eurobarometer data will be deliberated. 
3.2 Research Approach 
For the purpose of the current study, secondary data in the forms of books, academic 
journal articles, Eurobarometer data and other public opinion survey data in the 
United Kingdom and France, official governmental and para-governmental data 
such as economic and demographic data have been used. These data offer a number 
of advantages. According to Ghauri et al. (1995), the first and the foremost 
advantage of using secondary data is the enormous saving on time and money. 
These data can at times be of higher quality than could be obtained by an individual 
study such as this one (Stewart and Kamins, 1993). This is especially true in the 
context of Eurobarometer survey data, which are collected bi-annually in a rigorous 
manner - although their limitations are discussed below - and hence provide here 
the possibility of undertaking longitudinal studies: this is of particular importance 
for the present research questions and objectives. Secondary data have permitted us 
to set the present research in context and generate the research hypotheses and even 
triangulate this study's findings. Finally secondary data generally provide a source 
of data that is both permanent and available in a form that may be checked relati\'t~ly 
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easily by others (Denscombe, 1998). This means that the data and individual 
research findings are more open to public scrutiny. 
Nevertheless secondary data subsume some disadvantages. Thus they may have 
been collected for a purpose that does not match the researcher's need or the 
secondary data may enable the researcher to answer the research question or address 
the research objectives only partially. Other disadvantages include aggregations and 
definitions used in the secondary data, which may be unsuitable; access to secondary 
data, which may be difficult or costly; no real control over data quality; and initial 
purpose of the secondary data researcher may affect how the data are presented 
(Saunders et aI., 2003). For the latter, the culture, predispositions and ideals of those 
who originally collected and collated the secondary data will have influenced the 
nature of these data at least to some extent. Hence, for instance, Eurobarometer data 
and the reports drawn from them by the Directorate-General Press and 
Communication of the European Commission tend to be rather subjective in the self-
selection and interpretation of results but this is not surprising considering that the 
European Commission is not unbiased or neutral on European integration questions 
as discussed below. It must be though noted that despite showing some drawbacks, 
much of previous research has used secondary data as these represented the best 
alternative for analyses aimed at explaining cross-national, cross-temporal and 
cross-sectional public opinion's views on European integration. This is also true in 
the present research, for which secondary data were fully adapted to the research 
objectives and research problem at hand and as such were considered as the best 
option. 
3.2.1 Quantitative and Qualitative Research 
Ghauri et al. (1995) summarize the differences in the emphasis between qualitative 
and quantitative research methods: 
- Quantitative methods may be used when the emphasis is on testing and 
verification· there is a focus on facts and/or reasons of social events; a logical and , 
critical approach is put forward; when the research design deals with a controlled 
environment; the research is based on a hypothetical-deductive method and focuses 
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on hypothesis testing; there is a generalization by popUlation membership; an 
objective "outsider view" distant from data is favoured; the study is particularistic, 
analytical and results oriented. 
- Qualitative methods place emphasis on understanding; focus on understanding 
from respondent's/informant's point of view; observations and measurements are 
carried out in natural settings; the research orientation is explorative; there is a focus 
on interpretation and rational approach; a subjective "insider view" and closeness to 
data are favoured; the research is process oriented and a holistic perspective is 
promoted; and there is generalization of the results by comparison of properties and 
contexts of individual organism. 
For the purpose of this research, quantitative research methods are adopted for the 
reasons mentioned above but more specifically because the research is of a 
hypothetical-deductive nature as it aims to test theories developed by other 
researchers to see whether they apply to the French and British contexts. These 
theories have not though been researched extensively, as for example hypothesis 
(H3), which has not been tested across time and for specific countries and individual 
policies. Similarly, hypothesis (H 1) about dissatisfaction/satisfaction with social, 
economic and political performance of national institutions influencing public 
opinion has also been tested in a very limited way, that is to say with no testing for 
specific countries, across time and limited policy variable considered. Hypothesis 
(H2) about the relationship between citizens' support for integration and citizens' 
individual benefits extracted from European integration has also not been tested in 
the individual contexts of France and the United Kingdom. Therefore the research 
undertaken here is of an explanatory and exploratory nature. The generalisation of 
the results obtained to population membership as the statistical verification of results 
are here critical and as such warrant the use of quantitative research methods 
(Curwin and Slater, 2002; Dewhurst, 2002). Secondary data are used in the study. 
A quantitative analysis of Eurobarometer data together with economic, social and 
political data from other national and international public sources is thus carried out. 
The related analysis is done both at the aggregate and individual data levels in line 
with the research hypotheses which test the effect of both national and individual 
utilitarian arguments on European integration support. The mixture of aggregate 
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and individual data level analyses - involving a range of diverse data - as the 
reinforcement - between one another - and complementarity of hypotheses tested in 
the study are not only suited to the objectives and purpose of the research but also 
enhance the validity of the present research. Such a hybrid research procedure is 
known as triangulation and recommended in research (Ghauri et aI., 1995; Saunders 
et aI., 2003). 
3.3 Eurobarometer Data Surveys 
Researchers have used Eurobarometer surveys to analyse public opinion about 
European integration as they enable them to avoid potential problems associated 
with the measurement of citizen opinions: that is to say variations in question across 
independent studies; irregularity in the timing or frequency of surveys; or changes in 
sampling frame or survey procedures. Since the early 1970s, the EU has monitored 
public opinion in its member nations with coordinated, semi-annual surveys of 
public attitudes towards the community and the political issues facing Europe. 
Thus, the Eurobarometer surveys regularly ask a series of identical questions about 
public support for the EU and the integration support. The reasonably large 
samples, their national representativeness and the perenity of the sampling procedure 
used by Eurobarometer are also an advantage for comparative opinion research. The 
Eurobarometer surveys use a multi-stage stratified random sampling method 
targeted at resident population aged 15 years and over in each of the member states. 
In each country, a number of sampling points are first drawn with probability 
proportional to population size (for a total coverage of the country) and to 
popUlation density. Sampling points were thus drawn from each of the regional 
administrative units after stratification by individual unit and type of area (in terms 
of metropolitan, urban and rural areas). Following this, in each sampling point, a 
starting address is drawn at random and additional addresses randomly selected as 
Nth address. In each household, a respondent is drawn at random and interviewed 
face-to-face in her/his home in the appropriate national language. In each member 
state, a national weighting procedure (marginal and intercellular weighting) is 
utilised to introduce minimum gender, age and region in the iteration procedure. 
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Another benefit of eurobarometer surveys is that they subsume general public 
opinion surveys aimed at specific target groups as well as the public at large, and 
qualitative surveys are also sometimes conducted in member states. Another 
positive aspect is that there are thus questions which are present in all EB surveys as 
the membership evaluation and benefit questions or demographic questions such as 
age, sex and education or questions which appear frequently in EB surveys as for 
example Europe's perceived and desired speed questions. There is also a relative 
variety in the formulation of response in the EB questionnaires although it can be 
improved: there are few choices and rejection questions, few ranking questions and 
few word/open questions, which indicate a methodological bias. Yet Eurobarometer 
questionnaires do incorporate closed-ended questions, which facilitate the statistical 
treatment of the data. The Eurobarometer surveys enable the researcher to facilitate 
and carry out cross-sectional, cross-national and cross-temporal research, which is 
particularly important for the present study on French and British public opinions 
from 1992 to 2001. 
Nevertheless eurobarometer surveys have disadvantages. Firstly, there are a number 
of questions with a dichotomous nature in a transparent or hidden manner - for 
instance trust in institutions question or priority/not priority areas for European 
policies, in favour or against EU enlargement including for some of the dependent 
variables such as benefit question - which can lead to a caricature of opinions. 
There is also perhaps an excessive use of the "Don't Know" category, which 
provides an escape route to respondents and thus can give a better picture of the EU 
for European decision-makers. This is particularly striking for the membership 
evaluation question where the "Don't know" category adds to the "Neither good nor 
bad" one and thus can neutralise a part of negative opinions about the European 
Union. A Likert scale or a continuous rating scale would be more useful here. 
There are also questions which lead to centralized responses as for instance the 
question about the introduction of the Euro - "On 1st January 2002 the (national 
currency) will be replaced by the Euro. Do you think it is ... ?" - with a rating scale 
containing a very good thing, a fairly good thing, a neither good nor bad thing, a 
fairly bad thing, a very bad thing and don't know. The adjective "fairly" is though 
subjective. It is revealing that this middle category is dropped when respondents are 
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asked about how comfortable they are with using the Euro with a rating scale 
incorporating very comfortable, fairly comfortable, not very comfortable, not at all 
comfortable and don't know. This issue is though not all the time present with more 
important questions, as for example with the following question - Do you totally 
agree, somewhat agree, somewhat disagree or totally disagree with each of the 
following statements about the introduction of the Euro? The introduction of the 
Euro will ... (for example create more jobs)". It must be hence noted that the body, 
which orders the EB surveys - the European Commission - and interprets its results 
- the Directorate-General of the European Commission - are not independent 
institutions but have an interest in preparing and presenting results in line with their 
pro-European views. The reports on survey results prepared by the directorate-
general of the European Commission are symptomatic with a clear focus on positive 
results - the one favourable to European integration. The benefit question and the 
membership evaluation questions are also questions, which are close to one another 
in meaning but are written in such a way so as that more respondents' positive 
answers come out. This is particularly evident for the questions about Europe's 
perceived and desired speed with a rating scale from "standstill" to "runs as fast as 
possible" which is subjective and more likely to elicit opinions on the plus side of 
EU integration. The question about the current occupation of the respondent 
contains an extensive range of distinct categories which is perhaps not so advisable 
although the regrouping of categories is possible for statistical treatment. 
The mode of administration of the EB questionnaires via in-home interviews is 
arguable in the sense that the proper respondent can be selected in the household but 
the presence of the interviewer in the home of the respondent may reduce the 
respondent's anonymity and generate socially desirable answers, especially for a 
sensitive subject such as opinions about European integration. The level of data 
measurement in the EB surveys tends to be nominal and ordinal rather than interval 
and ratio which can as a result restrict at first glance the use of parametric statistics 
and orientate the researcher towards non-parametric statistics. The benefits of non-
parametric statistics are that they require fewer assumptions than their parametric 
counterpart, exempli gratia they do not make assumptions about the underlying 
population distribution, that is to say the variable's distribution does not need to be 
nonnal. The latter assumption is not such an issue when using EB surveys as the 
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sample size tends to be large: inferences for means using the t distribution assume 
that the data have a normal distribution - Central Limit Theorem (Grimm, 1993). 
Non-parametric tests tend to be less sensitive than their parametric cousins and 
therefore may fail to detect differences between groups that actually do exist. Yet, if 
the data are based on a nominal scale and! or an ordinal scale, and the latter cannot be 
considered as continuous, and other assumptions of parametric techniques are not 
met, non-parametric techniques are recommended. 
However there are some variables in the surveys (like the question about the desired 
speed of building Europe) which can be considered as strictly continuous, although 
the measured scale is ordinal, if the number of categories is large (seven or more 
although the figure seven is somewhat arbitrary) and the data meet the other 
assumptions of the parametric test (Tabachnick and Fidell, 2001; Agresti and Finlay, 
1997). If it is more powerful to achieve measurement at a higher level as this will 
contain more discriminating information, it is customary in the social sciences -
including the research produced in the topic area - to treat variables as continuous 
when they have fewer ordinal categories than seven as the property that is crucial to 
the application of multivariate parametric procedures is not the type of measurement 
so much as the shape of the distribution, that is to say the normality of the 
distributionS7 (Tabachnick and Fidell, 2001; Curwin and Slater, 2002; Dewhurst, 
2002). Under these conditions for hypothesis I, II (the latter only with desired speed 
dependent variable) and III, parametric statistics will be used in the present research. 
Overall, EB data offer a number of advantages which clearly outweigh its 
weaknesses and are especially suited to the present unfunded cross-national, cross-
sectional and cross-temporal study. 
57 Nonnal probability distribution is used to describe a symmetrical, bell shaped curve, which has the 
greatest frequency of scores in the middle, with smaller frequencies towards th~ ex~remes. 
Multivariate normality is the assumption that each variable and alllinear combmatIOns oft~e 
variables are nonnally distributed. When the assumption is met, the residuals of the analysls are also 
normally distributed and independent (Tabachnick and FidelL 200 I). 
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3.4 Critique of Methodology used by Previous Studies 
3.4.1 Aggregate Level Data Analysis 
In the article of Eichenberg and Dalton (1993), they employed a Dependent variable 
which is intrinsically binary (net support: good thing - bad thing expressed in 
percentage) for a study at the aggregate national level. 58 This may invalidate the use 
of multivariate linear regression - they used GLS (for cross-section)/ARMA (= 
autoregressive moving average) analysis - as this dependent variable is not 
continuous itself but as indicated above it may be treated as such: the shape of the 
distribution of the variable, as well as other parametric test assumptions, are 
moreover more important than the level of measurement of the variable. Another 
weakness of the methodology of Eichenberg and Dalton (1993) is that the "neither 
agree nor disagree" category, that is to say "neither good thing nor bad thing" 
category, is left out of the analysis but in some EU countries, this category is 
important, especially when it is considered that this category may be linked with a 
lack of familiarity with the process of European integration in some countries such 
as the United Kingdom. 
Another weakness of the methodology used by Eichenberg and Dalton (1993) is that 
it does not recognize that the state of national economies is not only affected by the 
European Union, but for example by global recession. It follows from this that the 
EU should be judged in terms of the policies it enacts and which influence the state 
of national economies. The methodology used by Gabel and Palmer (1995), in a 
study though done this time at the individual level, recognized this by incorporating 
a control variable - Has your country benefited or not from EU membership? - with 
the questions of evaluation of the national economic situation (though measuring 
respondents' perceptions over past twelve months rather than actual economic 
condition), WWII deaths per capita and cross-sectional data (for example income 
and education), although there are some multicollinearity problems between EC 
benefit question and cross-sectional data (many respondents associate their nation's 
benefit with their own benefit). It must be noted that when the question about 
respondent's perceptions about the national economic situation is not used, this 
58 The same dependent variable was moreover used in Eichenberg and Dalton's (2007) latest cross-
national aggregate analysis. 
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control variable is not used and the former replaced by objective measures of 
national benefits, for instance EC trade percentage and EC trade balance. 
In the aggregate level study of Christin and Hug (2002) on referendums and 
citizens' support for European integration, they used the percentage of good thing as 
the dependent variable for the period from 1973 to 1997 across nations and used a 
number of dummy variables. Focusing on one response category in the dependent 
variable used here, is problematic because variations in responses in the other 
categories are not reflected (Gabel and Palmer, 1995). However the authors found a 
high correlation (.97) between net support and absolute support.59 In addition 
dummy variables for the period of time the related countries were under a popularly 
approved treaty (Denmark and Ireland for all periods; France from 1993 to 1997 
before new treaty: that is to say the Amsterdam Treaty) were utilised. To measure 
the instantaneous effect of referendum, a dummy variable including all semesters for 
all countries in which a referendum occurred was applied. This study was not done 
at the individual level or regional level. The justification for using control variables 
is slim. Other independent variables used include inflation, unemployment, GDP 
growth and intra-EU exports. 
Anderson and Kaltenthaler (1996) used three questions separately as dependent 
variables in their aggregate data level analysis, namely 
- For or against efforts to unify Western Europe, using only percentage of 
respondents answering "for"; 
- Country's membership ofEC, using only percentage of respondents answering 
"good thing"; 
- Very sorry, indifferent and relieved EC scrapped, using only percentage of 
respondents answering "very sorry". 
While this operationalisation takes into account the middle category score and thus 
corrects one of the weaknesses in the methodology of Eichenberg and Dalton 
(1993), only one category (positive evaluation of integration) is retained for the 
59 Net support is measured by the difference between the percentage of good ,thing minus the . 
percentage of bad thing as for the study of Eichenberg and Dalton (1993) while absolute support IS 
operationalized by the percentage of good thing. 
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analysis, which at best represents a partial result. Furthennore, the underlying scale 
of each dependent variable considered is not strictly continuous (from 3 to 4 point 
scales) but as indicated above they may be treated as such - the shape of the 
distribution of the variable, and other parametric test assumptions, are moreover 
more important than the level of measurement of the variable - which warrants the 
use of parametric statistics such as the GLS regression model used in the analysis. 
Along the same line, there are also some independent variables, like the timing of 
(EU) entry of country with only three categories: that is to say the original six 
countries are assigned a value of 3, late joiners (Portugal, Spain and Greece) a value 
of 2 and middle joiners (United Kingdom, Ireland and Denmark) a value of 1. It 
must be noted that the attribution of this coding (values to countries) rests on a 
presumption that at any given point in time over the period from 1973 to 1993, 
support levels are highest for the original six countries, somewhat lower among the 
most recent members and lowest among those countries that joined in the 1970s. 
The length of (EU) membership is itself measured by adding 0.5 for each subsequent 
semi-annual Eurobarometer survey for which a country has been a member of the 
EU over the related study period. 
A strength in the methodology is that the analysis was carried out over a time period 
of more than 20 years, that is to say from 1973 to 1993, and a greater number of 
countries were included, namely twelve - compared to only eight for Eichenberg 
and Dalton (1993) over a time period of 1973 to 1988 - which allow them to mirror 
better the business cycle and thus facilitate the examination of whether the support 
for integration is correlated with macro-economic indicators. This may explain why 
Anderson and Kaltenthaler (1996) found significant effects for unemployment and 
inflation (for the EU membership evaluation) when Eichenberg and Dalton (1993) 
only found significant effects for inflation. In addition, the economic aggregates 
used in the study, namely GDP growth, unemployment and inflation, are measured 
in the twelve months prior to the month the Eurobarometer survey was conducted. 
This may be both a strength and a weakness. A strength because respondents may 
make an evaluation of the integration based on the evaluation of the general 
economic situation in their country of residence relying on definitive and widely 
published data, economic data for the past year (lag for publication of annual 
figures) which may have already influenced their daily life. Nonetheless, it is also a 
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weakness in the sense that respondents may make their opinion about the general 
economic situation in their country based on present daily life evidence but also 
information and data reported in the media, especially newspapers, television and 
radio, and by the elites (for example political parties) which tend to comment on 
actual current situation and the near future (economic forecasts). For the purpose of 
this research, the second assumption is retained and economic aggregates of the year 
in which Eurobarometer surveys are conducted, will be used. Kaltenthaler and 
Anderson (2001) used the same approach. The studies carried out tend to be more 
global and less individual, and not take care of the particularities of each member 
state to explain the support for the EU integration. The present study will address 
this in the context of France and the United Kingdom. 
The merit of the aggregate level study of Kaltenthaler and Anderson (2001) is that it 
analyses the respondents' support for a specific policy question (support for EMU 
and a single currency) rather than public support for integration as a whole. To do 
so, they used two questions, one asking respondents whether the currency should be 
managed by the national government or jointly within the EU, and the other one 
asking respondents whether they are in favour or against EMU and a single 
currency. The latter question is a more specific question and inclined to uncover the 
opinions of citizens towards EMU. The sequential use of these questions allows the 
researchers to compare the results to these two questions and check the validity of 
responses as the question becomes more specific to EMU. However, as for example 
Eichenberg and Dalton (1993), the dependent variable used is also binary and not 
continuous itself: Kaltenthaler and Anderson (2001) utilized only the positive 
answer to the question and transformed this as a percentage (percentage of people 
who says "yes" to the question). 
Another strength of the study by Kaltenthaler and Anderson (2001) is that they have 
carried out multivariate regression analyses taking into account not only monetary 
policy variables (length of membership of EMS; inflation; Central Bank 
independence) and economic aggregates (intra-EU trade; unemployment) but also 
political variables (government position on EU; length ofEU membership and age 
of nation state) which can influence public opinion on the EU and its policies. Thus 
previous research - that is to say Eichenberg and Dalton (1993); Gabel and Palmer 
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(1995; 1998) - had established that national traditions and particular historical 
experiences could influence public opinion about integration. The age of nation 
state variable is especially important here as it can measure the sense of attachment 
to the national state and its correlated national identity in the sense that the longer a 
nation state has existed, the more opportunity there is for a strong national identity 
to develop and become meaningful for its citizens as the citizens accumulate a 
common historical experience. The relatively short reference time period used in the 
research, namely from 1994 to 1997, limits somewhat the validity of the research 
and will require further research to confirm the results. 
The methodology used by Sanchez-Cuenca (2000) is interesting in the sense that the 
dependent variable that he used can be considered as strictly continuous and can 
warrant the use of parametric statistics if test assumptions are respected, including 
the concomitant use of this dependent variable with interval or ratio level data - that 
is to say economic aggregates - as in the related study at the aggregate level. The 
related dependent variable is desired integration speed question with a seven point 
scale - the average score per country was taken for the aggregate level analysis -
and has the merit of specifying views in a more precise way than the dependent 
variables used in other studies, such as the evaluation of membership or unification 
question. The question asks directly about integration, unlike the membership 
indicator, which refers to the benefits of a country being in the EU, which is a 
narrower issue. It is also positive that the perceived and desired rhythm of 
integration are measured, this enabling the researcher to examine and separate the 
factual and evaluative dimension of integration. The disadvantage of using this 
dependent variable is that it does not measure the degree of support for integration. 
However if a respondent declares a preference for a rapid integration, it goes without 
saying that he or she supports integration. This reasoning is perhaps less valid for a 
respondent preferring a low speed of integration (one to three point chosen on the 
scale) as a person can be in favour of integration but desire a low speed of 
integration. This objection can though lose a large part of its substance when 
considering that a quite small minority of respondents choose a value under four. 
This objection also assumes a degree of sophistication on the part of the respondents 
not warranted with most citizens' limited knowledge and interest in European 
affairs. In addition the related dependent variable appears to be correlated 
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moderately with other dependent variables used in other studies like the EU 
membership evaluation. 
The analysis of Sanchez-Cuenca (2000) contains weaknesses - further weaknesses 
and benefits of Sanchez and Cuenca's analysis will be commented on in the next 
section on individual level analysis. Thus only one survey (EB 44.1, 1995) has been 
used in the research, which as a result limits the value of the results obtained and 
requires further analysis with other data. The author also carried out an individual 
level analysis to confirm the results done at the aggregate level and did an ordered 
logit analysis but seemed to have mixed aggregate level data (that is to say 
corruption) and individual level data (for example trust in institutions, influence on 
institutions, desired speed) which is for the least arguable. The aggregate level data 
as the adjective implies, relies on an average of responses, which is de facto more 
consensual and general and thus cannot account for the unique response of an 
individual, and put on a par with individual level citizens' responses. 
Dutch and Taylor (1997) in their aggregate-level analysis of Eurobarometer data 
from 1973 to 1989 have used a lagged EU membership variable in their regression 
analyses to capture the growing elite consensus in favour of European integration 
during the 1980s - referred as elite-driven diffusion. This elite diffusion effect was 
first observed with the curve of EU support through the related years and with a 
rising intercept in the same years. What is also interesting in the research approach 
of Dutch and Taylor (1997) is that they have controlled the relationship between EU 
support and economic performance of the country with the incumbent support -
question used "If there were a general election tomorrow, which party would you 
support?" - as it was considered that the EU had little direct role in creating national 
economic conditions, especially in the eyes of citizens. In the study period of the 
present research, it can be argued that the EU has a greater role in the economic and 
social policies followed by member states - influencing in the process their national 
fiscal and monetary policies - especially after the Maastricht and Amsterdam 
Treaties. This also echoes citizens' perceptions, and as such this control may not be 
necessary. Nevertheless it can also be contended that national governments still 
retain a role - albeit a restricted one - in the management of their economy 
especially in the eyes of the electorates. Thus the incumbent government control 
106 
variable will also be used to observe its effect. One of the main weaknesses of 
Dutch and Taylor's (1997) analysis is that they have not tested the effect of 
subjective economic evaluation - in other words, national economic performance 
perceptions of people - on EU support. Furthermore, Dutch and Taylor (1997) also 
carried out a multivariate analysis of regional-level data. The object of the present 
research is to uncover and contrast the British and French citizens' national 
attitudinal patterns towards EU integration, and thus makes redundant such a 
regional-level study. It can be though useful to retain some regional variables in the 
analysis. 
In the research approach of Hooghe (2003), the operationalisation of the functional, 
distributional and social model variables is worthy of note. Hooghe (2003) relying 
partly on Wessels and Kielborn's (1995) research on ordinal European functionality 
of policies firstly classified policies according to their externalities or economies of 
scale - one for policies with low externalities (education, health and employment 
policy); two for policies with medium externalities (regional policy, social policy, 
research and development) and three for policies with high externalities (or scale 
economies) (environment, defence, foreign policy, third world aid, immigration, 
currency and agriculture). It must be noted that Hooghe (2003) had reclassified 
regional and social policies to the second category because they can create negative 
externalities - thus for example differential national public investment may divert 
private investment and create social problems in neighbouring countries. Secondly 
the distributional variable was created by assigning a score to each policy as a 
function of average government spending as a percentage of GDP for the fourteen 
largest countries in 2000, relying on data compiled from the Commission of the 
European Communities for the bulk of policies, from OECD for third world aid, 
from extrapolations from national accounts for foreign policy, currency and 
immigration policy. Five categories were thus created from less than 0.1 % of GDP 
(first category) to superior or equal to 4.5% of GDP (fifth category). Finally the 
social model was structured as a dummy variable - coded one for the five policies 
singled out as central to regulated capitalism (employment, social inclusion, regional 
policy, environment, research and development) and zero for the remaining policies. 
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Hooghe (2003) utilized as dependent variable the national average response (per 
country) to the following question: "For each of the following areas, do you think 
that decisions should be made by the (nationality) government, or made jointly 
within the European Union?". This dependent variable is binary and as such the 
treatment of this variable with parametric statistics, as highlighted earlier, is 
problematic. Furthermore the related researcher does not seem to have used the 
"Don't know" answer, which could have been treated as the middle category albeit 
as conveyed earlier it is not a perfect measure but it is linked to the weaknesses of 
Eurobarometer data. In Hooghe's (2003) research, the questions used in the national 
elite survey and European elite survey are similar to the Eurobarometer question but 
differ slightly in that they incorporate a 10 point scale and allow respondents to 
indicate, in addition to the direction, the degree of support or opposition: "To what 
extent should each of the following policy areas be decided at the national or 
regional level and to what extent at the European level? We have a scale from 1 to 
10 ... the scores in between allow you to say how close to either side you are 
(towards 1 = more in favour of the policy being decided at the national or regional 
level; towards 10 = more in favour of the policy being decided at the European 
level)". Two further research limitations ofHooghe's (2003) study are that datasets 
with different years were used in the analysis - 1996 for the national elite survey; 
2001-2002 for the European elite survey and 2000 for the citizens' survey 
(Eurobarometer) - and that the model was not tested across time, both of these 
necessarily limiting the value of the results elicited in the related study. 
A weakness of many of the researches reviewed is that the dependent variables used 
tend not to be aggregate variables but yet the related variables are tested with 
economic aggregate variables. A fairer approach is to test the relationship of an 
aggregate dependent variable with aggregate variables, which will be done in this 
research. An aggregate level study, whilst useful, is also of limited value as it 
focuses on the aggregation of opinions and calls for a study at the individual level, in 
the full sample of citizens to confirm results obtained in the aggregate level study. 
Hence, in the current research, an individual level analysis will also be carried out. 
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3.4.2 Individual Level Data Analysis 
3.4.2.1 Individual Benefit and EU Support 
A strength of the analysis carried out by Sanchez-Cuenca (2000) is that in the 
individual level analysis, the explanatory variables, trust in institutions (Commission 
and national government) and influence on institutions (national government and 
European institutions), are selected rather than the satisfaction with national or 
European democracy variables which are quite general. All these measures are 
though unsatisfactory as they fail to gauge the performance of the political actors (in 
other words the people running the country). The first two variables measure the 
approval of the regime institutions while the other two measure the regime 
performance (Linde and Ekman, 2003). It can be though hypothesized that citizens 
do not actually dissociate the performance of institutions from that of political actors 
and tend to place the latter as the overarching player. Besides certain researchers 
such as Anderson (1998), Ray (2003a), Gabel (1998a) - support for party of prime 
minister (president in France) for the latter - and Dutch and Taylor (1997) - the 
latter in a study at the aggregate level - have identified and utilized an incumbent 
government support variable. To do so, they used the following question "If there 
were a general election tomorrow, which party would you vote for?" and 
transformed it into a dummy variable with a code of one given for supporters of the 
government (governing parties) and zero otherwise. 
It is also useful that the political variables used by Sanchez-Cuenca (2000) plus the 
EC/EU benefit question are used at the same time in the analysis, controlling for the 
effect of each other as the evaluation of European integration for respondents is 
complex and subject to several sources of proxies. However the coding of "don't 
know" as the middle category for example for the benefit question or trust in 
institutions, is though arguable as mentioned above although the author claimed that 
there was no change in results by not incorporating the related category. It must be 
noted that the selection of the trust in government variable is also consistent with the 
incumbent popularity argument (Franklin, Van Der Eijk and Marsh (1995); Hug and 
Sciarini (2000) and Ehin (2001), the latter in the context of Central and Eastern 
European countries). The masses are thus often too uninformed and uninterested to 
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fonn independent opinions on integration issues, their willingness to endorse the 
elite driven integration project is partially dependent on their overall trust in national 
elites. 
As discussed in the literature review, Gabel (1998a) in his book entitled "Interests 
and Integration: Market Liberalization, Public Opinion and European Union", has 
tested utilitarian support for integration. In the methodology that was used, there are 
a number of strengths and weaknesses. The first positive point is that he examined 
via a confinnatory factor analysis, the covariation patterns between the dependent 
variables of support for European integration and de facto identified latent and 
underlying factors. This enabled him to identify the measures of utilitarian and 
affective support. It must though be noted that the "don't know" category was 
arbitrarily coded as the middle category in the questions such as EC national benefit, 
EC solidarity and European unification. A respondent who answers "don't know" to 
a question may not belong to this mid category and may have no opinion on the 
issue, which is different to the implicit neither in favour or nor against positioning 
used in this coding. However "don't know" answers in questions such as the benefit 
question where there was no other middle category, were found to express lack of 
support for the EU (Anderson and Smith, 2004). The use of "don't know" category 
in the confinnatory factor analysis is also justified by the fact that a binary variable 
would be problematic if used with such a statistical procedure. Following the factor 
analysis, Gabel (1998a) used rightly the dependent variable (evaluation of 
membership) with the highest factor loading to test whether integration support has a 
utilitarian perspective. However as mentioned above, the related Eurobarometer 
question is perhaps too vague and broadly worded to be a precise measure of 
utilitarian support, this underlining the limitation of factor analysis. 
Another positive aspect of Gabel's research is that the study was carried out over a 
long period from spring 1975 to spring 1992. The research carried out by Gabel 
(1998a) also relies on multivariate analyses both at the individual and aggregate 
levels, and de facto circumvents the results validity issues found with research 
carried out by for example Inglehart et al. (1991), Feld and Wildgen (1976), 
Hewstone (1986) and Handley (1981) with much of the evidence consisting for 
these of bivariate analyses, which may conceal intervening or spurious relationships. 
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Gabel (1998a) has used a number of controlling variables to look at their effect on 
other explanatory variables and their unique effect on utilitarian support at both the 
individual and aggregate level. 
Although in Gabel's study (1998a), the dependent variable used - membership 
evaluation with a three point scale coded from 0 (bad thing), 1 (neither good nor bad) 
to 2 (good thing), standardized in percentage - contains less discriminating info, it 
can still be treated as continuous as discussed above and therefore employed with 
OLS regression models. It must also be noted that the author claims to have done an 
ordered probit analysis, which gave the same results. It must be noted that Gabel 
(1998a) is using the same dependent variable, calculated in the same manner in both 
the individual and aggregate level data. For the latter he does not take the average, 
which is for the least an arguable practice. In addition, limited response categories 
on the dependent variable necessarily impose some restrictions on how well 
respondents can express their attitudes and some respondents may interpret the 
meaning of the categories slightly differently, which may in tum deflate the 
explained variance R2, although Gabel's analysis aimed to estimate the relationship 
between the explanatory variables and the dependent variable, and not maximize 
explained variance. A study aiming at maximizing inter alia the amount of variance 
in the dependent variable (integration support) accounted by the explanatory 
variables, in other words a profiling of the pro-European and the eurosceptic, may be 
itself propitious. It must be noted that some of the assumptions of the parametric 
tests used (e.g. normality, linearity, independent observations) are not discussed in 
Gabel's book but it is true that in most of the research literature on the topic of 
interest, few researchers comment on the assumptions of the tests used. The respect 
of these assumptions is though necessary to warrant the use of tests like OLS 
regression models. There is also a tendency to multiply the use of dummy variables 
in the analysis but this is partly related to the poor design of the Eurobarometer 
surveys commented upon above. 
In the study of Gabel and Palmer (1995), a dependent variable constructed from 
responses to two questions was employed - three point scale country's membership 
evaluation (good, neither good nor bad and bad thing) and four point scale western 
Europe unification (very much/to some extent for - against) which are summed, 
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standardized by the maximum possible total and mUltiplied by one hundred, this 
forming an effective seven point scale. However for 1976 and 1977, the European 
unification question is replaced by a three point scale, desired speed of unification 
question as it was not available for the related years. A benefit of using the related 
two survey questions is that a more precise and discriminating measure of ED 
support is created, capturing the full range of underlying attitudes, that is less 
plagued by the statistical problems associated with measurement error (Gabel, 
1998b). The related Eurobarometer questions on their own may be too vague and 
broadly worded to be precise measures of the different types of public support, that 
is to say affective and utilitarian support. Furthermore a weakness in Gabel and 
Palmer's research (1995) is that they are testing individual level data with some 
aggregate level data (although some are measured per capita like World War II 
deaths and EC trade balance; EC trade percentage is not per capita), practice, which 
is in essence open to question. 
Along the same lines as Palmer and Gabel (1995), Nelsen et al. (2001) in 
demonstrating in an individual level study that religion, in particular Catholicism, 
can influence support for integration, have relied on dependent variables constructed 
from adding responses to several questions, checking prior to this whether responses 
to questions were loading one another by carrying out principal component analyses. 
Some of these indexed dependent variables incorporated a combined five-point scale 
(for 1998, used answers to evaluation of membership question and EC benefit 
question). Others relied on a seven point scale or more (for 1994, 5 questions were 
used: evaluation of membership; for or against unification; country benefit; desired 
pace of integration and sorry if the ED was scrapped). However, there are two main 
issues with these constructed dependent variables. Firstly, the individual questions 
mixed in the index measure different sorts of public evaluation (affective, utilitarian 
or pace of integration) which may not help the analyses, especially when the purpose 
of the current study is to uncover whether the evaluation of the ED depends on the 
performance of the nation state and may therefore concern more utilitarian support 
than a generalized measure of support for the ED.60 Secondly, there is a paucity of 
data concerning the simultaneous availability of these individual questions in 
60 It must be noted that other studies such as ones by De Vreese and Boomgaarden (2005) and 
Hooghe and Marks (2005) have also used such indexed dependent variables. 
112 
Eurobarometer surveys, which makes the comparability of results between periods 
difficult. It must be noted that from 1995, evaluation of membership, EC benefit 
and pace of integration are the questions, which are the most available in the 
surveys. With explained variances ranging from 7.6% to 28% in their regression 
analyses, although measured at the individual level, the multivariate analyses carried 
out tend not to optimise explained variance (the latter being a research objective of 
the related researchers), possibly because of some over-fitting with the full models 
of 1994. 
The approach taken by Nelsen and Guth (2000) to explore gender differences in the 
support for European integration (individual level analysis) has the advantage of 
also using an indexed dependent variable (for or against unification; evaluation of 
membership; Country benefit and Sorry if the EU was scrapped), the latter being the 
product of reliability and principal component analyses. Yet, as mentioned above, 
this may also be a weakness and difficult to apply with regard to the paucity of data. 
It must be noted that the related researchers have also used indexed variables for 
some independent variables such as traditional gender role variable. Though the 
validity of the results obtained in that study is limited as it relied on one cross-
national survey, namely, Eurobarometer 42 (1994). The retention and coding of 
"Don't know" in the dependent variable is also contestable as indicated above. 
Kritzinger (2003) in her cross-sectional research, to demonstrate that public support 
for integration is endogenous to the national economic and political performance of 
the related member state, recognized partly that political support should be measured 
by creating new scaled political variables to gauge political support at the national 
and European level. Thus, for the political support at the national level, Kritzinger 
(2003) relied on the questions "satisfaction with the way democracy works in your 
country" and "rely or not on each of the following institutions to make sure that the 
decisions taken by this institution are in the interest of yourself? the national 
government and the national parliament?". It must be noted that Kritzinger (2003) 
did not report the reliability of the newly created variable. 
What is positive in the methodology used by Kritzinger (2003) is that she has used 
exogeneity tests to look at whether the European factor is endogeneous (in other 
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words dependent on) to national economic and political factors and has taken this 
into account to build three stage least squares regression models.61 It is also positive 
that (independent) variables were created from different questions, this permitting 
her to rely on several questions' responses to form a construct and also build, in the 
process, continuous variables necessary to use parametric regression models 
although the reliabilities for these created variables were not reported. 62 The 
dependent variable selected for Kritzinger's research, namely "For or against 
unification of West em Europe" (four point measurement scale) whilst being limited 
in terms of discriminating information can be treated as continuous. In addition 
Kritzinger has claimed to have used other dependent variables such as membership 
indicator, dissolution indicator and a scale of these questions and found very similar 
results. 
A major limitation to Kritzinger's research results pertains to their validity as the 
related study relies solely on one data survey, namely EB 42 (1994) and calls 
therefore for further research to confirm her results although the availability of 
similar data is here an obstacle. Another limitation in Kritzinger's research, is that 
only attitudinal questions, that is to say citizens' perceptions, regarding national and 
European factors (economic, political and social factors) are tested, and as a result, 
the relationship between actual economic, social and political data and integration 
support (aggregate level study) is ignored. Kritzinger's study is limited to four 
countries, namely Germany, Italy, the United Kingdom and France but provides a 
wealth of comparisons in the sense that the four countries have inter alia somewhat 
different public attitudes to European integration from enthusiasm to euroscepticism, 
differences in public attitudes to national structures and types of states. It is 
especially interesting that the two countries, France and the United Kingdom on 
which the present study is carried out are included here. 
Anderson and Reichert (1996) have used OLS regression models with the dependent 
variable "EU membership" which has a three-point ordinal scale. Assumptions of 
61 The last stage ofthe regression models was destined to apply a Generalized Least Squares 
procedure (= Weighted Least Squares regression procedure) to deal with heteroscedasticity present in 
the data and produce unbiased estimates although the transformation of data would have provided 
more efficient estimators. 
62 A reliability analysis is carried out to ascertain whether diverse items (questions) measure the 
same underlying construct. 
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test were moreover not commented on. They also used in the same analysis 
aggregate (EU trade and net EU budget return) and individual level data (age, 
gender, income, education, farmers, and post-materialism), which is for the least an 
arguable practice. What is interesting in the procedure followed by Anderson and 
Reichert (1996) is that in testing whether countries and individuals that benefit from 
the European integration process are significantly more supportive of the EU, they 
test the data per year (that is to say year 1982, 1986 and 1990 tested separately) and 
do not pool data cross-sectionally or at the aggregate level in a time-series manner as 
they argue that national and personal economic benefits can have time-variant 
effects on citizens' support for integration. This procedure is thus justified by three 
reasons: The object of investigation - European integration and the EU as an 
organisation has evolved and is evolving through time; the national and international 
economic and political context in which European integration takes place is also 
evolving; and finally countries which have joined the EU at different times and with 
different political and economic motivations may not react similarly to economic 
costs and benefits resulting from the integration context. This procedure has the 
merit of making possible and easy comparisons between years. 
Objects of Political Support 
Linde and Ekman (2003) have shown that the survey item "satisfaction with the way 
democracy works" is an indicator of support for the way the democratic regime 
works in practice. Norris (1999a, 1999b, 1999c) building on the work of Easton 
(1965; 1975) thus distinguished five levels or objects of political support: The 
political community, regime principles, regime performance, regime institutions and 
political actors. The question "satisfaction with the way democracy works" gauges 
the regime performance rather than the performance of political actors in the related 
countries. However respondents may not dissociate clearly between the 
performance of the regime ("satisfaction with the way democracy works" question), 
the approval of the regime institutions (trust or no trust in institutions questions) and 
the performance of political actors (people running the country). It goes without 
saying that these domains also influence each other mutually, so the dissociation is 
not easy to extricate nor totally possible considering their mutual interdependence. 
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Thus it should be noted that the perceived perfonnance of a regime has to do with 
what the regime delivers and what it does not deliver (what it refrains from doing). 
As Lipset (1959), Easton (1965; 1975) and Almond and Verba (1963; 1980) have 
pointed out, the support for the political regime and a fortiori for political leaders is 
built on a record of acknowledged regime perfonnance or systems outputs over the 
long tenn. Systems outputs are not only of an economic and social nature 
(economic growth, employment ... ) but also have to do with the regime's capacity to 
maintain order, to maintain the rule of law and to otherwise respect human rights 
and the democratic rules of the game. This implies that there are bridges between 
the effectiveness of regime and its legitimacy. A successful political and economic 
development generates a reservoir of goodwill that can be used to cover minor or 
temporary setbacks in the system's ability to produce outputs. This aspect can be 
especially important in the case of the United Kingdom and France as they have 
witnessed a different economic, social and political outputs record in tenns of, for 
example, unemployment, taxation or public order over the last 15 to 20 years which 
can be considered as long tenn and may have a role to play in citizens' support for 
European integration. It concerns the real measurement in these domains, that is to 
say the actual outputs or outcomes, as well as citizens' perceptions of these. 
The "satisfaction with the way democracy works" item has the weakness of being 
influenced by the political-ideological orientations of the respondents and as such 
dissatisfaction with democracy measured by this item may not be necessarily 
motivated by actual political outcomes. Thus persons who voted for a party that 
made it to government - that is to say the winners - tend to be more satisfied with 
democracy than those who voted for a party that did not make it into the government 
- that is to say the losers. Winners are supposedly more likely to believe that their 
government is interested in and more responsive to their needs and thus are more 
inclined to be more satisfied than the losers with the perfonnance of the government 
(Anderson and Guillory, 1997; Fuchs et aI., 1995). Party Preference and ideological 
orientation of individuals as tested before, also influence support for integration by 
themselves. It must be noted that if electoral preferences on EU integration are 
influenced by party position - and the demographic profile of each respondent -
party position on European integration is also influenced by electoral preferences on 
EU integration, as demonstrated by Carrubba (2001) with the use ofa two-least 
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squares regression model. Ray (2003a) has shown that the relationship between EU 
support and incumbent government support is context dependent and therefore 
mediated by a range of variables such as party positions on ED integration, left-right 
ideology, ideological extremism, party attachment and economic situation of the 
respondent but also by proximity to European referendum and European Parliament 
elections. 
In actual terms, within the political support framework proposed by Norris (1999a, 
b, c), it is sensible to postulate that citizens use different proxies, objects of political 
support to assess the performance of the national authorities to deal with the 
economic, political, and social issues that the country undergoes without 
distinguishing clearly between the specificities of each (this, depending on citizens' 
knowledge of and interest in the national political environment). In the EB surveys, 
there are questions which measure political support in terms of the political 
community ("proud to be a citizen of this country?"), regime performance 
("satisfaction with the way democracy works in our country?"), regime institutions 
("trust in institutions?"). Moreover these questions are applied to both the related 
country and the European Union as a whole but these questions are not present in all 
surveys. As noted above there are no indicators of the approval of political actors in 
the Eurobarometer series nor of the regime principles although the question "If there 
were a general election tomorrow, which party would you vote for?" used by some 
researchers such as Anderson (1998), Ray (2003a), Gabel (1998a) and Dutch and 
Taylor (1997) may help to gauge the approval of incumbent political actors. 
However this indicator is not optimal in the sense that this support is also 
conditioned by the existence and nature of the political opposition to the incumbent 
government and then the political game, and not entirely by the approval of policies 
per se followed by the incumbent government and its behaviour. Also it is possible 
to gather approval ratings for political leaders in polls published and take the yearly 
average, although this would conflict with the use of individual data for the reasons 
mentioned above. Linde and Ekman (2003) have also underlined that to gauge 
political support, there should be questions which not only measure the five 
indicators of political support but also there should be several questions for each 
indicator. It is also a limitation of the EB series as the measurement of each 
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dimension tends to rely on one question, and questions are not always available 
across years. 
National and European Identity and Image 
What is interesting in Medrano and Gutierrez's study (2001) is that although it is 
about nested identities, they use questions with more discriminating information 
than Eurobarometer questions, that is to say they often use ten point scales or index 
scales, addressing in the process some of the weaknesses in the phrasing of 
Eurobarometer questions. They use questions to uncover the compatibility of the 
European identity with national and regional identities such as "Image of Europe in 
political, economic and social terms", degree of "Identification with Europe", degree 
of "Identification with Spain" and degree of "Identification with the Autonomous 
Community", cumulated with an analysis of the discourse of the national Spanish 
political actors on Europe. This is certainly important in the context of the United 
Kingdom and France as Europe tends to be portrayed by related national political 
actors and the media in a different way. 
In Eurobarometer surveys, there are questions - though not always available across 
years - about whether people watch the media, how fairly the media cover European 
affairs, whether respondents are interested in European and national politics, how 
often respondents think themselves as European - it must also be noted that the 
Eurobarometer question "how often do you think of yourself as European?" is 
awkward as identity is not something one usually thinks about but adequately 
differentiates individuals according to their degree of identification with Europe. 
EB surveys also subsume the following questions "In the near future do you see 
yourself as ... ?" (coding 1 = Nationality only; 2 = Nationality and European; 3 = 
European and Nationality; 4 = European only) and "People may feel different 
degrees of attachment to their country or to Europe. Please tell me how attached 
you feel to your country or to Europe" (very attached; fairly attached; not very 
attached; not at all attached) which are clearly about community and identity, in 
particular sense of inclusive or exclusive identity and attachment to the country and 
Europe, and have been used in recent research studies to monitor their influence on 
European integration (Hooghe and Marks, 2005; Carey, 2002; Luedtke, 2005). 
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There is a need in the current research, to build on this and investigate whether and 
to what extent the national identity concern and its compatibility with Europe 
moderate the relationship between European integration support and utilitarianism, 
and what role national political actors and national institutions play in this. The 
terms identity and image have here a broad meaning and cover the national and 
European socio-economic and political dimensions. 
Furthermore in his research on France and Germany, Schild (200 I) has shown a 
relationship between sense of European identity and one's evaluation of the 
country's Ee membership - this contrasting with the sense of national identity being 
more affective-based. To do this, he used Eurobarometer data from 1982 to 1999. 
He first looked at a series of correlations between pride to be a national of a country 
and self-perceptions as a French or German and/or as a European. The questions 
used were the following: National pride question: "Would you say that you are very 
proud, fairly proud, not very proud or not at all proud to be French or German?" 
(coding 1 = not at all proud; 2 = not very proud; 3 = fairly proud; 4 = very proud); 
Self-perceptions as a French or German and/or as a European: "In the near future do 
you see yourself as ... ?" (coding 1 = French/German; 2 = French/German and 
European; 3 = European and French/German; 4 = European only). He also 
correlated these questions with the unification question, membership benefit 
question and membership question. 
3.4.2.2 Structuring of Individual EU Policy Preferences 
The way individuals structure their EU policy preferences has been much less 
researched. Thus, Gabel and Anderson (2002) conducted a confirmatory factor 
analysis of Eurobarometer data of citizens' preferences regarding existing EU policy 
areas and therefore left out Eurobarometer questions related to creation of new 
policies but it is true that some of the EU policies in the question selected for the 
study concern policies that were not fully developed at the time when data was 
collected, that is to say in 1996. The question selected by Gabel and Anderson 
(2002) in EB 44.2 BIS "Some people expect the European Union to become more 
active than now in certain policy areas. For each of the following, please tell me if 
you consider it a key priority or not: a to y" has the merit of covering a broad range 
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of policy areas of EU policy authority from monetary union, crime, immigration, 
employment programmes, environment protection, equal opportunities to common 
defence policy and as such can gauge citizens' preferences in these domains. While 
the list does not exhaust all EU policies, it did include policy areas that are useful to 
test how citizens structure their EU policy preferences in the economic, political and 
social fields. The policy statements also generally indicated a policy direction, not 
simply a policy area, for instance they were asked whether "intervening more firmly 
in possible conflicts" is a priority. The related survey question chosen by Gabel and 
Anderson (2002) has, however, the weakness of not directly measuring the 
respondents' agreement with the EU policy as they are asked whether the policy is a 
priority - measuring de facto both salience and direction of each policy statement as 
Gabel and Anderson (2002) acknowledged. The fact that the respondent's choice of 
priority policies is not limited helps to reduce this problem and as a result 
respondents are not constrained explicitly to prioritise among policy statements and 
can advance their directional preference regarding each policy statement. 
A further weakness is that the question's response scale used has only three 
categories, namely "not a key priority", "a key priority" and "Don't know". It does 
not include directly an intermediate category that captures indifference regarding the 
policy statement. The "Don't know category" may capture some of this indifference 
and as such was retained in the analysis of Gabel and Anderson (2002). This 
resolved partly the problem of conducting a factor analysis with a dichotomous 
variable but such an analysis would ideally require a quantitative variable which is a 
rare occurrence in the Eurobarometer data. Gabel and Anderson (2002) do not 
moreover comment on the assumptions of the related test. The analysis and results 
of Gabel and Anderson (2002) on the structure of citizens' attitudes and the EU 
political space is also not tested across time. The analysis was for the European 
electorate as a whole and had the drawback of not examining the structure of 
attitudes within member states. 
In their studies, Hooghe (2003) and Voessing (2005) have used an EB question 
which asks respondents how they want to distribute authority between the EU and 
national governments for specific policies. The merit of this question is that it 
provides a measure of EU policy preferences, tapping therefore utilitarian support 
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and enabling it to measure the EU's output legitimacy for individuals. While 
Hooghe's (2003) research takes into account a number of policies (thirteen) in her 
analysis ranging from agriculture to social inclusion, the analysis is at the aggregate 
level- policies are not analysed individually - and only inter-group variation 
between national and European elites and public opinion as a whole were studied. 
Voessing's analysis (2005) involved using a composite index of eight policies 
ranging from currency to security and defence and examined the differences in 
scores between public opinions in eleven countries. In the same analysis, 
differences on ideological opinions between public opinions in the same countries 
were reviewed separately. The main weakness ofVoessing's (2005) and Hooghe's 
(2003) studies is that public preferences towards the scope ofEU policy-making are 
not tested and analysed together with the directional content of policies. This will 
be tested across individual policies and time for France and the United Kingdom in 
hypothesis III. 
3.5 Selection and Operationalization of Variables 
3.5.1 Selection and Operationalization of Variables for Hypothesis I 
Hypothesis I aims to study the relationship between EU support and national 
political institutions performance in socio-economic, societal and political terms in 
the French and British contexts. The study is done at the aggregate level and based 
on twelve nations including the United Kingdom, France, Italy, Spain, Portugal, 
Germany, Belgium, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Ireland, Greece and Denmark. 
British models subsume a dummy variable comparing the United Kingdom to the 
other EU countries while French ones incorporate a dummy variable comparing 
France to the other EU countries. These dummies permit us to see whether the level 
of EU support in France and the United Kingdom is higher or lower than in other 
EU countries but also allow us to measure the effects of economic, social, political 
and socio-economic variables on EU support controlling for these dummies. They 
therefore enable us to see whether these independent variables have an effect on EU 
support in the French and British contexts. 
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3.5.1.1 Dependent Variables 
Two dependent variables were used, one measured support for current EU 
membership and the other one measured support for future European integration. 
Current EU Membership Evaluation 
The current EU membership dependent variable is constructed from answers on the 
following two questions: 
- "Generally speaking, do you think that (OUR COUNTRY)'s membership of the 
European Union is ... ?" (11 a good thing; 2/ neither good nor bad; 3/ a bad thing) 
- "Taking everything into consideration, would you say that (OUR COUNTRY) has 
on balance benefited or not from being a member of the European Union?" (11 
benefited; 2/ don't know; 3/ not benefited) 
Two variants of the first current EU membership dependent variable were used. 
Both consisted of an aggregate composite score of these two questions but one 
integrated the "don't know" response in the benefit question and the other one did 
not. The rationale behind keeping "Don't know" response - and recoding it as a 
middle category in the benefit question - in the first variant dependent variable is 
justified by the fact that it can help to capture the opinion of people who feel their 
country has neither benefited nor not benefited from EU membership - and not only 
those who have no opinion on the issue - in the absence of such an option in the 
response categories proposed to respondents. The fact that "don't know" responses 
represented over 20% of responses in the benefit question - against 7 or 8% of 
answers in the good thing question - seems to corroborate this. 
The choice of the compound dependent variables is motivated by the fact they 
measure utilitarian support (and recognised as such by earlier research literature), 
are available across years - in the study period - and provide a more precise and 
discriminating measure of EU support, capturing a fuller range of underlying 
attitudes that are less plagued by the statistical problems associated with 
measurement error. The composite dependent variable has good internal 
consistency with a Cronbach's Alpha of .868 and .856 for respectively scale without 
122 
"don't know" answers in benefit question and the one with "don't know" answers in 
benefit question (please see appendix 3.1), and as such measure the same underlying 
construct. 
Future European Integration Support 
The future European integration dependent variable is operationalised by using the 
following question: 
- "Which corresponds best to the speed of building Europe you would like? nO 1 is 
running as fast as possible, nO? is standing still". 
The related dependent variable has a seven point scale - the average score per 
country was taken for the aggregate level analysis (hypothesis I) - and has the merit 
of specifying views in a more precise way than the dependent variables used in other 
studies, such as the European Unification question, and is available across the study 
period. 
3.5.1.2 Independent Variables 
The independent variables which will be tested, are regrouped into four themes in 
line with the literature and hypothesis I aiming to test utilitarian explanations. The 
present research uses economic aggregates, political and societal indicators of the 
year in which Eurobarometer surveys are conducted. The rationale for this is that 
respondents form their opinion about the general economic, political and societal 
situation in their country based on present daily life evidence but also information 
and data reported in the media and by the elites (for example political parties) which 
tend to comment on actual current situation and the near future (for example 
economic forecasts). 
Socialisation Theory and EU Support 
The variables timing of (EU) entry and length of (EU) membership account for the 
socialisation theory. In line with earlier research, length of membership variable is 
gauged in years whilst timing of entry is operationalised by giving a code of 3 to 
founding Ee nations (France, Germany, Benelux and Italy) who initially started EU 
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membership with a higher enthusiasm for EU integration, a code of2 to late joiners 
(Portugal, Spain and Greece) who started membership with a lesser enthusiasm for 
EU integration and finally a code of I for middle joiners (United Kingdom, Ireland 
and Denmark) who started membership with an even lesser enthusiasm for EU 
integration. It must be noted that these two variables are not tested together in the 
same models as they are highly correlated with one another (multicollinearity 
problem), which would inflate the size of error terms and weaken the regression 
analyses (Tabachnick and Fidell, 200 I). 
Economic and Social Sphere and EU Support 
The following socio-economic variables are tested: 
Inflation - Annual consumer price variation, Source: European Commission (2002). 
GDP Growth - Gross Domestic Product at constant market prices, annual 
percentage change, Source: European Commission (2002). 
Intra-EU Trade Dependence - Intra-EU exports plus intra-EU imports divided by 
two as a percentage of GDP at market prices, Source: European Commission (2002). 
Intra-EU Trade Balance - Intra-EU exports minus intra-EU imports as a percentage 
of GDP at market prices, Source: European Commission (2002). 
Unemployment - Unemployment rate (Eurostat Definition), Source: European 
Commission (2002). 
Social Expenditure per Head - Total Expenditure on Social Protection per Head of 
Population in ECU/EURO, Source: Eurostat/ESSPROS (2006). 
Total Tax Burden - Current Tax Burden (Total Economy) in percentage ofGDP, 
figure from 1995 with ESA 95 definitions, Source: European Commission (2003). 
Total Tax Burden is a variable which to my knowledge has not been tested before 
the present research. 
Bureaucracy - Extracted from annual World/Global Competitiveness Reports 
(various years), figures were standardised (divided by maximum score of scale-
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scale was reversed for 2000 and 2001 figures - and multiplied by 100), Source: 
Institute for Management Development (various years). Bureaucracy is a variable 
which to my knowledge has not been tested before the present research. 
Societal Sphere and EU Support 
National Economic Corruption - Level of National Economic Corruption, Source: 
Transparency International (various years). Although the measure of national 
corruption used here is only economic and therefore does not include abuse of 
political influence - for instance misuse of or excessive centralization of power -
national economic corruption is usually more current than abuse of political 
influence and the indicator used is available across countries and years. The higher 
the figure, the less corruption there is in a country. 
Crime per Head of Population - Crime per Head of Population (recorded by the 
police), Source: Barclay and Tavares (2003). Crime is a variable which to my 
knowledge has not been tested before the present research. 
While studies have demonstrated the link between anti-immigration sentiments, 
general hostility towards other cultures and reluctance about European integration 
(De Vreese and Boomgarden (2005); McLaren (2002)), immigration and its link 
with European integration is a variable which has not been tested on the aggregate 
level before the present research. Immigration indicators investigated here consist 
of three variables: 
Foreign Population Inflows - Inflows of foreign populations into EU countries in 
thousand, Source: Eurostat (2006a); OECD/SOPEMI (Various Years). Figures for 
Greece from 1999 to 2001 are not available, despite approaches to the Greek home 
office and immigration research centre. 
Net Migration - Net Migration in thousands, figures including corrections, Source: 
Eurostat (2006a). 
Political Asylum Applications - Political Asylum Applications, Source: Eurostat 
(2006a). 
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Since most countries do not have accurate figures on immigration and emigration 
and given the public sensitivity of the information, these figures need to be taken 
with caution. 
National Identity - Aggregate score taken from dichotomous national identity 
variable where the value of one is given to respondents with exclusive national 
identity (nationality only) and zero otherwise (all other categories). Recoded from 
Eurobarometer question: "In the near future, do you see yourself as (1) nationality 
only, (2) nationality and European, (3) European and nationality, and (4) European 
only?". This question was selected as it is about community and identity (in line 
with literature) and is available across years. 
Political Sphere and EU Support 
Incumbent Government Support - Composite score from questions: "On the whole, 
are you very satisfied (1), fairly satisfied (2), don't know (3), not very satisfied (4) 
or not at all satisfied (5) with the way democracy works in (our country)?" and "if 
there was a General Election tomorrow, which party would you vote for?" (the latter 
with one given for supporters of the government (governing parties), two for don't 
know and three otherwise), figures were standardised (scores were added, then 
divided by maximum score of combined scale and multiplied by 100). Middle 
category answers (that is to say "Don't Know") were only used in composite score 
when "Don't Know" response was considered in benefit dependent variable. The 
results for the incumbent government support variable were no different with or 
without integrating this middle category. 
Referendum Years - Years of referendum were coded 1 (France, 1992; Denmark, 
1992, 1998 and 2000; and Ireland, 1992, 1998 and 2001) and otherwise coded 0 for 
all other years and countries. 
European Elections Years - Years of European elections (1994 and 1999) were 
coded 1 and otherwise coded 0 for all other years. 
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3.5.2 Selection and Operationalization of Variables for Hypothesis II 
Hypothesis II aims to study the relationship between citizens' support for integration 
and citizens' individual benefits extracted from European integration in the French 
and British contexts. The study is done at the individual level and done separately 
for French and British samples. 
3.5.2.1 Dependent Variables 
Two types of dependent variables were used, one measured support for current EU 
membership and the other one measured support for future European integration. 
Current EU Membership Evaluation 
Two dependent variables with each two variants were used to test current EU 
membership evaluation, as follows: 
- "Generally speaking, do you think that (OUR COUNTRY)'s membership of the 
E U ··?" uropean mon IS .... 
First variant: answer coded 0 for neither good nor bad & a bad thing and 
answer coded 1 for a good thing 
Second variant: answer coded 0 for a bad thing and answer coded I for a 
good thing 
- "Taking everything into consideration, would you say that (OUR COUNTRY) has 
on balance benefited or not from being a member of the European Union?" 
First variant: answer coded 0 for don't know and not benefited and answer 
coded 1 for benefited 
Second variant: answer coded 0 for not benefited and answer coded 1 for 
benefited 
The rationale for selecting the two dependent variables and retaining "don't know" 
responses in the benefit question developed in Section 3.5 .l.1 applies here. Thus 
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these variables both gauge utilitarian support, are available across years - in the 
study period - and provide a more precise and discriminating measure of EU 
support, capturing a fuller range of underlying attitudes. The retention of "don't 
know" responses in the benefit question is justified by the fact that it can help to 
capture the opinion of people who feel their country has neither benefited nor not 
benefited from EU membership - and not only those who have no opinion on the 
issue - in the absence of such an option in the response categories proposed to 
respondents. 
The two dependent variables - good thing and benefit variables - are tested 
separately as the study is carried out here at the individual data level - inter-item 
correlations and reliability (scale) results between the two dependent variables are 
lower (albeit still high) than at the aggregate level (please see appendix 3.2) - and it 
is itself valuable to examine whether there are any differences in the results between 
citizens' appraisal of current EU support involving the benefit variable and the good 
thing variable. The benefit question is a relatively more precise question which may 
accentuate the stress on utilitarian feelings for individuals. Anderson and Smith 
(2004) thus found that citizens tend to be even more critical of European integration 
when responding to the EU benefit question. 
The coding of the dependent variables - that is to say the regrouping of the middle 
category with "not benefited" or "a bad thing" responses - is motivated not only on 
statistical grounds - to avoid the problem of empty cells or inadequate expected cell 
frequencies which would weaken the logistic regression statistical analysis - but 
also by the fact that hypothesis II primarily aims to analyse whether individual 
utilitarian reasons explain or not people's support for current EU membership in the 
French and British contexts. "Don't know" and "neither good nor bad" answers in 
the membership and benefit questions were also found to express lack of support for 
the EU (Anderson and Smith, 2004). The analysis here does not attempt to fully 
explain all individual attitudes - "don't know" answers were thus not taken into 
account in the operationalisation of desired speed and good thing variables as they 
only represented around 10% of all answers and a middle category in these variables 
was already retained - but incorporated the middle category of the dependent 
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variables which provides some methodological enhancements compared to previous 
research. 
Future European Integration Support 
The future European integration dependent variable is operationalised by using the 
following question and coding of answers: 
- "Which corresponds best to the speed of building Europe you would like? nOl is 
running as fast as possible, n07 is standing still". 
The related dependent variable has a seven point scale and has the merit of 
specifying views in a more precise way than the dependent variables used in other 
studies, such as the European Unification question, and is available across the study 
period. 
3.5.2.2 Independent Variables 
The independent variables which will be tested, are regrouped along four themes in 
line with the literature and hypothesis II aiming to test utilitarian explanations. To 
avoid the problem of zero cells or inadequate expected cell frequencies which would 
weaken the logistic regression analysis, the effective categorisation of each variable 
was organised according to the statistical significance of categories with one another 
on the dependent variable - in other words whether they have a significant effect on 
the dependent variable. 
Subjective Economic Performance Evaluation and EU Support 
The following question was used to operationalize the three variables below: "What 
are your expectations for the year to come, will (next year) be better, the same or 
h . ?" worse, w en It comes to .... 
Expectations over coming 12 months for Economic Situation in Country 
Expectations over coming 12 months for Employment Situation in Country 
Expectations over coming 12 months for Financial Situation of Household 
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The justification for selecting citizens' subjective economic performance evaluation 
over the next twelve months (rather than just in the past twelve months) is that 
respondents tend to form their opinion about the general economic situation and 
their personal situation on the present situation and the near future rather than just on 
the near past. This question is also useful as it enables the respondent to compare 
the current year with next year's expectations. Furthermore these variables were 
available largely across years in the study period, which was not the case for the 
other type of variables. 
Demographic and Socio-Economic Characteristics of Individuals and EU Support 
Income - Question D29 on harmonised income groups has been used as it facilitates 
the comparison between British and French individuals. Respondents are asked to 
take into account the total income of their household (inclusive of all private and 
public incomes). Income groups consist of"- -" (lowest income group), "-", "+" and 
"++" (highest income group). 
Education - Question D8 has been employed to operationalise the education 
variable. It incorporates the following groups: "up to 15 years", "16 - 19 years", 
"20+ years" and "still studying". 
Occupation - Question D15a was operationalised in two ways. The first variable 
compared together middle and high managers, professionals (inclusive of employed 
ones) and students (coded 1) versus rest (shop owners, farmers/fishermen, manual 
workers, clerks, unemployed, retired or unable to work through illness) and 
housewives) (coded 2). The justification for this is that the category coded 1 are 
expected to support EU integration as the market liberalization pertaining to the EU 
integration offers more opportunities for people with human and financial capital. 
The second variable compared separately professionals and general management 
(coded 1), manual workers (including supervisors) (coded 2), students (coded 3), 
unemployed (coded 4), middle managers (coded 5), and clerks (coded 6) against 
retired or unable to work. The latter was chosen as the reference category as it 
includes the largest number of respondents and retired or unable to work people tend 
to be more reluctant towards European integration as they are concerned about the 
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effects of European integration (especially economic integration) on their welfare 
(especially on health and pensions). Statistical models integrating the seven 
category occupation variable are labelled "+" in addition to the model number. For 
models incorporating the future European integration dependent variable, 6 dummy 
variables are used with retired or unable to work as the control category (coded 0) 
and each occupational group assigned a code of 1. 
Materialism/Post-Materialism - The following question was used: "what should be 
the nation's goals?(1 st choice; 2nd choice)" Maintain order and fight rising prices 
coded as 1 (corresponding to materialist values); protect freedom of speech and give 
people more say in government decisions coded as 2 (corresponding to post-
materialist values). This procedure was replicated for the first and second choice 
expressed by individuals. 
Proximity to intra-EU Borders - Regions bordering the EU were coded 1: for the 
United Kingdom (Wales, South East and South West and Northern Ireland) and for 
France (Champagne-Ardenne, Picardie, Haute-Normandie, Basse-Normandie, Nord 
Pas de Calais, Lorraine, Alsace, Franche-Comte, Bretagne, Aquitaine, Midi-
Pyrenees, Rhone-Alpes, Languedoc-Roussillon, Province-Alpes-Cote d' Azur and 
Corse); other regions were coded 0: for the United Kingdom (Scotland, North + 
Yorkshire & Humberside + North West, East/West Midlands + East Anglia, and 
Greater London Council) and for France (Ile-de-France, Centre, Bourgogne, Pays de 
la Loire, Poitou-Charentes, Limousin and Auvergne). The disadvantage of these 
regions is that they are relatively broad and may make it more difficult to capture 
intra-EU proximity utilitarian assessment but this is the best regions variable 
available in Eurobarometer - the combined regions variable has even broader 
regions categories. 
EO Knowledge, Political Ideology, Cognitive Mobilisation, Media Use, Age, 
Gender and EU Support 
EO Knowledge - The following question was used: " .... how much do you feel you 
know about the European Union, its policies, its institutions?" answers were coded 
as 1 for respondents who know it very and quite well, and coded as 2 for 
respondents who know it not very well and not at all. This variable measures 
131 
subjective knowledge. Measures of objective knowledge were not available every 
year and consisted of different knowledge questions (varying in difficulty from one 
Eurobarometer survey to another) which made it somewhat less reliable to infer and 
compare knowledge of respondents across years. The effect of subjective and 
objective knowledge on the dependent variable was moreover very similar. 
Political Ideology - Ideological views of respondents with left, centre and right 
categories. 
Cognitive Mobilisation - It is operationalised by two variables: 
Political Discussion Frequency - using the question "When you get together 
with friends, would you say you discuss political matters frequently, 
occasionally, or never?" 
Political Persuasion - employing the question "When you hold a strong 
opinion, do you ever find yourself persuading your friends, relatives or 
fellow workers to share your views? Does this happen often, from time to 
time, rarely, or never?" 
Media use - Operationalised by the following question: "Do you read the news in 
daily papers everyday, several times a week, once or twice a week, less often or 
never?" 
The choice of newspaper reading is justified by the fact that it is consistently listed 
in Eurobarometer data as one of the most important sources of information about the 
EU for citizens in Europe. More than watching television or listening to the radio, 
daily newspaper reading enhances political interest and knowledge, local political 
participation and a more integrated understanding of political issues (McLeod et aI., 
1999; Guo and Moy, 1998; Holtz-Bacha and Norris, 1999; Schultz, 2003; and Peter 
and De Vreese, 2003). Despite the decline of newspaper readership in the recent 
past - especially for young readers -, newspaper readership remains important 
(Lauf, 2001) and as such has been retained as a variable in the present testing. 
Age - With 15-24, 25-39, and 40+ years groupings. 
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Gender - Female and male categories 
Political Sphere and EU Support 
Incumbent Government Support - Composite score from questions: "On the whole, 
are you very or fairly satisfied (coded as 1), don't know (coded as 2), not very or not 
at all satisfied (coded as 3) with the way democracy works in (our country)?" and "if 
there was a General Election tomorrow, which party would you vote for?" (the latter 
with one given for supporters of the government (governing parties), two for don't 
know and three otherwise). Middle category answers (that is to say "Don't Know") 
were only used in composite score when "Don't Know" response was considered in 
benefit dependent variable. The results for the incumbent government support 
variable were no different with or without integrating this middle category. 
Referendum Years - Year of referendum was coded 1 (France, 1992) and otherwise 
coded 0 for all other years. This variable was only used for French samples as the 
United Kingdom did not have any referendum in the study period. 
European Elections Years - Years of European elections (1994 and 1999) were 
coded I and otherwise coded 0 for all other years. 
3.5.3 Selection and Operationalization of Variables for Hypothesis III 
Hypothesis III aims to study the relationship between socio-economic model 
inclinations and EU policy preferences in the British and French contexts. The 
study is done at the individual level. 
3.5.3.1 Dependent and Independent Variables 
The individual answers to the following question were used to operationalize the 
dependent variables and test hypothesis III: "For each of the following areas, do you 
think that decisions should be made by the (nationality) government, or made jointly 
within the European Union?" 
This question is asked for the following policy areas: regional policies, social 
inclusion, employment (fight against unemployment), environment, research, 
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currency, humanitarian aid, foreign policy, immigration and asylum, police, anti-
drug policy, urban and juvenile crime prevention, agriculture, defence, culture, 
health policy and education. In Eurobarometer data, please note that there are no 
social inclusion questions from 1992 to 1997, no regional policy and agriculture 
questions from 1992 to 1994, no anti-drug question in 1992, no police and urban & 
juvenile crime prevention questions from 1992 to 1998. The virtue of the related 
question is that it provides a more fine-grained measure of preferences for individual 
policies, in other words it taps policy specific, utilitarian support. The question is 
also available across years. The question does not always give a direction for the 
policy itselfbut certain policies are based in political ideology - for example market 
regulation and redistributive policies - especially when tested with left, centre and 
right ideological views of respondents (the independent variable). 
The analysis aimed to broadly and primarily examine whether French and British 
individuals with left or centre or right ideological views (including extreme left and 
right) are in favour or not to transfer policies to the EU as a consequence of a 
preference for a particular socio-economic model: as such individuals with extreme 
left and right ideological opinions have been preserved and included with those with 
left and right views in the analysis. This approach is also justified for statistical 
reasons: more balanced sample sizes are obtained which enable us to detect 
differences if they exist (and avoid therefore Type II errors). Furthermore the means 
of individuals interviewed with extreme left or right ideological views are also 
examined and compared to those with left or right ideological views to see whether 
they are in favour or not of the transfer of policies to the EU, the power of the test 
(need to be at least 70% to be ok and 80% to offer a good power) in this situation 
may not be sufficient - due to very unequal sample sizes - to detect though whether 
the difference is statistically significant. The statistical difference between 
individuals interviewed with extreme left or right and left or right ideological 
opinions on the transfer of policies to the EU tends though to be generally small 
which limits the importance of a statistical difference if it arises. Please note that for 
the testing with left, centre and right, the ideology variable with the harmonised 
categories was used - respondents are grouped in tertiles of the approximately one 
third placing themselves most left, the approximately one third most right, and the 
centre, for each country. For the testing with individual extreme ideological 
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categories, the ideology variable with 10 categories (from 1 (left) to 10 (right)) was 
used: categories were regrouped as follows, 1 to 2 (classified as extreme left), 3 to 4 
(left), 5 to 6 (centre), 7 to 8 (right) and 9 to 10 (extreme right). 
"Don't Know" answers were not included in the testing as they always represent less 
than 9% of all answers and often much less than that. Integrating "Don't Know" 
answers in the testing would have also obscured the interpretation of the national 
means, in other words whether citizens were or were not in favour of a transfer of a 
policy to the EU. Furthermore, integrating "Don't Know" answers in the testing did 
not alter the essence of the results. 
3.6 Selection of Statistical Tests and Eurobarometer Data 
The Eurobarometer data surveys used for the statistical analyses are the following: 
EB 56.2, EB 54.1, EB 52.0, EB 50.0, EB 48.0, EB 46.0, EB 43.1, EB 42.0, EB 40 
and EB 37.0. This choice of data is motivated by the availability of required 
questions to test the hypotheses in the period of study. The primary goal in building 
the regression models as for ANOVAs analyses was to examine the unique effects 
of independent variables on the dependent variable, maximising the explained 
variance in the regression analyses coming only as a secondary goal. Furthermore, 
regression models were also designed to avoid multicollinearity problems, which 
would inflate the size of error terms and weaken the regression analyses 
(Tabachnick and Fidell, 2001). National weights - weight special United Kingdom, 
weight special United Kingdom and Germany, weight result from target and Euro 
weight 12 - are used to make the national samples more representative of the total 
populations, prior to testing the data. 
3.6.1 Selection of Statistical Tests for Hypothesis I 
To test hypothesis I, cross-sectional aggregate-level data from 1992 to 2001 were 
pooled. As aggregate-level data are used, time series problems (that is to say 
autocorrelation) of pooled models of panel data are applicable to the present 
statistical design (Tabachnick and Fidell, 2001; Stimson, 1985; Beck and Katz, 
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1995). Autocorrelation patterns have been first examined and then suitable ARIMA 
models have been used to deal with autocorrelation problems and test the 
hypothesis.63 Upon identification of autoregressive processes, ARIMA models were 
run - and diagnosed - using Cochrane-Orcutt, Prais-Winsten and Maximum-
Likelihood estimation methods. Results using Cochrane-Orcutt estimation method 
are presented in the appendix. Very similar results were obtained with Prais-Winsten 
and Maximum-Likelihood estimation methods. 
In order to avoid the parameter estimates suffering from bias associated with any 
time- or nation-specific effects (fixed effects), regression model residual means for 
each nation and year were checked and in the case of nations and years with large 
residual means - not close to zero - the model was re-estimated with dummies for 
these. As customary in the social sciences, where appropriate, results were accepted 
with very minor variable distribution deviations from normality (residuals 
distribution not significantly different from normality) and as such did not invalidate 
the analyses. The transformation of variables did not improve model fitting64 and 
obscured results interpretation, and as a result transformed variables were not used. 
Models respected all regression assumptions and best models were retained. The 
sample size, namely 120 cases, has limited the number of variables which could be 
used simultaneously in each model but was adequate to satisfy the objectives of the 
present analysis (Tabachnick and Fidell, 2001; Miles and Shevlin, 2001). Even for 
the largest models, that is to say models 27, 27.7, 28, 28.8, 29 and 29.9, the size of 
the sample, namely 120 observations (or 110 for models 27 and 27.7), is enough to 
achieve a high level of power and detect large effects (Miles and Shevlin, 2001). 
3.6.2 Selection of Statistical Tests for Hypothesis II 
To test hypothesis II, cross-sectional individual-level data from 1992 to 2001 were 
pooled for French and British samples separately. As individual-level data are used, 
time series problems (that is to say autocorrelation) of pooled models of panel data 
63 Model building in pooled cross-sectional time series analyses is an iterative process: the final 
model is the result of a series of diagnostic estimations and re-estimations. 
64 In some cases, transformed variables improved model fitting very marginally (for example with 
some of the M28.8 and M29.9 models) but results were very similar with or without transformed 
variables. 
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are not applicable to the present statistical design, which pools a series of 
independent cross-sections (Tabachnick and Fidell, 2001; Stimson, 1985; Beck and 
Katz, 1995). In order to avoid that the parameter estimates suffer from bias 
associated with any time-specific effects (fixed effects), regression model residual 
means for each year were checked and in the case of years with large residual means 
- not close to zero - the model was re-estimated with dummies for these. The 
rationale for selecting two different statistical tests (one parametric and the other one 
non-parametric) to test current EU membership variables and future European 
integration is explained below. 
Current EU Membership Evaluation 
The use of logistic regression as the statistical tool for the analysis of current EU 
membership is determined here by the dichotomous nature of the dependent 
variables used (please refer to section 3.5.2.1). Logistic regression is a useful tool as 
it enables us to differentiate between groups of respondents and compare the 
likelihoods that they support current EU membership. Logistic regression is a 
relatively flexible method in the sense that it makes no assumptions about the 
distributions of the predictor variables. Thus, in logistic regression, the predictors 
do not have to be normally distributed, linearly related - logistic regression assumes 
though a linear relationship between continuous predictors and the logit transform of 
the dependent variable - or of equal variance within each group although 
multivariate normality and linearity among the predictors may enhance power, 
because a linear combination of predictors is used to form the exponent. Logistic 
regression is especially useful when the distribution of responses on the dependent 
variable is expected to be non-linear with one or more of the independent variables. 
The sample size was adequate to satisfy the objectives of the present analysis 
(Tabachnick and Fidell, 2001; Field, 2005). However, in models 17 (especially 
those without "Don't know" answer) and for the seven category occupation variable, 
the samples tend to be smaller and as such due to not enough cases for some 
variables and variable categories, models may not be able to detect small effects. 
However, as standard errors were not unreasonably large in this case, model results 
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were reliable. Models respected all regression assumptions and best models were 
retained. 
Future European Integration Support 
The use of multiple parametric regression (ordinary least squares regression) as the 
statistical tool for the analysis of future European integration is determined here by 
the continuous nature of the seven point scale dependent variable used (please refer 
to section 3.5.2.1). Multiple parametric regression is likely to be more powerful 
than logistic regression when the outcome is continuous and the assumptions 
regarding it and the predictors are met (Tabachnick and Fidell, 2001; Field, 2005). 
The sample size required for a seven point dependent variable is also less onerous 
for multiple linear regression than for multiple logistic regression. In any case, the 
sample size was adequate when using the former to satisfy the objectives of the 
present analysis (Tabachnick and Fidell, 2001; Field, 2005). Furthermore the 
dependent variable has been transformed (square root transformation) in all models 
so as to improve model fitting and better respect regression assumptions. Models 
respected all regression assumptions and best models were retained. 
3.6.3 Selection of Statistical Tests for Hypothesis III 
To test hypothesis III, cross-sectional individual-level data from 1992 to 2001 were 
pooled for French and British samples separately. As individual-level data are used, 
time series problems (that is to say autocorrelation) of pooled models of panel data 
are not applicable to the present statistical design, which pools a series of 
independent cross-sections (Tabachnick and Fidell, 2001; Stimson, 1985; Beck and 
Katz, 1995). In order to avoid that the parameter estimates suffer from bias 
associated with any time-specific effects (fixed effects), ANOVA model residual 
means for each year were checked. 
ANOVAs were used rather than MANOVAs to test hypothesis III as correlation 
between DVs varies from ~.2 to ~.6 (Tabachnick and Fidell, 2001). To control for 
familywise Type I error across multiple ANOV A tests, a Bonferroni adjustment was 
used for the main effect (Pallant, 2001). For post hoc analyses, Tukey test and 
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Games-Howell test (the latter where necessary) outcomes were also reported. Other 
post hoc tests such as Bonferroni, Gabriel and Hochberg were also run and similar 
results were found. Sample size was adequate to satisfy the objectives of the present 
analysis (Tabachnick and Fidell, 2001; Field, 2005). Models respected all ANOYA 
assumptions. 
3.7 Conclusion 
This chapter discussed the research approach followed in the current study. 
Quantitative research methods are thus adopted because the research is of a 
hypothetical-deductive nature as it aims to test theories developed by other 
researchers to see whether they apply to the French and British contexts. 
Eurobarometer survey data are used as they offer a number of advantages which 
clearly outweigh their weaknesses and are especially suited to the present unfunded 
cross-national, cross-sectional and cross-temporal study. 
Besides the novelty of doing a Franco-British comparative study of the period from 
1992 to 2001 - relying on creative hypotheses - the present thesis corrects some 
previous distortions, offers a more rigorous treatment of the effect of utilitarian 
explanations on EU support than past research has done and provides some 
methodological enhancements. Thus, the effect of utilitarian explanations is 
considered in relation to evaluations of both current EU membership and further 
European integration at both the individual and aggregate data levels. Current EU 
membership is gauged through the use of both EU benefit and membership 
dependent variables which provide a more precise and discriminating appraisal of 
current EU membership support, capturing in the process a fuller range of 
underlying attitudes. 
The use of the seven-point future integration dependent variable specifies views in a 
more precise way than the dependent variables used in other studies. Where 
possible, middle category answers ("don't know" and "neither good nor bad") are 
also integrated in the statistical treatment, providing in the process some 
methodological enhancements from what has been done previously. The mixture of 
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aggregate and individual data level analyses involving a range of diverse data, 
combined with the mutual reinforcement and complementarity of hypotheses tested 
in the study, is not only suited to the objectives and purpose of the research but also 
enhances its validity. Moreover, the present analysis incorporates not only the study 
of attitudinal patterns (that is to say, citizens' perceptions of European and national 
economic, social and political factors) but also assessment of the relationship 
between actual data and support for integration. Finally, another benefit of the 
current research is that it encompasses meticulous and exhaustive statistical 
modelling and subsumes original variables (or new ways of operationalising 
variables) in the analysis. 
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4- COMPARATIVE BACKGROUND CHAPTER ON FRANCE 
AND THE UNITED KINGDOM 
4.1 Introduction 
France and the United Kingdom are comparable nations in tenns of population, 
economic and political power, both older members of the EU but have had a 
different relationship with European integration, especially in the study period. 
France is a founding member of the European Community and has traditionally 
played a key role in the integration of Europe. In the period from 1992 to 2001, 
European integration has not been though free from critiques in France especially in 
periods of greater national economic, social and societal difficulties. The United 
Kingdom has had traditionally an ambivalent relationship with European integration, 
especially in the period from 1992 to 2001 where the politicisation of the EU issue 
has been possibly the greatest. European integration and its compatibility with the 
British dominant economic and social model are often subject to question. In this 
chapter, the approaches towards European integration and political rapport de force 
in France and the United Kingdom will be firstly discussed. Secondly, the national 
economic situation and politicisation of the EU issue in France and the United 
Kingdom will be examined. Finally, French and British public opinion on European 
integration will be reviewed. 
4.2 Approaches towards European Integration and Political Rapport de Force 
in France and the United Kingdom 
France has been much more in favour of European integration than the United 
Kingdom in the study period (as indeed before) but the United Kingdom's reputation 
for being a reluctant European may be somewhat over-stated as in some areas such 
as the development of the European single market, British governments - both 
Conservative and New Labour governments - have been positively enthusiastic. 
This enthusiasm for this area of European integration was justified as it connected 
with British state policy preferences and was seen as both in the interests of the 
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United Kingdom and as potentially strengthening it by increasing the likelihood of 
key objectives, such as those in the realm of market liberalisation being attained 
(Geddes, 2004; Rosamond, 2002). Not unlike France - with though a different 
economic, social and European policy preference - the political polarisation towards 
European integration but also towards economic and social policy between the 
British mainstream political parties has incrementally disappeared from the 1970s to 
the beginning of the 21 st century. This culminated in the United Kingdom in a party 
preference for neo-liberalism and a free trading, competitive EU organised in an 
intergovernmental manner. In France, political polarisation towards European 
integration - though more limited than in the UK65 - but also towards economic and 
social policy between the French mainstream political parties has also incrementally 
disappeared from the 1970s to the beginning of the 21 st century. This culminated in 
France in a party preference for regulated capitalism and a widely integrated EU 
according to a regulated capitalism model. France and the United Kingdom have 
thus played a different role in the integration of Europe as politicalleaderships 
within those two countries have a different conception of what the EU should be: in 
other words, they are each in favour of a different type of Europe. France pursued 
the objective of a widely integrated EU according to a regulated capitalism model 
while the United Kingdom preferred the EU to be a loose intergovernmental 
association of nations where neo-liberalism and free trade rules prevail. 
4.2.1 European Integration at the Heart of French Policy-Making and Society and 
France at the Heart of European Integration 
4.2.1.1 France Co-Engine of European Integration and Broad Party Political 
Consensus in Favour of European Integration in France 
France has always been at the heart of the integration of Europe - as one of the 
initial co-founders of the European Community - and as such has played a historic 
role in this from the creation of the community for steel and coal in 1951, the Treaty 
of Rome in 1957, the Single European Act in 1986, the Treaty of Maastricht in 
1992, the Treaty of Amsterdam in 1997 or the Treaty of Nice in 2000. France and 
its political actors from Schuman, Monnet, Delors, Mitterrand to Chirac and Jospin, 
65 RPR has become more pro-integration in the 1990s following the stance of UDF and PS political 
parties. 
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have always privileged the deepening of European integration over the enlargement 
of the EU - albeit with the EU institutional refonn in the late 1990s, the latter was 
also pursued - preferring an economic and political union of Europe to a purely free 
trade European zone. France's partnership with Gennany was often key to the 
integration of Europe and reflected an economic and political bargaining between 
these two countries. France and Gennany played a key role in the elaboration of the 
Treaty of Amsterdam in 1997 and the Treaty of Nice in 2000 but from 1996 this 
partnership underwent tensions and frictions pertaining to the financial 
consequences of the BSE crisis for the European Union, the stability pact - and the 
inherent constraints that it put on the economic and social policy of France - and to 
the growing and greater weight of Gennany in the EU partly as a consequence of the 
Treaty of Nice. These tensions cumulated with the traditional reluctance towards 
European integration of some states such as the United Kingdom have brought about 
relatively mediocre steps towards further European integration in Amsterdam and 
Nice (Bonnefous and Amouroux, 1998, 2001, 2002). 
Successive French governments have actively participated in all new common 
European policies - and often co-initiated these policies - such as for example 
Schengen agreements on internal border controls, Economic and Monetary Union, 
Social Chapter, immigration, asylum and civil law EU legislation. Thus, under 
acute French insistence, a charter of fundamental social rights for workers was 
adopted in Strasbourg in December 1989, despite British opposition to it and its 
opting out. On 19 June 1990, Gennany, France and the Benelux countries signed 
the Schengen Convention on free movement of people aiming to suppress internal 
border controls. The European Union Treaty - also known as Maastricht Treaty -
was signed on 7 February 1992 in Maastricht and took effect on 12 November 1993. 
This treaty was exceptionally significant for its extension of policy competencies 
and the significant overhaul of the architecture of the Communities. It aimed to put 
in place by stages an Economic and Monetary Union - the latter with a British opt-
in. It instilled a European citizenship; created a common foreign and security policy 
organised on an intergovernmental basis; granted new or extended competencies to 
the community in the social field - a social chapter (the latter with a British opt-out) 
- but also in the environment, research and technological development, industrial, 
culture, health and transport domains. It also increased the power of the European 
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Parliament and the domains where qualified majority voting rather than unanimity in 
the European Council could be used (Beitone et aI, 1995). The Treaty of Maastricht 
exemplifies best the economic and political bargaining between Germany and 
France, the European partners of Germany, and especially France, have subjected 
the German reunification and its consequences to the resolute and definitive 
anchoring of Germany to Europe by the Treaty of Maastricht and its inherent 
economic and monetary union. In return, Germany has accepted EMU and the 
single European currency in exchange for a political cooperation (will to put in place 
a common foreign and security policy; an institutional reform and an enlargement to 
the east of Europe) giving Germany a role lost after the second world war (De 
Boissieu, 1997). With the Treaty of Amsterdam in 1997, Schengen agreements 
became EU competence as immigration policy, political asylum policy, visas policy, 
judiciary cooperation in the field of civil law and European external border control 
dispositions - with opt-out for the United Kingdom, Denmark and Ireland -
although these policies were subject to unanimity voting for a minimum of five 
years after the Treaty of Amsterdam took effect (Bonnefous and Amouroux, 1998). 
The French political executives in the period considered - and presented to the 
electorate - European integration as a way to achieve economic and social 
objectives for France. Mitterrand exemplified this by declaring on 12 April 1992 
(Bonnefous and Duroselle, 1993: 51): "the success of France and Europe are 
indissociable to me". After the victory of the right (UDF-RPR) at the 1993 
legislative elections, Mitterrand had even declared that he would not appoint an anti-
European prime minister and chose a pro-European one, namely Mr Balladur. 
Along the same line, Chirac appointed two pro-European prime ministers (and both 
partisans of the "Franc fort" policy) in 1995 and 1997, namely Mr Juppe and Mr 
Jospin. Furthermore, in his declaration to dissolve the national assembly and call for 
new legislative elections on 21 April 1997, Chirac justified this step inter alia to face 
in a better position the European commitments of France, that is to say to qualify for 
the single currency. The 1997 dissolution was indeed motivated by the need to curb 
further public deficits as these were in 1996 and anticipated in 1997 well above the 
needed 3% of GDP as prescribed by convergence criteria of EMU. In the following 
years, Prime Minister Jospin did ensure that France qualified for the Euro by 
increasing corporate tax and savings tax. 
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The continued implementation of the "Franc fort" policy adopted from 1983,66 with 
the prevalence of monetary policy over budgetary policy (with an inherent tight 
monetary control) enabled France to have a relatively low inflation and a stable 
currency which in tum aimed to improve France's competitiveness internationally. 
EMU and the single currency - with the adjustments to the Stability Pact under inter 
alia French insistence (discussed below) - followed for them this logic and aimed to 
stimulate economic growth and employment. In other words, the economic and 
social success of France was deemed to depend on European integration, and to this 
effect, from 1992 to 2001, the consensus among leaderships of French mainstream 
political parties in favour of European integration grew even closer although 
European integration limited the traditional interventionism of the state in the 
economic and social sphere - albeit relatively important when compared with other 
EU countries such as the United Kingdom. This involved more specifically a 
renunciation of planning and sectoral industrial policies, a disengagement from the 
state in competitive public sector with privatisations - that even the Jospin 
government accepted albeit in a smaller way than the Balladur and Juppe 
governments - and a greater opening of French markets to international competition 
- for example in telecommunications, airline and electricity industries - under the 
actions of the European Union (Crozet et aI., 1997; De Boissieu, 1997; Bonnefous 
and Duroselle, 1993, 1994 and 1995; Bonnefous and Amouroux, 1996, 1997, 
1998,1999,2000,2001 and 2002). 
This consensus in favour of European integration was accompanied by a growing 
consensus, among governments of the left as well as of the right, on the economic 
policy to follow. The European economic and monetary engagements of France 
have indeed limited the capacity of French governments to intervene in the economy 
and placed the French state in a more regulatory role rather than in a direct industrial 
and economic development role but have not removed completely the traditional 
interventionism of French governments. 67 Thus, in the related period, governments 
of the left as well of the right have not decreased so much public expenditure but 
66 In 17 years from 22 March 1983 to 1 January 1999: French Franc was only devalued once on 6 
April 1986, by 3% against the Deutsch Mark (Europa, 2006). .. . 
67 The state interventionism and centralisation is though traditional and old in France wIth It datmg 
back to Colbertism in the ancient regime and Jacobinism of revolutionary era. 
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increased tax to curb public budgetary deficits. They have also shown a 
commitment to a high level of social protection including the building of social 
accommodation - albeit greater under the Jospin government with for example the 
medical cover for all (CMU) and family allowance from the first child - and taken 
initiatives for the EU to adopt a European social model, a commitment to public 
work programmes - though on a much smaller scale than in the preceding decades -
and have tended to treat unemployment socially rather than economically - failing 
therefore largely to attack the rigidities of the job market. For the latter, 
governments of the period have decreased social contributions on low salaries, put 
in place subsidised employment programmes especially for young workers and long 
term unemployed and accepted more or less the sharing of jobs via the alteration of 
working time, the Jospin government (1997-2002) made this compulsory for large 
and medium companies (Cole et aI., 2005). Levy (2005) called this the "social 
anaesthesia state" whose central mission has been to pacify and demobilize the 
potential victims and opponents of economic liberalisation, thereby permitting the 
French economy to reorganize on a more market rational basis. Overall, the 
liberalism implemented by successive French governments during the period 
appeared nevertheless relatively moderate, all accepting the European and 
international constraints on France and limiting the state interventionism in the 
economic and social sphere. Nonetheless these governments tried to recapture some 
of their traditional economic and social state interventionism at the European level 
for example by lobbying the EU to adopt an economic government to 
counterbalance an independent European central bank,68 by pushing the EU to adopt 
a social Europe with a renewed impetus on growth and employment (Bonnefous and 
Amouroux, 1998, 2001, 2002). This approach had the benefit of limiting dissension 
within mainstream political parties and the growing unpopularity of the European 
project for public opinion which appeared amidst acute and continuing national 
economic and social difficulties. French successive governments - and leaderships 
of mainstream political parties - in the study period preferred an EU which 
promoted regulated capitalism, a high level of social protection and upheld the 
principle of European preference although this preference came somewhat under 
68 There is here moreover a certain historical continuity as the establishment of a Franco-German 
Council in the late 1980s aimed to counteract the German economic and financial influence on the 
ERM and on France's economic policy. 
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attack with the monetarist stance of EMU and the management of the single 
currency, the political opposition of some EU members such as the United Kingdom 
which supported a more liberal, market oriented European impetus and the 
international political and competitive constraints. 
4.2.1.2 Elections and Politicisation of EU Issue among French Mainstream Political 
Parties 
The growing consensus on European integration between the leaderships of the 
mainstream parties explained the lack of politicisation of the EU issue in the first 
part of the 1990s. Yet the persistence of a difficult economic and social situation as 
the persistence of minority eurosceptic movements within mainstream parties but 
also beyond, and the greater impact of Europe on the French economy and society, 
and search for influencing the EU towards more interventionism in the economic 
and social sphere have contributed to an increased politicisation of the EU issue in 
the second part of the 1990s and early 21 st century. 
1993 Legislative Elections and 1995 Presidential Election: A Lack of Politicisation 
of the EU Issue 
Europe was not central to the political debates at the 1993 legislative elections won 
by a landslide by the UDF-RPR-Divers Droite with 484 members of parliament 
versus 91 for PS-PC (Habert et aI., 1993; Bonnefous and Duroselle, 1994). This 
relative lack of importance of European integration among the political debates -
partly because the leadership of the main parties namely PS and UDF-RPR 
displayed relatively similar positions on Europe during the campaign - is reflected 
in the motivations of vote at the related elections (CSA, 21 March 1993): Europe 
only arrived in sixth position as a vote motivator after employment, education, 
crime, social inequalities and immigration. 
Chirac won the 1995 presidential election with 52.6% of votes versus Jospin, 47.4% 
of the votes. The 1995 campaign was again marked by the main candidates 
speaking little about Europe and focusing their campaign on unemployment, social 
inequalities, social protection and purchasing power. The main candidates namely 
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Jospin, Chirac and Balladur displayed relatively similar positions on Europe during 
the campaign. They were all in favour of further European integration, of the Franc 
fort and the single currency - Chirac only came though more clearly in favour of the 
franc fort on 19 April 1995 - and of a social Europe. Le Pen had a hostile position 
to the single currency and further European integration but focused little on 
European integration in the campaign (Bonnefous and Amouroux, 1996). The 
relative lack of importance of European integration among the political debates is 
reflected in the motivations of voting at the related elections (lfop-Liberation, 27 
April 1995): Europe only arrived in tenth position as a vote motivator after 
unemployment, social inequalities, purchasing power, immigration, social 
protection, reduced working hours, education, defence of "acquis sociaux" and place 
of France in the world. European integration was a little more present in the 2002 
presidential campaign especially at the second round of the election between Chirac 
and Le Pen but the key issues of the campaign reflecting the broad consensus in 
favour of European integration of the mainstream candidates were not unlike the 
ones of the 1995 election and were respectively unemployment, crime, social 
inequalities, pension funds and immigration - European integration only came in 
10th position (Lewis-Beck and Wendell Miller, 2004). European integration played 
an increased role in the 2007 presidential campaign although it remained relatively 
secondary. The key issues of the campaign echoed those of the 1995 and 2002 
elections, and were respectively unemployment, social inequalities, purchasing 
power, crime and immigration. European integration only arrived in 16th position as 
a vote motivator (CSA-CISCO, 22 April 2007). However in the political debates 
pertaining to the 2007 presidential election, the issue of European integration was 
linked with national identity, protectionism, delocalisations, employment, the value 
of the Euro and purchasing power in mainstream politics as in peripheral politics. 
As such the ranking of European integration and therefore its importance was there 
undervalued. 
1994 and 1999 European Elections and 1997 Legislative Elections: European 
integration takes relatively more importance in the political debates 
Although the year 1994 (and second part of 1993) was marked by a movement 
towards euroscepticism in public opinion coinciding with a relatively poor economic 
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and social year,69 the debate on European integration at the 1994 European elections 
campaign was inconsistent and the latter focused more on domestic problems such 
as unemployment undoubtedly because of the proximity of national elections in 
1995 but also because of divisions on Europe within political parties and political 
alliances. The support for the Europe of Maastricht in the four pro-Maastricht party 
lists, namely Radicale, UDF-RPR, Generation Ecologie and PS, tended to be 
somewhat cautious and their programmes unclear and ambiguous. Thus, Baudis 
(Perrineau and Ysmal, 1995:211), leader of the UDF-RPR list declared, "Maastricht 
is a fight of the past" and "the Maastricht Treaty is a relatively mediocre text, too 
complicated and which says on the convergence of economies some dangerous 
things". On 10 November 1994, Millon (Perrineau and Ysmal, 1995:212) in an 
interview in Le Monde envisaging his candidacy at the 1995 presidential elections, 
conceded: "it is impossible to have an unclear or ambiguous message on Europe" 
and "yet the differences of opinion which appear presently in the majority (UDF-
RPR) undoubtedly demonstrate that a unique candidate would have to use this 
ambiguous language - we have seen this language at the last European elections ... ". 
The UDF-RPR list lead by Baudis obtained 25.58% of the votes (28 Members of 
European Parliament (MEPs)) challenged by an anti-Maastrichtian UDF dissident, 
De Villiers (12.33% of the votes and 13 MEPs) (Perrineau and Ysmal, 1995). The 
PS list obtained 14.49% of the votes (15 MEPs) while Energie Radicale list elicited 
12.03% of the votes (13 MEPs) (Perrineau and Ysmal, 1995). Despite the climate of 
greater euroscepticism in public opinion in 1994 as indicated above, the anti-
Maastricht lists - De Villiers (12.33%), Le Pen (10.52%) (11 MEPs), Wurtz (6.88%) 
(7 MEPs), Chevenement (2.54%), Laguiller (2.77%) and Gonstat (3.95%) - totalled 
only 39% of the votes which demonstrated somewhat the importance of domestic 
issues in the vote at the 1994 European election (Perrineau and Y smal, 1995). This 
was further substantiated by a Sofres Poll (April 1994) which showed that 66% of 
people would vote at the 1994 European elections on the basis of French problems 
(attitude towards the government and economic and social policy) against 27% on 
the basis of European problems, a clear decline from the 1989 European elections 
which were relatively more centred around European problems (38% for latter and 
69 In the BV NRTLILe Monde poll of September 1993 (BVA, Sept 1993) the no to Maastricht 
represented 56% versus 44% for the yes and in the Louis Harris poll of April 1994 (Louis Harris, 
April 1994) the same represented 51 % versus 49%. 
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51 % for French problems). European integration (16%) came though as the second 
most important vote motivator at the 1994 European elections, quite far though 
behind unemployment (28%) (lfop, 12 June 1994). 
European integration - as the management of the economy and the role of the state-
occupied a more important place at the 1997 legislative elections although the theme 
of Europe varied in intensity and clarity during the campaign (Le Monde, 1997). As 
discussed above the dissolution of the national assembly was partly motivated by the 
need to make further efforts to curb public deficits and satisfy convergence criteria 
pertaining to Maastricht. These elections coincided with a relatively poor economic 
and social situation and record unpopularity of the executive, namely Chirac 
(President) and Juppe (Prime Minister) with 56% of people interviewed unsatisfied 
with Chirac in April 1997 (31 % satisfied), 61 % of people interviewed unsatisfied 
with Juppe (27% satisfied) (Ifop/Journal du Dimanche, April 1997). The 
unpopularity of the executive reflected partly a series of unpopular measures taken 
by the executive in 1995 and 1996 to reduce the public deficits and qualify for EMU 
and the single currency: inter alia TVA (VAT) increase from 18.6% to 20.6%; 
abandonment of promised tax reduction; unilateral freeze of civil servants' salaries; 
increase in Contribution Sociale Generalisee (CSG) (generalised social contribution) 
from 2.4% to 3.4%; decrease in Livret A (savings product) remuneration and rise in 
hospital fees. According to a poll of Ipsos-Le Point (March 1997) 66% of people 
interviewed wished the president, Chirac, to change his economic policy, and 43% 
wished the president, Chirac, to change both his prime minister and the economic 
policy. Furthermore 43 % of people did not agree that the preparation of France's 
European commitments justified the dissolution of the national assembly versus 
40% who agreed and 17% without opinion but 48% agreed (versus 40% disagreed 
and 12% without opinion) that the dissolution would permit a change in the 
economic policy (CSA-Le Parisien Libere, 22 April 1997). 
The novelty in the 1997 legislative elections is not that the leaderships of the 
mainstream parties, namely the PS and UDF -RPR, were in favour of European 
integration as they have been so during the study period although at varying degrees 
- leadership of PS and UDF have been relatively more pro-European than RPR - but 
that the divide in economic policy subject to the European integration constraint had 
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lessened even further. Both PS and UDF-RPR leaderships were unwilling to 
diminish real public expenditures so as to qualify for the single currency - and limit 
further the traditional interventionism of the state - but willing to increase taxes to 
do so. Both PS and UDF-RPR leaderships were in favour of the single currency but 
wished a softening of the EMU convergence criteria to give more room for growth 
and employment in European integration. They were both in favour of a social 
Europe. Both UDF-RPR and PS leaderships thus made France's adoption of the 
single currency conditional upon the adhesion of Italy and Spain to EMU in the first 
joining circle; conditional upon the creation of a European economic government, 
and were therefore disputing the ability of the European central bank to decide freely 
the monetary policy for the eurozone; conditional upon the signature of a pact on 
solidarity and growth; and objected to the overvaluation of the Euro compared to the 
dollar. This echoed public support for the single currency subject to the 
abandonment of the economic austerity policy - 60% of respondents agreed with 
this statement versus 24% who disagreed (CSA, May 1997). It is in this sense that 
one should interpret the fact that respondents placed European integration only as 
the 14th most important vote motivator at the 1997 legislative elections, inter alia 
after employment, social inequalities, social protection, education, crime, corruption, 
immigration, salary increase (CSA, June 1997). The 1997 legislative elections were 
won by the left: socialists (23.51 % of the votes and 250 members of parliament 
(MPs)); communists (9.92% of the votes and 36 MPs); radical-citoyen-verts (33 
MPs) versus the right, UDF (14.23% of the votes and 113 MPs); RPR (15.67% of 
the votes and 140 MPs) and Divers Droite (6.61 % of the votes). At the related 
elections, the FN obtained 14.95% of the votes but no members of parliament 
(Perrineau and Y smal, 1998). 
European integration took a more central role at the 1999 European elections 
although the political campaign had been pushed to one side by the Kosovo conflict 
and Corsica problems - Bonnet Prefect scandal- until the last two weeks of the 
campaign. Thus the visibility of the 1999 European elections campaign of May and 
June 1999 in the TV news coverage was twice as weak as in the 1994 European 
elections campaign and five times as weak as in the 1997 legislative elections 
campaign. During the 1999 elections campaign, the political positions on European 
integration were though structured by the opposition between those in favour of 
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European integration - UDF, RPR, PS and Verts - and those in favour of national 
sovereignty - RPF (Rassemblement Pour La France), FN, LO-LCR, CNPT (chasse, 
nature, peche et tradition), MNR (Mouvement National Republicain) and to a lesser 
extent PC (the latter was no longer opposed to Maastricht but wished to keep the EU 
as it is with though more room for social policies). On the right ideological 
spectrum, the results were marked by the success of the anti-Maastricht RPF 
(Pasqua-De Villiers List) (13.06% of the votes and 13 MEPs) which came before the 
two mainstream pro-Maastricht right parties (UDF, 9.29% of the votes and 9 MEPs, 
and RPR, 12.82% of the votes and 12 MEPs). The RPF campaigned on the 
economic, cultural, societal and social dangers of European integration for France 
and advocated a drawing back of European integration in many domains and a return 
to national sovereignty, this much in common with the FN which also advocated in 
addition the national preference for French and European nationals for jobs, 
accommodation and social help. Adding the scores of the FN (5.70% and 5 MEPs), 
CNPT (6.78% and 6 MEPs), MNR (3,28% and no MEPs) to the one of the RPF, the 
right anti-European votes outweighed the right pro-European ones but further adding 
to this the scores of the left anti-European ones - LO-LCR (5.18% and 5 MEPs) and 
PC (6.78% and 6 MEPs) -, anti-European votes were nevertheless outweighed by 
the pro-European ones of the UDF, RPR, PS and Verts (Grundberg et ai., 2000). 
As far as the pro-European lists were concerned, while the electoral platforms of the 
UDF and Verts were more exhaustive and precise - with proposals on inter alia 
education, environment, fishing policy, agriculture, culture, regional policy - the 
electoral platforms of the PS and RPR were briefer, vague and moderate, 
undoubtedly to hide or limit the disagreements and dissidence on European 
integration within each respective party. Despite European policy and European 
questions being more present in the debates, national problems were also present-
as political parties sought to instrumentalize the European elections nationally. Thus 
52% of people interviewed confessed that they voted according to European stakes 
rather than national stakes (36%) (and 12% without opinion) at the 1999 European 
elections (CSAlLe Parisien, 16 June 1999). Social inequalities, crime, European 
integration, immigration, national economic situation, environment and personal 
economic and social situation were respectively the most important vote motivators 
at the 1999 European elections (CSAlLe Parisien, 16 June 1999). Amidst a more 
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limited interventionism of the French state in the economic and social sphere and 
economic, social and societal problems that European integration partly contributed 
to creating, eurosceptic ideas surfaced within and outside parties as discussed in 
section 4.3. 
4.2.2 Perennial Contesting and Politicisation of the EU Issue in the United Kingdom 
4.2.2.1 Key Events in Contesting and Politicisation ofEU Issue in the United 
Kingdom 
The British contesting and politicisation of the EU issue is not a relatively new 
phenomenon uncovered in the 1990s but dates back to the 1950s when the United 
Kingdom stood aside from the first steps of European integration - amidst 
scepticism about its supranational stance - and more particularly from the UK's 
entry into the EC in 1973 (George, 1998; Hay, 2002; Geddes, 2004). Thus the 
following events chronicle this: 
- The non-participation of the United Kingdom in the early movement of European 
integration in the 1950s and 1960s which was deemed supranational and departed 
from the British preference for trade liberalisation within intergovernmental 
structures. The United Kingdom's interests were seen as lying elsewhere. Its 
European vocation remained contested by compelling claims from the 
Commonwealth, from the special relationship with the USA, and from political 
relations and trading patterns that were more global than strictly European. 
- Two years after the UK's EC entry (1975), a referendum was held on continued 
EEC membership. 
- The Labour Party's commitment to terminate British EC membership at the 1983 
General Election as the EC was construed as being in the way of Labour's desire for 
an increased governmental interventionism in the economic and social sphere. 
- Periodic disputes about the size of the British contribution to the community 
bUdget. Thus following the Conservative 1979 electoral victory, the Thatcher 
government adopted an aggressive negotiating posture within the EC's 
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intergovernmental institutions over the issue of British contribution to the 
community budget with an eventual settlement of this problem at the Fontainebleau 
European Council of 1984, which paved the way for the completion of the 
community's internal market. The British rebate obtained at the related summit is 
still today subject to political debate and argument with the United Kingdom's 
European partners. 
- An enduring refusal to join the European Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) 
although it finally culminated in the eventual entry of the pound sterling in October 
1990, albeit much to Prime Minister Thatcher's reluctance. John Major played a 
key role in persuading her to do so with a view to controlling inflation (Evans, 
1999). 
- Thatcher government's running battle with the De10rs European Commission. 
- Exit of the pound sterling from ERM in September 1992. 
- Major government's tough negotiating posture at Maastricht - Maastricht only 
endorsed after a vote of confidence in the British parliament in July 1993 - and its 
policy on non-cooperation within EU institutions at the height of the BSE crisis in 
1996. 
- Blair government's refusal to enter EMU and the Conservative Party leadership 
adopting a more Eurosceptic party line from 1997. 
It must be noted that in much of this period, the British press and more generally 
media tended to rely on caricature to depict the EU and often used "us versus them" 
language (Wilkes and Wring, 1998; Franklin, 1994; Anderson and Weymouth, 
1998; Gavin, 2000, 2001). Newspaper and television coverage partly reinforced 
zero-sum ideas of national sovereignty with the British government often portrayed 
as seeking to advance its interests in competition with other member states. 
4.2.2.2 Elections and Politicisation ofEU Issue in the United Kingdom 
At variance with France, the United Kingdom has been more reluctant to support the 
integration of Europe in the study period (as before) under the Major governments 
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but also, albeit perhaps to a lesser extent, under the Blair governments - the latter 
has cooperated more with other EU nations which wanted to progress further along 
the line of economic, political, social and societal European integration but without 
necessarily taking part in these new European policies. Major was not alienated by 
Thatcher's anti-integrationist stance on Europe and rejected the federalist vision of 
Europe whilst though stressing that Britain should be at the heart of Europe. At the 
Maastricht summit of 1991, Major obtained a compromise on EMU, on the Social 
Chapter and on common foreign policy and justice and home affairs, and was able to 
elicit an opt-in on EMU and an opt-out on the social chapter. Major also obtained 
that the common foreign policy and justice and home affairs be organised in an 
intergovernmental way (Butler and Westlake, 1995). In the study period, Europe 
did not playa key role in the 1992 General Election but the subsequent events of 
"Black Wednesday" in September 1992 and growing disquiet over Maastricht, 
contributed to raising the issue of European integration and especially its link with 
economic management in the subsequent European and national elections. Polls 
regarding the European issue thus placed the latter as one of the most important 
issues for voters in the aftermath of British ERM withdrawal (Ipsos-Mori, 2006). 
Europe Issue Takes Centre Stage Incrementally from 1994 European Elections to 
1997 General Election, 1999 European Elections and 2001 General Election 
Confronted with acute party division over Europe following "Black Wednesday" in 
September 1992 and growing disquiet over Maastricht, Major adopted a more 
eurosceptic tone - with other British mainstream parties such as Labour and the 
Liberal-Democrats choosing to focus their political strategies on the government's 
poor record especially on domestic issues rather than on the European issue. He 
vowed to preserve British national identity and sovereignty, denounced the EU's 
over-regulation, over-interventionism, excessive protectionism and centralisation 
ahead of the 1994 European elections. This move aimed at unifying the party. The 
Conservatives only gained 28 % of the votes (18 MEPs) and lost the 1994 European 
elections to Labour with 44.2% of the votes (62 MEPs) but the turnout was low and 
the Conservatives had been in government for fifteen years and were vulnerable to 
mid-term unpopularity. However, the European People's Party commissioned a 
Harris poll - results were never published but the main findings leaked out - which 
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revealed a shift towards euroscepticism (Butler and Westlake, 1995): those who 
voted tended to be more pro-European than the electorate in general, and Labour and 
Liberal Democrat identifiers were decisively more pro-European than the electorate 
as a whole; a majority of Conservative supporters found the tone of the Conservative 
campaign about right but the general electorate particularly in London and the 
South-East believed the Conservatives' European policies to be too negative. 
In the following European and national elections in the study period, the European 
issue took a more important role. Europe was thus an issue frequently raised with 
candidates and took most media space, coming to the fore time and again during the 
1997 campaign. Table 4.1 and 4.2 show the pre-eminence of the related issue at the 
1997 General Election. The "wait and see" policy on the single currency - joined 
EMU if it is in the British national interest subject to a referendum - agreed in the 
Major cabinet in autumn 1996 was under battering from the conservative press, 
Referendum and UK Independence parties and more seriously from its own 
candidates at the 1997 General Election. As their constituency addresses appeared, 
a majority of Conservative candidates were implacably opposed to any possibility of 
UK entry into EMU. The Times and the Daily Telegraph published daily lists of 
Conservative candidates who were defying Major's line on the single currency. The 
final Daily Telegraph tally, based on 385 Conservative candidates, found only three 
pro-European statements (please see Table 4.3). 
Table 4 l' Relative Prominence of Issues in News Bulletin, 1997 ..
BBCl lTV Channel 4 Radio 4 All 1997 
Europe 1 1 1 1 1 
Constitution 2 3 2 3 2 
Sleaze 3 2 5 2 3 
Education 4 4 3 5 4 
Taxation 6 5 10 4 5 
NHS 7 9 5 6 6 
Pensions 5 6 9 7 7 
The 8 13 7 9 8 
Economy 
Ell!Qloyment 13 10 4 9 8 
Law and 9 8 8 8 10 
Order 
Northern 12 7 11 14 1 1 
Ireland 
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BBC1 lTV Channel 4 Radio 4 All 1997 
Public 13 12 6 13 12 
Expenditure 
Source. Butler and Kavanagh (1997: 140) 
T bl 42 R IfF a e e a lve requency 0 fl ssues R· d alse with Candidates, 1997 
Total Conservative Labour Liberal 
Frequency Candidates Candidates Democrat 
Candidates 
% % % % 
Europe 25 30 18 18 
Health 20 21 18 20 
Education 18 17 18 20 
Pensions 9 12 5 4 
Time for 9 8 13 6 
Change 
Economy 4 1 9 6 
Sleaze 4 4 4 2 
Law and Order 3 1 4 6 
Leadership 2 2 4 0 
Others 2 1 4 4 
Taxation 2 2 2 4 
Social 1 1 2 2 
Services 
Source: Butler and Kavanagh (1997 :220) 
Table 4.3: Statements of Conservative Candidates for 1997 
Against Any Common Currency 190 
Anti-Europe Tone, Not Specific 26 
Anti-Brussels Tone, Not Specific 52 
Neutral 2 
Support Government Line 57 
No Mention of Europe 51 
Pro-Europe 3 
Source: Butler and Kavanagh (1997: 107) 
Labour and Liberal Democrats took a more positive, constructive view on European 
integration but placed more emphasis on other aspects of their campaign such as 
health, education, crime and taxation. In Blair's ten point contract with the people 
in the Labour manifesto, European integration came only tenth and was very 
general: "We will give the leadership in Europe which Britain and Europe need" 
(Butler and Kavanagh (1997:99). The Labour party's position on single currency 
was moreover remarkably identical to the Conservative government's one: to "wait 
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and see" and hold a referendum before entry. Labour won the 1997 General 
Election with a landslide - 419 MPs (44% of the votes) versus 165 (31 % of the 
votes) for the Conservatives and 46 MPs (17% of the votes) for the Liberal 
Democrats and formed the next government. The Conservatives may not have lost 
the 1997 General Election on the key issues: on taxes, levels of public spending and 
British membership of a single currency, there was not much difference between 
them and Labour but they lost comprehensively on valence issues - where the 
parties promote widely shared goals. On such qualities as party unity, competence, 
newness, trust and integrity, the Conservatives trailed badly (Rose, 1997). 
Following the election of William Hague as leader of the Conservative Party on 19 
June 1997 (Europe was moreover a key issue in the Conservative leadership contest 
between William Hague and Kenneth Clark), the Conservative Party moved 
subsequently to the right on the political chess board. The Conservatives radicalised 
their position on European integration in stages - basically settling Europe in the 
eurosceptics' favour in the Conservative Party - from ruling out joining the single 
currency in the next parliament (2001-2006), opposing tax harmonisation, favouring 
a reduction in EU budget and UK budgetary contributions, and retaining the national 
veto at the 1999 European elections to opposing the European Rapid Reaction Force 
and making a stand against the ratification of the Nice Treaty at the 2001 General 
Election - the latter on EU institutional changes with inter alia extension of qualified 
majority voting (QMV) and preparatory steps for a European Constitution and EU 
Charter - although it paved the way for ED enlargement that the Conservative Party 
has traditionally supported. The positions on the European issue of Labour and to a 
lesser extent of the Liberal Democrats were not so far from those of the 
Conservatives at these elections (Butler and Westlake, 2000; Norris, 2001). The 
differences on the Euro between the British mainstream political parties were though 
more substantive: Whilst the Conservatives were ruling out the Euro for the next 
parliament, Labour subjected a Euro entry to satisfactory economic conditions - the 
five economic tests (see Edwards, 2001: 189-191) and a referendum - and Liberal 
Democrats favoured an early entry into the Euro subject to a referendum. Although 
explicit commitment by the Blair government was made to engage more 
constructively with its European partners, EMU remained deeply troublesome and 
divisive (Hay, 2002). The language of public ministerial statements presented EMU 
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as a largely technical matter, not to be handled with ideological zeal on either side. 
The then foreign secretary declared (Cook, 1999:5): 
"It is a rational approach that puts a cool calculation of the national interest first. It 
does not make the mistake of a commitment out of romantic affection for Europe to 
join the Euro, even if the economic conditions were not right. And it avoids the 
mistake on the other extreme which is to rule out joining the Euro out of distaste for 
all things European." 
But few doubted that this technocratic language masked potentially damaging 
divisions within the Labour Party (Baker and Seawright, 1998). Labour and the 
Liberal Democrats failed again to make the case for the Euro at the 1999 European 
elections and 2001 General Election, preferring to focus on domestic issues such as 
education, healthcare and the economy perhaps partly because they were fearful it 
was a vote loser and Europe was not the most important issue for the electorate as a 
whole as demonstrated by polls. According to a Mori poll (May 1999) sponsored by 
the Greens, only 35% were going to vote on the parties' policies on Europe as 
against 41 % on the way the government was running the country at the 1999 
European elections (Butler and Westlake, 2000: 134), and electors only placed the 
European issue as the tenth most important problem facing the country at the 2001 
General Election (Echo Research, 2001). A reason for this may be that the 
differences on Europe between Labour and the Conservatives were not deemed very 
significant by the electorate (Norris, 2001). Moreover Europe played a smaller role 
in the 2005 General Election for the same reason (Kavanagh and Butler, 2005). 
Nevertheless, Webb (2005) points out judiciously that Europe, as well as 
immigration and later the Iraq issue, have contributed to an incremental (albeit 
relatively small) erosion of traditional party loyalties and fostered the growth of 
protest parties and minor party support. The Conservatives won the 1999 European 
elections with 36 seats (35.8% of the votes) versus 29 seats for Labour (28% of the 
votes) and 10 seats for Liberal Democrats (12.7% of the votes). The United 
Kingdom Independence Party campaigning on an anti-European campaign platform 
- favouring immediate EU withdrawal - also won 3 seats (7% of the votes) 
surprisingly. The turnout was though low (barely 23%) (Edwards, 2001:45). In 
2001 Labour won another landslide with 413 seats (40.7% of the votes) as against 
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166 seats (31.7% of the votes) for the Conservatives and 52 seats (18.3% of the 
votes) for the Liberal Democrats (Norris, 2001). 
4.2.2.3 From an Unequal Moderate Support for European Integration to a Greater 
Euroscepticism in British Mainstream Political Parties 
Despite Liberal Democrats' and Labour's more open policy towards European 
integration contrasting with the Conservatives' strong opposition to it - especially 
under Hague's leadership - British mainstream political parties in the study period 
have largely converged as the 1990s progressed and shared the same focus on 
liberalisation of European markets, free trade, intergovernmental cooperation, the 
enlargement of the EU and the search for national interest (Rosamond, 2002; Evans, 
1999; Bara and Budge, 2001). It is thus revealing that in the period of study, 
contrary to France, the United Kingdom has opted out of a number of common 
European policies such as the single European currency, the social chapter (the 
United Kingdom adopted it though later in the 1990s under the first Blair 
government), the Schengen agreements on internal border controls,7o and the EU 
legislation on immigration, asylum and civil law. Labour government convergence 
into Europe has been itself relatively moderate with for example the integration of 
the social chapter into British law, the emergence of common foreign and security 
policy organised on an intergovernmental basis (defence role of NATO was though 
preserved under British insistence), the addition of a new employment chapter to the 
Treaty (of Amsterdam) as well as the inclusion of a new article 13 within the Treaty 
(of Amsterdam) that greatly extended anti-discrimination measures, the agreement 
to increase the use of qualified majority voting - for example for the environmental 
policy - and bolster the role of the European Parliament. The Labour government 
retained though the national veto for key policy areas such as taxation, national 
contribution to EU budget, immigration, the opt out from Schengen agreements and 
the pursuit of European enlargement, and pushed for CAP reform towards more 
liberalisation. 
70 The Labour government decided though later in the 1990s to take part in some aspects of the 
Schengen agreements, namely police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters, the fight against 
drugs and the Schengen information systems (Europa, 2005). 
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Another important difference with France is that the United Kingdom, especially 
after the withdrawal of the pound from the exchange rate mechanism in September 
1992, has given less importance to EU developments as a way to achieve economic 
and social objectives themselves although the liberalisation of European markets and 
the pursuit of EU enlargement were seen and presented as an opportunity to exploit 
British competitiveness. In other words, the EU was not seen - and presented to the 
electorate - by British successive governments as the sole way to achieve economic 
growth and employment but under the right European conditions - an EU organised 
around free trade and competition principles - could contribute to it. In opposition 
to France, the support for European integration in British mainstream political 
parties, especially Labour and Liberal Democrat parties (Conservative party was 
comparatively more eurosceptic at the start of the 1990s and grew more so as the 
decade progressed), was relatively moderate and grew more eurosceptic throughout 
the decade. The neo-liberal Thatcherite consensus between the main political parties 
(that is to say Labour Party, Conservative Party and the Liberal Democrat Party)-
centred on a reduced role for the government and acceptance of the market - and the 
perceived inherent divergence with the EU's more interventionist economic, social 
and societal model have contributed to making the leaderships of these political 
parties more eurosceptic in the study period as discussed below. The growing 
radicalisation of the Conservatives towards the European integration project (from 
1997 under Hague's party leadership) and its increasing echo with public opinion 
and support in the media - especially in the press - together with internal divisions 
in the Labour party, the quest for re-election, the comparatively sound economic and 
social situation of the British economy have also perhaps contributed to limiting the 
European ambitions of the Labour government and shy away from a clear open 
debate on European integration. 
Contrary to France, the preservation of a close relationship with the USA - and 
enthusiasm for US style market liberalisation - as to a lesser extent the attachment to 
the Commonwealth also moderated the European ambitions of successive British 
governments in the period (Evans, 1999; Clift, 2001; Gamble and Kelly, 2000). 
Furthermore, a further disparity between France and the United Kingdom is that in 
the French context, European integration has been much more widely justified by 
mainstream political parties as a way to securing peace in Europe but also a means 
161 
of making the EU take more weight in international political and commercial 
negotiations. In the British context, these arguments have been much less used by 
the main political parties on grounds of the cult of British history - including 
parliamentary tradition - but also because of the British social order which rests on 
the preservation of a strong community via the development of national identity, and 
not via the welfare state as in France. European integration which was unwrapping, 
was often construed as threatening the very British national identity (Evans, 1999; 
Davies, 1995; Evans and Taylor, 1997). 
Although the issue of national sovereignty also resonated with the opponents to 
European integration in France - but mainly in factions within mainstream political 
parties and in the political periphery (FN, MNR, MDC, RPF, MPF, CNPT and PC)-
this issue was much more instrumentalised in British mainstream politics to oppose 
the further integration of Europe (George, 1998; Edwards, 2001; Cole et aI., 2005). 
It is partly explained by the fact that the United Kingdom experienced a unique 
continuity of political history and developed a unique regard for its inherited 
political forms as a guarantee of its independence. The inherited doctrines of 
untrammelled parliamentary sovereignty and the sole accountability of the executive 
to Parliament are hard to reconcile with European supra-nationalism (Skidelsky, 
1992; Spiering, 2004). The unease with supranational partnerships is also linked to 
the one-party British governments not used to sharing power (Papamikail, 1998) but 
also the United Kingdom's first-past-the-post electoral system which invites 
political polarisation between and within the main political parties (Forster, 2001; 
Papamikail, 1998; Wilks, 1998; Usherwood, 2002; Aspinwall, 2004). Thus, Prime 
Minister Major declared to the House of Commons on 22 March 1994 (Hansard, 
1994): 
"We shall not do what the Labour party do, which is to say yes to everything that 
comes out of Europe, with no critical examination whatever. The opposition would 
sign away our votes, our competitiveness and our money. The right honourable and 
learned member for Monklands East (the then Labour Leader John Smith) is the 
man who likes to say yes in Europe. Monsieur Qui, the poodle of Brussels". 
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It is partly on the issue of national sovereignty but also in virtue of the national 
interest that the successive British governments have thus opted out of a number of 
European agreements - the United Kingdom kept for example the national veto on 
taxation, British contribution to the EU, foreign and security policy and 
constitutional reform. However the United Kingdom and France showed some 
similarity to the extent that the opposition to European integration used the argument 
that the diversity of local economic and social circumstances in different EU 
countries was at odds with the very idea of one common economic and social policy 
for the entire EU. In the next section, EU issue politicisation and its link with the 
national economic situation and context will be reviewed. 
4.3 National Economic Situation and Politicisation of EU Issue 
In both France and the United Kingdom, the politicisation of the EU issue grew 
from 1992 to 2001 although the EU issue was not always the primary topic of 
concern for electors and politicians alike. The Maastricht Treaty and perceived 
socio-economic consequences of European integration - including EMU and the 
single currency project - have contributed in both these countries to a raising of the 
issue of European integration in the political debates. Ifboth countries experienced 
economic and social problems because of their European commitments - for the 
United Kingdom especially in the early 1990s - the political and economic 
implications drawn from these differed between France and the United Kingdom. 
4.3.1 EU Integration Contributing to France's Economic, Social and Societal 
Problems Source of Political Contesting 
4.3.1.1 Franc Fort Policy and Maastricht causing National Economic, Social and 
Societal Difficulties 
If the Maastricht Treaty referendum and the closeness of its result in 1992 
(discussed below) contributed to politicising the issue of European integration, it is 
the persistence of national economic and social problems which made the EU issue 
more predominant in political debates in the second part of the 1990s. The policy of 
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"Franc fort" 71 first came under intense critique in the first part of the 1990s as 
France was undergoing a tough, lasting economic recession and was following the 
monetary policy of Germany. The German reunification had first imposed an 
expansionary budgetary policy which made it necessary thereafter to stop the 
inflationary tensions (in Germany) by a drastic monetary strategy based on high real 
interest rates. France and other EU partners did follow the German interest rates. 
The high level of these weighed negatively on France's economic activity by 
contributing to a fall in investment and consumption. This situation contributed to 
the failure of France's economic recovery and created uncertainty in financial 
markets about EMU before and after the 1992 referendum, which in turn 
necessitated rises in interest rates to restore confidence and harmed further the 
French economy - inflation being mastered, France had one of its highest ever real 
interest rates in this period (Bonnefous and Duroselle, 1992). The quest for 
Economic and Monetary Union perpetuated subsequently the alignment of France's 
(and other EU countries) monetary policy on Germany's policy. EMU convergence 
criteria and the subsequent Stability Pact did institutionalise the pre-eminence of 
objectives of monetary policy, with the retention of five criteria enabling a country 
to be able to adopt the single currency (Bonnefous and Duroselle, 1992): 
- inflation rate had not to be greater than 1.5 point above the average of the three 
best inflation performances; 
- public debt had not to be greater than 60% of GDP and public budgetary deficit 
had to be no more than 3% ofGDP; 
- long term interest rate had not to exceed by more than 2 points the average of the 
three lowest ones; 
- the national currency had to have been at least two years without being devalued in 
the European monetary system; 
However, partly thanks to French pressures, at the European Council of Dublin on 
13 and 14 December 1996, a slight softening of the convergence criteria for EMU 
71 The "Franc fort" policy aimed to maintain French Franc parity with Deutsch Mark and was 
implemented from 22 March 1983 to 1 January 1999. 
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(and subsequent pact of stability) was obtained to include the state of economic 
growth (Bonnefous and Amouroux, 1997): 
- if the public budgetary deficit went over 3% ofGDP, the state concerned had 12 
months to react; a failure to act could generate a financial penalty of between 0.2% 
and 0.5% of the related state's GDP; 
- Case justifying going over the stated limit: a country could have a public budgetary 
deficit of more than 3% of its GDP in the case of an annual decrease in its real GDP 
by more than 2%. On the other hand, if the recession was between 0.75% and 2%, 
the European council could pronounce itself on the nature of the deficit, either 
accept this over limit deficit or recommend sanctions if it deemed the deficit to be 
excess deficit; finally for a decrease in GDP inferior to 0.75%, states could not in 
principle invoke exceptional circumstances to justify the greater deficit; 
The EMU convergence criteria and subsequent Stability Pact meant that France 
largely subjected the use of budgetary policy to a strict monetary policy: this 
consequently limited the traditional economic interventionism of successive French 
governments and opened further the French economy to international competition 
(Crozet et aI, 1997; Hoang-Ngoc, 1996). Despite France's controlling inflation well, 
it obtained relatively poor economic results especially in the period from 1992 to 
1997 and from the second part of2000 (please see Table 4.4). The aggravation of 
unemployment, the worsening of the tax burden from a relatively high level in 1992 
and the relatively poor economic growth, were particularly patent and served as a 
basis for criticizing European integration for factions within mainstream political 
parties and political parties on the periphery as discussed in section 4.3.1.2. 
Table 4 4' Selected Economic Aggregates of France 
Year Inflation (%) GDP Growth Unemployment Total Tax 
(%) (%) Burden as a 
percentage of 
GDP1 
1992 2.37 1.50 10.00 45.00 
1993 2.06 -0.90 11.30 45.60 
1994 1.76 2.10 11.80 46.00 
1995 1.68 1.70 11.30 45.20 
1996 2.10 1.10 11.90 46.40 
1997 1.20 1.90 11.80 46.50 
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Year Inflation (0/0) GDP Growth Unemployment 
(%) (%) 
1998 0.70 3.40 11.40 
1999 0.60 3.20 10.70 
2000 1.80 3.80 9.30 
2001 1.80 1.80 8.50 
Source: European CommIssIOn (2002; 2003) 
Note I: figure from 1995 with ESA 95 definitions 
Total Tax 
Burden as a 
percentage of 
GDP 1 
46.40 
47.10 
46.70 
46.50 
These relatively poor results are only partly explained by the international recession 
in 1992, 1993 and at the end 2000, and certain politicians such as Seguin, De 
Villiers, Pasqua, Chevenement, Emmanuelli and Le Pen saw these as the 
consequence of the governmental insistence that monetary objectives prevail over 
growth and employment but also the consequence of a liberal policy orientation 
opening France to globalisation and unfair competition. The European constraints -
pertaining chiefly to the "Franc Fort" policy, the EMU convergence criteria and 
subsequent Stability Pact - on successive governments' policies was considered as 
reducing the traditional interventionism of the state in the economic and social arena 
which was politically perceived by the same as eroding national cohesion as the 
welfare state was deemed instrumental in fostering a strong community. 
4.3.1.2 Anti-European Opposition 
At variance with the United Kingdom, the political protests against European 
integration did not come from the politicalleaderships of mainstream parties but 
from factions within them (mainly from Seguin, Emmanuelli and Pasqua) and from 
political parties on the periphery such as FN, MPF, MDC, PC, MNR, CNPT and 
RPF. If the anti-European contestation in political currents in mainstream parties 
and beyond precedes the Maastricht Treaty, it is the Maastricht referendum 
campaign in 1992 which accelerated anti-European protest (Bonnefous and 
Duroselle, 1993). Pasqua, Seguin and De Villiers supported by former French prime 
ministers such as Couve De Murville, Messmer and Debre, joined forces to lead the 
"No to Maastricht" campaign, condemning the policy of the "Franc fort" and the 
planned single currency which gave in their views precedence to financial orthodoxy 
over social preoccupations, bringing about more factory transfers abroad, more 
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unemployment and less economic growth, and sacrificing national sovereignty - it 
must be noted that the simple majority ofRPR members of parliament (MPs) were 
opposed to Maastricht, this despite the leadership of the RPR being in favour. 
Similar arguments with a clear focus on social questions and employment were used 
by the PC, the Verts and Chevenement - with few other PS MPs such as 
Emmanuelli - in that campaign. Furthermore, De Villiers together with Poniatowski 
and Griotteray insisted that voting no to Maastricht was voting against Mitterrand as 
Maastricht was partly his creation. Le Pen, the far right leader, also denounced 
Maastricht as of Mitterrand's progeniture, followed by declaring "With Maastricht, 
there will be more immigration, more crime, more drugs and more Aids" 
(Bonnefous and Duroselle, 1993: 85). De Villiers also deplored the greater traffic -
in people, drugs, etc. - that Maastricht would bring about. 
The "Yes" to Maastricht narrowly won with 51.05% versus 48.95% for the "No" 
despite the early comfortable lead of the "Yes" in the referendum campaign. The 
majority ofRPR electors (despite the leadership ofRPR calling for "yes" vote), FN, 
PC, extreme left electors, and people with no political affiliation voted "No" to 
Maastricht (BVA-Liberation, 24 September 1992). It must be noted that rural 
regions - such as Auvergne, Aquitaine, Bourgogne, Centre, Champagne-Ardennes, 
Picardie and Basse-Normandie - and regions with old industrial traditions - such as 
Nord-Pas-De-Calais and Haute-Normandie - voted in majority "No" to Maastricht. 
It is thus paradoxical that regions receiving most European help under the cohesion 
hat, either by their status as disfavoured rural regions or by their status as industrial 
zones in re-conversion have voted in this way but the reasons underlined below 
explain this. In the same way, the weight of the FN, the fear of the foreigner and of 
the mafia may explain why Corsica, P ACA and Languedoc-Roussillon voted "No" 
to Maastricht. Individuals in lower socio-professional categories tended to vote 
"No" to Maastricht whereas individuals in higher socio-professional categories 
voted yes (BVA-Liberation, 24 September 1992). 
Among the reasons which played a role in the "No" vote to Maastricht, loss of 
national sovereignty came first (57%) followed respectively by leaving France in the 
hands of Brussels technocrats (55%), fear to see Germany dominate Europe (40%), 
show one's discontent to Mitterrand and his government (39%), Maastricht being 
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deemed expensive and bringing about austerity policy (37%), show one's rejection 
of the entire French political class (31 %) and the war in the ex -Yugoslavia (28%) 
(BV A-Liberation, 24 September 1992). These reasons show a discontent as much 
with the expected economic, social and societal consequences of Maastricht as with 
the economic, societal and social situation of that time and those deemed responsible 
for it, and the loss of national sovereignty. Among the reasons which have played a 
role in the "Yes" vote to Maastricht, ensure peace in Europe came first (72%) 
followed respectively by deemed indispensable to carry on European integration 
(63%), fighting better economically against Japan and the USA (51 %), fear to see 
the "No" win (35%), the war in the ex-Yugoslavia (27%), fear to see Germany 
dominate Europe (21 %), support Mitterrand (14%) (BVA-Liberation, 24 September 
1992). These reasons show that the "Yes" to Maastricht was primarily motivated by 
the wish to preserve peace in Europe, pursue further European integration and show 
greater economic power on the international scene. 
The narrowness of the result at the 1992 referendum brought the politicians, in 
particular those opposed to Maastricht, to underline the social and political fracture 
that this result testified, and encouraged the anti-Maastricht politicians to pursue 
their attack on European integration. Thus, on 14 and 16 June 1993, Seguin, in a 
discourse on European integration and on French economic policy, criticised the 
liberal, free-trade and internationalist ideological substratum of policies led within 
the framework of the European economic convergence and symbolised by the Treaty 
on European Union. On that occasion, Seguin proposed a Europe resting on four 
pillars: principle of European preference, the maintenance of high levels of social 
protection, the redevelopment of central and oriental Europe, and the invention of a 
real solidarity with Mediterranean countries and Africa (Bonnefous and Duroselle, 
1994). He went on, evoking a future "social Munich", by declaring "the 
employment preoccupation remains undoubtedly second in the choices made, 
relegated after the currency defence, the public deficit reduction, productivism or the 
promotion of free trade" (Bonnefous and Duroselle, 1994:74). 
The currency crisis within the European monetary system (EMS) over the summer 
1993, as well as the new GATT agreements in December 1993 - the latter bringing 
about the reduction of agricultural subsidies and further opening of European 
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markets to imports - were opportunities for Le Pen, Chevenement and De Villiers to 
castigate the failure of European integration - in particular Maastricht - and free 
trade impetus with its corollary of social dumping which threatened entire sections 
of French industry (Bonnefous and Duroselle, 1994). The activism of eurosceptic 
figures cumulated with acute economic and social difficulties of the time coincided 
with a public opinion being increasingly eurosceptic: thus in September 1993, 56% 
of people interviewed would say "No to Maastricht" versus 44% "yes" (BV A, 
September 1993). Despite the dominance of domestic problems at the 1994 
European elections, these elections saw a number of anti-Maastricht political lists 
obtain variable success separately but a relatively strong success altogether 
especially given the profusion of lists as discussed in section 4.2.1.2. In the related 
elections, the critique of the anti-Maastricht lists targeted the excessive liberalism of 
the GATT agreements; factory transfers creating social dumping and resulting from 
free trade; non-defence of European trade (non-respect of European preference 
principle); the supra-nationalism; the single currency and its economic and social 
consequences (thus Chevenement declared that Maastricht was tantamount to 
massive unemployment); the Brussels bureaucracy; and the development of 
immigration and crime inter alia favoured by Schengen - the latter three topics were 
developed by De Villiers and Le Pen -(Bonnefous and Amouroux, 1995; Perrineau 
and Ysmal, 1995) . 
The political opposition to European integration continued in the second part of the 
1990s although some important changes took place. Politicians such as 
Emmanuelli, Seguin and Chirac contested any role for the central bank to dictate the 
economic policy, at the 1995 presidential elections - Chirac though declared himself 
in favour of the "Franc fort" policy (Bonnefous and Amouroux, 1996). As 
discussed above, Chirac as well as Jospin pledged a commitment to EMU and the 
single currency subject inter alia to the establishment of a European economic 
government. Seguin did not oppose EMU and the single currency any longer but 
continued to oppose the "Franc fort" policy and the excessive focus on monetary 
aspects in relation to the convergence criteria. On 24 January 1996, he thus called 
on Germany and France to adopt a European reflationary policy to ensure a 
successful shift to the single currency, and he wished the EU would adopt a social 
and democratic base swiftly. In the second part of the 1990s, Chevenement (MDC) 
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as well as the communists also came to accept de facto EMU, the single currency 
and some transfers of competence to Europe in exchange for European guarantees 
on employment, growth, and the establishment of a social Europe: Both 
Chevenement (MDC) and the communists as part of the left government in the 
period 1997 to 2002 thus contributed to further integration in Europe although the 
rhetoric used by the MDC and the PC is anti-European (Reynie, 2005). 
On the right of the political chess board, the pro-European and pro-EMU positioning 
of Chirac at the 1997 legislative elections has had as a consequence that some of his 
1995 electors voted FN because of the Europe issue. Pasqua left de facto the RPR in 
1998 on grounds of disagreements on the Europe issue and founded the 
"Rassemblement Pour La France" (RPF) - a movement with an anti-European 
positioning - and with De Villiers competed at the 1999 elections on an anti-
European platform as discussed in section 4.2.1.2. De Villiers left the RPF on 19 
July 2000 over inter alia a disagreement with Pasqua on the political anchoring of 
this party - Pasqua wished to appeal to both Sovereignists of the left and of the right 
and De Villiers only to those on the right. As discussed in section 4.2.1.2, political 
activity against European integration was relatively more important within the right 
of the political chess board at the end of the 1990s and early 21 st century,72 
especially in peripheral parties such as FN, RPF, MPF and MNR although there 
exists currents within mainstream parties of the right and left which without wanting 
a scaling back of European integration wish to limit and alter the scope and nature of 
the expansion of Europe often with a focus on the preservation (and development) of 
social rights, the need to regulate markets and the preservation of national 
sovereignty. 
Despite the worsening in the economic and social situation (rise in unemployment 
and relatively poor economic growth, especially from 1992 to 1997 and from the 
second part of 2000) and a public opinion increasingly preoccupied by the European 
constraints, the successive governments as well as the leaderships of mainstream 
political parties pursued their austerity policy with a view to ensuring France 
qualified for the single European currency. It must be nevertheless noted that 
72 MDC and PC in the government of Jospin de facto participated in European integration and altered 
somewhat their position. 
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French successive governments achieved qualification for the latter not so much by 
decreasing public expenditure - no doubt fearful of a greater popular and political 
rebellion - but by augmenting tax to curb public budgetary deficits. The French 
governments further sought to inter alia soothe the popular and political opposition 
to the single currency and further integration, at the least in the eurosceptic factions 
within mainstream political parties and in the MDC and PC (both government 
partners in the Jospin government), by lobbying the ED to adopt an economic 
government to counterbalance an independent European central bank, by pushing 
the ED to adopt a social Europe with a renewed impetus on growth and 
employment. This manoeuvre had the extra benefit of recapturing some of the lost 
power of public interventionism at the European level. Section 4.4.1 will show that 
although French public opinion tends to have a relatively strong attachment to 
Europe, both affective and utilitarian, economic, social and societal concerns 
pertaining to European integration and the future of the latter moderated this 
attachment in the study period. 
4.3.2 European Integration as a Threat to British Dominant Economic and Social 
Model (and British Economic and Social Prosperity) 
4.3.2.1 Thatcher and Major Eras: Neo-Liberalism and Neo-Conservatism 
British membership of the ED has brought about an upsurge of intra- and inter-party 
debate about European integration combined with the European issue becoming a 
staple item of popular and journalistic discourse. Prior to the mid-1980s, questions 
of European integration intruded only periodically (albeit significantly) into British 
political consciousness. After this period and particularly in the second part of the 
1990s, European integration has assumed greater importance in the British political 
scene. Polls substantiate this (Ipsos-Mori, 2006). 
The Thatcher and Major years were marked by an ideological preference for free 
markets and individualism (Evans, 1999; Davies, 1995; Evans and Taylor, 1997). 
Thus, in those years a range of policies were followed such as greater labour market 
flexibility, privatisation of state companies, including public utilities, deregulation, 
favouring home-ownership (sales of council houses), slimming down of the public 
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sector, direct tax reduction and curbing of union power. Thatcher and Major also 
displayed a strong concern with social order which, they believed, was best secured 
by preserving a strong community (Evans, 1999; Davies, 1995; Evans and Taylor, 
1997). The development of national identity - and not the welfare state - was 
thought instrumental in fostering a strong community. 
Thatcher saw European integration advocated by other European nations such as 
Germany and France and by Delors, President of the European Commission, as 
threatening the British economic and social model. On 20 September 1988, 
Thatcher (1993:744-745) delivered a speech at Bruges: 
"To try to suppress nationhood at the centre of a European conglomerate would be 
highly damaging .... We have not rolled back the frontiers of the state in Britain to 
see them reimposed at a European level with a European superstate exercising a new 
dominance from Brussels". 
It was reported that the first draft of the related speech was far more contentious than 
the final version but Sir Geoffrey Howe, who was the Foreign Secretary, managed 
with the assistance of the Whitehall civil service network to have the inflammatory 
sections removed. There had been attacks upon the inferior colonial record of other 
European countries and suggestions that they were less attached to liberty than the 
British (Young, 1998). The protest against European integration was also anchored 
in the importance of atlanticism especially for Conservative right wingers, the fear 
about a reunified Germany and the perceived greater trade and investment 
opportunities available in dynamic Asian economies. Thatcher had a different 
conception of Europe's future development and advocated a family of nations in 
which there would be willing and active cooperation between independent sovereign 
states rather than a single endeavour. On 30 October 1990, opposed to EMU and the 
Social Charter, Prime Minister Thatcher declared at the House of Commons (Butler 
& Kavanagh, 1992: 16): 
"I do not want the Commission to increase its powers at the expense of the house ... 
Mr Delors said ... that he wanted the European Parliament to be the democratic body 
of the community, he wanted the Commission to be the executive and he wanted the 
Council of Ministers to be the senate. No. No. No." 
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These speeches inflamed divisions in the cabinet which contributed to Thatcher's 
nemesis in November 1990 but she along with leading Conservative eurosceptics 
such as Norman Tebbit continued their divisive influence on the Conservative Party 
on the European issue in the 1990s. Thus for example, Thatcher and Tebbit called 
for a referendum on Economic and Monetary Union. Major, who succeeded 
Thatcher as prime minister on 28 November 1990 was not alienated by the 
substance of Thatcher's position on the EC - which struck nationalist chords with 
conservative members of parliament and voters - but by her confrontational style. 
In order to blur the differences of opinion on European integration - that is to say 
the Conservative split over Europe - Major used the twin tactic of rejecting the 
federalist vision of Europe but stressing that Britain should be at the heart of Europe. 
At the Maastricht summit of 1991, Major obtained a compromise on EMU, on the 
Social Chapter and on common foreign policy and justice and home affairs, eliciting 
an opt-in on EMU and an opt-out on the social chapter. Major also secured that the 
common foreign policy and justice and home affairs be organised on an 
intergovernmental way (Butler and Westlake, 1995). Major won the 1992 General 
Election with a smaller overall majority of 21. Europe as well as defence and 
foreign policy were part of the 1992 campaign manifestoes of the Conservative 
Party, Labour Party and Liberal Democrats but did not play an important part in the 
campaign - they had been so important before under Thatcher leadership and in 
Maastricht intergovernmental negotiations: taxation, public services provision, 
United Kingdom devolution and economic management including unemployment -
the early 1990s were marked by an economic recession - played a key role (Butler 
and Kavanagh, 1992). 
On 16 September 1992, the pound sterling was forced out of the ERM following a 
colossal speculative attack on the pound sterling, this episode referred to as "Black 
Wednesday" (Barrell et al., 1994; Michie, 1998). An overvalued pound sterling - a 
result of the shadowing of the Deutsch Mark and the Bundesbank's monetary policy 
including setting of interest rates - contributed to a deepening and lengthening of the 
recession in the early 1990s (Evans, 1999). The significance of "Black Wednesday" 
is that it instantly destroyed the Conservative Party's reputation as the party of 
competent economic management (King et al., 1998). The event of "Black 
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Wednesday" was also decisively important because it raised the issue of European 
integration and emboldened eurosceptics in the Conservative Party and the press to 
exert pressure on Prime Minister Major who adopted a more eurosceptic line of 
conduct towards European integration and more particularly towards Economic and 
Monetary Union and the single currency as discussed in section 4.2.2. Internal party 
management became a priority for Prime Minister Major in the context of a 
dwindling parliamentary majority. The removal of the party whip from a 
troublesome group of eurosceptic Conservative backbenchers (Teresa Gorman, 
Teddy Taylor, Tony Marlow, John Wilkinson, Richard Shepherd, Nicholas Budgen 
and Christopher Gill who even launched their own manifesto on Europe) in 
November 1994, the challenge to Major's leadership of the party by John Redwood 
in July 1995 and further crisis occasioned by the issue of BSE - a world-wide and 
European-wide ban on British beef - were all manifestations of the chaos wrought 
by European integration in British politics and more especially in the Conservative 
Party and government (Baker et aI, 1996). The "Black Wednesday" episode was 
interpreted as a sign that the project of Economic and Monetary Union and the 
single currency necessitated an economic and social convergence of the countries 
taking part in it, a convergence between the British neo-liberal Thatcherite model 
and the continental European prevalent model of regulated capitalism which was 
considered as more elusive with the passing of time. 
4.3.2.2 Blair Era: The Weight of the Thatcherite Heritage and Neo-Liberal 
Consensus 
The weight of successive electoral defeats and the consequent changes in the 
electorate's aspirations and economic and social situation pushed Neil Kinnock-
Labour leader from 1983 to 1992 - to start to alter the Labour party's ideological 
positioning towards the centre ground of British politics, bringing it relatively closer 
to a market economy stance: abandoning in the process unilateralism, Labour's 
opposition of Britain's membership of the EU, accepting the sales of council houses, 
coming round to the need for lower taxes and jettisoning the traditional faith of the 
party in old-style nationalisations (Evans, 1999). Blair, who took office in 1997, 
went further in the re-foundation of Labour and largely accepted the Thatcherite 
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inspired refonns of the 1980s and 90s, and embraced the Thatcherite values of 
individualism, social order and free markets - so as to be able to compete globally-
but showed more commitment to public services such as education and health, 
which is also true for the Liberal Democrats (Blair, 1996; Evans, 1999; Hay, 2002). 
However Labour, promising to stick with the previous government's spending plans 
for the first two years of the parliament, made a relatively slow start to their 
ambitious plans for the renewal of public services: Brown in his first budget only 
spent an extra £3 billion. However, on 18 July 2000 in the comprehensive spending 
review, Brown announced that the public services would receive £43 billion over the 
next three years, education, health and transport being the main beneficiaries 
(Edwards, 2001). 
As discussed in section 4.2.2.3, despite Blair's explicit commitment to engage more 
constructively with his European partners, the Labour government's engagement 
towards Europe has been relatively moderate. EMU and the Euro remained more 
discordant and problematic. The return to economic growth and full employment in 
the United Kingdom (see Table 4.5), the relatively better economic and social health 
of the latter compared to other EU nations, as well as the importance of national 
identity and national sovereignty made the project of EMU and the single currency, 
and more generally of further European integration far less appealing and popular. 
These culminated in an increased politicisation of the EU issue in the second part of 
the 1990s and contributed to a limiting of the European ambitions of successive 
British Labour governments. 
T bl 45 Sid E a e .. e ecte 'A conomlC ggregates 0 fth U 't d Ki d e me ng om 
Year Inflation GDP Growth Unemployment Total Tax 
Burden as a 
percentage of 
GDP l 
1992 3.73 .20 9.80 32.2 
1993 l.56 2.50 10.20 31.3 
1994 2.48 4.70 9.40 31.9 
1995 3.41 2.90 8.50 36.5 
1996 2.40 2.60 8.00 36.1 
1997 3.10 3.40 6.90 36.6 
1998 3.40 2.90 6.20 37.8 
1999 l.60 2.40 5.80 37.9 
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Year Inflation GDP Growth Unemployment 
2000 2.90 3.10 5.40 
2001 1.80 2.00 5.00 
Source: European CommIsSIOn (2002; 2003) 
Note 1: figure from 1995 with ESA 95 definitions 
Total Tax 
Burden as a 
percentage of 
GDP1 
38.6 
38.4 
The growing commitment of the British government to public services - but also the 
growing consensus on public services among the main political parties - in the late 
1990s also made European integration less attractive in this respect. The relative 
economic, societal and social dynamism of countries in Asia, North America and in 
Oceania (mainly Australia and New Zealand) - contrasting with the economic and 
social difficulties of the largest ED nations (other than the UK) committed to further 
European integration - was interpreted by politicians from the Conservative Party 
but also increasingly from the Liberal Democrat Party and Labour Party as another 
sign that the current model of European integration was ill-thought out, and needed 
re-adjustments towards less interventionism of the state in the economic and social 
sphere, more intergovernmental cooperation rather than supra-nationalism, more 
market liberalisation and promotion of free trade (Evans, 1999; Clift, 2001; Gamble 
and Kelly, 2000). Not unlike Margaret Thatcher who believed the EC required a 
healthy dose ofThatcherism, New Labour argued that participation in deeper 
integration depended on other member states modernizing their economies and 
social welfare systems and adopting economic reforms that mirrored those 
introduced in the United Kingdom. This became thus a core component of the 
British Treasury's evaluation of whether adoption of the Euro would be in Britain's 
interests (HM Treasury, 200 I). 
In an analysis based on official party manifestos from 1945 to 2001, Bara and Budge 
(2001) showed that a growing consensus emerged between the three main British 
political parties - Conservatives, Labour and Liberal Democrats - which started in 
the early 1990s and especially manifested itself in 1997 and 2001. They found thus 
that these parties had globally evolved towards the centre and centre right of the 
political chess board - Conservatives were deemed though more to the right than the 
other two parties. In party programmes and their economic orientation, there is a 
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neo-liberal Thatcherite consensus between the three related parties, centred on 
reduced role for government and acceptance of the market. Likewise, in 
programmes' emphasis on social conservatism, there are still some distinctions (but 
differences have narrowed acutely in the second part of the 1990s) between the 
related political parties: this is mainly due to law and order, a topic that the 
Conservatives have continued to prioritise heavily, but both Labour and Liberal 
Democrats have markedly increased their emphasis on this area in the 1997 and 
2001 elections. On immigration, there are also quite small differences between the 
parties with Labour moving away from its traditional pro-immigration image in 
1997 and 2001 (Saggar, 2001; Amin and Richardson, 1998). 
In party programmes' emphases on welfare, there is still a differentiation between 
Labour, the Liberal Democrats and Conservatives: Labour and to a lesser extent the 
Liberal Democrats continue to manifest a traditional support in this area - as 
discussed though above, the expenditure on public services was very moderate in the 
first Labour parliament in the study period - although the Conservatives have shown 
greater acceptance of spending on public services in 1997 and 2001. Moreover in 
the 2005 General Election, the Conservatives have shown an even greater 
commitment in this area, almost matching Labour's planned spending (Kavanagh 
and Butler, 2005). Concerning party programme emphases on Europe, there is a 
difference in positioning between the main political parties. The Liberal Democrats 
and to a lesser extent Labour are in favour of European integration. The 
Conservatives' distinctiveness occurs in their opposition to European integration, 
which has grown consistently throughout the nineties (Bara and Budge, 2001). 
Labour and to a lesser extent the Liberal Democrats have though partly followed the 
Conservatives' leadership on Europe in the second part of the 1990s (for example 
only joining the Euro when the conditions are right and subject to a referendum; 
retention of national veto for key policy areas such as taxation; national contribution 
to EU budget; immigration) and have largely shied away, as discussed above, from 
taking an unequivocal stance on Europe. This is pa~ly because of internal party 
divisions, partly because of key economic, social and societal policy consensus 
between the main parties and inherent divergence with the EU more interventionist 
economic, social and societal model - including the deemed more favourable 
economic and social situation in the United Kingdom compared to other EU 
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countries -, but also partly because of unpopularity of European integration with the 
electorate and the media as a whole, and the quest for re-election. Section 4.4.2 will 
underline the growing euroscepticism of British public opinion which reflects the 
political, economic, social and societal environment of the period. In the next 
section, French and British public opinions on European integration will be 
contrasted. 
4.4 Public Opinion and European Integration 
In both the United Kingdom and France, public opinion on European integration has 
fluctuated with the national economic and social situation, and the perceived 
consequences that the former has had and could have on this national situation. This 
implies that public opinion in both these nations relied on utilitarian assessments to 
derive their views on European integration. This relationship is not exclusive in the 
sense that particularly for France, public opinion on European integration also 
depended on an affective attachment to European integration but utilitarian 
appraisals are taking more and more precedence over the latter. 
4.4.1 A French Public Opinion in Favour of European Integration but Concerned 
about the Type of European Union Built 
4.4.1.1 French Public Opinion's Support for European Integration and the Single 
European Currency 
Although French public opinion was and remained much more in favour of 
European integration in the study period than the British one, the level of support for 
European integration in both countries has followed a downward curve - for France 
especially from 1992 to 1997 and from the second part of 2000, and for the United 
Kingdom in the aftermath of the pound's forced withdrawal from the ERM and 
throughout the study period (latter discussed in section 4.4.2). French public 
opinion support for European integration in the study period has varied with the 
economic, social and societal difficulties that France has undergone and the 
perceived role that European integration - and the type of Europe being built - has 
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played in these. The level of public opinion support for European integration, albeit 
overall relatively high in the study period, has dipped from 1992 to 1997 (especially 
first part of 1997) and to a lesser extent from the second part of 2000 echoing acute 
economic and social difficulties in France in these periods as discussed in section 
4.3.1. If68% of people interviewed thought that France's membership of the EU 
was a good thing - versus 6% a bad thing and 21 % neither a good thing nor a bad 
one (5% No Opinion) - in November 1989 (lfop-Profession Politique, 1 April 
1990), and 78% of people interviewed were favourable to European integration -
versus 14% opposed (8% NSPlNo Opinion) - in September 1992 (CSA-
L'Evenement du Jeudi, September 1992), a series of polls confirmed that public 
opinion became increasingly eurosceptic following the ratification of the Maastricht 
Treaty. 
Thus in 1993,52% of persons questioned wished the government to stimulate 
economic activity even if it increased inflation rather than maintain austerity policy 
in pursuance of the Franc Fort policy and EMU commitments - 26% against and 
22% no opinion (CSA-Le Parisien, 24 June 1993). In 1994,51% of people 
interviewed thought that since the ratification of the Treaty on European Union 
(TEU), the EU had gone in the wrong direction - versus 30% in the right direction. 
In the same way, 39% thought that the action of the EU, for themselves and their 
family, had rather negative effects versus 38% positive effects - at the next 
European elections (in June 1994),59% of people interviewed moreover wished to 
express their distrust towards the type of Europe that is being built versus 34% 
confidence (lfop-L'Express, 30 April 1994). In 1997, in relation to the economic 
policy of the government and the budgetary and European constraints, 58% of 
persons questioned thought that the government should profoundly change its 
economic policy, 12% were of the opinion that there was no other policy possible, 
while 20% answered that it was possible to soften the orientations of the 
government's economic policy and 10% had no opinion (Louis Harris-Valeurs 
actuelles, 28 April 1997). In 1996, 48% of people interviewed even agreed that a 
break from European integration should be taken - versus 42% disagreed and 10% 
no opinion (Louis Harris-Valeurs Actuelles, 7 Oct 1996). 
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Public opinion's negative feelings towards European integration became greater in 
1997 and from the second part of 2000, coinciding with a less favourable economic 
and social situation in France (lpsos-Canal Ipsos, 10 Dec 2001; CSA-Liberation, 28 
June 2000). Considering the perceived impact of the EU on specific policies, the 
pattern of scepticism towards the EU is similar with a deterioration in public 
perceptions of the EU in the period from 1992 to 1996 - poll data for these for 1997, 
1998, 2000 and 2001 are not available - and coincide with the period of economic 
and social difficulties in France (see Table 4.6, 4.7 and 4.8 in appendix 4.1). The 
EU as being built is therefore considered by public opinion as contributing to 
France's economic, social and societal problems. From 1992 to 1994 and 1996, 
there is a worsening in public opinion's perceptions on the action of the EU on all 
policies - including agriculture, employment, immigration, social and economic 
policies (EU action is deemed negative overall for these) - and even on those where 
EU action is deemed positive overall such as environment protection and 
maintaining peace in Europe. 
In 1999, there is an amelioration in the perceived contribution of the EU to all 
policies coinciding with a relatively better economic and social environment in 
France, that is to say the fall in unemployment and greater economic growth 
although this unemployment remained relatively high compared to other European 
countries. If the EU is perceived by public opinion as having overall a positive 
effect on policies such as environment protection, maintaining peace in Europe, 
youth training & education, economic growth, the EU influence on policies such as 
unemployment reduction, immigration control, tax decrease, agriculture is still 
perceived as having a negative impact in 1999. The EU is considered by the public 
to have a very marginal positive effect on social protection, 47% positive versus 
46% (see table 4.8 in appendix 4.1). This slight reversal of perceptions concerning 
EU action on social protection - the EU was considered by public opinion before 
this date as having a negative influence on social protection - may be explained by a 
relatively better economic and social environment in France in 1999 but also by the 
fact that the EU under inter alia French insistence has made some limited moves on 
the social agenda. 
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Moreover on this aspect, public opinion judged that the priority of the EU should be 
to firstly focus on building a social Europe: 57% of people interviewed placed the 
establishment of a Social Europe as the priority for the EU followed respectively by 
the establishment of a Europe of Defence (19%), European Monetary and Financial 
Union (18%), European Cultural Policy (12%), European Agricultural Policy (12%) 
and European Political Union (11 %) (CSA-L'Humanite, 2 June 1999). The public 
concern for social protection is further substantiated by the fact that public opinion 
judged that European integration as it unfolded reinforced the effects of 
globalisation rather than protected against the effects of globalisation (Ipsos-Canal 
Ipsos, 10 Dec 2001). The further rise in this feeling in November 2000 and 
November 2001 - passing from 47% (against 45%) in October 1999 to 50% (against 
38%) in November 2000 & 56% (against 33%) in November 2001 - may be 
explained by the French economic slow down from the second part of 2000. 
The prevalence of monetary policy over budgetary policy pertaining to the Franc 
Fort policy and EMU, and the political agitation over this issue in the discourse of 
the left and the right in the study period have contributed to the public opinion's fear 
about the consequences of the Euro on social policies. Thus 55% of people 
interviewed thought that with the Euro there will be a diminution in social protection 
- versus 27% an amelioration and 18% no opinion (CSA-La Tribune, 1 May 1998). 
For public opinion, the perceived negative impact of the Euro on social protection 
was deemed even greater in 1997, a period in which the economic and social 
situation was very poor: 71 % of people interviewed judged that the single currency 
and a common European economic policy will not be conducive to social 
inequalities reduction, 73% not conducive to a decrease in unemployment and 50% 
not conducive to a return to economic growth (Louis Harris-Valeurs Actuelles, 28 
April 1997). 
When considering the issue of the single European currency and EMU itself, the 
pattern of support among public opinion is similar to the one for European 
integration as a whole. Thus, in the study period, public opinion has quite clearly 
supported the single currency and EMU but this support has varied with the 
economic, social and societal difficulties that France has undergone and the 
perceived role that the single currency and EMU - and the way to achieve it - have 
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played in these. The level of public opinion support for the single currency and 
EMU, albeit overall clearly in the majority in the study period, has dipped from 
1992 to 1997 (especially the first part of 1997 and the second part of 1993) and to a 
lesser extent from the second part of 2000 echoing acute economic and social 
difficulties in France in these periods as discussed in section 4.3.1.1. The lowest 
level of support for the single European currency was reached in April 1997 and 
October 1993, namely 49% (see Table 4.9 in appendix 4.1), coinciding in 1997 and 
1993 with a very poor economic and social situation with high unemployment and 
low economic growth: this cumulated in 1993 with a currency crisis within the 
European monetary system (EMS) - pushing the French Franc outside the 
fluctuations margins of the EMS. Table 4.10 (in appendix 4.1) also reveals that 
positive opinion about the single European currency dropped from 2000 echoing the 
economic slowdown in France - including the expectations of an economic slow 
down from the second part of 2000 - in this period. 
When considering the perceived influence of the single European currency on 
specific aspects (see table 4.l1, 4.12 and 4.13 in appendix 4.1), public opinion saw 
the Euro as mainly having positive consequences on commercial exchanges, 
inflation control, currency stability, easing travel and dynamism of the French 
economy (the latter in 1998 when the economic situation was relatively better). 
Public opinion though regarded the single European currency as principally having 
negative consequences on purchasing power, savings, social protection, pensions, 
unemployment, identity and national sovereignty of France. It must be noted that in 
the 1998 period, the relatively better economic climate in France has contributed to 
improving public opinion's views on the consequences of the Euro for specific 
aspects but public opinion remained sceptical on the consequences of the Euro for 
employment, salaries and even the sacrifices that people had to make because of the 
Euro. 
4.4.1.2 French Public Opinion's Support for Europeanization of Policies 
Section 4.4.1.1 has demonstrated that public opinion has been overall in favour of 
European integration in the study period from 1992 to 2001 although there have 
been some fluctuations in the level of support for European integration during this 
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period echoing economic, societal and social difficulties in France for which 
European integration - at least the type of EU being built - is deemed to contribute. 
French public opinion was thus particularly unhappy with the austerity policy 
relating to EMU and the single European currency and construed the EU as too 
liberal, deregulated, excessively open to often deemed unfair world competition, as 
not giving enough place to social and societal preoccupations in its policies and as 
partly harming the identity and national sovereignty of France. 
Contrary to the United Kingdom, the socialisation effect - concomitant with the 
continuing pro-Europeanism of mainstream parties in France - partly explains the 
support of French public opinion for European integration. The feeling of 
attachment to Europe exemplifies this: 63% of people interviewed felt European 
from time to time or often - versus 35% rarely or never and 2% no opinion (CSA-La 
Vie, 2 January 1993). The circulation of the single European currency was 
moreover viewed by public opinion as the most decisive element further 
contributing to feeling European: 39% in 2001,39% in 2000,46% in 1999 (Ipsos-
Canal Ipsos, 10 Dec 2001). Even if European integration tended to be seen as 
threatening the French identity - albeit the figures are almost evenly balanced 
(Ipsos-Canal Ipsos, 10 December 2001), public opinion is in favour of transferring 
some policies to the EU (Sofres-Le Figaro, 8 March 1996) and in favour of 
decisions in the European Council being taken by qualified majority rather than by 
unanimity: 67% of people interviewed in favour - versus 30% opposed and 3% no 
opinion (CSA-Liberation, 28 June 2000). Despite an unfavourable economic and 
social climate in France in 1996, public opinion was thus willing to transfer some 
policies to the EU such as industrial policy, unemployment fighting policy, 
telecommunications policy, foreign policy, immigration policy, environment policy 
and the use of troops abroad. People interviewed were though opposed to 
transferring professional training policy, economic policy, social policy, cultural 
policy and education (Sofres-Le Figaro, 8 March 1996). The unfavourable 
economic and social climate in 1996 has probably contributed to influencing public 
opinion's views on not wishing to transfer to the EU, policies such as social policy, 
economic policy and professional training: as discussed above, the EU was seen as 
contributing to France's economic and social problems via especially Franc Fort 
policy, EMU but also the concern that the EU was too liberal. 
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The desire to transfer policies to the EU may be explained by the belief that the EU 
may be best able to deal with some of these policies - subsidiarity principle - and 
that French successive governments have failed to deal successfully with these. 
Unemployment, crime and immigration are at a high level in the study period 
(European Commission, 2002, 2003; Barclay and Tavares, 2003; Eurostat, 2006a 
and OECD/SOPEMI, various years) and have been key issues for public opinion at 
elections (see section 4.2.1.2). Ifpublic opinion is critical of some of the 
agreements in place such as the Schengen agreement and their consequences for 
immigration and crime, they may believe that the EU, at least the type of EU they 
favour, would implement a more restrictive policy towards immigration from 
outside the EU than the French one - France has one of the most liberal immigration 
policies in Europe. It is revealing here to note that French citizens are not in favour 
of transferring social, cultural and education policies to the EU as they may perceive 
that French successive governments have dealt relatively better with these - level of 
social protection is relatively high in EU terms (Eurostat/ESSPROS, 2006) - and 
that the national level may be best placed to cater for these but also because they 
fear a liberal policy path of the EU. French citizens would like the EU to take a 
more regulated capitalism path, with more interventionism in the economic and 
social sphere. 
4.4.2 An Increasingly Eurosceptic British Public Opinion 
4.4.2.1 A British Public Opinion Ever More Sceptical towards European Integration 
and the Single European Currency 
British public opinion was and remained more reluctant towards EU membership 
and particularly towards further European integration compared to most other EU 
countries including France, and grew even more eurosceptic from 1992 (especially 
in the aftermath of the pound's forced withdrawal from the ERM) to 2001. British 
public opinion was also opposed to EMU and the single currency and grew even 
more so throughout the study period. Thus, from 1994, there is a majority of British 
respondents who are against further transfer of sovereignty to the EU with a view to 
being closer with it. There was a further progress of eurosceptic ideas in 1997 
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concomitant upon the increased politicisation of the EU issue by political parties. 
The percentage of respondents with no opinion in one way or the other has also 
fallen significantly in the second part of the 1990s (IeM Research, 2001a). 
On the question of whether Britain should leave the EU or not, which is a relatively 
extreme and binary question, there is a weakening in public opinion support for 
Britain staying in the EU especially from 1992 and especially 1993 (Post ERM 
crisis) (see Table 4.14 in appendix 4.2). Across the study period, there is an increase 
in the percentage of people who are in favour of Britain leaving the EU and people 
who are uncertain about European integration (Don't Know answers). The greater 
politicisation of the EU issue - especially in April 1997 General Election, June 1999 
European Elections and June 2001 General Election - has contributed to this. From 
these data, despite the decrease in support for EU membership, British respondents 
are still in favour of remaining in the EU (Ipsos Mori, 2003). However, in a poll of 
February 2001 by Ipsos-Mori (2001), a majority of respondents (50%) would favour 
a withdrawal from the EU - versus 37% would stay in and 13% Don't know - if the 
UK could keep a Free Trade zone with the EU. In the latter poll, a large majority of 
respondents (84%) felt though that politicians should give them more information 
with a view to deciding whether to leave or not to leave the EU. 
The most important reasons given by British respondents for thinking Britain's EU 
membership is a good thing are: "good for trade" (34%), "good to cooperate and 
avoid isolationism" (14%), "need to/will get left behind/cannot afford not to/too 
small to survive" (7%), "greater chance of peace and military stronger" (7%), "good 
for jobs" (5%), "good for the economy" (5%) (IeM Research, 2001b). The single 
most important reasons given by British respondents for thinking Britain's EU 
membership is a bad thing are: "losing national independence" (25%), EU 
membership not needed (13%), cost too much to belong (11 %), losing the national 
identity (11 %), "single currency/keep the Pound" (8%) (IeM Research, 2001 b). In 
the same poll, 59% of respondents agreed that the EU is good for British jobs and 
trade (versus 21 % (disagreed)); 60% agreed that it promotes peace and security in 
Europe (versus 22%); 66% agreed that the EU makes it easier to live or work in 
other European countries (versus 15%); 46% agreed that Britain has more influence 
as part of the European Union (versus 31 %). However, 58% agreed that with the 
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EU, Britain's national identity is being lost (versus 30%); 38% disagreed that 
Britain's EU membership means lower prices e.g. air travel, gas/electricity bills 
(versus 34%); 51 % agreed that Britain pays in more to the EU than it takes out 
(versus 14%); 61 % agreed that Britain is losing the ability to make its own decisions 
(versus 26%); 67% agreed that the EU is full of red tape and bureaucracy (versus 
12%); 44% agreed that the EU makes decisions in an undemocratic way (versus 
25%); 57% agreed that with the EU, Britain is pushed around by other countries 
such as France and Germany (versus 30%). When asked how they feel about their 
national identity, 66% of respondents felt only British, 20% more British than 
European, 8% equally British and European, 1 % more European than British, 1 % 
only European and 3% don't know. An important difference between British and 
French public opinions is that national identity and sovereignty issues are much 
more important in opposing European integration for the former. British identity is 
conceived as much less compatible with European identity than French identity 
partly due to lesser importance of socialisation in the United Kingdom (cult of 
British history), British mainstream political parties being less in favour of European 
integration - political elites embracing EU membership as a pragmatic step 
essentially focused on economic argument without conversion to the symbolism of 
integration (Wallace, 1997; Schmidt, 2006) - and a different conception of national 
cohesion - role of the welfare state in fostering a strong community in France versus 
role of national identity in fostering a strong community in the United Kingdom 
(CSA-La Vie, 2 January 1993; Ipsos-Canal Ipsos, 10 Dec 2001; Ipsos-Canal Ipsos, 
10 December 2001 and ICM Research, 200 1 b). 
When asked which three or four things do you think should be a priority for the 
European Union to undertake in the future (ICM Research, 2001 b), respondents 
answered the following: 
Maintaining peace and security in Europe (47%) 
Fighting poverty (46%) 
Fighting crime (40%) 
Fighting unemployment (40%) 
Developing a common approach to asylum and immigration (31 %) 
Developing and protecting the rights of citizens (30%) 
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Protecting the environment (28%) 
Protecting consumers (18%) 
Reforming the way that the EO institutions work (13%) 
Welcoming new countries to join the EO (8%) 
None of them (4%) 
Don't Know (8%) 
Finally when asked "what do you think public services such as health, education and 
transport are like in other major European countries compared to Britain, do you 
think they are better, worse or are much the same?", 42% answered better, 25% 
much the same and 10% worse (23% Don't Know) (IeM Research, 2001b). 
These results seem to indicate that British respondents are increasingly critical of the 
EO (the euro poll results below confirm this further). Although the EO is 
considered as having a beneficial effect on British jobs and trade, and on peace and 
security in Europe, the EO image is one of an undemocratic, bureaucratic institution 
taking away Britain's national sovereignty, endangering Britain's national identity 
and not giving value to Britain. The EO is though considered to be able to playa 
role in inter alia fighting poverty, crime, unemployment and resolving immigration 
and asylum problems, developing and protecting the rights of citizens - partly in 
reference to having access to better public services - besides maintaining peace and 
security in Europe. 
On the issue of the single European currency, there is also globally a decrease in the 
support for a single European currency after 1991 (see Table 4.15 in appendix 4.2). 
That is to say the trend in favour of rejecting the single European currency has 
grown larger after 1991. It is particularly interesting to note that the polls in 
proximity with 1 st May 1997 and 7th June 2001 General Elections, 10th June 1999 
European Elections show a greater percentage of respondents against the single 
currency or being uncertain about it (Don't Know answers). The increase in the 
opposition to the single European currency is still witnessed in the late 1990s even if 
the government would urge voters to vote in support of it (see Table 4.16 in 
appendix 4.2). 
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British public opinion is sceptical about the single European currency and relies on a 
utilitarian assessment to judge the single European currency. Thus British public 
opinion is concerned about the negative impact that the single currency would have 
on unemployment, interest rates, the control over the setting of tax rates and interest 
rates and the control over government spending shifting to the European Union, the 
use of British tax in other European countries, the transfer of Britain's gold reserves 
to a European Central Bank and more generally the negative impact that the single 
European currency would have on the British economy (Ipsos Mori, 14 November 
1997). British public opinion is therefore not only opposed to the single European 
currency on the grounds of loss of national sovereignty and national identity but also 
because they fear that the single European currency would have a negative impact 
on the British economic and social model. This must be interpreted in the context of 
a British economy which is in a relatively better situation than most of the EU in 
terms of for example employment and tax levels and therefore the fear that the 
single European currency and EMU would damage the relative economic and social 
health of the United Kingdom. It is thus revealing to see that British public opinion 
deemed the single currency had not worked and would not work in the future (lpsos 
Mori, 30 September 2000). 
However if joining the Euro were to translate itself into economic gains for the 
United Kingdom and its citizens, British public opinion could be persuaded to vote 
in favour of the Euro in a referendum on the Euro. Thus, among the main reasons 
which could persuade voters to vote yes in a referendum on the Euro, "If I was 
convinced that Britain's economy had lost jobs, trade-unions and investment by 
staying out of the Euro" (37%) came first, respectively followed by "If I thought that 
the Euro had become a successful currency" (27%), "If I thought the Euro will bring 
cheaper prices" and "If I was persuaded that the Euro will not lead to a United States 
of Europe with a federal government" (24%), "If the Prime Minister and the 
Chancellor convinced me that joining the Euro is in the national interest" (22%), "If 
I thought that the Euro had helped improve Europe's economy" (19%), "If I thought 
the Euro would bring cheaper mortgages" (17%), "If I felt that Britain had lost 
influence in the European Union by staying outside the Euro" (16%), "If Europe's 
economy became more competitive" (13%), "If the pound stayed overvalued against 
the Euro" (11 %) and "If the Chancellor's five economic tests for joining the Euro 
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were met" (7%) (Ipsos Mori, 2 July 2001). It must be noted that the national 
sovereignty issue is also important for British public opinion and a Yes vote on the 
Euro would be subject to the proviso that the Euro would not lead to a federal 
European government?: "If I was persuaded that the Euro will not lead to a United 
States of Europe with a federal government" (24%) (Ipsos Mori, 2 July 2001). 
Furthermore, it is important to note that if it was demonstrated that the Euro had a 
positive effect on Europe's economy, it would be conducive to British public 
opinion voting Yes to the Euro: "If Europe's economy became more competitive", 
"If I thought that the Euro had helped improve Europe's economy" and "If I thought 
that the Euro had become a successful currency". This can be linked to the 
argument above that Europe's economy was deemed to be weaker than the United 
Kingdom's one and therefore made adopting the Euro less appealing to British 
public opinion but that if economic circumstances in Europe changed with the Euro, 
British public opinion would consider adopting the Euro. 
Therefore, although British and French public opinions have a different conception 
of European integration - in other words, what the EU should be - clearly one more 
integrative than the other, if the EU is deemed to have a positive effect on the 
national economic and social situation, public opinion in these two countries will 
support European integration. As discussed in the background section on France, 
the level of French citizens' support for European integration and the Euro was 
higher in periods when the economic and social situation was better, and French 
citizens are clearly in favour of European integration, especially one oriented 
towards a social Europe. It is also revealing that British public opinion is less 
supportive of the EU and against adopting the Euro as it perceives both not to work 
well and give value to the United Kingdom but if the EU and specifically the Euro 
were to materialize itself into economic gains for the United Kingdom and its 
citizens, British public opinion would favour further European integration and could 
be persuaded to adopt the Euro. In the British context, the economic gains 
pertaining to further European integration are though subject to the national 
sovereignty constraint: British citizens would not approve the establishment of a 
federal Europe. 
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4.4.2.2 British Public Opinion Reluctant to Europeanize Policies 
Section 4.4.2.1 has shown that British public opinion has grown far less disposed 
towards European integration from 1992 to 2001. Although the EU was considered 
as having a beneficial effect on British jobs and trade, and on peace and security in 
Europe, British public opinion judged the EU to be undemocratic, bureaucratic, too 
interventionist, somewhat value dis-enhancing and threatening British national 
identity and sovereignty. The outcomes regarding the Europeanization of policies 
should be construed in this environment. 
There are very few polls which deal with the transfer of national policies to the EU, 
probably because British public opinion has grown more eurosceptic throughout the 
decade which made this issue far less important for polling companies. From 1993 
to 1996 the level of public opinion support for transfer of national policies to the EU 
has deteriorated (Ipsos Mori, 3 May 1996). Thus, by 1996, the net support for a 
common system of legal practice has fallen to 28 points from 43 points in 1993. In 
the same way, in 1996 the differential in favour of a common system of taxes 
between member states has fallen to 2 points whilst in 1996 British public opinion 
did not support the establishment of a Supreme Court of Europe and a single co-
ordinated European foreign policy any longer (differential respectively of 3 and 2 
points). In 1996 the opposition to transferring more power to the European 
Parliament from individual national parliaments has grown to a differential of 46 
points and the opposition to the establishment of a United States of Europe with a 
federal government was of a differential of 45 points. Finally, in 1996 British public 
opinion was still opposed to sterling rejoining the European Exchange Rate 
Mechanism (differential of 8 percentage points but was of 37 percentage points in 
the immediate aftermath of the currency crisis in the early 1990s). It is probable that 
consistent with the further deterioration in British public opinion's support for the 
EU in the second part of the 1990s, the British have grown even more opposed to 
further transfers of sovereignty to the EU after 1996. 
Importance of Issues and British Public Opinion 
The importance of issues for public opinion throughout the study period brings some 
insights into the reasons which substantiate the growing reluctance of British public 
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opinion towards European integration and the Europeanization of policies. When 
asked what the most important issues faced by Britain each year are and considering 
the study period from 1992 to 2001, British respondents attached more importance 
to unemployment and the management of the economy (with peaks in 1992 and 
1993) in the first period of the 1990s, and this declined subsequently (lpsos-Mori, 
2006). The improvement in the United Kingdom's economic performance 
especially in the second part of the 1990s explains this: unemployment has fallen to 
5% by 2001 - among the lowest in the EU - and economic growth has improved 
after 1993 (European Commission, 2002, 2003). 
By the 1990s, there was a greater readiness on the part of voters to accept the need 
for higher taxation in order to fund social and public services (Evans, 1999). Health 
(NHS) and education whilst always considered quite important by British 
respondents throughout the period, took even more importance for them from the 
second part of the 1990s - became then the most important issues facing Britain 
(lpsos-Mori, 2006). This is reflected by the level of the United Kingdom's total 
expenditure on social protection per head of population (in ECU/EUR) which has 
improved especially in the last few years of the century to become relatively more 
comparable to France - albeit still lower than France when considering the cost of 
social provisions (PPS measurement) but above EU average (EurostatiESSPROS, 
2006). The integration of the social chapter into British law under the first Labour 
government in the study period as the accumulated government commitments to 
public services - albeit rather moderate in the first Labour parliament as discussed 
above - have here played a role. This means that the social argument for supporting 
European integration is losing substance here as the United Kingdom's social 
expenditure is above the EU average towards the end of the study period and 
expenditure on social protection has been pledged by the British government to go 
up further in real terms in the future (post 2001). 
Crime/Law and Order have always been quite important for British respondents 
throughout the study period, more especially in the first part of the 1990s and from 
2000 (lpsos-Mori, 2006). This reflects a relatively high crime rate per head of 
population throughout the study period - the highest one in the EU (Barclay and 
Tavares, 2003). The permeability of European borders - partly resulting from the 
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principle of free movements of people, services and goods - is perceived as 
contributing to crime and law and order issues in the UK, the media focus on traffic 
of arms, drugs and people in Europe contributing to this perception. Race 
relations/immigration, while considered relatively less important, has assumed more 
importance for British respondents from the second part of the 1990s, especially 
from 1999 - it has been even more important for respondents from 2002 to 2006 
(often well over 30%) (lpsos Mori, 2006). This echoes an immigration to the United 
Kingdom which is relatively high and has accelerated in the late 1990s (Eurostat, 
2006a); OECD/SOPEMI, various years). The growing immigration concern may be 
partly explained by an important flow of European nationals and residents coming to 
the UK to work given its relatively better economic situation, but also by the media 
focus on the poor handling of illegal immigration by the EU and other European 
countries such as in Sangatt, the Channel Tunnel, in the Canary Islands and in Sicily 
and Southern Italy. It is thus revealing that British respondents place immigration 
and crime among the policy priorities of the EU (see above). 
Europe, beside the ERM crisis and BSE crisis periods, has taken more importance 
for British respondents in the second part of the 1990s, coinciding with the greater 
politicisation of the EU issue, its comparative importance is though below the one 
for Health and Education (lpsos-Mori, 2006). Taxation and inflation are deemed of 
little importance for British respondents in the study period (Ipsos-Mori, 2006). For 
the latter, it is explained by the fact the United Kingdom has relatively low inflation 
in the study period - the control of inflation improved further in the second part of 
the 1990s. For the former, it is explained by the relatively low level of taxation as a 
percentage of GDP in the United Kingdom. Although taxation has increased 
throughout the period of study, the United Kingdom has low taxation as a 
percentage of GDP and remains one of the lowest in the EU - just behind Ireland, 
Spain and Portugal (European Commission, 2002; 2003). 
4.4.2.3 British and French Public Opinions: Two Visions of the EU 
Overall, despite both public opinions in the United Kingdom and France seeing a 
role for the EU in for example helping to fight unemployment, poverty, maintain 
peace and security, fight crime, regulate immigration, protect the environment and 
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develop and protect the rights of citizens, they have a different conception of what 
the EU should be. French public opinion would like the EU to be more integrated 
economically and politically, and be organised on a supra-national basis. It is in 
favour of transferring a number of policies to the EU such as industrial policy, 
unemployment fighting policy, telecommunications policy, foreign policy, 
immigration policy, environment policy and the use of troops abroad - this even in a 
context of acute national economic and social problems (1996: date of when poll 
was carried out) perceived as partly due to European integration via especially Franc 
Fort policy and EMU but also the concern that the EU was too liberal- and supports 
decisions being taken at qualified majority in the European Council (Sofres-Le 
Figaro, 8 March 1996; CSA-Liberation, 28 June 2000). French public opinion backs 
the establishment of a social Europe with a regulated capitalism, a high level of 
social protection and one that upholds the principle of European preference, and 
therefore an EU which protects its citizens against the effects of globalisation. It 
must though be noted that French citizens are not in favour of transferring social, 
cultural and education policies to the EU (Sofres-Le Figaro, 8 March 1996) as they 
may perceive that French successive governments have dealt relatively better with 
these - level of social protection is relatively high in EU terms (Eurostat/ESSPROS, 
2006) - and that the national level may be best placed to cater for these. The context 
of acute national economic and social difficulties in 1996 (date of when poll was 
carried out) for which European integration via especially Franc Fort policy and 
EMU was deemed to have contributed may also explain the reluctance of French 
public opinion to transfer the social policy and economic policy to the EU. British 
public opinion itself prefers the EU to be organised on an intergovernmental basis 
and implement free trade and market liberalisation. It is thus strongly opposed to 
transferring more power to the European Parliament from the national parliament 
and to the establishment of a United States of Europe with a federal government. 
More specifically it is against the transfer of foreign policy to the EU, against 
sterling rejoining the exchange rate mechanism and against a supreme court of 
Europe (Ipsos Mori, 3 May 1996). British public opinion appears though 
ambivalent towards a common system of taxes between member states. 
Nevertheless it is likely that consistent with the further deterioration in British public 
opinion's support for the EU in the second part of the 1990s, the British have grown 
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even more opposed to further transfers of sovereignty to the EU after 1996 (date of 
when poll was carried out). Besides national identity and sovereignty issues, the 
growing relative reluctance of British public opinion towards European integration 
can be explained by a perceived divergence of the EU economic, social and societal 
model with the largely consensual British one which focuses more on free markets , 
individualism and by the comparative relative success of the British economic , 
social and societal model - to other EU countries - which is perceived to be 
threatened by a EU deemed undemocratic, bureaucratic, more interventionist and 
somewhat value dis-enhancing as discussed above. In line with this, it is particularly 
important to note that a majority of British respondents (50%) would favour a 
withdrawal from the EU - versus 37% would stay in and 13% Don't know - if the 
UK could keep a Free Trade zone with the EU (Ipsos-Mori, 2001). 
4.5 Conclusion 
Despite both France and the United Kingdom seeing a role for the EU, they each 
have a different view of what form the EU should take: this reflects a dissimilar 
national economic, social, societal and political experience in the study period. 
There is relatively strong support in favour of European integration in France in the 
period from 1992 to 2001 which is the consequence of the socialisation effect, a 
consensus in mainstream political parties favouring European integration, a 
relatively low exclusive national identity of French citizens but also the belief that 
the EU - at least the type of EU favoured: an EU focused on regulated capitalism -
can help to tackle some of the key economic, social and societal issues faced by 
France. In the study period, the support for current EU membership and further 
European integration has nevertheless fluctuated with economic, social and societal 
difficulties that France has undergone - especially from 1992 to 1997 and from the 
second part of 2000 - and the perceived role that European integration - and the 
type of Europe being built: an EU which is deemed to be too liberal, deregulated and 
excessively open to world competition - has played in these. This seems to indicate 
that public opinion views on European integration in France are increasingly the 
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result of national economic, social and societal assessments rather than affective 
feelings towards European integration. 
The United Kingdom is and remains less disposed towards European integration 
than other EU countries (including France) and has grown more so from 1992 to 
2001. The growing relative reluctance towards the United Kingdom's EU 
membership - and more especially towards further European integration - in the 
study period appears to be explained by a perceived divergence of the ED economic, 
social and societal model with the British consensus model of free markets, 
individualism, national sovereignty and national interest. It may well also be 
explained by the comparative relative success of the British economic, social and 
societal model - to other EU countries - which is perceived to be threatened by a 
ED deemed undemocratic, bureaucratic, more interventionist and somewhat value 
dis-enhancing, but also by the perceived threat that the EU brings to British national 
identity, and by the lack of real party competition on European integration. 
195 
5- ANALYSIS OF FINDINGS FOR HYPOTHESIS I 
5.1 Introduction 
In this chapter, the relationship between citizens' opinion on national political 
institutions perfonnance and citizens' view towards European integration 
(Hypothesis I) is investigated. The analysis of findings and conclusions for 
hypothesis I are consequently presented below. 
5.2 Analysis of Findings for Hypothesis I 
Research Question I: Is there a relationship between citizens' support for integration 
(or opposition to integration) and citizens' dissatisfaction with national political 
institutions' perfonnance (or satisfaction with national political institutions' 
perfonnance) in socio-economic, societal and political tenns? 
It is hypothesized: 
HI There is an inverse relationship between citizens' levels of satisfaction with 
national political institutions' perfonnance - pertaining to the national economic, 
political, social and societal situation - and citizens' support for European 
integration in France and the United Kingdom (thus, the higher the satisfaction with 
national perfonnance, the lower the support for European integration). 
Statistical outputs are included in the appendices numbered 5.1 A F to 5.48 A F for 
French models and 5.1 B UK to 5.48 B UK for British models. An example of 
statistical output, Evaluation of Current EU Membership (Total Score without don't 
know) (Model M29.9), is shown below (for full output details for the latter, please 
refer to Appendix 5.16 A F). 
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Estimate of Autocorrelation Coefficient 
Rho .82599054 
Standard Error of Rho .05554143 
Cochrane-Orcutt Estimates 
Multiple R .79930717 
R-Squared .63889196 
Adjusted R-Squared .58224756 
Standard Error .10928748 
Durbin-Watson 2.09442 
Analysis of Variance: 
DF Sum of Squares Mean Square 
Regression 15 2.1554168 .14369446 
Residuals 102 1.2182629 .01194375 
Variables in the Equation: 
B SEB BETA T SIG T 
netmigra .0004870 .0001360 .25872497 3.5812941 .00052559 
intraeub -.0118271 .0048826 -.24206199 -2.4223260 .01718550 
inflat .0031429 .0098665 .02950161 .3185435 .75072406 
ttaxburd .0027011 .0069743 .03995843 .3872937 .69934570 
unempl .0326422 .0079738 .34188183 4.0937054 .00008511 
197 
Variables in the Equation: 
B SEB BETA T SIG T 
gdpgrwth .0020815 .0061699 .02281296 .3373582 .73654010 
corupq -.0084288 .0171387 -.04886521 -.4917970 .62391954 
crirnephd 6.0555986 1.0613828 .46292666 5.7053859 .00000011 
burocras .0017322 .0006370 .21922693 2.7193307 .00768996 
tnatpols .0131008 .0025081 .43624673 5.2233021 .00000093 
epel -.0110246 .0202777 -.03806928 -.5436821 .58784657 
referend .0108037 .0396813 .01872806 .2722616 .78597129 
durnfr -.1059330 .1186571 -.08010924 -.8927662 .37408383 
exclnati .3448169 .1903050 .15115867 1.8119175 .07294132 
19thrnber .0023386 .0035131 .08838044 .6656871 .50711377 
CONSTANT .8827031 .3944106 . 2.2380310 .02739295 I 
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5.2.1 Patterns ofEU Support 
Table 5.1 summarizes the pattern of significance of national variables on the 
dependent variables, current EU membership (EU benefit and membership) and 
future EU integration (European integration desired speed preference). 
T bl 5 1 P tt a e .. a erno f' 'fi f Signi Icance 0 EU Support 
Variables Effect on Current EU Effect on Future EU 
Membership Integration 
Dummy Variable for Significant Significant 
United Kingdom 
Dummy Variable for Not Significant Not Significant 
France 
Regression Constant Significant Significant 
Evaluation of Current EU Membership 
The dummy variable for the United Kingdom (UK) is significant in all British 
models, and the direction of the coefficient indicates that the level of support for EU 
membership is significantly lower in the United Kingdom, controlling for other 
factors, than in the other EU member states - it must be noted that the dummy UK 
variable is one of the most important contributors to the explanation of the 
dependent variable, evaluation of current EU membership in British models (even 
more so in British models incorporating "don't Know" answer). It is also revealing 
that the level of support for EU membership is not significantly higher (or lower) in 
France than in the other EU countries. The regression constant is also significant in 
both French and British models with evaluation of current EU membership as the 
dependent variable, and the direction for the coefficient of the constant suggests that 
overall there is a significant drop in current EU membership support in the study 
period (1992-2001 ) (controlling for France and the UK). 
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Desired Speed of European Integration 
The dummy variable for the United Kingdom is overall significant (it shows though 
a small effect which cannot be therefore detected in larger models) in British 
models. The direction of the coefficient for the related variable indicates that the 
level of support for faster European integration is significantly lower in the United 
Kingdom, controlling for other factors, than in the other EU member states. It is 
also revealing that the level of support for faster European integration is not 
significantly higher in France than in the other EU countries. It must be noted that 
the regression constant shows a small significant effect (small effects cannot be 
detected in large models) in all British and French models. The direction of the 
coefficient for the constant suggests that overall there is a small significant drop in 
further European integration support (desired speed of European integration) in the 
study period (1992-2001) (controlling for France and the United Kingdom). 
We can therefore infer from these results that British respondents tend to support 
significantly less current EU membership and further European integration than 
respondents in other EU member states, and French respondents tend to support 
current EU membership and further European integration not significantly less or 
higher than respondents in other EU countries. Furthermore, current EU 
membership support and further European integration support has significantly 
dropped in the study period (1992-2001 ) (controlling for France and the UK). This 
pattern is echoed in the individual level analysis, current EU membership support 
and further European integration support have significantly dropped in the study 
period (1992-2001) for both the United Kingdom and France. The individual level 
analysis brings further insight through a more detailed analysis of periods 
(consequent to restricted data availability) as discussed in chapter 6 (Hypothesis II). 
It must be underlined that although current EU membership support and further 
European integration support have significantly decreased in the study period (1992-
2001) for both the United Kingdom and France, the drop in support for current EU 
membership and future EU integration is lower in France than in the United 
Kingdom - for both individual and aggregate level data analyses. Keeping in mind 
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the hypothesis, in the next sections, it is now necessary to explain the pattern of EU 
support in the French and British contexts. 
5.2.2 Socialisation Theory and EU Support 
Table 5.2 summarizes the pattern of significance of socialisation variables on the 
dependent variables, current EU membership (EU benefit and membership) and 
future EU integration (European integration desired speed preference). If an effect 
is found to be significant, then the relevant variable is a unique contributor to the 
explanation of the dependent variable. 
Table 5.2: Pattern of significance of Socialisation Theory Variables 
Socialisation Theory Effect on Current EU Effect on Future EU 
Variables Membership Integration 
Timing of Entry Significant for French and Significant for British 
British Models with Models 
"don't Know (DK)" Localised Significance for 
Answer (small effect) French models 
Not Significant otherwise 
Length of Membership Not Significant Significant 
Timing of EU Entry 
Evaluation of Current EU Membership 
The timing of EU entry variable tends overall to show a small significant effect on 
the dependent variable, evaluation of EU membership in French and British models 
with "DK" answer. The coefficient for this variable is thus significant in model 
M8K and M9K (British models with "DK" answer), and Model M9K and just 
outside the significance area for M8K (French models with "DK" answer). The 
coefficient for this variable is not significant in all remaining models (large models 
cannot though detect small effects). The direction of the coefficient for the timing of 
entry variable shows in both French and British models that the circumstances of EU 
entry show a small significant effect on current EU membership - with "DK" 
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answer. Thus countries which initially started EU membership with a higher 
enthusiasm for EU integration - that is to say founding member states of the 
European Community (EC) (France included) - are showing now in the study period 
(1992-2001) more uncertainty or even opposition towards EU membership. 
Conversely those who joined later with a relatively lower initial level of support for 
European integration - that is to say countries joining the EC in the 1970s and 1980s 
- are showing more support for EU membership in the study period. The latter may 
apply to countries such as Greece, Portugal, Spain or Ireland but does not apply to 
the United Kingdom as the dummy variable for the UK is significant. The direction 
of the coefficient for the UK dummy variable denotes in all British models that the 
level of support for EU membership is significantly lower in the UK, controlling for 
other factors, than in the other EU member states. It was also revealed above that 
the level of support for EU membership is not significantly higher in France than in 
the other EU countries. This result on timing of entry variable contradicts somewhat 
the results of Anderson and Kaltenthaler (1996) who found that timing of entry was 
the most important predictor of European integration before unemployment and 
length of membership. However they noted a levelling off of support for the EU in 
the older EU members which may make the effects of domestic economic conditions 
more important in the future (post 1993) to explain support for EU integration. 
Desired Speed of European Integration 
In French models, timing of EU entry is a significant predictor of desired speed of 
European integration in model M27 and M29, and is not a significant predictor of 
desired speed of European integration in model M8, M9 and M28 (but not too far 
from the significance area). In British models, timing ofEU entry is a significant 
predictor of desired speed of European integration (except in model M9). Overall, 
the timing of EU entry variable tends to show a significant effect on desired speed of 
European integration in British and French models. This implies that the 
circumstances of EU entry matter in the following manner. Countries who initially 
started EU membership with a higher enthusiasm for EU integration - founding 
member states of the EC (France included) - are showing in the study period (1992-
200 I) more support towards further European integration. Conversely those who 
joined later with a relatively lower initial level of support for European integration -
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countries joining the EC in the 1970s and 1980s - are showing less support for 
further European integration. This is in line with the results elicited for the dummy 
variable for the United Kingdom. Thus the dummy variable for the United Kingdom 
was found overall significant (it shows though a small effect which cannot be 
therefore detected in larger models) in British models with desired speed of 
European integration, and its direction revealed that the level of support for faster 
European integration is significantly lower in the UK, controlling for other factors, 
than in the other EU member states. It was also revealed that the level of support for 
EU membership is not significantly higher in France than in the other EU countries. 
The results obtained here are in line with previous findings (for example, Anderson 
and Kaltenthaler, 1996). 
Length of Membership 
Evaluation of Current EU Membership 
The length of membership variable is not a significant predictor of the dependent 
variable, evaluation of current EU membership in all British and French models. 
The results elicited in the present study run counter to previous findings: for 
example Anderson & Kaltenthaler's (1996) and Anderson & Reichert's (1996) 
results who found that the longer a country has been a EU member state, the more 
respondents in the country support EU integration. However Anderson and 
Kaltenthaler (1996) conceded that there was a levelling off of support for the EU in 
the older EU members which may make the effects of domestic economic conditions 
more important in the future (post 1993) to explain support for EU integration. It 
appears that this has occurred according to the present study's results and this is in 
line with Gabel (1998a) and Easton (1975) who pointed out that affective EU 
support derived inter alia from the socialisation effect was in minorit/3 and that 
discontent with governance performance over a long enough time would erode even 
the strongest underlying bond of attachment. For a country like France which has 
had poor economic and social results (for instance high unemployment) for a 
number of years, this explanation seems plausible. It was found moreover in the 
73 In other words, utilitarianism is more important to explain EU support than affective attachment. 
203 
present study that the higher the unemployment in the country is, the more 
respondents are against current EU membership. This is especially true for France 
which has a relatively high unemployment rate as discussed later in this chapter. 
Desired Speed of European Integration 
Length of membership is a significant predictor of desired speed of membership in 
French (except in model M12 but close to the significance area) and British models. 
The coefficient for the related variable denotes that the longer a country has been in 
the EU, the more the respondents prefer a faster European integration. This result is 
in line with previous findings (for example Anderson & Kaltenthaler, 1996 and 
Kaltenthaler & Anderson, 2001 74). Therefore France's longer membership of the 
EU - with its corollary of process of education about the benefits of the EU and 
familiarization with the Union's institutions - drives faster European integration, 
and conversely the United Kingdom's more recent EU membership favours a slower 
European integration. It is worth noting that length of membership is one of the 
most important predictors of desired speed of European integration. 
The results obtained for the socialisation theory variables show an erosion of the 
socialisation effect on public opinion's current EU membership. This is particularly 
important for France as the latter is an old EU member state. As it will be shown 
later in this chapter, citizens' economic, social and societal assessments of how the 
EU is affecting nation states together with the incumbent government support seem 
more important to explain support for current EU membership. This echoes 
somewhat Kritzinger's (2003) and Angelucci (1993) suggestions that citizens use 
national proxies to express attitudes towards the EU. The socialisation effect 
remains though important to explain public opinion support for further European 
integration, along side economic, social and societal assessments of how further 
European integration can affect nation states as witnessed later in the chapter. 
74 Albeit Anderson & Kaltenthaler (1996) and Kaltenthaler & Anderson (200 1) used a different 
dependent variable in their research. The former used unification of Western Europe as a dependent 
variable and the latter used EMU and single currency support as a dependent variable. 
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5.2.3 Economic and Social Sphere and ED Support 
Table 5.3 summarizes the pattern of significance of socio-economic variables on the 
dependent variables, current ED membership (ED benefit and membership) and 
future EU integration (European integration desired speed preference). If an effect 
is found to be significant, then the relevant variable is a unique contributor to the 
explanation of the dependent variable. 
Table 5.3: Pattern of Significance ofSocio-Economic Variables 
Socio-Economic Effect on Current EU Effect on Future EU 
Variables Membership Integration 
Inflation Not Significant Significant (small effect) 
GDP Growth Not Significant Not Significant 
Intra-ED Trade Significant Significant for French 
Dependence Models only 
Intra-ED Trade Balance Significant Significant 
Unemployment Significant Not Significant 
Social Expenditure per Significant for British Significant 
Head Models only 
Total Tax Burden Not Significant Significant 
Bureaucracy Significant Significant 
Inflation and GDP Growth 
Evaluation of Current ED Membership 
Overall, inflation is not a significant predictor of evaluation of current EU 
membership for all French and British models. The direction of this coefficient for 
French models (with and without "don't know" answer in the dependent variable) 
and for British models (with "don't know" answer) indicates that the more inflation 
there is, the more respondents support (here though statistically insignificantly) EU 
membership. 
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In all French and British models, GDP growth is not a significant predictor of 
evaluation of current EU membership, and the coefficients for GDP growth for both 
French and British models reveal that the higher the economic growth in a country 
is, the more respondents support (here though statistically insignificantly) EU 
membership. 
The results obtained in this study - current EU membership evaluation - for 
Inflation and GDP Growth refute Eichenberg & Dalton's (1993), Anderson & 
Kaltenthaler's (1996) and Gabel's (1998a) results in the sense that the related 
variables are not statistically significant in the present research. However, the 
direction of the coefficient for inflation obtained here conforms to Gabel's (1998a) 
results in the sense that poor macro-economic conditions (high inflation) lead (albeit 
here statistically insignificantly) to increased level of support for current EU 
membership. Along the same line, the direction of the coefficient for GDP growth 
conforms to Eichenberg & Dalton's (1993) and Anderson & Kaltenthaler's (1996) 
results in the sense that high GDP growth leads (albeit here statistically 
insignificantly) to increased level for current EU membership. The non statistical 
significance of the inflation and GDP variables elicited in the present study confirms 
though the results of Eichenberg and Dalton (2007) who found that in the post-
Maastricht period 1992-2004, the related variables show no effect on EU 
membership support. 75 
A factor which may explain why inflation is here found not to be a unique 
contributor to the explanation of current EU membership, is that in the period 
studied (1992-2001) France and to a lesser extent the United Kingdom (especially in 
the second part of the study period) had a relatively low inflation. As such French 
and British respondents may not have perceived inflation as an actual problem itself 
needing to be remedied by inter alia the European Union. 
The finding that GDP growth is here not a unique contributor to the explanation of 
current EU membership (as further European integration, please see below) is 
75 Eichenberg and Dalton (2007) did not though use the same dependent variable. Their depende.nt 
variable measured the difference between the percentage of survey respondents who feel that their 
country's EU membership is a "good thing" minus the percentage who feel it is a "bad thing". 
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somewhat paradoxical as citizens in France and to a lesser extent in the United 
Kingdom have been subject to messages by national political actors that current EU 
membership (and further European integration) in the forms of, for example, the 
single European market and economic and monetary union, are conducive to greater 
economic growth. This may be so as GDP growth may be a too general and 
restrictive index of economic well-being - improvements in employment situation 
and standard of living as used in the individual analysis may be comparatively more 
concrete. Thus as demonstrated in the individual level analysis, British and French 
respondents who have better or the same expectations for the country's economic 
situation for the year to come are more likely to support current EU membership and 
favour a faster European integration than those who have worse expectations. 
Desired Speed of European Integration 
In both British and French models, inflation makes a small significant contribution 
to the explanation of the outcome variable, EU desired speed: this variable is 
significant in models M8 and MIl, and not significant in model M27, M28 and M29 
(the last three models cannot though detect small effects). The direction of the 
coefficient for inflation in all models suggests that when inflation is high in the 
country, respondents in the country wish to have a faster European integration. The 
results obtained in this study regarding desired speed of European integration and 
inflation are in line with Sanchez-Cuenca (2000) suggestions in so far as high 
inflation leads to desired faster European integration, and run counter to Anderson 
and Kaltenthaler's (1996)76 results in both significance and direction. 
In all British and French models, GDP growth is not a significant predictor of 
desired speed of European integration, and the direction of the coefficient for this 
variable tends to indicate that the higher the GDP growth in the country is, the more 
respondents in the country favour (here statistically insignificantly) a slower 
European integration pace. Regarding the GDP growth variable, although Anderson 
and Kaltenthaler (1996) did not use the same dependent variable, the results 
obtained in the present research refute Anderson and Kaltenthaler (1996) results as 
76 Anderson and Kaltenthaler's (1996) used though Western Europe unification as a dependent 
variable in their study. 
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GDP growth is here not significant, and the coefficient for this variable has here not 
the same direction as in Anderson and Kaltenthaler's (1996) results. 
Inflation is thus found to be a small significant contributor to the explanation of 
further European integration in both French and British models, and given that 
France and to a lesser extent the United Kingdom (especially in the second part of 
the study period) have a relatively low inflation in the study period, this indicates 
that the low inflation in these two countries is conducive to a preferred slower 
European integration for both nationalities. This is in line with the results obtained 
for the evaluation of current EU membership (see above albeit the effect was there 
found not to be significant), and invalidates therefore the strength of inflation 
control-related arguments developed by French mainstream political parties and to a 
lesser extent by some British mainstream political parties and factions to justify 
further European integration and more particularly EMU in the United Kingdom and 
especially France. A European utilitarian value for inflation cannot be inferred in 
the French and British context. 
Furthermore in the French context, EMU and the Euro may have been perceived by 
respondents as bringing rigidities to the national budget and jeopardising inter alia 
national social expenditure - factions within mainstream parties and non-
mainstream left and right parties have moreover intrumentalised this to rally support 
against further European integration and more particularly EMU and the single 
currency. This is echoed by the significance and direction of the social expenditure 
per head variable (please see below). In the British context, British politicians in 
especially factions within the Conservative Party for the first part of the study 
period, the Conservative Party leadership (from the end of 1997), and factions 
within mainstream left parties and non-mainstream political parties have widely 
publicized the rigidities and threats that EMU and the Euro would bring to British 
economic management if they were adopted, and the differences between the British 
economic cycle and economic policies and the continental European ones. It is 
therefore likely that British respondents have been partly influenced by these 
arguments. 
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Unemployment 
Evaluation of Current EU membership 
As far as unemployment is concerned, it is a significant contributor to the 
explanation of the outcome variable, evaluation of current EU membership in all 
British models and in the large majority of French models especially in the ones 
incorporating "DK" answer. Only in French models M9, M12 and M9K is 
unemployment not a significant predictor of evaluation of current EU membership. 
It must be noted that when incorporating the "DK" answer, unemployment becomes 
a more significant predictor in French models. In all models, the direction of the 
coefficient for unemployment designates that the higher unemployment in the 
country is, the more respondents in the country are against current EU membership. 
The results elicited for the unemployment variable in the present study are consistent 
with the ones obtained by Eichenberg & Dalton (1993) and Anderson & 
Kaltenthaler (1996): high unemployment leads to a significantly lower level of 
support for current EU membership. The present results refute however the findings 
of Eichenberg and Dalton (2007) who uncovered that unemployment shows no 
statistically significant effect on EU membership support in the pre- and post-
Maastricht periods. A different dependent variable - net EU membership support -
was though used in their study. 
The results obtained for the unemployment variable may be explained as follows. 
France has a relatively high unemployment rate in the study period and conversely 
the United Kingdom has a relatively low one. French political discourse -
especially in factions within mainstream parties and in non-mainstream parties of 
the left and right - in the media tends to stress the idea that the current EU promotes 
an excessively laissez-faire, free market economic policy - even labelled by some 
political actors as ultra-liberal- opened to competition from low labour cost 
countries which endangers French jobs and social protection. British political 
discourse in the media tends to underline the opportunities that the single European 
market offer to British firms, who benefit in the United Kingdom from a more 
favourable competitive, company and job friendly environment and as such can 
benefit from the single European market. These results are confirmed by the 
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individual level analysis results for France and the United Kingdom for the 
employment situation expectations for the year to come, which show that when the 
respondents have better expectations about the employment situation for the year to 
come, respondents are more likely to support current EU membership. 
Desired Speed of European Integration 
In French and British models, unemployment is not a significant predictor of desired 
speed of European integration (except for Model MIlD) and the direction of the 
coefficient for the unemployment variable indicates that the higher unemployment 
is, the more respondents favour (though statistically insignificantly) a faster 
European integration. This is in line with Sanchez-Cuenca (2000) suggestions and 
contradicts Anderson and Kaltenthaler (1996) results (in both significance and 
direction) although the latter did not use the same further integration variable (they 
used the Western Europe unification variable). 
Unemployment is not a unique contributor to the explanation of desired speed of 
European integration but the direction of the coefficient for the related variable in 
the French context of high unemployment may be partly explained by the fact that 
French citizens favour a European integration with a more social and protectionist 
dimension, relayed by the mainstream political discourse in the media with the 
promises of higher employment associated with further European integration - for 
example EMU and the single currency were marketed to the public opinion inter alia 
in terms of employment gains by most mainstream French politicians. However 
French citizens may also be somewhat doubtful and cynical about political actors' 
promises of better employment as such promises have been made year after year 
without real improvement. The suspicion of an "ultra-liberal Europe" may be 
moreover perceived (partly the consequence of such portrayal made by some French 
left and right wing politicians) by French citizens as bringing a more 
competitiveness quest, employment precariousness, and depression of salary levels. 
The results of the individual level analysis confinn this and reveal that when 
respondents have better expectations about the employment situation for the coming 
year, respondents are more likely to favour a faster European integration than those 
who have worse or the same expectations. 
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British respondents are accustomed to a relatively low unemployment and as such 
further European integration may be perceived as adding little to this. In addition, 
the mainstream political discourse in the media witnessed by British citizens is also 
more heterogeneous with some political actors mainly on the right stressing that 
further European integration (for example with EMU and the single currency) will 
hann jobs and other political actors mainly on the left and centre who argue it will 
strengthen jobs. However, in the individual level analysis, it was found that when 
British respondents have better expectations about the employment situation for the 
coming year, respondents are more likely to favour a faster European integration 
than those who have worse or the same expectations. A further improvement in the 
employment situation in the United Kingdom would bring about support for faster 
European integration. 
Social Expenditure per head 
Evaluation of Current EU membership 
Social expenditure per head is a significant predictor of current EU membership in 
all British models whereas the same variable is not a significant predictor in French 
models.77 In both French and British models, the direction of the coefficient for the 
related variable implies that the higher the social expenditure per head is in the 
country, the more the respondents are (effect though not statistically significant for 
French models) against current EU membership. This result is in line with Sanchez-
Cuenca (2000) results (in both direction and significance for British models but only 
direction for French models) although the latter used EU desired speed as the 
dependent variable rather than current EU membership. This result is especially 
important for the United Kingdom as the level of social expenditure per head tends 
to be lower than in other comparable EU member states: nonetheless, over the last 
few years in the study period, under the Blair government, these have increased and 
become relatively comparable to France - albeit still lower than France when 
measured in purchasing power standards (PPS) (EurostatiESSPROS, 2006). 
77 Social expenditure per head is nevertheless close to the significance area in French models M 12 
and MI2K (with the length of membership variable). 
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British citizens may perceive the current EU as a way to improve the social 
expenditure in the United Kingdom with the acquisition of new social rights in the 
process. Thus, for instance the beneficial aspect of the social chapter, with reference 
for instance to greater maternity rights for individuals, was well politicized by the 
Labour leadership. Conversely, French citizens used to higher social expenditure 
per head may view the EU as adding little to their social rights and even being a 
threat to their social rights - in line with the fear of an ultra-liberal Europe - albeit 
the social expenditure (per head) variable is not a significant predictor in French 
models. However, as seen below, French citizens may feel that national social 
expenditure (and therefore social rights) are more threatened by the reforms 
pertaining to further European integration - starting for instance with the full 
implementation and running of the economic and monetary union and the Euro -
than current EU membership. 
Desired Speed of European Integration 
In all French and British models, social expenditure per head is a significant 
contributor to the explanation of desired speed of European integration, and the 
coefficient for this variable suggests that the higher the social expenditure per head 
in the country is, the slower the respondents wish European integration to proceed. 
This result confirms Sanchez-Cuenca (2000) results. It ensues from this that French 
citizens used to higher social expenditure per head (relatively high compared to 
other European countries) may view the furthering of European integration as a 
threat to their social rights. This perception is frequently reinforced directly or 
indirectly by the political discourse of some French political parties (particularly on 
the left but not exclusively) who "suspect" the EU institutions of Ultra-liberalism. 
British citizens are themselves accustomed to social expenditure per head lower than 
in France and Germany but higher than in Italy or Spain. However, as indicated 
above, over the last few years in the study period, under the Blair government, social 
expenditure per head in the United Kingdom have increased and become relatively 
comparable to France - albeit still lower than France when measured in PPS. 
Thus, on the one hand the prospect of higher social expenditure may be an element 
which partly drove British citizens to support faster European integration although 
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this may have lost its essence in the last few years of the study period as the United 
Kingdom's social expenditure moved above the EU average towards the end of the 
study period and expenditure on social protection has been pledged by the British 
government to go up further in real terms in the future (post 2001). On the other 
hand, British citizens are also accustomed to less unemployment, more flexible 
labour markets and greater professional and occupational mobility than all these 
countries - with reference to the UK's relative economic results over the related 
decade - and may view the furthering of European integration as hindering their 
social mobility: this is reinforced by national British political parties who portray the 
EU as an institution with a tendency for over-regulation, over-taxation and lack of 
international competitive perspective (as discussed in the background chapter for the 
United Kingdom). In both French and British models, social expenditure per head 
appears as an important contributor to the explanation of desired speed of European 
integration. 
Intra-EU Trade Dependence and Intra-EU Trade Balance 
Evaluation of Current EU Membership 
Intra-EU trade dependence is a significant contributor to the explanation of 
evaluation of current EU membership in all British and French models, and the 
direction of the coefficient for intra-EU trade dependence implies that the more 
countries are dependent on EU trade, the more respondents in these countries are 
significantly in favour of current EU membership. It must be noted that this variable 
is even more important for France (most important variable in models M9 and MI2). 
Intra-EU trade balance is a significant predictor of current EU membership for all 
French models (with and without "don't know" answer in the dependent variable). 
This variable tends to be a significant predictor for British models incorporating 
"DK" answer (except M8K (Timing of Entry) nearing though the significance area) 
and the following models without "DK" answer: M20sbis (Timing of Entry), MIl 
and M28. In the remaining British models without "DK" answer, this variable is 
usually just outside the significance area but in the majority of British models 
without "DK" answer, intra-EU trade balance is a significant predictor of current EU 
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membership. As a result, the coefficient for intra-EU trade balance tends to be 
stronger in models integrating "DK" answer in both British and French models, and 
the coefficient for this variable is stronger in French models than in British models. 
The direction of this coefficient in all models indicates that the more the intra-EU 
trade balance is positive, the more respondents in the country are in favour of current 
EU membership. 
The results obtained in the present research for intra-EU trade balance and intra-EU 
trade dependence conform to previous research results (for example Gabel and 
Palmer, 1995; Anderson and Reichert, 1996; and Eichenberg and Dalton, 1993). 
However, for the intra-EU trade dependence variable, the results elicited here run 
counter to the results of Eichenberg and Dalton (2007) who found that in the post-
Maastricht period (1992-2004), intra-EU export exhibits no significant effect on EU 
membership support. A different dependent variable - net EU membership support 
- and intra-EU trade dependence (independent) variable78 were though used in their 
study. 
The United Kingdom and to a lesser extent France tend to be less dependent on EU 
trade than other European countries (for example Belgium, Netherlands, Ireland, 
Luxembourg, Denmark, Spain or even Germany), this results in less support in 
current EU membership due to this. In the British context, public opinion is subject 
to a political discourse (especially on the right ideological spectrum) tending to 
underline the lack of economic and social convergence of the United Kingdom with 
the bulk of the rest of Europe, and on the contrary the economic and social (but also 
cultural and historical) convergence with Anglo-Saxon markets such as the USA, 
Australia and Canada (as discussed in the United Kingdom background chapter). In 
the French context, public opinion is subject to a French political discourse more 
predisposed to national (but also European) protectionism for economic and social 
purposes partly in symbiosis with the current EU - for instance protection of 
European agriculture - although the way the EU is further integrated is perceived by 
public opinion - and instrumentalised by some political leaders such as Seguin, 
78 Intra-EU trade dependence was measured via the use of intra-EU export percentage. The latter is 
the percentage ratio of a country's intra-EU exports to its total exports. 
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Villiers, Emmanuelli, Le Pen, Chevenement and Hue - as increasingly reinforcing 
the effects of globalisation and therefore eroding this protectionism. 
France and the United Kingdom have respectively a marginally positive or negative 
intra-EU trade balance, and are in an intermediate situation (mid-table) compared to 
countries with a positive balance such as Belgium, Germany, Luxembourg, Ireland, 
Netherlands, and nations with a negative balance such as Greece, Portugal or Spain. 
In the case of France, its marginally positive intra-EU trade balance drives current 
EU support (reinforced by political discourse in the media) and conversely in the 
United Kingdom its marginally negative intra-EU trade balance inhibits somewhat 
current EU support. British politicians (particularly in the Conservative Party) have 
underlined the lack of flexibility of labour markets and over-regulations in many 
continental European countries as the source of relatively poor economic growth 
there and as a result the limited market opportunities there. 
Desired Speed of European Integration 
In all French models, intra-EU trade dependence is a significant contributor to the 
explanation of desired speed of European Integration whereas in all British models, 
Intra-EU trade dependence is not a significant contributor to the explanation of 
desired speed of European Integration. In all French models, it means that the more 
countries are dependent on intra-EU trade, the more respondents in these countries 
are in favour of faster European integration. The relationship does not work in the 
UK context and may be partly explained by the fact that the UK has a lower intra-
EU trade dependence than France. Some British politicians (especially of the right 
such as John Redwood) tend to underplay the importance of EU markets for British 
businesses, for example for the service industry, arguing that North-American 
markets (and Commonwealth ones) are more important for British businesses and 
that an economic alliance with North America is therefore more propitious. 
In British and French models, intra-EU trade balance is overall a significant 
predictor of desired speed of European integration. 79 The coefficient for this 
79 Intra-EU trade balance is always significant in models with the length of membership variable, and 
is significant in the majority of models with the timing of entry variable. There is a smaller effect of 
intra-E U trade balance on desired speed of European integration in models with the timing of entry 
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variable reveals that the more countries have a positive balance of intra-ED trade , 
the more the respondents in these countries wish to see a slower speed of European 
integration. 
The results elicited here for intra-ED trade dependence confirm earlier research 
results (for example Kaltenthaler and Anderson, 2001, although the latter used a 
different further integration dependent variable - EMU and single currency support 
-). The results obtained here for intra-EU trade balance are in line with Gabel 
(1998a) and Sanchez-Cuenca (2000) suggestions that countries with poor economic 
results support European integration. 
It must be noted that both France and the UK show a similar marginally positive or 
negative intra-ED trade balance as a percentage of GDP and a relatively slower 
desired speed of European integration contrasting with countries such as Spain, 
Greece or Portugal with clear negative intra-ED trade balance as a percentage of 
GDP and a relatively faster desired speed of European integration. In the case of 
France, French citizens may fear that further European integration will threaten their 
current trade position as they suspect (this under the influence of political discourse 
in the media) further European integration will be conducive to more open markets 
and therefore more European and global competition which will jeopardize the very 
economic protection and welfare state they are attached to. Furthermore they may 
feel that France is less well equipped to deal with a perceived largely unfair 
competition from low labour cost nations often referred to in the political discourse 
developed by the French left, and even partly on the centre and right ideological 
scene as "mondialisation sauvage". 
Conversely British respondents, subject to a political discourse (of the right, centre 
and even partly the left (Labour leadership)) which favours more open and 
deregulated markets, may feel that a more integrated Europe in tune with this 
preference - and respecting the subsidiarity principle and national sovereignt/o -
would benefit British firms. The latter moreover benefit in the British context from 
a more labour and company friendly environment. However British politicians, 
variable (especially for French models) which cannot be detected in large models - in other words, 
large models cannot detect small effects. 
80 National sovereignty being more important for the hard left and right. 
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especially on the right of the ideological spectrum, are doubtful of the future 
economic and social convergence of continental European countries and as such 
tend to oppose further European integration. 
Tax Burden 
Evaluation of Current EU membership 
Tax burden is a variable which to the investigator's knowledge has not been tested 
before the present research. It is not a significant predictor of current EU 
membership in both French and British models. The fact that tax burden does not 
show a significant relationship with current EU membership implies that tax burden 
is not perceived as important enough to influence evaluation of current EU 
membership in both the British and French contexts. This may be explained by the 
fact that in the study period, the United Kingdom and France are not very dependent 
on EU trade and the effect of tax burden is here seen as minor in the current EU. 
However examining the direction of the coefficient for tax burden brings further 
insight. For British models, the direction of the coefficient for the tax burden 
indicates that the higher the tax burden in the country is, the more the respondents in 
the country are statistically insignificantly against current EU membership: the 
United Kingdom has a relatively low tax burden and as such British respondents 
may view (statistically insignificantly though) the UK's relative lower taxes as a 
way to compete effectively in the current EU. For French models, the direction of 
this coefficient suggests that the higher the tax burden in the country is, the more the 
respondents in the country are statistically insignificantly in favour of current EU 
membership: it seems to denote that French respondents may be unsatisfied with 
relatively high taxes in France and may view (statistically insignificantly though) the 
current EU membership as a way to decrease some of the taxes (for example VAT) 
especially in a context of more restricted current intra-EU competition. 
Desired Speed of European Integration 
In all British and French models, tax burden is a significant predictor of desired 
speed of European integration, and the direction of the coefficient for this variable 
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reveals that the higher the tax burden is in the country, the more respondents favour 
a slower speed of European integration. France has a relatively high tax burden and 
therefore French respondents may perceive faster European integration negatively as 
they may feel they have presently a home competitive disadvantage in the European 
and international context. They may feel that further European integration 
especially at a fast pace may jeopardize the supportive social policies to which they 
are accustomed: faster European integration may oblige the French national 
government to reduce tax - for competitive reasons - via social policy cuts. The 
United Kingdom has a relatively low tax burden: British respondents may feel that 
they have presently a home tax competitive advantage in the European and 
international environment and faster European integration in a free market way may 
empower this and benefit British interests. 
Bureaucracy 
Evaluation of Current EU membership 
Bureaucracy is a variable which to the investigator's knowledge has not been tested 
before the present research. For both British and French models without "DK" 
answer, bureaucracy is a significant predictor of current EU membership. Once 
models integrate "DK" answer, both French and British models show a smaller 
effect. Thus French models (with "DK" answer) show mostly a significant effect in 
models M8K, MIlK, 27Kbis, M27K, M28Kbis and M29Kbis, and a non-significant 
effect in models M28K and M29K (albeit there just outside the significance zone). 
British models (with "DK" answer) show mostly a non-significant effect in models 
M28Kbis, M28K, M29Kbis, M29K and MIlK (though not far from the significance 
zone for these) and a significant effect in models M8K, M27Kbis and M27K. The 
coefficient direction for this variable in all these models denotes that the less 
bureaucracy there is in the country, the more respondents in the country are against 
current EU membership. 
The United Kingdom shows a relatively low bureaucracy level and British 
respondents may view current EU membership as bringing more regulations and 
bureaucracy - as underlined by the political discourse of especially the right and 
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centre - and as such show fewer dispositions towards current EU membership of the 
United Kingdom. In the same way, France shows a relatively high bureaucracy 
level and French respondents may view the current EU as enabling the necessary 
regulation of EU competition, harmonizing laws to avoid "concurrence 
sauvage"(unregulated competition), and keeping some markets protected from non-
European competition and even from the European. They may also view the current 
EU as reducing or limiting bureaucracy pertaining to intra-EU trade and simplifying 
in some cases old national bureaucratic business and trade policies, and as such 
show greater disposition towards the current EU membership of France. 
Desired Speed of European Integration 
In both French and British models, Bureaucracy (variable not tested before) is 
overall a significant predictor of desired speed of European integration in models 
with the timing of entry variable, and not a significant predictor of the related 
dependent variable - albeit relatively close to the significance zone: larger models 
cannot though detect small effects - in models with the length of membership 
variable. In all British and French models, the direction of the coefficient for 
bureaucracy shows that the less government bureaucracy there is in the country, the 
more respondents support significantly (for models with the timing of entry variable 
and statistically insignificantly otherwise) faster European integration. 
The United Kingdom shows a relatively low bureaucracy compared to other 
European nations (including France) and British respondents may favour a faster 
integrated EU in a free market way as a means to capitalise on their home business 
advantage. Thus the political discourse of the Conservative Party, the Liberal 
Democrats but also the Labour Party particularly underline the need for the EU to 
become more business friendly, to deregulate markets, embrace globalisation and 
flexible labour markets although the former doubts this will happen and warn their 
electorate accordingly. Along the same line, France shows a relatively high 
bureaucracy compared to other European countries (including the United Kingdom), 
and French respondents may view faster European integration as bringing about 
more deregulation and the further opening of European markets to European and 
global competition - as denounced by some French politicians of the left but also of 
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the right - and as such as a danger to their economic well being given their home 
disadvantage in this field. 
5.2.4 Societal Sphere and EU Support 
Table 5.4 summarizes the pattern of significance of societal variables on the 
dependent variables, current EU membership (EU benefit and membership) and 
future EU integration (European integration desired speed preference). If an effect 
is found to be significant, then the relevant variable is a unique contributor to the 
explanation of the dependent variable. 
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Societal Variables Effect on Current EU Effect on Future EU 
Membership Int~ration 
National Economic Not Significant Significant 
Corruption 
Crime per Head of Significant Significant 
Population 
Foreign Populations Significant Significant 
Inflows 
Net Migration Significant Significant 
Political Asylum Significant Significant 
Applications 
National Identity Significant Significant 
Corruption 
Evaluation of Current EU membership 
Corruption is largely not a significant predictor of current EU membership in both 
French (only significant in French model M9K) and British models. The direction 
of the coefficient for corruption in both French and British models tends to denote 
that the less perceived corruption there is in the country, the more respondents in the 
country are against current EU membership. Although the direction of the 
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coefficient for corruption is in the same direction as in the research of Sanchez-
Cuenca (2000), in the present research this coefficient is not significant whereas the 
latter had a significant effect in Sanchez-Cuenca's (2000) results. It is though true 
that Sanchez-Cuenca (2000) used a different dependent variable, desired speed of 
European integration rather than evaluation of current EU membership. 
Notwithstanding this, France tends to have a relatively high corruption level and is 
in effect a more corrupt country than the United Kingdom - the latter has a relatively 
low corruption level8! - as per the national economic corruption index, and this may 
partly (albeit effect is not statistically significant) explain that French respondents 
show higher levels of support for current EU membership than British respondents. 
The relationship between corruption and current EU membership is not significant 
here (therefore not established) because the current EU may not be perceived as 
being able to alter or influence the pattern of corruption perceived in France or in the 
United Kingdom. 
Desired Speed of European Integration 
In all British and French models, corruption is a significant predictor of the 
dependent variable, desired speed of European integration. The coefficient direction 
for this variable reveals that the more perceived corruption there is in the country, 
the more respondents desire a faster European integration. This result corroborates 
Sanchez-Cuenca's (2000) results, and thus suggests that the relatively high 
corruption in France - compared to the United Kingdom as per the corruption index 
- is a factor bringing French respondents to favour a faster European integration. 
The further integration of the EU through its inherent institutional, political and 
economic change is perceived by respondents as being able to help fight France's 
perceived national corruption. For French respondents who perceive the corruption 
to be relatively high in France, the further integration of the EU has here a utilitarian 
value. HI is therefore here confirmed, that is to say there is a relationship between 
citizens' dissatisfaction with France's corruption and citizens' support for further 
European integration. 
RI Other nations such as Germany, Denmark, Luxembourg, Netherlands and Ireland also haw a 
relatively low corruption level. 
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In the same way, for British respondents who perceive corruption to be relatively 
low in the United Kingdom, the further European integration offers no utilitarian 
value here and can even be counterproductive. Thus the European institutions are 
often portrayed as bureaucratic, wasting tax payers' money and sometimes using 
funds inappropriately by some British politicians, particularly (but not exclusively) 
in the Conservative Party. The scandal related to the Santer Commission in 1999 
was denounced accordingly. HI is therefore here confinned, that is to say there is a 
relationship between citizens' satisfaction with the United Kingdom's relatively low 
corruption and citizens' opposition to further European integration. 
Crime 
Evaluation of Current EU membership 
Crime (per head) is a variable which to the investigator's knowledge has not been 
tested before the present research. For all French models, crime is a significant 
predictor of current EU membership with coefficients a little weaker in models with 
"DK" answer. For British models, the pattern of significance is more contrasted: the 
coefficient is significant in models M8, MIl, M27, M8K and MIlK and not 
significant in models M27bis, M28bis, M28, M29bis, M29, M29Kbis, M29K, 
M28Kbis, M28K, M27Kbis and M27K.82 Thus, for British models, the effect for 
the crime variable is not significant in larger models (M20s) as the effect tends to be 
small and the fonner given the size of the sample to the number of independent 
variables cannot detect this. The direction of the coefficient for all British and 
French models reveals that the higher the crime per head in the country is, the more 
respondents in the country are against current EU membership. The United 
Kingdom and to a lesser extent France83 have a relatively high crime rate per head of 
population and the current EU may be perceived by citizens as contributing to it. 
This may be explained by the Schengen agreements84 - the latter for France 
!!2 The letter "K" in the model numbering indicates that the model integrates "OK" answer. The letter 
"bis" in the model numbering denotes that the model incorporates the timing of EU entry variable 
rather than the length of EU membership variable. . . 
83 Both countries are reported to have additionally a substantial number of crimes which IS not 
included in the crime statistics published by their respective interior ministry (home office) but 
France has an even greater number of these (INHES, 2006; Home Office, 2007). 
84 Internal borderless EU for countries taking part in the Schengen agreements. 
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particularly as the United Kingdom has opted not to partake fully in the Schengen 
agreements - but also more generally by the freedom of movement for European 
residents which may be perceived (and portrayed by non-mainstream political 
parties or factions within mainstream parties) as contributing to increasing crime. 
Crime per head is one of the most important predictors of evaluation of current EU 
membership in French models. 
Desired Speed of European Integration 
In both French and British models, crime per head is a significant contributor to the 
explanation of desired speed of European integration and the direction of the 
coefficient for this variable, shows that the higher the crime per head is in the 
country, the more respondents favour a slower speed of European integration. 
Crime per head is one of the most important predictors of evaluation of current EU 
membership in both French and British models. Both France and the United 
Kingdom have a relatively high crime per head and furthering European integration 
especially at faster pace may be perceived as conducive to the rise in crime. The 
Schengen free border agreements application (or potential full application in the 
British context), the freedom of movement of people, goods and money, and the 
embryonic liberal home affairs policies may contribute to these perceptions. Crime 
fighting is also associated with an issue of national sovereignty which may resonate 
with respondents in the United Kingdom and to a lesser extent France. These 
concerns are also instrumentalised by French political parties (particularly non-
mainstream ones but also factions within mainstream parties) and by British political 
parties (both mainstream and non-mainstream ones). 
Immigration 
Europe has experienced an increase in popularity of anti-immigrant and often anti-eu 
populist/extreme right political parties. Immigration was identified as one of the top 
problems facing Europe by 82% of the members of the European Parliament (Lahav, 
1997). Towards the end of the study period, immigration was considered one of the 
most important issues facing the United Kingdom before Europe, the economy, 
unemployment or taxes (Ipsos-Mori, 2006). Throughout the study period. 
223 
immigration has been consistently seen as one of the most important issues facing 
France - albeit behind issues such as unemployment, social protection and generally 
crime (Ipsos, 2006). 
Evaluation of Current EU membership 
Studies have demonstrated the link between anti-immigration sentiments, general 
hostility towards other cultures and reluctance over European integration (De Vreese 
and Boomgarden, 2005; Kessler and Freeman, 2005; Lahav, 2004; McLaren, 2002, 
2007a and Luedke, 2005) and the link between importance of national identity and 
reluctance over European integration (Carey, 2002; Christin and Trechsel, 2002; 
Luedtke, 2005; Kaltenthaler and Anderson, 2001; De Vries and Van Kersbergen, 
2007; Marks and Hooghe, 2003; McLaren, 2007b; Kostakopoulou, 2001 and 
Hooghe and Marks, 2005). However immigration and its link with European 
integration is a variable which has not been tested on the aggregate level before the 
present research. Three indicators are here used to operationalize the immigration 
variable: foreign inflows, net migration and asylum applications. For all French and 
British models, all these three variables are significant predictors of the dependent 
variable, evaluation of current EU membership. The direction of the coefficient for 
these three variables implies that the more immigrants enter into the country, the 
more respondents in the country are against current EU membership. This may be 
also explained by the Schengen agreements (especially for France), by the freedom 
of movement of European and non-European nationals and the embryonic more 
liberal European Home Affairs policy which may be perceived (and 
instrumentalized by non-mainstream political parties in France and in the United 
Kingdom but also by factions within mainstream parties in France and in the United 
Kingdom) as contributing to increasing immigration in EU countries. 
Desired Speed of European Integration 
The same three indicators of immigration were regressed against desired speed of 
European integration. For all French and British models, all the three related 
variables are significant predictors of desired speed of European integration and the 
direction of the coefficient for these variables shows that the more immigrants enter 
the country, the more respondents prefer a slower European integration. France and 
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the United Kingdom have a relatively high immigration, this confinns the result 
obtained with evaluation of current EU membership as a dependent variable: 
immigration pressures seem to be from these results a key driver of negative 
opinions towards the current EU and further EU integration. In the United Kingdom 
(for mainstream and non-mainstream political parties) and to a lesser extent France 
(for non-mainstream political parties and factions within mainstream parties), the 
control of immigration is seen as an issue of national sovereignty. 
Throughout the 1990s and early 2000s, French respondents have been unhappy and 
worried about the level of immigration to France: immigration is one of the key 
concerns of citizens as discussed in the background chapter on France. British 
citizens have also placed immigration as one of their key concerns in the related 
period but more especially in the second part of the study period (see background 
chapter on the United Kingdom). However, contrary to British respondents, French 
citizens are more willing to transfer the immigration and asylum policies to the EU 
than British respondents as substantiated by the individual testing of immigration 
and asylum policies for hypothesis III. This implies that they feel that immigration 
has been mishandled by successive French governments and may believe that the 
EU, at least the type of EU model they favour, would control immigration relatively 
better,85 putting in place a more restrictive policy towards immigration from outside 
the EU than the French one86 although they are critical of some of the agreements in 
place such as the Schengen agreements. It must be noted that immigration variables 
are unique contributors to the explanation of evaluation of current and future EU 
membership, inter alia irrespective of the sense of national identity of respondents. 
This is linked to the perception, in France and the United Kingdom, that 
immigration brings about economic and social costs for countries and citizens. The 
approach is therefore here partly utilitarian. 
85 This is tantamount to the subsidiarity principle which indicates that action should only be taken by 
the community or Union if and in so far as the objectives of the proposed action cannot be 
sufficiently achieved by the Member States and can therefore be better achieved at European lewl. 
86 France has one of the most liberal immigration policies in Europe. 
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National Identity 
In the literature, national traditions have been used to explain different levels of EU 
support between member nations but the inclusion of measures of national identity 
in statistical analyses to explain EU support is more rare: Kaltenthaler and Anderson 
(2001) - the latter in the context of support for the common currency -, McLaren 
(2002, 2007a, 2007b), Carey (2002), Luedtke (2005), De Vries and Van Kersbergen 
(2007), Christin and Trechsel (2002), Marks and Hooghe (2003), Hooghe and Marks 
(2005) and Kostakopoulou (200 I). 
Evaluation of Current EU membership 
For French and British models (especially models with "don't know" answers), the 
national identity variable is a significant predictor of the dependent variable, 
evaluation of current EU membership and the direction of the coefficient for this 
variable implies that the more interviewees show high feelings of national identity, 
the more respondents in the country are against current EU membership. This is in 
line with results of Carey (2002), Kaltenthaler and Anderson (2001), Christin and 
Trechsel (2002), De Vries and Van Kersbergen (2007), Marks and Hooghe (2003), 
Hooghe and Marks (2005), McLaren (2007b), Kostakopoulou (2001) and Luedtke 
(2005). 
Desired Speed of European Integration 
French and British models show that the national identity variable is a significant 
predictor of the dependent variable, desired speed of European integration, and the 
direction of the coefficient for this variable denotes that the more interviewees show 
high feelings of national identity, the more respondents in the country are in favour 
of slower European integration. This confirms results of Carey (2002), Kaltenthaler 
and Anderson (2001), Christin and Trechsel (2002), De Vries and Van Kersbergen 
(2007), Marks and Hooghe (2003), Hooghe and Marks (2005), McLaren (2007b), 
Kostakopoulou (2001) and Luedtke (2005). French respondents exhibit however 
relatively low feelings of exclusive national identity among EU citizens and have the 
lowest exclusive national identity with Italians, Spaniards and Luxembourgers. In 
the other end, British respondents reveal relatively high feelings of exclusive 
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national identity with Danes and Greeks. In the French context, this contributes to 
explaining the support of French citizens for European integration. There is an 
affective bond towards the process of European integration - the European identity 
is often portrayed as complementary to the French one - which has been cultivated 
by French institutions such as the educational system and reinforced by the media 
and most French mainstream politicians. In the British context, the strong feeling of 
national identity - reinforced by an often uncritical view of history in the British 
educational system (Daddow, 2004; 2006) - contributes to a lower level of support 
for European integration as the latter is often portrayed as threatening national 
identity by politicians - especially but not exclusively in the Conservative Party _ 
but also by the media which in majority adopt a more eurosceptic stance. As a 
result, British citizens have often few social bonds with the ED and the relationship 
towards the ED reflects utilitarian economic, societal and social appraisals whereas 
for French citizens utilitarian economic, societal and social appraisals cohabit with 
affective bonds. 
5.2.5 Political Sphere and ED Support 
Table 5.5 summarizes the pattern of significance of political variables on the 
dependent variables, current ED membership (ED benefit and membership) and 
future ED integration (European integration desired speed preference). If an effect 
is found to be significant, then the relevant variable is a unique contributor to the 
explanation of the dependent variable. 
Table 5.5: Pattern of Significance of Political Su~ort Variables 
Effect on Current EU Effect on Future EU 
Political Variables Membership Integration 
Incumbent 
Government Support 
Aggregate 
Data 
Significant 
Individual 
Data 
Significant 
Aggregate 
Data 
Not 
Significant 
Individual 
Data 
Not 
Significant 
for British 
sample 
Significant 
for French 
samJ2.1e 
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Effect on Current ED Effect on Future EU 
Political Variables Membership Integration 
Aggregate Individual Aggregate Individual 
Data Data Data Data 
Referendum years Not Significant Not Significant 
(variable) Significant Significant 
European Election Not British Significant British 
years (EPEL) Significant Sam2le: Sam2le: 
(variable) Significant Significant 
(MI7); (Ml7); 
Not Not 
significant significant 
(Ml4/Ml5) (M14/M15) 
French French 
Sam2le: SamQle: 
Not Significant 
Significant (Ml7); 
(Ml7); Not 
Significant Significant 
(Ml4(EU (M14/M15) 
Benefit 
DV)/M15(EU 
Membership 
DV) 
Incumbent Support 
Evaluation of Current EU membershiQ 
The incumbent government support variable is a significant contributor to the 
explanation of the dependent variable, evaluation of current EU membership in all 
French and British models. The direction of the coefficient for incumbent 
government support suggests that the more confidence in the incumbent government 
respondents display, the more respondents are in favour of current EU membership. 
The incumbent government support variable is one of the most important predictors 
of evaluation of current EU membership in both French and British models (the 
coefficient for this variable is a little weaker in models incorporating "DK" answer). 
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The results obtained here are confirmed by the individual analyses for French and 
British samples. To a certain extent, the results obtained in the present study 
disconfirm Ray's (2003a) results in the sense that a strong positive relationship is 
found in this study throughout the period and not only in European election years or 
when a referendum is held on a European topic. The present research also confirms 
results of Franklin, Marsh and Mc Laren (1994), Franklin, Marsh and Wlezien 
(1994), Franklin, Van Der Eijk and Marsh (1995), Hug and Sciarini (2000) on the 
influence of the popularity of the incumbent government at referendums on 
European topics and results of Reif (1985), Van Der Eijk & Franklin (1996) and 
Franklin & Curtice (1996) on the influence of the popularity of the incumbent 
government in European elections. The masses may be sometimes too uninformed 
and uninterested to form independent opinions on integration issues, their 
willingness to endorse the elite driven integration project is partially dependent on 
their overall trust in national elites. 
Governments in France and the United Kingdom in their political discourse also 
tend to limit the critique of the current EU, and even justify the current EU to public 
opinion as incumbent governments are playing a part in the current management of 
the EU and as such it is more difficult and can be counterproductive for them to 
criticize the current workings of the EU to which they are a key part. Furthermore, 
governments aim to reassure public opinion that in the European negotiations they 
defend national interests. It must be however noted that over the study period, 
French respondents and to a lesser extent British respondents show a below EU 
average trust in their governments but it varies from year to year. The critique of the 
ED is more present in factions within governmental parties and opposition parties: 
Conservative Party faction in the early and mid-1990s, Labour Party faction, DKlP, 
Referendum Party in the United Kingdom; RPR and PS faction, MPF, FN, MDC, 
RPF, PC and extreme left in France. 
Desired Speed of European Integration 
For all British and French models, incumbent government support is not a 
significant predictor of the outcome variable, desired speed of European integration. 
The direction of the coefficient for the related variable reveals that the more 
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respondents support the incumbent government, the more respondents favour though 
statistically insignificantly a faster pace of European integration. The British 
individual analysis confirms that the relationship between incumbent government 
support and desired speed of European integration is not significant whereas the 
French individual analysis shows that the relationship between the related variables 
becomes significant and therefore indicates that the more respondents support the 
incumbent government, the more respondents favour a faster pace of European 
integration. 
French results contradict Ray's (2000; 2003a) and Sanchez-Cuenca's (2000) results 
who found that supporters of incumbent government appear reluctant to risk 
weakening the national executive through political reform (European further 
integration), these researchers establishing in the process that individuals who enjoy 
advantageous national policy outcomes, tend to oppose European-level policy in 
those areas of great interest to them. British results also contradict somewhat Ray's 
(2000; 2003a) and Sanchez-Cuenca's (2000) results as no (statistically significant) 
relationship between the related variables was found. In the French context, the 
significance (in the individual analysis) and direction of the incumbent government 
support variable may be explained by the fact that mainstream parties' leaderships 
have adopted a more pro-European integration positioning and party supporters may 
be therefore following the party line. French mainstream governmental political 
parties (especially PS, RPRIUMP and UDF) in supporting and advocating further 
European integration underline in their political discourse the economic and social 
dimension that the EU will have: for instance, the single currency helping to create 
jobs, social chapter to guarantee fundamental social rights, elaboration of a 
European constitution with the declaration on rights of citizens. 
In the British context, mainstream governmental political parties have a more 
eurosceptic positioning,87 reflecting an electorate which is more reserved towards 
European integration - affective side of the EU less present and largely not 
cultivated in the UK -, has a greater sense of national identity, place greater 
emphasis on national sovereignty. This also reflects an electorate which is perhaps 
87 Although from 1997, the Blair governments adopted a less eurosceptic stance, pushing for the EU 
to be less bureaucratic, regulation- and market-friendly, and competitive. 
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also reluctant to risk weakening the national executive through political refonn 
which may be detrimental to advantageous national policy outcomes such as 
employment and purchasing power although no (statistically significant) relationship 
was found between incumbent government support and desired speed of integration. 
Thus the mismanagement of the British pound in the ERM in the early 1990s has 
created economic and social problems in the United Kingdom or, equally, inflation 
especially in the second part of the 1990s is already relatively low in the United 
Kingdom and further European integration may be deemed as adding little to this. 
In line with Ray's (2003b), Steenbergen et a1.'s (2007) and Kriesi's (2007) findings, 
the present research outcomes confinn that political parties have also exercised some 
influence on their electorate amidst greater levels of disagreement between political 
parties88 and greater saliency of the EU issue to parties in the study period. 
Furthennore, in line with Carruba's (2001) and Steenbergen et a1.'s (2007) research 
outcomes, the relative pro-integration nature of the French electorate has also 
influenced mainstream parties to be pro-integration. Equally, the relative anti-
integration nature of the British electorate has influenced British mainstream parties 
to be more reserved towards European integration. However, consistent with 
Steenbergen et a1.'s (2007) research, it seems also probable that with the increased 
visibility and impact of European integration on a citizen's life in the study period, 
the mass-elite linkage has declined over time as voters have a greater understanding 
of the consequences ofEU policy on domestic policy and environment. This may 
be especially true in the French context as despite the pro-European nature of French 
mainstream parties and media, there has been a significant drop in French citizens' 
support for current EU membership and further integration. 
European Election Years (EPEL) 
Evaluation of Current EU membership 
The European election years (EPEL) variable is not a significant predictor of the 
dependent variable, evaluation of current EU membership in all French and British 
88 Greater levels of disagreement between political parties take place more in the periphery of French 
politics and more in British mainstream politics. 
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models. The direction of the coefficient for the related variable for models without 
"DK" answer indicates that in European election years respondents are statistically 
insignificantly more in favour of current ED membership. For models with "DK" 
answer, the related coefficient denotes that in European election years respondents 
are statistically insignificantly against current ED membership. Given that the 
related coefficients do not show statistical significance, this suggests that the level of 
support for current ED membership is not significantly greater in European election 
years and therefore disconfirms Dalton & Duval's (1986), Eichenberg & Dalton's 
(1993) and Gabel & Palmer's (1995) results. The British individual data analysis 
partly confirms these results89 but the former through a more detailed analysis of 
periods (resulting from restricted data availability) brings further insight. Thus the 
level of support for current ED membership was found significantly lower in the 
1994 European election year compared to non-European election years (1992 and 
1993) (model M17) due to the economic impact on citizens of the mismanagement 
of the British pound in the European exchange rate mechanism and the growing 
disquiet over Maastricht. This is also to a lesser extent due to the increased 
politicization of the ED issue bringing lower ED support in the 1999 European 
election year albeit the effect is outside the significance zone (model MIS). The 
French individual data analysis also partly confirms the aggregate data results90 but 
through a more detailed analysis of periods (consequent to restricted data 
availability) it brings additional insight as well. Thus the level of support for current 
ED membership was found significantly lower in European election years 
(especially the 1999 one) (models M14 with the ED benefit dependent variable/MIS 
with the ED membership dependent variable)91 compared to non-European election 
years due to the increased politicisation of the ED issue, particularly by factions 
within mainstream parties and non-mainstream political parties. 
The aggregate data analysis results seem to imply that the level of support for 
current ED membership is not significantly greater in European election years 
89 The majority of models in the British individual data analysis tend to show that the EPEL variable 
is not a significant predictor of current EU membership. . 
90 The majority of models in the French individual data analysis tend to show that the EPEL vanable 
is not a significant predictor of current EU membership. . . 
91 EPEL coefficients in models M 14 with the EU membership dependent vanable and M 15 with the 
EU benefit dependent variable are short of statistical significance but share the same coefficient 
direction. 
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compared to non-European election years and therefore disconfirms Dalton & 
Duval's (1986), Eichenberg & Dalton's (1993) and Gabel & Palmer's (1995) results. 
An explanation of this may be that voters may partly perceive European elections as 
second order elections which are used to express domestic concerns (Reif & 
Schmitt, 1980; Van Der Eijk & Franklin, 1991, 1996). However, with the increased 
visibility of the EU in the study period, the individual data analysis results 
(controlling for socio-economic profiles of respondents) are pointing to an increased 
politicization of the ED issue in the second part of the 1990s. The increased 
politicisation of the ED issue was spearheaded by political parties from the political 
periphery to increasingly the political mainstream (the latter especially in the United 
Kingdom with the Conservative Party from 1997). In the British context, the 
economic and social consequences of the mismanagement of the ERM has brought 
about the start of the discontent with the current EU, which has subsequently 
continued amidst an increasing politicisation of the ED issue in the second part of 
the 1990s. The politicisation of the ED issue was though limited in the 1994 
European elections as the leaderships of the main political parties (Conservatives, 
Labour and Liberal Democrats) showed a relative consensus on ED membership and 
tended not to compete on this. In the French context, the persistence of national 
economic and social problems92 (that the ED is perceived to contribute to with the 
Franc Fort policy and budgetary rigidities pertaining to EMD) brought about a 
consolidation of the discontent with the current ED and an increased politicisation of 
the ED issue, especially at the 1999 European elections. 
Desired Speed of European Integration 
EPEL is a significant predictor of desired speed of European integration (except in 
model M9 and M12 but close there to the significance zone), this being due to a 
level of ED support for further integration in 1994 being higher than most years after 
1994 for French and British samples and also before 1994 for French sample. The 
direction of the coefficient for this variable reveals that respondents in European 
election years are more in favour of faster European integration. This result 
92 Although the French economic and social climate is relatively better in 1999 t?an ,in th,e period 
from 1992 to 1997 and at the end of 2000 and in 2001 but the economic and SOCIal SItuatIOn of 
France is relativel; poor in EU terms: thus for example the unemployment rate remains relatively 
high. 
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conforms to previous research results (for example Gabel and Palmer, 1995). At 
European election time, politicians (especially European Parliament candidates) 
have vested interests in dispersing positive messages about the EU, its policies and 
the value of further integration. Politicians also come closer to public opinion 
positions because of the fear of sanction votes. This is in line with Schmitt & 
Thomassen's (2000), Carruba's (2001) and Wessels' (1995) findings. 
The British individual data analysis results are partly in line with the British 
aggregate level data results - the direction of the coefficient for the related variable 
is the same in the majority of models albeit the coefficient is not statistically 
significant. However through the division of periods (resulting from restricted data 
availability) the individual data analysis delivers further insight. Thus in the 1994 
European election year, British respondents were significantly more likely to favour 
a slower (or standstill) European integration preference than in non-European 
election years 1992 and 1993 (model MI7). As discussed above this is the 
consequence of the economic impact on citizens of the mismanagement of the 
British pound in the European exchange rate mechanism (and its eventual exit). The 
effect of European election years after 1994 (therefore in 1999) on further European 
integration (desired speed) is not significant any longer as the level of (citizens ') 
support for further integration has not recovered since the effect of the 
mismanagement of the ERM and continued to go down in the second part of the 
1990s. Furthermore, the EPEL results for models other than model M 17 may have 
been affected by the fact that the year 1992 (year of higher further European 
integration support prior to the ERM mismanagement) could not be included in 
individual models (other than model M17) as data for some variables was not 
available. A good part of 1992 is also prior to the mismanagement of the ERM and 
exit of the British pound from the ERM: Black Wednesday took place on 16 Sept 
1992. EB sample data date used for the analysis - reference: model M 17 - is 
March-April 1992 (prior to Black Wednesday). 
The French individual data analysis results are partly in line with the French 
aggregate level data results but through the division of periods (resulting from 
restricted data availability) the individual data analysis delivers further insight. Thus 
in the 1994 European election year, French respondents were significantly more 
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likely to favour a faster European integration preference than in non-European 
election years 1992 and 1993 (model M17) due to the relative consensus in favour of 
EU further integration by mainstream political parties - and more generally the 
campaigning of political parties largely on domestic issues rather than on European 
integration itself - and consequently the low level of politicisation of the EU issue at 
the 1994 European elections. In 1999 (but also mostly before and after), the 
European issue became politicised, especially in factions within RPR and PS, and in 
political parties such as RPF, MPF, FN, MDC, PC and the extreme left: this explains 
that the effect of European election years is altogether no longer significant (models 
M 14 and MIS) and cancels the effect of 1994 on the mobilisation of public opinion 
for further European integration. 
Referendums 
Evaluation of Current EU membership 
It must be noted that France has had only one EU referendum (in 1992) and the 
United Kingdom none, in the study period (1992-2001). It should also be pointed 
out that the data used for 1992 was collected in March-April 1992 (EB 37.0),93 that 
is to say four to five months before the actual Maastricht Treaty referendum in 
France. As such the effect of the referendum on public opinion may be partly 
limited by this but the Maastricht Treaty was already politicised in the period when 
the data was collected. 
The referendum variable is not a significant contributor to the explanation of the 
outcome variable, evaluation of current EU membership in all French models. This 
result contradicts Dalton & Duval's (1986), Eichenberg & Dalton's (1993), Christin 
& Hug's (2002) and Gabel & Palmer's (1995) results, which found increased public 
opinion support for EU integration in referendum years. This may be due to the fact 
that EU referendums are contaminated by domestic issues and by the popularity of 
incumbent government. The non-significance of the referendum variable may be 
explained by the fact that there are other years in the study period (1992-2001) such 
as 200 I and to a lesser extent 1998 where the level of support for current EU 
93 This EB data was selected as contained the required variables. 
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membership is comparable to 1992 - year of referendum - and economic results 
(GDP growth and employment) are improving. This explanation is supported by the 
French individual analysis which shows that the related variable becomes 
statistically significant and indicates that in a referendum year, respondents are more 
likely to be in favour of current EU membership: this result may be explained by the 
fact that only the period from 1992 to 1994 is tested - due to restricted data 
availability. The result elicited in the individual analysis supports earlier research 
results. 
Desired Speed of European Integration 
The referendum variable is not a significant predictor of desired speed of European 
integration in all French models and the direction of the coefficient for this variable 
tends to indicate that respondents in referendum years are statistically insignificantly 
in favour of faster European integration. Although this variable is not significant in 
the present research, the direction of the coefficient for this variable tends to be in 
the same direction as earlier findings by, for example, Gabel and Palmer (1995). 
The result obtained here may be due to the fact that EU referendums are 
contaminated by domestic issues and by the popularity of incumbent government. 
The non-significance of the referendum variable may be explained by the fact that 
there are other years in the study period (1992-2001) such as 2001 where the level of 
support for further European integration is comparable to 1992 - year of referendum 
- and economic results (GDP growth and employment) are improving. This result is 
supported by the French individual analysis which shows that the related variable 
becomes statistically significant and indicates that in referendum years, respondents 
are more likely to be in favour of faster European integration: this result may be 
explained by the fact that only the period from 1992 to 1994 is tested - due to 
restricted data availability. The result elicited in the individual analysis supports 
earlier research results. 
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5.3 Conclusion 
In both French and British samples, a relationship was found between citizens' EU 
support and national political institutions' performance in socio-economic, societal 
and political terms. Therefore it can be inferred that public opinion on European 
integration is related inter alia to utilitarian explanations: in other words respondents 
use inter alia utilitarian appraisal to form attitudes towards the European Union and 
its further integration. The EU integration throughout the 1990s has become more 
visible, more publicized and increasingly politicised, and de facto more present in 
citizens' work and private life. Individuals may not all have a very sophisticated 
view of the European Union but this climate has increased the chance for them to 
take information shortcuts to express attitudes towards the European Union, and 
national proxies play here a key role. 
The socialisation theory as an explanation of public opinion's current EU 
membership support has lived and is giving way to economic, social and societal 
assessments of how the EU membership is affecting nation states. This echoes 
somewhat Kritzinger's (2003) and Angelucci's (1993) suggestions that citizens use 
national proxies to express attitudes towards the EU. However, while respondents in 
older EU member states such as France seem to show more opposition and 
uncertainty towards current EU membership linked to poor national economic, 
social and societal results, older EU member states (such as France)94 seem to show 
more disposition towards the further integration of the EU. In other words, the 
socialisation theory still plays a role in the further integration of the EU but 
increasingly poor national economic, social and societal results are starting to erode 
this affective support. 
France has been found to show not significantly lower support for current EU 
membership and ED further integration than other EU countries whereas the United 
Kingdom - which has had relatively better economic and social results throughout 
the period of study - has been found to display a significantly lower support for 
current EU membership and EU further integration than other EU nations. In both 
France and the United Kingdom, in the study period (1992-2001), the level of 
94 France is found to show an insignificant higher support for EU further integration than other EU 
countries. 
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support for current EU membership and further integration has dropped 
significantly. The drop in support for current EU membership and future EU 
integration is though lower in France than in the United Kingdom - for both 
individual and aggregate level data analyses. This may be a reflection that both 
countries favour a change of political direction of the EU to cater for their own 
policy concerns as argued later on in the following chapters. 
French Overall Conclusions 
It was hypothesized: 
HI There is an inverse relationship between citizens' levels of satisfaction with 
national political institutions' performance - pertaining to the national economic, 
political, social and societal situation - and citizens' support for European 
integration in France and the United Kingdom (thus, the higher the satisfaction with 
national performance, the lower the support for European integration). 
For all the variables tested (except corruption for further European integration), 
hypothesis HI is rejected in its stated direction. There is therefore no relationship 
between citizens' dissatisfaction with national political institutions' performance -
pertaining to the national economic, political, social and societal situation - and 
citizens' support for European integration. Nevertheless as pointed out above, there 
is a relationship between national political institutions' performance - in economic, 
political, social and societal terms - and citizens' support for European integration. 
Citizens consider the EU to be contributing to poor national results, and the 
increased politicisation of the EU issue especially in the second part of the 1990s 
plays here its role. Factions within mainstream political parties and political parties 
in the political periphery (FN, RPF, MPF, MDC and PC) criticize moreover the 
detrimental influence of the EU institutions in France's economic and social 
situation: for example the negative influence of European quotas, the unfair global 
competition on French agriculture and the negative influence of the stability pact on 
French economic growth and public expenditure. It is thus revealing that the 
continued relatively high unemployment in France, as well as the relatively high 
crime and immigration levels there, affect current EU membership support 
negatively. French citizens fear how a fast European integration, especially a free 
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market (completely open to world competition), deregulated European Union _ 
earmarked "ultra-liberal" by some politicians - can influence detrimentally social 
expenditure, the currently positive intra-EU trade balance of France, and the already 
high level of crimes and immigration. They are afraid that the relatively high French 
tax burden and bureaucracy may handicap them in such a rapidly integrating 
European Union. The latter point is especially important as France has a relatively 
low dependence on intra-ED trade and French citizens may be afraid that the current 
EU and especially further European integration may be conducive to a further 
opening of French markets, partly still protected from world competition95 and to a 
lesser extent from European competition. They also consider that France will gain 
little with a rapidly integrating European Union in terms of inflation as they are 
already accustomed to a relatively low inflation. French successive governments 
and mainstream opposition are however in favour of current EU membership and 
further European integration, and have exercised some influence on their electorate 
in support of the process of European integration, trying to reassure their electorate 
about the economic and social benefits of integration - including the preservation of 
peace and international influence of the EU in world issues. They have also 
promised their electorate that the ED and France would retain a strong social policy 
and that the EU was putting in place a regulated capitalism (please refer to 
background chapter on France (chapter 4)). 
The incumbent government support, the socialisation effect and the relatively low 
exclusive national identity of French citizens partly explain the support of French 
citizens for current membership96 and further European integration but French 
citizens are preoccupied by the persisting economic, social and societal problems 
that France is undergoing, and perceive the EU, and more particularly a neo-liberal 
EU, as contributing to these problems. These perceptions are facilitated by a 
growing politicisation and political protest towards European integration. 
Concerning the results of hypothesis III, French citizens with left, centre but also 
right ideological opinions are though in principle in favour of transferring policies 
such as employment, immigration and political asylum, social inclusion, 
95 World competition is moreover sometimes deemed unfair. . ' 
96 The socialisation effect on current EU membership is though giving way to natlOnal economIC, 
social and societal assessments as discussed above. 
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environmental, anti-drug, scientific research, agriculture, currency management, 
defence, humanitarian aid, regional and foreign policies to the EU. On the evidence 
examined in this thesis and in the work of other authors, it seems probable that this 
is so as they perceive that the EU may be best able to deal with these policies _ 
subsidiarity principle - and that French successive governments have failed to deal 
with some of these. French citizens would like the EU to take a more regulated 
capitalism path, with more interventionism in the economic and social sphere. It is 
revealing to note that French citizens are not in favour of transferring health, 
education and cultural policies to the EU as they may perceive that French 
successive governments have relatively better dealt with these and that the national 
level may be best placed to cater for these. French nationals are also against the EU 
transfer of police and urban & juvenile crime prevention policies as they consider 
that the national level may be best placed to cater for these, and that the permeability 
of European borders - partly concomitant upon the principle of free movements of 
people, services and goods - and the Schengen agreements implementation are 
perceived by respondents as contributing to crime and law and order issues, without 
though denying that the EU could playa role in fighting crime. 
In addition as demonstrated in the individual level analysis, support for current EU 
membership can be mobilised when French respondents have better or the same 
expectations for the country's economic situation for the year to come, have better 
expectations about the employment situation for the year to come and have better 
expectations for their household financial situation for the year to come. Support for 
further European integration can be also mobilised when French respondents have 
better expectations for the country's economic situation for the year to come, have 
better expectations about the employment situation for the year to come and have 
better expectations for their household financial situation for the year to come. 
British Overall Conclusions 
It was hypothesized: 
HI There is an inverse relationship between citizens' levels of satisfaction with 
national political institutions' performance - pertaining to the national economic, 
political, social and societal situation - and citizens' support for European 
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integration in France and the United Kingdom (thus, the higher the satisfaction with 
national performance, the lower the support for European integration). 
For the corruption variable (for further European integration), hypothesis HI is 
accepted. There is therefore a relationship between citizens' satisfaction with the 
United Kingdom's relatively low corruption and citizens' opposition to further 
European integration. Further support for the acceptance of the related hypothesis is 
brought by the non-relationship between incumbent government support and further 
integration which cumulated with the relatively eurosceptic nature of mainstream 
political parties is indirectly partly a confirmation that British citizens appear 
reluctant to risk weakening the national executive through political reform 
(European further integration), which may be affecting individuals who enjoy 
advantageous national policy outcomes such as employment and purchasing power. 
Thus for example, the mismanagement of the British pound in the ERM in the early 
1990s created economic and social problems in the United Kingdom, or inflation 
especially in the second part of the 1990s is already relatively low in the United 
Kingdom and further European integration is deemed as adding little to the control 
of inflation. This relative opposition to further European integration is also albeit 
rooted in a strong feeling of national identity and an emphasis on national 
sovereignty. 
Further support for the acceptance of hypothesis HI comes with the European Union 
being considered as bringing or contributing to problems, or adding little to the 
United Kingdom's economic, societal and social situation. Thus in the domains of 
inflation control and increase in social expenditure - with inherent social rights - the 
further integration of the EU (and current EU membership for social expenditure) is 
considered as adding little to these as inflation has been relatively low in the UK 
especially in the second part of the 1990s and social expenditure has increased to 
reach a comparable level with countries such as France towards the last few years of 
the study period - albeit still lower than France when considering the cost of social 
provisions (PPS measurement) but above the EU average. In the fields of 
immigration and crime, the current EU and further integration of the EU with its 
corollary of freedom of movement of European and non-European nationals, and the 
embryonic more liberal European Home Affairs policy, may be perceived (and 
2.+1 
instrumentalized by British non-mainstream political parties such as UKIP, BNP but 
also by factions within mainstream parties and even the leadership of political 
parties (such as the Conservative Party from 1997)) as contributing to increasing 
immigration and crime in the United Kingdom. In the domain of bureaucracy, 
subject to a political discourse of especially the right and centre underlining the 
bureaucratic nature of the current EU bringing more regulations, bureaucracy and 
red tape which would threaten the competitiveness of British businesses, British 
citizens fear the negative impact that the current EU has on British businesses. 
Furthermore, the United Kingdom tends to have a relatively low dependence on 
intra-EU trade and as such the current EU may be considered by British respondents 
- as reinforced by the political discourse of especially the right - as making a 
relatively minor contribution to the UK's economic and social success and 
contrasting with the publicized (mainly by politicians on the right) trade 
opportunities with relatively fast growing countries such as Canada, USA, Australia, 
New Zealand and other countries in the Commonwealth but also increasingly China. 
Further support for hypothesis HI is brought by the results of Hypothesis III which 
confirm that British respondents do not wish to transfer to the EU, immigration and 
political asylum, health, education, currency management, police and urban & 
juvenile crime prevention, employment, defence, cultural, agriculture, social 
inclusion policies (the latter only for individuals with extreme right ideological 
views).97 British opposition to further European integration and to a lesser extent to 
current EU membership reflects somewhat a vision of the EU as a too 
interventionist, bureaucratic, over-regulated, and somewhat uncompetitive and 
inflexible economic entity98 which can threaten British economic growth and social 
progress accomplished throughout the study period as reinforced by the political 
discourse of much of the right but also partly of the centre and left. The importance 
of national sovereignty, a limited socialisation effect and a strong exclusive feeling 
of national identity bolster this opposition to further integration and to a lesser extent 
the current EU. British citizens' opposition to the European Union is not a total 
opposition to any form of European Union but is grounded on a preference for an 
97 Individuals with right ideological opinions wish to transfer the social inclusion policy to the 
European Union only very marginally. 
98 The political role of the EU is also contested. 
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EU to embrace free market policies and cooperation between independent nation-
states rather than supra-nationalism with its corollary of a super-state. In this 
perspective, British political discourse in the media99 tends to underline the 
opportunities that the single European market (and a more integrated and expanded 
Europe organised along a free common deregulated market) offer to British firms-
for example in terms of employment -, who benefit in the United Kingdom from a 
more favourable competitive, company and job friendly environment and as such 
can benefit from the single European market. 
In addition as demonstrated in the individual level analysis (hypothesis II), support 
for current EU membership can be mobilised when British respondents have better 
or the same expectations for the country's economic situation for the year to come, 
have better expectations about the employment situation for the year to come and 
have better or the same expectations for their household financial situation for the 
year to come. Support for further European integration can be also mobilised when 
British respondents have better expectations for the country's economic situation for 
the year to come, have better expectations about the employment situation for the 
year to come and have better expectations for their household financial situation for 
the year to come. It must be noted that the coefficients for the related variables are a 
little weaker in British models than in French models, as such support for current 
EU membership and future European integration can be mobilised when British 
individuals have more positive expectations but to a lesser extent than France. 
99 Especially the incumbent government as playing a part in the current management of the EU. 
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6- ANALYSIS OF FINDINGS FOR HYPOTHESIS II 
6.1 Introduction 
In this chapter, the relationship between citizens' support for integration and 
citizens' individual benefits extracted from European integration (Hypothesis II) is 
examined. The analysis of findings and conclusions for hypothesis II are therefore 
presented beneath. 
6.2 Analysis of Findings for Hypothesis II 
Research Question II: Is there a relationship between citizens' support for 
integration and citizens' individual benefits extracted from European integration? 
It is hypothesized in the context of both France and the United Kingdom: 
Hn There is a relationship between citizens' support for integration and citizens' 
individual benefits extracted from European integration 
Individual level data analysis 
It must be noted that Models M17 have smaller samples (especially for France) 
which may not be able to detect small differences. Pattern of significance and 
conclusions for incumbent government support, EPEL and referendum variables 
have been discussed in the aggregate level data analysis (section 5.2.5). Statistical 
outputs are subsumed in the appendices numbered 6.1 A F to 6.17 A F for French 
models and 6.1 B UK to 6.16 B' UK for British models. Please note that models 
incorporating a seven category occupation variable are marked with a prime. An 
example of statistical output, Evaluation of EU Benefit (without don't know) (Model 
14 BDNBD), is shown below (for full output details for the latter, please refer to 
Appendix 6.4 B UK). 
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Dependent Variable Encoding 
Original Value Internal Value 
Not benefited 0 
Benefitted 1 
Categorical Variables Codings 
Parameter codinq 
Frequenq (1 ) (2) 
Age recoded - 3 cat 15-24 years 444 1.000 .000 
25-39 years 1116 .000 1.000 
40 + years 1949 .000 .000 
01 LEFT-RIGHT LEFT 1005 1.000 .000 
PLACEMENT - Centre 1290 .000 1.000 
Harmonised 3 cat Right 1214 .000 .000 
05 EXPECTATIONS: Better 1162 1.000 .000 
FINANCIAL SITUATION Same 1735 .000 1.000 
Worse 612 .000 .000 
d29 Income HH quartiles --&-&+ 2340 1.000 
(harmonised) in 2 cat ++ 1169 .000 
05 EXPECTATIONS: Better & Same 2510 1.000 
ECONOMIC SITUATION Worse 999 .000 
q5.4 expectations: Better 1080 1.000 
employment lage in land Same & Worse 2429 .000 
08 AGE EDUCATION - Up to 19 years 2782 1.000 
RECODED (2 cat) 20 + years & still studying 727 .000 
010 SEX Male 1898 1.000 
Female 1611 .000 
uk: regions bordering EU scotland, north yorks 
coded 1 vs rest of regions humberside north w, e-w 1802 1.000 
coded 0 midlads, e-ang 
wales, south east/south 1707 .000 
west, northern ireland 
subj knowledge question, know very and quite well 910 1.000 2 categories sin OK (1 to 5) 
know not very well & not 2599 .000 
at all well (6 to 10) 
European elections year Other years 2474 1.000 
European elections year 1035 .000 
Democracy satisfaction in Very & fairly satisfied 1932 1.000 
Country Not very & not at all 
satisfied 
1577 .000 
occupation of Professionals (inc\. 
respondents in 2 cat employed 
ones )/GenerallMidd Ie 800 1.000 
MGT/stdt 
ShopOw/Unempll 
EmplpoX3,Worker X3, 2709 .000 
Houswv, farmfish/reti r -u n 
ab 
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Omnibus Tests of Model Coefficients 
Chi-square df Sig. 
Step 1 Step 462.266 16 .000 
Block 462.266 16 .000 
Model 462.266 16 .000 
Model Summary 
-2 Log Cox & Snell Nagelkerke 
Step likelihood R Square R Square 
1 4358.394a .124 .166 
a. Estimation terminated at iteration number 4 because 
parameter estimates changed by less than .001. 
Hosmer and Lemeshow Test 
I ~tee I Chi-square df Sig. 12.324 8 .137 
Contingency Table for Hosmer and Lemeshow Test 
019 EU MEMBERSHIP 019 EU MEMBERSHIP 
- COUNTRY BENEFIT - COUNTRY BENEFIT 
= Not benefited = Benefitted 
Observed Expected Observed Expected 
Step 1 288 279.963 65 72.788 
1 2 243 250.116 106 98.941 
3 233 231.809 117 117.416 
4 219 217.449 130 131.744 
5 184 202.550 167 148.036 
6 197 186.463 152 162.228 
7 163 166.004 187 183.895 
8 161 142.867 189 206.477 
9 102 111.743 248 237.664 
10 66 65.166 273 274.143 
Total 
353 
349 
349 
349 
351 
349 
350 
349 
349 
339 
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Likelihood Ratio Tests 
-2 Log 
Likelihood of 
Reduced 
Effect Model Chi-Square df Sig. 
Intercept 3504.792a .000 0 
d10aa 3506.632 1.840 1 .175 
know2 3546.631 41.839 1 .000 
dumreguk 3504.811 .019 1 .890 
epel 3505.176 .384 1 .535 
q5.3aa 3517.468 12.676 2 .002 
q9ww2 3536.029 31.237 1 .000 
d11.1a3c 3505.287 .496 2 .780 
d8aa2cat 3582.499 77.708 1 .000 
q5.2aa2c 3527.463 22.671 1 .000 
d1.4aa 3587.427 82.635 2 .000 
d29f2iii 3517.052 12.261 1 .000 
q5.4a2be 3514.347 9.555 1 .002 
d15af2su 3505.018 .227 1 .634 
The chi-square statistic is the difference in -2 log-likelihoods 
between the final model and a reduced model. The reduced model 
is formed by omitting an effect from the final model. The null 
hypothesis is that all parameters of that effect are O. 
a. This reduced model is equivalent to the final model 
because omitting the effect does not increase the degrees 
of freedom. 
Variables in the Equation 
B S.E. Wald 
S~ep d15af2su(1) .049 .102 .227 
1 d29f2iii(1 ) -.282 .080 12.288 
d1.4aa 81.119 
d1.4aa(1 ) .770 .093 68.153 
d1.4aa(2) .094 .089 1.135 
q5.2aa2c(1 ) .419 .088 22.508 
q5.4a2be(1 ) .262 .085 9.555 
d8aa2cat(1 ) -.949 .110 74.863 
d11.1 a3c .496 
d 11.1 a3c( 1 ) .067 .123 .297 
d11.1a3c(2) .049 .083 .343 
q9ww2(1) .430 .077 31.023 
q5.3aa 12.559 
q5.3aa(1 ) .395 .116 11.675 
q5.3aa(2) .327 .106 9.478 
epel(1 ) -.051 .082 .384 
know2(1 ) .550 .085 41.569 
dumreguk(1 ) .011 .076 .019 
d10aa(1) .101 .075 1.840 
Constant -.563 .186 9.168 
df Sig. Exp(B) 
1 .634 1.050 
1 .000 .754 
2 .000 
1 .000 2.161 
1 .287 1.099 
1 .000 1.520 
1 .002 1.300 
1 .000 .387 
2 .780 
1 .586 1.069 
1 .558 1.050 
1 .000 1.537 
2 .002 
1 .001 1.484 
1 .002 1.387 
1 .535 .951 
1 .000 1.734 
1 .890 1.011 
1 .175 1.107 
1 .002 .569 
a. Variable(s) entered on step 1: d15af2su, d29f2iii, d1.4aa, q5.2aa2c, q5.4a2be, d8aa2cat, d11. 
1a3c, q9ww2, q5.3aa, epel, know2, dumreguk, d10aa. 
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6.2.l Patterns ofEU Support 
Table 6.l summarizes the pattern of significance of the regression constant with the 
dependent variables, current EU membership (EU benefit and membership) and 
future EU integration (European integration desired speed preference) and the 
direction of the coefficient for the related variables. 
T bl 6 1 P tt a e .. a ern 0 f· ·fi Slgnl lcance 0 fEUS uQQort 
Variables Effect on Current EU Effect on Future EU 
Membership Integration 
EU EU Benefit EU Desired Speed 
Membership 
Regression French French French Sample: 
Constant Sample: Sample: 
Significant and EU support 
Significant and Significant and decreases (M14, M15 & M17 
EU support EU support (for latter, especially effect of 
decreases (M 14 decreases 1993)) 
&MlS) (M14 & MIS) 
Significant and Not Significant 
EU support (M17) 
lllcreases 
(M17) 
British Sample: British Sample: British Sample: 
Significant and Significant and Significant and EU support 
EU support EU support decreases (M14, M15 & M17) 
decreases decreases 
(MIS) (M14 & M15) 
Not Significant Not significant 
(M14 & with & EU support 
"neither good decreases 
nor bad" (M 17 but close 
category) to significance 
zone - small 
Not significant differences are 
(M17 with not detectable 
"neither good with models 
nor bad" 17) 
2.+8 
Variables Effect on Current EU Effect on Future EU 
Membership Integration 
EU EU Benefit EU Desired Speed 
Membership 
category) 
Significant & 
EU support 
increases (M 14 
& M 17 without 
"neither good 
nor bad" 
category) 
Evaluation of Current EU Membership 
The regression constant tends to be significant in both French and British models 
with evaluation of current EU membership (EU Benefit and EU Membership) as the 
dependent variable, and the direction of the constant coefficient suggests that overall 
there is a significant drop in current EU membership support in the study period 
(1992-2001) in France and the UK. The individual level data analysis per period 
(resulting from restricted data availability) brings further insight. It must be 
nevertheless noted that the drop in support for current EU membership is lower in 
France than in the United Kingdom - for both individual and aggregate level data 
analyses. Citizens are even more critical of European integration when responding 
to the EU benefit question, which accentuates the stress on utilitarian feelings, this 
confirms Anderson and Smith's (2004) findings. 
British Sample: 
Models M17 (1992, 1993, 1994) 
In the period 1992 to 1994 (M 17), it can be inferred that there is a small significant 
drop in the level of support for current EU membership when British respondents 
are asked to evaluate whether the United Kingdom has benefited from EU 
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membership. This is especially true when integrating the middle category "don't 
know" in the dependent variable. The drop in EU support is no longer significant 
when British respondents are asked to evaluate whether the United Kingdom's EU 
membership is a good thing. When omitting the "neither good nor bad" category in 
the response variable, there is a significant increase in the level of support for 
current EU membership when British respondents are asked to evaluate whether the 
United Kingdom's EU membership is a good thing. 
Models M14 (1993,1994,1996,1997,1999,2000 and 2001) and M15 (year 1993, 
1996, 1997, 1999, 2000 and 2001) 
There is a significant drop in the level of support for current EU membership (EU 
Membership and EU Benefit variables). For models 14, this is especially so when 
respondents are asked to evaluate whether the United Kingdom has benefited from 
EU membership. 
French Sample: 
Models M17 (1992,1993,1994) 
In the period 1992 to 1994 (M 17), there is a significant increase in the level of 
support for current EU membership when French respondents are asked to evaluate 
whether France's EU membership is a good thing. This increase disappears though 
when respondents are asked to evaluate whether France has benefited from EU 
membership. This may be explained by the fact that in the related period (early 
1990s), France was experiencing strong economic and social problems 100 partly 
arising from a poor global economic situation, but also aggravated (and perceived 
accordingly by public opinion) by the preparation for single currency membership 
and EMU (and its initial politicisation) with its corollary of prevalence of monetary 
policy over budgetary policy. 
100 Including ERM problems with the expansion in currency fluctuations margins in 1993. 
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Models M14 (1993,1994,1996,1997,1999,2000 and 2001) & M15 (year 1993, 
1996, 1997, 1999, 2000 and 2001) 
There tends to be a significant decrease in the level of support for EU membership 
(EU membership and EU benefit variables). 
In the UK context, the economic and social consequences of the mismanagement of 
the British pound in the ERM (and its ultimate exit from it in 1992) on citizens have 
brought about more uncertainty about current EU membership, and even the start of 
discontent with the current EU, which subsequently continued amidst the increasing 
politicisation of the EU issue in the second part of the 1990s. The politicisation of 
the EU issue was though limited in the first part of the 1990s including at the 1994 
European elections as the leadership of the main political parties (Conservatives, 
Labour and Liberal Democrats) showed relative consensus on EU membership and 
tended not to compete on this. In the French context, the discontent with the current 
EU gained momentum in the second part of the 1990s amidst persisting economic 
and social problems and the increasing politicisation of the EU issue, the latter 
especially at the 1997 legislative elections and 1999 European elections. 
Desired Speed of European Integration 
Models M17, M14 and M15 
It must be noted that the regression constant shows a significant effect in all British 
and French models, and the direction of the coefficient for the constant suggests that 
there is a significant decrease in further European integration support (desired speed 
of European integration) in the study period (1992-2001). It must be noted that the 
drop in support for future EU integration is lower in France than in the United 
Kingdom - for both individual and aggregate level data analyses. 
In the British context, the reasons evoked above, that is to say, the economic and 
social consequences of the mismanagement of the British Pound in the ERM (and its 
ultimate exit from it) on citizens in the early 1990s have brought about more 
uncertainty and discontent about EU membership and by extension about further 
European integration: a discontent with the EU and its further integration, which has 
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subsequently continued amidst the increasing politicisation of the EU issue in the 
second part of the 1990s. In the French context, discontent with the current EU and 
by extension with further European integration has particularly gained momentum in 
the second part of 1990s amidst persisting economic and social problems and the 
increasing politicisation of the ED issue, the latter especially at the 1997 Legislative 
elections and 1999 European elections. The pact of stability pertaining to EMU and 
the single currency with its inherent monetary, budgetary and fiscal rigidities was 
perceived and instrumentalised by non-mainstream political parties and factions 
within mainstream political parties as contributing to French economic and social 
problems. 
6.2.2 Subjective Economic Performance Evaluation and EU Support 
Table 6.2 summarizes the pattern of significance of SUbjective economic 
performance evaluation variables on the dependent variables, current EU 
membership (ED benefit and membership) and future ED integration (European 
integration desired speed). If an effect is found to be significant, then the relevant 
variable is a unique contributor to the explanation of the dependent variable. 
Table 6.2: Pattern of Significance of Subjective Economic Performance Evaluation 
Variables 
Subjective Economic Effect on Current EU Effect on Future EU 
Performance Membership Integration 
Evaluation Variables 
EU EU Benefit EU Desired Speed 
Membership 
Expectations over Significant Significant Significant 
coming 12 months for 
Economic Situation in 
Country 
Expectations over Significant Significant Significant 
coming 12 months for 
Employment Situation 
in Country 
Expectations over Not Significant Significant Significant 
coming 12 months for but coefficient 
~52 
, 
I 
, 
, 
Subjective Economic Effect on Current EU Effect on Future E U 
Performance Membership Integration 
Evaluation Variables 
EU EU Benefit EU Desired Speed 
Membership 
Financial Situation of in expected 
Household direction 
Expectations for the Economic Situation of the Country (for the year to come) 
Evaluation of Current ED membership 
EU Membership and Benefit Dependent Variables 
The odds in favour of United Kingdom or France EU membership being deemed as 
a good thing increase significantly when the respondents have better or the same 
expectations for the economic situation of the country for the year to come 
compared to those with worse expectations. The odds in favour of Dnited Kingdom 
or France having benefited from ED membership increase significantly when the 
respondents have better or the same expectations for the economic situation of the 
country for the year to come compared to those with worse expectations. It must be 
noted that the economic situation expectations coefficient is stronger for models 
without "neither good nor bad" or "don't know" answers. These results confirm 
earlier research results (Carey, 2002; Gabel and Whitten, 1997; Gabel, 1998a). 
Further EU Integration: European Integration Desired Speed Preference 
For British and French samples, the expectations in the country's economic situation 
(for the year to come) variable is a significant contributor to the explanation of 
European integration desired speed and the relationship conveys that the more the 
respondents have worse expectations in terms of the country' economic situation for 
the year to come, the slower they wish European integration to go. The related 
variable is a little stronger in French samples. These results broadly corroborate 
earlier findings (Hooghe and Marks, 2005; De Vreese and Boomgaarden. 2005-
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dependent variables used are not the same but contain components of further EU 
integration -). 
Expectations for the Employment Situation in the Country (for the year to 
come) 
Evaluation of Current EU membership 
EU Membership and Benefit Dependent Variables 
The odds in favour of United Kingdom or France EU membership being viewed as a 
good thing increase significantly when the respondents have better expectations 101 
for the employment situation in the country for the year to come compared to those 
with the same or worse expectations. The odds in favour of United Kingdom or 
France being considered as having benefited from EU membership increase 
significantly when the respondents have better expectations for the employment 
situation in the country for the year to come compared to those with the same or 
worse expectations. The expectations for the national employment situation 
coefficient is also a little stronger for models without "neither good nor bad" or 
"don't know" answers. It should be underlined that although the direction of the 
expectations for the national employment situation coefficient is the same in French 
and British samples, this coefficient appears more important in French samples. 
This may be so as the employment situation in France in terms of availability of jobs 
and average salaries is relatively worse in France than in the United Kingdom. 
These results confirm earlier research results (Carey, 2002; Gabel and Whitten, 
1997; Gabel, 1998a), although these studies used national economic expectations as 
independent variable rather than national employment expectations. 
Further ED Integration: European Integration Desired Speed Preference 
For British and French samples, the future country's employment situation 
expectations variable is a significant predictor of European integration desired 
speed. The direction of the coefficient for this variable reveals that the more the 
101 Except model 14 GO for French sample and model 15 GO for British sample where the pattern of 
significance is "Better and Same Expectations" versus "Worse Expectations". 
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respondents have the same or worse expectations in terms of the country's 
employment situation for the year to come, the slower (the more) they wish 
European integration to go (or to standstill). These results corroborate earlier 
findings (Hooghe and Marks, 2005; De Vreese and Boomgaarden, 2005 - dependent 
variables used in these studies are not the same but contain components of further 
EU integration, and these studies also used national economic expectations as the 
independent variable rather than national employment expectations -). 
Expectations for Household Financial Situation (for the year to come) 
Evaluation of Current EU membership 
EU Membership and Benefit Dependent Variables 
The household financial situation coefficient tends not to be a significant predictor 
of the EU membership variable for both French and British models but the related 
coefficient is in the expected direction. Thus, the odds in favour of United Kingdom 
or France ED membership being considered as a good thing increase statistically 
insignificantly when the respondents have better expectations for their household 
financial situation for the year to come compared to those with worse expectations. 
For British samples without a "don't know" answer, the household financial 
situation coefficient is a significant predictor of the EU benefit variable. Thus, the 
odds in favour of the United Kingdom being viewed as having benefited from EU 
membership increase (statistically) significantly when the respondents have better or 
the same expectations for their household financial situation for the year to come 
compared to those with worse expectations. However, when integrating "don't 
know" answers to the British samples (model 15 BDDKNBD with media influence 
and cognitive mobilisation variables), the coefficient for better household financial 
situation expectations is no longer a significant predictor (not so far though from the 
significance zone) of the EU benefit variable but the related coefficient has the same 
direction as for British models without "don't know" answers: the odds here in 
favour of the United Kingdom being viewed as having benefited from EU 
membership increase statistically insignificantly when the respondents have better 
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expectations for their household financial situation for the year to come compared to 
those with worse expectations. 
For French samples with or without a "don't know" answer, the household financial 
situation coefficient is always a significant predictor of the EU benefit variable. The 
odds in favour of France being viewed as having benefited from EU membership 
increase (statistically) significantly when the respondents have better expectations 
for their household financial situation for the year to come compared to those with 
the same or worse expectations. Therefore the household financial situation variable 
seems more important as a predictor ofEU benefit (dependent) variable in French 
samples than in British samples: this may be because in connection with the 
relatively worse national economic and social results in France, the French 
household financial situation tends to be worse than the British household financial 
situation. 
These results partly confirm (an effect not always significant) earlier research results 
(Llamazares and Gramacho, 2007; Carey, 2002; Gabel and Whitten, 1997; Gabel, 
1998a). 
Further EU Integration: European Integration Desired Speed Preference 
For British samples, the expectations in the household's financial situation for the 
year to come variable is not a significant predictor of European integration desired 
speed (quite close though to the significance area, .087 > .05) but the direction of the 
coefficient indicates (statistically insignificantly though) that the worse future 
expectations respondents have for their household financial situation, the slower 
they wish European integration to go. However in model 15 (controlling inter alia 
for media influence and cognitive mobilisation), the coming year household 
financial situation expectations variable becomes a significant predictor of European 
integration desired speed. The coefficient is though in the same direction in both 
models. This implies that the worse future expectations respondents have for their 
household financial situation, the slower they wish European integration to go. For 
French samples, the future household financial situation variable is a significant 
predictor of European integration desired speed. The direction of the coefficient 
denotes that the more the respondents have the same or worse expectations about 
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their household financial situation for the year to come, the slower (or the more) 
they wish European integration to go (or to standstill). These results corroborate 
overall earlier findings (Hooghe and Marks, 2005 and McLaren, 2007b102 _ 
dependent variables used in the related studies are not the same but contain 
components of further EU integration -; Kritzinger, 2003 - although the latter has 
used an indexed independent variable incorporating personal and national economic 
expectations, and the dependent variable used is not the same -). 
Overall, Un is accepted. Therefore there is a relationship between citizens' 
support for integration (current ED membership and future integration) and 
citizens' individual benefits extracted from European integration. In other 
words, the more British and French respondents have better expectations about 
the national economic situation, the national employment situation and their 
household financial situation for the year to come, the more they support 
current ED membership and the faster they wish European integration to go. It 
must be noted that the coefficients for the related variables are a little weaker in 
British models than in French models, as such support for current EU membership 
and future European integration can be mobilised in both countries when individuals 
have more positive expectations for the year to come but to a lesser extent in the 
United Kingdom than in France. As discussed in the aggregate level analysis, 
British citizens have a strong sense of national identity, place greater emphasis on 
national sovereignty and benefit from a lower socialisation effect, which moderate 
the perceived individual and national benefits extracted from the EU. 
6.2.3 Demographic and Socio-Economic Characteristics of Individuals and EU 
Support 
Table 6.3 summarizes the pattern of significance of individual demographic and 
socio-economic variables on the dependent variables, current EU membership (EU 
benefit and membership) and future EU integration (European integration desired 
speed preference). If an effect is found to be significant, then the relevant variable is 
a unique contributor to the explanation of the dependent variable. 
102 McLaren (2007b) has also used a different independent variable, that is to say, perceived personal 
advantages from EU membership. 
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Table 6.3: Pattern of Significance of Individual Demographic and Socio-Economic 
Variables 
Individual Effect on Current ED Effect on Future E V 
Demographic and Membership Integration 
Socio-Economic 
Variables 
EU EU Benefit EU Desired Speed 
Membership 
Income Significant Significant Significant(except~17 
(1992-1994) although 
British British relatively close to 
SamQles SamQles significance for UK 
Significant Significant sample) 
(but more (but more 
limited limited 
significance significance 
for ~odell7 for ~odel17 
(~17) (1992- (~17) (1992-
1994): second 1994): second 
and third and third 
lowest income lowest income 
not significant) not significant) 
French French 
SamQles SamQles 
Significant Significant 
(not significant (not significant 
in ~17) in M17) 
Education Significant Significant British SamQle 
Significant only for ~14 
(but same coefficient 
direction for ~15) 
French SamQle 
Significant (except ~ 17 
but same coefficient 
direction) 
Occupation British SamQle British samQle Largely Not Significant 
(smaller differences Localised Not 
are not detectable*) Significance Significant 
French SamQle French SamQle 
Tend to be Tend to be 
significant significant 
~aterialismlPost- Significant Sigl!ificant Sig!!ificant 
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Individual Effect on Current ED Effect on Future ED 
Demographic and Membership Integration 
Socio-Economic 
Variables 
EU EU Benefit EU Desired Speed 
Membership 
Materialism 
Proximity to Intra- British SamQle Tend to be not Not Significant 
EU Borders Tend to be not significant 
significant 
French SamQle 
Tend to be 
significant 
Income 
Evaluation of Current ED membershiQ 
EU Membership and Benefit Dependent Variables 
British models 
The odds in favour of the United Kingdom membership of the EU being seen as a 
good thing decrease significantly overall when respondents have an income "--" or 
"-" or "+" compared to those with a higher income "++". The coefficient for "-" 
and "+" is though not significant in models M17 GD and M17 GDNGNB (and just 
outside significance for "--" for M17GD) but has the same direction as for other 
coefficients: that is to say the odds decrease versus "++". Therefore overall, those 
with greater incomes are more likely to answer that the United Kingdom 
membership of the ED is a good thing rather than a bad thing or neither good nor 
bad. Income coefficients for models with "neither good nor bad" are also a little 
stronger than for models without "neither good nor bad". 
In the same line, the odds in favour of the United Kingdom being deemed as having 
benefited from membership of the EU decrease significantly overall when 
respondents have an income "--" or "-" or "+" compared to those with a higher 
income "++". The coefficient for "-" and "+" is yet not significant in models M 17 
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BDNBD and M 17 BDDKNBD but has the same direction as for other coefficients: 
that is to say the odds decrease versus "++". Therefore overall, those with greater 
incomes are more likely to answer that the United Kingdom benefited from EU 
membership rather than not benefited or don't know. Income coefficients for 
models with "don't know" and without the latter show a similar strength. 
French models 
The odds in favour of France membership of the EU being seen as a good thing 
decrease significantly overall when respondents have an income " __ ,, or "-" or "+" 
compared to those with a higher income "++". The coefficient for " __ ,, and "+" is 
however not significant in models M17 GD and M17 GDNGNB but has the same 
direction as for other coefficients: that is to say the odds decrease versus "++". 
Contrary to British models, albeit the second lowest income ("-") coefficient being 
also not significant in models M17 GD and M17 GDNGNB, the second lowest 
income coefficient ("-") shows no direction. Therefore overall, as for British 
models, those with highest incomes are more likely to answer that France 
membership of the EU is a good thing rather than a bad thing or neither good nor 
bad. Contrary to British models, income coefficients for models without "neither 
good nor bad" are also a little stronger than for models with "neither good nor bad". 
As for British models, the odds in favour of France being deemed as having 
benefited from membership of the EU decrease significantly overall when 
respondents have an income "_,, or "+" compared to those with a higher income 
"++". The coefficient for "+" is nonetheless not significant in models M17 BDNBD 
and M17 BDDKNBD but has the same direction as for other coefficients: that is to 
say the odds decrease versus "++". The coefficient for "_,, is also not significant in 
models M 17 BDNBD and M 17 BDDKNBD and the odds slightly increase. As for 
British models, the odds in favour of France being deemed as having benefited from 
membership of the EU decrease (statistically) significantly overall when respondents 
have the lowest income ("--") compared to those with the highest income "++" for 
models with "don't know" (the coefficient for "--" is not significant in models M17 
BDNBD and M17 BDDKNBD but has the same direction as for other coefficients: 
the odds decrease versus "++"). However it differs from British models when the 
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odds in favour of France being deemed as having benefited from membership of the 
EU decrease statistically insignificantly overall when respondents have the lowest 
income ("--") compared to those with the highest income "++" for models without 
"don't know" but the related coefficient has the same direction as in British models. 
The coefficient for "--" is also not significant in models M17 BDNBD and M17 
BDDKNBD but has the same direction as for other coefficients: that is to say the 
odds decrease versus "++". Therefore overall, as for British models, respondents 
with greater incomes are more likely to answer that France benefited from EU 
membership rather than not benefited or don't know. 
The results obtained for current EU membership are in line with Gabel's (1998a) 
and Carey's (2002) results. On the evidence examined and in the work of other 
authors, it seems probable that citizens on lower incomes perceive the EU as 
affecting more adversely job market and salaries with greater competition arising 
from freedom of movement of workers, capitalliberalisation and economic 
integration. In tum, wealthier citizens consider that they benefit from increased 
investment opportunities as a result of the European Union. 
Further EU Integration: European Integration Desired Speed Preference 
For British samples, the income variable is a significant contributor to the 
explanation of European integration desired speed and the direction of the 
coefficient denotes that the greater the respondents' income is, the slower they wish 
European integration to go. This result contradicts somewhat Gabel's (1998a) and 
Carey's (2002) results - albeit not the same dependent variable was used in these 
studies. This is likely to be so because wealthier British citizens perceive that they 
benefit from current EU membership but that further European integration moves 
may go in opposition to their interests, with a more interventionist European 
governmental stance (departing from British free market policy) with for example 
greater risk of market regulations and higher taxation (compared to the British 
national context). Wealthier British Citizens are partly taking cues from the largely 
eurosceptic British press but also from the national political elites who are more 
reserved and critical towards further European integration. Conversely, it is 
plausible that those on lower incomes view the further integration of the EU as 
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providing more opportunities for social spending (compared to the British context) 
although towards the end of the study period this is losing somewhat its essence with 
the United Kingdom social spending per head (including adoption of social chapter) 
being similar to comparable countries such as France - albeit still lower in real terms 
than the latter - and the greater spending commitment on public services from the 
government for the future (please refer to chapter four). 
For French samples, the income variable is also a significant contributor to the 
explanation of European integration desired speed but the direction of the coefficient 
conveys that the higher the respondent's income is, the faster they wish European 
integration to proceed. This result corroborates somewhat Gabel's (1998a) and 
Carey's (2002) findings - albeit not the same dependent variable was used in these 
studies. This is probable to be so because wealthier French citizens view the further 
EU integration as serving their interests with a less interventionist European 
governmental momentum (compared to the French more tightly regulated market 
policy), with less market regulation and less taxation (compared to the French 
national context), and with more opportunities to invest their money. Conversely, it 
is plausible that those on lower incomes consider the further European integration as 
constraining social spending (compared to French context) - budgetary rigidities 
related to EMU and pact of stability - and increasing job market competition with a 
negative impact on salaries. 
Pattern of significance of income variable shows for both France and the 
United Kingdom that Hn is accepted. As a result, based on income variable, 
there is a relationship between citizens' support for integration (current EU 
membership and further integration) and citizens' individual benefits extracted 
from European integration. It must be pointed out that utilitarian appraisals of the 
EU based on income variable have increased since 1994 for France and to a lesser 
extent the United Kingdom. Utilitarian appraisals for British individuals on lowest 
income compared to highest income already existed in period 1992-1994, the 
mismanagement of the British Pound in the ERM and its economic and social 
consequences especially on lowest income households explain this. In the British 
context, the apparent contradiction between individuals with higher income being in 
favour of current EU membership but against further EU integration is not surprising 
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and reflects a self-interested logic. A more favourable competitive, company and 
job friendly environment in the United Kingdom enable them to benefit from the 
current EU and its single European market. Yet the further integration of the EU is 
perceived by them to carry risks of excessive public interventionism, greater market 
regulations and higher taxation which could threaten their current competitiveness 
and welfare. Much of the political discourse - including the reservations of the 
Labour government on further integration topics such as for example the Euro 
membership - but also the political activism of the largely eurosceptic British press 
against further European integration reinforce this belief. The results obtained for 
the daily papers use and incumbent government support variables corroborate this 
explanation. 
Education 
Evaluation of Current EU membership 
EU Membership and Benefit Dependent Variables 
The odds in favour of the United Kingdom or France membership of the EU being 
considered as a good thing decrease (statistically) significantly when respondents 
have studied up to 19 years old compared to those studying further. Along the same 
line, the odds in favour of France or the United Kingdom being viewed as having 
benefited from EU membership decrease significantly when respondents have 
studied up to 19 years old compared to those studying further. In both French and 
British models, the education coefficient is a little stronger in models without "Don't 
Know" or "Neither Good Nor Bad" in the dependent variable for both the benefit 
and the membership variable. It must be noted that the education coefficient tends 
to be stronger with the membership variable as the dependent variable than with the 
benefit variable as the dependent variable. The education variable, albeit showing a 
significant effect in both French and British models, is a little more important to 
explain current EU support in British models than French ones. These findings 
corroborate earlier research results (for instance Gabel, 1998a; Hix, 1999b and 
Carey, 2002). The market liberalization pertaining to the EU integration offers more 
opportunities for people with human capital. 
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Further EU Integration: European Integration Desired Speed Preference 
For British samples, the education variable is a significant predictor of European 
integration desired speed in model M 14 but the effect is not statistically significant 
in model MIS and model M 17 - the direction of the education coefficient is though 
the same in MIS (direction albeit neutral in MI7). This denotes that the more 
educated the respondents are, the faster they wish European integration to proceed 
but the effect is only statistically significant in model M14: therefore this 
relationship is only found true in model M14. For French samples, the education 
variable is a significant predictor of European integration desired speed (except 
model M 17 but the direction of coefficient is the same). This denotes that the more 
educated the respondents are, the faster they wish European integration to go. 
These findings for French samples and to a lesser extent for British samples mostly 
corroborate earlier research results (for example Hooghe and Marks, 2005 - albeit 
the same dependent variable was not used but included a measure of further 
European integration -). The present results for further European integration do not 
however support Brinegar and Jolly's (2005) findings. The latter found that high 
skilled workers in low skill endowment countries (such as the United Kingdom), in 
residual welfare states (such as the United Kingdom) or in conservative welfare 
states (such as France although the latter has a more mixed political economy) are 
less supportive of further European integration than low skilled workers in the same. 
The present research outcomes indicate that further EU integration offers more 
opportunities for people with human capital but that this is less true in the British 
context. British respondents, especially those with high skills, show more 
ambivalence towards greater European integration as they fear that it can mean more 
tax and less labour market fluidity. 
The pattern of significance of the education variable shows for both France and 
the United Kingdom (to a lesser extent for the latter for further integration) 
that HII is accepted. As a result, based on the education variable, there is a 
relationship between citizens' support for integration (current EU membership 
and further integration) and citizens' individual benefits extracted from 
European integration. 
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Occupation 
Evaluation of Current EU membership 
EU Membership and Benefit Dependent Variables 
*It must be pointed out that given the size of the sample for models with the seven 
category occupation variable (D 15cat7VSr), smaller differences may not be able to 
be detected there. 
British data 
The occupation variable - professionals, students, or general or middle managers 
compared to other occupations - tends not to be a significant contributor to the 
explanation ofEU membership or EU benefit. However, when comparing each 
occupation to retired respondents or respondents unable to work (D 15cat7VSr), the 
coefficient for professionals and general managers becomes a significant predictor 
of evaluation of EU membership variable (with or without "neither good nor bad" 
answer) when compared to retired or unable to work respondents (DI5cat7VSr): the 
odds in favour of United Kingdom EU membership being considered as a good 
thing increase significantly when the respondents are professionals or general 
managers compared to retired or unable to work respondents. Furthermore, the 
coefficient for professionals and general managers is not a significant predictor of 
evaluation of EU benefit variable (with or without "don't know" answer) but the 
direction is the same as for models with EU membership variable: the odds in favour 
of United Kingdom being deemed as having benefited from EU membership 
increase statistically insignificantly for professionals and general managers 
compared to retired or unable to work respondents. This result is in line with the 
results of for example Gabel (1998a) and Gabel and Palmer (1995) - albeit the 
benefit variable is not used in the two earlier researches -. This seems to reflect the 
view that individuals with higher occupational status and more marketable 
occupational skills are more able to take advantage from an open European labour 
market. It must be noted that compared to retired or unable to work respondents 
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(D 15cat7VSr), the coefficient for students and to a lesser extent mid-managers is not 
a significant predictor of EU membership or EU benefit, and the direction of this 
coefficient tends to be negative (odds decreasing statistically insignificantly though) 
or neutral. The fact that the coefficients for unemployed individuals and manual 
workers are not statistically significant (and often in neutral or opposite direction), 
contradicts Gabel's (l998a) and Gabel and Palmer's (1995) results. 
French data 
The occupation variable - professionals, students, or general or middle managers 
compared to other occupations - tends to be a significant contributor to the 
explanation of EU membership or EU benefit in French models. This result is in 
line with the results of, for example, Gabel (1998a) and Gabel and Palmer (1995)-
albeit the benefit variable is not used in the two earlier researches. This seems to 
reflect the view that individuals with higher occupational status and more 
marketable occupational skills are more able to take advantage from an open 
European labour market. When comparing each occupation to retired respondents 
or respondents unable to work (D 15cat7VSr), although the coefficients for 
professionals/general managers, students and middle managers are often not 
significant predictors of evaluation ofEU membership variable (with or without 
"neither good nor bad" answer) and of EU benefit variable (with or without "don't 
know" answer),103 the direction of their coefficients suggests that the odds in favour 
of France EU membership being considered as a good thing or the odds in favour of 
France being considered as having benefited from EU membership tend to increase 
(though statistically insignificantly) when the respondents are professionals/general 
managers, students and middle managers when compared to retired or unable to 
work respondents. 
The pattern of significance of the occupation variable shows for France and to 
a lesser extent the United Kingdom that Hn is accepted. As a result, based on 
the occupation variable, there is a relationship between citizens' support for 
103 Given the size of the sample for models with 7 category occupation variable (D 15cat7VSr). 
smaller differences may not be able to be detected here. 
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integration (current ED membership) and citizens' individual benefits 
extracted from European integration. 
Further EU Integration: European Integration Desired Speed Preference 
For British samples, the professionals-general managers-middle managers-students 
versus other occupations variable is not significant and tends to show no direction. 
When comparing each occupation to the retired category, none of the coefficients for 
each occupation category is significant in the fuller models (model M14 and MI5)-
unemployed respondents are though significant predictors in model M 17 (year 1992, 
1993 and 1994) with unemployed interviewees more likely to desire a faster 
European integration - but the pattern of direction of the coefficients must be noted. 
Unemployed respondents, students, professionals/general managers, manual workers 
and clerks are statistically insignificantly more likely to desire a faster European 
integration than retired or unable to work interviewees. The coefficients for middle 
managers tend to have no direction. 
For French samples, the professionals-general managers-middle managers-students 
versus other occupations variable is not significant and tends to indicate that 
professionals, general managers, middle managers and students are statistically 
insignificantly more likely to desire a faster European integration than other 
occupations. When comparing each occupation to the retired category, only the 
coefficient for unemployed interviewees tends to be (statistically) significant 
compared to retired or unable to work interviewees, and its direction denotes that 
unemployed respondents tend to be significantly more likely to desire a faster 
European integration than retired or unable to work respondents. The rest of the 
coefficients for other occupation categories are not significant. Students (moreover 
significant in model MI7), professionals/general managers and manual workers are 
statistically insignificantly more likely to desire a faster European integration than 
retired or unable to work interviewees. The coefficients for middle managers and 
clerks tend to have a neutral direction. 
The results obtained here contradict somewhat the results of for example Gabel 
(l998a) and Gabel and Palmer (1995) - although not the same dependent variable 
was used in these studies. Only unemployed French respondents are significantly 
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more likely to favour a faster European integration but the direction of this 
coefficient is opposed to the one found by Gabel (1998a) and Gabel and Palmer 
(1995). It is plausible that this is linked to the relatively enduring poor work 
prospects and relatively low salaries in France, with unemployed respondents 
thinking that further EU integration may have a beneficial effect on employment. 
The pattern of significance of the occupation variable shows for the United 
Kingdom and to a lesser extent France that "II is rejected. As a result, based 
on the occupation variable, there is no relationship between citizens' support 
for integration (further integration) and citizens' individual benefits extracted 
from European integration. 
Value Orientations (Post-Materialism/Materialism) 
Due to restricted data availability, the value orientations variable is only tested with 
model 17 (period 1992 to 1994). 
Evaluation of Current EU membership 
EU Membership and Benefit Dependent Variables 
The value orientations variable is a significant contributor to the explanation of the 
dependent variables, EU membership and EU benefit, and the coefficient for this 
variable - coefficient a little weaker for value orientations 2nd choice for French 
samples - has the same direction in both British and French models. The odds in 
favour of France/the United Kingdom EU membership being seen as a good thing or 
France/the United Kingdom being viewed having benefited from EU membership 
decrease significantly when the interviewees have materialist values compared to 
those with post-materialist values. It must be noted that for British samples, not 
considering "neither good nor bad" and "don't know" answers in the dependent 
variable makes the value orientations coefficient a little stronger. For French 
samples, not considering "neither good nor bad" answer in the dependent variable 
makes the value orientations coefficient a little weaker. 
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Further EU Integration: European Integration Desired Speed Preference 
For British and French samples, the value orientations variable tends to be a 
significant contributor to the explanation of European integration desired speed, and 
the relationship denotes that respondents with post materialist views are more likely 
to desire a faster European integration. Both results for current EU membership and 
for further EU integration confirm Inglehart's findings (1970b and 1977b) that post 
materialists show more EU support and contradict Gabel's (1998a) (the latter found 
that materialists are supportive of European integration), Janssen's (1991) and 
Anderson and Reichert's results (1996) (the last three authors found that post 
materialists have no or little effect on evaluation of EU membership). The results 
elicited can be explained by the fact that they apply to the period from 1992 to 1994, 
which is a period for the United Kingdom and to a lesser extent France, which is 
marked by economic and social difficulties sparked by a poor international 
economic environment and ERM problems 104 and pursuit of economic (fiscal and 
monetary) austerity policy. In this difficult context, the support for current EU 
membership and further integration come from people who have a more affective 
bond with the EU rather than people who benefit individually from EU integration. 
As discussed in the aggregate level data analysis, the socialisation effect is also more 
present in the first part of the 1990s but will become more eroded afterwards with 
the greater politicisation of the EU issue and the greater importance of national 
economic, social and societal assessments of how the EU is affecting nation states. 
The pattern of significance of the value orientations variable shows for both 
France and the United Kingdom in the period 1992-1994 that "n is accepted. 
As a result, based on the value orientations variable in the relevant period, 
there is a relationship between citizens' support for integration (current EU 
membership and further integration) and citizens' individual benefits extracted 
from European integration. 
104 That is to say mismanagement of the British pound in the ERM (and its eventual exit from it) and 
widening of currency fluctuations margins for the French franc. 
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Intra-EU proximity 
Evaluation of Current EU membership 
EU Membership and Benefit Dependent Variables 
For British models, the intra-EU proximity variable tends not to be a significant 
predictor of the dependent variable, EU membership or EU benefit, except in model 
Ml7 BDNBD where the odds in favour of the United Kingdom being viewed as 
having benefited from EU membership augment (statistically) significantly in non-
EU bordering regions compared to EU bordering regions - in model M 1 7 
BDDKNBD, this variable is not far from significance zone (.076) and the coefficient 
has the same direction. In the British context, the intra-EU proximity variable tends 
not to work and therefore does not support Gabel's (l998a) findings. 
For French models, the intra-EU proximity variable tends to be a significant 
predictor of EU membership but not of EU benefit. For French models without 
"neither good nor bad" answer, the intra-EU proximity variable is a significant 
predictor ofEU membership in model Ml4 and MI7GD: the direction of the 
coefficient for this variable indicates there that the odds in favour of France EU 
membership being considered as a good thing augment significantly in non-EU 
bordering regions compared to EU bordering regions. Although the intra-EU 
proximity variable is not significant in model M15 GD, the direction is the same as 
in model Ml4 and M17 GD. For French models with "neither good nor bad" 
answer, the related variable is also significant in model M14 GDNGNB and just 
outside the significance zone in model 17 GDNGNB (.052), the direction of the 
intra-EU proximity coefficient is there the same as in model 14 and 17 GD. Finally 
in all EU benefit models with or without "don't know", the intra-EU proximity 
variable is not a significant predictor of the dependent variable, EU benefit. 
In the French context, for general opinion about France EU membership, the intra-
EU proximity variable does not work in the expected direction and contradicts 
therefore Gabel's (1 998a) findings. However looking more closely at the results, 
respondents in French wealthier economic areas such as Ile de France or agricultural 
areas such as Centre, Auvergne, Pays de Loire, Bourgogne, Limousin, Poitou-
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Charentes are significantly more likely to answer that France EU membership is a 
good thing. These are not regions which are close to intra-EU borders but by their 
nature (key economic centre and agricultural centres) they take actively part in EU 
trade and as such judge EU membership a good thing although respondents in those 
regions may not be satisfied with the national economic, societal and social results 
arising from France EU membership. Yet, there are other economic centres such as 
Rhone-Alpes where this relationship is not captured. For the benefit variable, the 
intra-EU proximity variable does not work and therefore does not support Gabel's 
(1998a) findings. 
Further EU Integration: European Integration Desired Speed Preference 
For British and French samples, the intra-EU proximity variable is not a significant 
predictor of European integration desired speed. Overall, these results do not 
support earlier research findings (for example Gabel, 1998a). The region categories 
(in Eurobarometer) may be too broad to capture intra-EU proximity utilitarian 
assessment. 
The pattern of significance of the intra-EU proximity variable shows for both 
the United Kingdom and France that Hn is rejected. As a result, based on the 
intra-EU proximity variable, there is no relationship between citizens' support 
for integration (current EU membership and further integration) and citizens' 
individual benefits extracted from European integration. 
6.2.4 EU Knowledge, Political Ideology, Cognitive Mobilisation, Media Use, Age, 
Gender and EU Support 
The related variables are control variables, which do not measure utilitarian 
assessments themselves (and therefore are not directly related to the hypothesis) but 
control for the effect of utilitarian variables and give further insight into the pattern 
of EU support. Table 6.4 summarizes the pattern of significance of EU knowledge, 
cognitive mobilisation, media use variables on the dependent variables, current EU 
membership (EU benefit and membership) and future EU integration (European 
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integration desired speed preference). If an effect is found to be significant, then the 
relevant variable is a unique contributor to the explanation of the dependent variable. 
Table 6.4: Pattern of Significance ofEU Knowledge, Cognitive Mobilisation, Media 
Use Variables 
EU Knowledge, Effect on Current EU Effect on Future EU 
Cognitive Mobilisation, Membership Integration 
Media Watching 
Variables 
EU EU Benefit EU Desired Speed 
Membership 
EU Knowledge Significant Significant Significant for French 
samples 
Not Significant for British 
samJ~les 
Cognitive Mobilisation: 
Frequency of political British British British SamQles 
Discussion SamQles SamQles Significant 
Significant Significant 
French French French SamQles 
SamQles SamQles Not Significant 
Partly Not 
Significant Significant 
Frequency of Political British British British SamQles 
Persuasion SamQles SamQles Significant 
Not Not 
Significant Significant 
French French French SamQles 
SamQles SamQles Significant 
Significant Significant 
Media Use - Newspaper British British Not significant 
Reading SamQles SamQles 
Partly Partly 
Significant Significant 
French French 
SamQles SamQles 
Not Not 
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E U Knowledge, Effect on Current EU Effect on Future EU 
Cognitive Mobilisation, Membership Integration 
Media Watching 
Variables 
EU 
Membership 
EU Benefit EU Desired Speed 
Significant Significant 
Political Ideology Significant Significant Significant 
Age Localised British Significant 
Significance Samgle 
Not 
Significant 
French 
Samgle 
Significant 
Gender British British Not significant 
Samgle Samgle 
Significant Significant 
with middle with middle 
category category 
French French 
Samgle Samgle 
Not Significant 
Significant with middle 
category 
EU Knowledge 
Evaluation of Current EU membershig 
EU Membership and Benefit Dependent Variables 
The odds in favour of the United Kingdom or France EU membership being seen as 
a good thing increase significantly when respondents know the EU very or quite 
well compared to those who know the EU not very well or not at all. In the same 
way, the odds in favour of the United Kingdom or France being considered as 
having benefited from EU membership increase significantly when respondents 
know the EU very or quite well compared to those who know the EU not very well 
or not at all. In both French and British models, the EU Knowledge coefficient is a 
little stronger in models integrating "Don't Know" or "Neither Good Nor Bad" in 
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the dependent variable for both the benefit and the membership variable. It must 
also be noted that the EU Knowledge coefficient is stronger in models with the 
benefit variable rather than models with the membership variable in both French and 
British models. However, in both French and British models, the EU knowledge 
variable is an important predictor of the outcome variable, benefit variable or 
membership variable. These results confirm earlier research results (for example 
Gabel, 1998a; Hix, 1999b). As French and to a lesser extent British citizens receive 
predominantly positive messages from political elites (mainstream political parties) 
concerning the current European Union, as Zaller (1992) predicted, political 
awareness determines variation in citizens' attitudes towards the current European 
Union. 
Further EU Integration: European Integration Desired Speed Preference 
For British samples, the EU knowledge variable is overall not a significant predictor 
(except model M 14) of European integration desired speed. Although the 
relationship is not significant (except M14) and therefore not proven, the direction 
of the EU knowledge variable indicates though that the less EU knowledge the 
respondents have, the slower they wish European integration to go. For French 
samples, the EU knowledge variable is a significant predictor of European 
integration desired speed. This means that the less EU knowledge the respondents 
have, the slower they wish European integration to go. These results confirm earlier 
research results (Gabel, 1998a; Hix, 1999b - albeit not the same dependent variable 
was used -). In the case of France, this can be explained by the fact that French 
citizens receive predominantly positive messages from political elites (mainstream 
political parties) concerning the further integration of the European Union,105 as 
Zaller (1992) predicted, political awareness determines variation in citizens' 
attitudes towards the current European Union. In the case of the United Kingdom, 
the effect is found not to be significant as political elites (mainstream British 
political parties) are more divided on the issue of further integration, and as such 
British citizens do not only receive positive messages about the further integration of 
105 Although in the second part of the 1990s, the EU issue has become more politicised, esp~ciall~ at 
the 1997 Legislative elections and 1999 European elections (smaller EU Knowledge coefficl~~ts In 
M 14 and M 15 than in M 1 7 (the latter covering the period from 1992 to 1994) but the oppositIOn to 
further integration tends to be in mainstream party factions or in non-mainstream political parties. 
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the European union. The result obtained for the United Kingdom is in line with 
Evans' (1998b) research results. According to the EU knowledge quiz scores 
(Evans, 1998b), it is the case that people who want Britain to leave the EU are less 
informed than those who do not. Those who want Britain to stay in the EU but try 
to reduce the EU powers are more informed than those who either wish to increase 
the EU powers or those who wish to have full integration. 
Political Discussion Frequency 
Evaluation of Current EU membership 
EU Membership and Benefit Dependent Variables 
British data 
For the UK EU membership models with or without "neither good nor bad" answer 
and the UK EU benefit models with or without "don't know" answer, political 
discussion frequency is a significant predictor of EU membership or EU benefit 
evaluation. The odds in favour of the United Kingdom EU membership being 
judged as a good thing or of the United Kingdom being judged as having benefited 
from EU membership increase significantly when the respondents discuss political 
matters frequently or occasionally compared to those who never discuss political 
matters. It must be noted that frequently and occasionally coefficients are a little 
weaker in British EU benefit models. These results support earlier research findings 
by Inglehart et al. (1991), Janssen (1991) and Medrano's and Gutierrez's (2001), 
and refute Gabel's (1998a) results. As cognitive mobilization (political discussion) 
increases, the European Union and the topic of integration become more familiar 
and less threatening and as a result, support for current EU membership increases. 
French Data 
For France EU membership models with "neither good nor bad" answer, political 
discussion frequency is a significant predictor of EU membership evaluation. The 
odds in favour of France EU membership being judged as a good thing increase 
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significantly when the respondents discuss political matters frequently or 
occasionally compared to those who never discuss political matters. However, for 
France EU membership models without "neither good nor bad" answer, political 
discussion frequency is no longer a significant predictor of EU membership 
evaluation but the direction of the coefficients - for both frequently and occasionally 
- is the same as for models with "neither good nor bad" answer. For France EU 
benefit models with or without "don't know" answer, political discussion frequency 
is not a significant predictor ofEU benefit evaluation. The odds in favour of France 
being considered as having benefited from EU membership increase statistically 
insignificantly when the respondents discuss political matters frequently compared 
to those who never discuss political matters. The direction of the coefficient for 
occasionally versus never is neutral. These results confirm only partly and weakly 
(as effect is only partly significant) early research results of Inglehart et al. (1991), 
Janssen (1991) and Medrano and Gutierrez (2001). 
Further EU Integration: European Integration Desired Speed Preference 
For British samples, the political discussion frequency variable is a significant 
contributor to the explanation of European integration desired speed, and the 
relationship conveys that the less respondents discuss political matters, the more 
they wish European integration to go slower. These findings support earlier research 
outcomes by Inglehart et al. (1991 ), Janssen (1991) and Medrano and Gutierrez 
(2001), and refute Gabel's (1998a) results - albeit not the same dependent variables 
were used in these studies. As cognitive mobilization (political discussion) 
increases, the European Union and the topic of integration become more familiar 
and less threatening and as a result, support for further European integration 
mcreases. 
For French samples, the political discussion frequency variable is not a significant 
predictor of European integration desired speed. The direction of the coefficient 
indicates, albeit statistically insignificantly, that the less interviewees discuss 
political matters, the slower (or the more) they wish European integration to go (or 
to standstill). These findings do not support (effect not statistically significant) 
earlier research outcomes by Inglehart et al. (1991), Janssen (1991) and Medrano 
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and Gutierrez (200 I) - albeit not the same dependent variables were used in these 
studies. 
Political Persuasion 
Evaluation of Current EU membership 
EU Membership and Benefit Dependent Variables 
British data 
The political persuasion - convince friends, relative or fellow workers - variable is 
not a significant predictor of EU membership or EU benefit evaluation and the 
coefficient for this variable tends to have no direction. These findings do not 
support earlier research findings by Inglehart et al. (1991), Janssen (1991) and 
Medrano and Gutierrez (2001), or Gabel's (1998a) results. 
French data 
The political persuasion variable is a significant predictor of EU membership with or 
without "neither good nor bad" answer or of EU benefit evaluation with or without 
"don't know" answer. Nevertheless, the direction of the coefficients varies. For EU 
benefit with "don't know" answer or EU membership with "neither good nor bad" 
answer models, the odds in favour of France EU membership being seen as a good 
thing or France being deemed as having benefited from EU membership increase 
significantly when the interviewees convince their friends, relative or fellow workers 
often, from time to time or rarely compared to those who never convince them. For 
EU benefit without "don't know" answer or EU membership without "neither good 
nor bad" answer models, the odds in favour of France EU membership being seen as 
a good thing or France being deemed as having benefited from EU membership tend 
to increase significantly when the interviewees convince their friends, relative or 
fellow workers from time to time or rarely compared to those who often or never 
convince them. The results with "neither good nor bad" or "don't know" answer in 
the dependent variable (that is to say GDNGNB and BDDKNBD models) support 
earlier research findings by Inglehart et al. (1991 ), Janssen (1991) and Medrano and 
277 
Gutierrez (2001), and refute Gabel's (1998a) results. The results without "neither 
good nor bad" or "don't know" answer in the dependent variable (that is to say GD 
and BDNBD models) do not support earlier research findings by Inglehart et al. 
(1991), Janssen (1991) and Medrano and Gutierrez (2001), but are in line with 
Gabel's (1998a) results. 
Further ED Integration: European Integration Desired Speed Preference 
For British and French samples, the political persuasion variable is a significant 
predictor of European integration desired speed, and the relationship denotes that the 
less respondents convince friends, the more they wish European integration to go 
slower. These findings support earlier research findings by Inglehart et al. (1991), 
Janssen (1991) and Medrano and Gutierrez (2001), and refute Gabel's (1998a) 
results - albeit not the same dependent variables were used in these studies. As 
cognitive mobilization (political persuasion) increases, the European Union and the 
topic of integration become more familiar and less threatening and as a result, 
support for integration increases. 
Daily Papers Use 
Evaluation of Current EU membership 
EU Membership and Benefit Dependent Variables 
British data 
For British EU membership models with "neither good nor bad" answer, the daily 
papers use variable is a significant contributor to the explanation of EU membership 
evaluation: the odds in favour of the United Kingdom EU membership being 
considered as a good thing increase significantly when the respondents read the 
news everyday, several times a week, once or twice a week or less often compared 
to those who never read the news. For British EU membership models without 
"neither good nor bad", daily papers use variable is no longer a significant 
contributor to the explanation of EU membership evaluation but the direction of the 
coefficients is the same as for models with "neither good nor bad". For British EU 
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membership models without "neither good nor bad", the coefficient for several times 
a week versus never is though significant, and suggests that the odds in favour of the 
United Kingdom EU membership being considered as a good thing increase 
significantly when the respondents read the news several times a week compared to 
those who never read the news. 
When using a more specific measure of evaluation of EU membership, that is to say 
EU benefit with or without "don't know" answer, the daily papers use variable is not 
a significant contributor to the explanation of the United Kingdom EU benefit 
evaluation but the direction of the coefficients tends to be the same as for the United 
Kingdom EU membership models: the odds in favour of the United Kingdom being 
seen as having benefited from EU membership increase statistically insignificantly 
when the respondents read the news everyday, several times a week, once or twice a 
week or less often compared to those who never read the news. It must be noted that 
for the United Kingdom EU benefit model without "don't know" answer, the odds in 
favour of United Kingdom being seen as having benefited from EU membership 
increase significantly when the respondents read the news several times a week 
compared to those who never read the news. 
These results show some significant effect of news reading on respondents' attitudes 
towards EU membership (mainly for EU membership models) and as such bring 
some support to earlier research (Bartels, 1993; Dalton et ai., 1998; Norris et ai., 
1999; Newton and Brynin, 2001; Norris, 2000; Brettschneider et ai., 2003; De 
Vreese and Boomgaarden, 2006 and Carey and Burton, 2004 - only the latter four 
articles deal specifically with the influence of the media on attitudes towards 
European integration -). 
French data 
For French EU membership with or without "neither good nor bad" answer or EU 
benefit with or without "don't know" answer models, the daily papers use variable is 
not overall a significant contributor to the explanation of EU membership evaluation 
or EU benefit evaluation. The direction of the coefficients for EU membership with 
or without "neither good nor bad" answer tends to be neutral whereas the direction 
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of the coefficients for EU benefit with or without "don't know" answer suggests that 
the odds in favour of France being seen as having benefited from EU membership 
increase statistically insignificantly when the respondents read the news several 
times a week compared to those who never read the news. These results show no 
significant effect of news reading on respondents' attitudes towards EU membership 
and as such do not support earlier research (Bartels, 1993; Dalton et aI., 1998; Norris 
et aI., 1999; Newton and Brynin, 2001; Brettschneider et aI., 2003; Norris, 2000 and 
De Vreese and Boomgaarden, 2006 - only the latter three articles deal specifically 
with the influence of the media on attitudes towards European integration -). 
Further EU Integration: European Integration Desired Speed Preference 
For British samples, the daily papers use variable is not a significant predictor of 
European integration desired speed but the direction of the coefficient for this 
variable denotes, albeit statistically insignificantly, that interviewees who never read 
the news are more likely to be in favour of a faster European integration than 
interviewees who read the news (even irregularly). This result, albeit showing no 
significant effect, brings some support to research by Anderson and Weymouth 
(1999) and Seymour-Ure (2002) who underlined the overwhelmingly eurosceptical 
nature of the British press. It must be added that the British national elites are 
divided on the European integration issue. The results obtained here also bring 
support to findings of Hooghe and Marks (2005) who demonstrated that the more 
national elites are divided on the EU issue, the more the citizens are cued to oppose 
European integration - the effect being particularly pronounced for citizens who see 
themselves as exclusively national. The result obtained here, albeit showing no 
significant effect, also brings some support to Carey and Burton's (2004) findings. 
The present reversal of the coefficient direction compared to the results of the 
current EU membership variable above may be explained by the fact that the 
eurosceptic British press 106 took a harder eurosceptic line on further integration 
topics such as the membership of the Euro than the more pro-European British 
press 107 on supporting further integration like for example on the single currency in 
the study period. Citizens have partly taken cues from this but also from the 
106 Such as for example The Sun, The Daily Telegraph or The Times. 
107 Such as for example The Independent. 
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national political parties which are more reserved and critical especially towards 
further European integration. For French samples, the daily papers use variable is 
also not a significant predictor of European integration desired speed but the 
direction of the coefficient for this variable reveals that the less respondents read the 
news, the more they wish European integration to go slower (or to standstill). This 
finding is in line with the fact that the French press (newspapers with high 
circulation) tends to be predominantly pro-integration. 
Left-Centre-Right Placement 
Evaluation of Current EU membership 
EU Membership and Benefit Dependent Variables 
The odds in favour of the United Kingdom or France membership of the EU being 
deemed as a good thing increase significantly when the respondents have left-wing 
ideological views compared to those with right-wing ideological views. However, 
while the odds in favour of France membership of the EU being judged as a good 
thing increase significantly when the respondents have centrist ideological views 
compared to those with right-wing ideological views, the same coefficient is not 
statistically significant in British models and therefore the relationship is found not 
true in the latter - the direction of the related coefficient is though in the same 
direction as in French models. This may be explained by the fact that Centre parties 
in the UK are not as pro-integration as in France. One must also keep in mind that 
in the study period, Labour political elites have moved to the centre of the 
ideological spectrum, Conservative political elites moved further to the right and 
Liberal political elites to the left (Liberals appearing as the most pro-integration of 
the British mainstream political parties). Voters have partly taken cues from their 
political parties but the reverse is also true. 
The odds in favour of the United Kingdom or France being regarded as having 
benefited from EU membership increase significantly when the respondents have 
left-wing ideological views compared to those with right-wing ideological views. 
While the odds in favour of France being regarded as having benefited from EU 
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membership increase significantly when the respondents have centrist ideological 
views compared to those with right-wing ideological views, the same is not true for 
British models (coefficient is not statistically significant) - the direction of the 
related coefficient is though in the same direction as in French models. This may be 
explained by the fact that Centre parties in the UK are not as pro-integration as in 
France. One must also keep in mind that in the study period, Labour political elites 
have moved to the centre of the ideological spectrum, Conservative political elites 
moved further to the right and liberal political elites to the left (Liberals appearing as 
the most pro-integration of the British mainstream political parties). Voters have 
partly taken cues from their political parties but the reverse is also true. 
In line with Ray's (2003b), Steenbergen et al. 's (2007), Gabel and Scheve's (2007) 
and Kriesi's (2007) findings, the relatively high party saliency of the EU issue, 
greater inter-party dissent (in mainstream parties) and relatively high intra-party 
dissent108 have accentuated the rather eurosceptic influence of political parties and 
party elites on their supporters in the United Kingdom. In line with Steenbergen et 
al.'s (2007), Ray's (2003b) and Kriesi's (2007) research results, whilst the limited 
intra-party dissent and the fairly high party saliency of the EU issue 109 have 
increased the rather pro-integration influence of political parties on party supporters, 
the more limited inter-party competition on European integration (competition on 
the EU issue tending to come from the political periphery) have moderated this 
influence in France. In agreement with Carruba's (2001) and Steenbergen et al.'s 
(2007) research outcomes, the relative pro-integration nature of the French electorate 
has also influenced French mainstream parties to be pro-integration. Equally, the 
relative anti-integration nature of the British electorate has influenced British 
mainstream parties to be more reserved towards European integration. Nevertheless, 
consistent with Evans and Butt's (2007) and Steenbergen et al. 's (2007) research, it 
seems also feasible that with the increased visibility and impact of European 
integration on a citizen's life in the study period, the mass-elite linkage has declined 
over time as voters have a greater understanding of the consequences ofEU policy 
on domestic policy and environment. This may be especially true in the French 
108 High intra-party dissent especially in the Conservative P~rty up t,o 199: but also in the Labour 
Party where some senior politicians in these parties have VOiced a dlscernmg tone on European 
integration with the party leadership. " , 
109 Albeit the EU issue is not used as a party differentiator in French mamstream politics, 
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context as despite the pro-European nature of French mainstream parties and media, 
there has been a significant drop in French citizens' support for current EU 
membership and further integration. 
It must be noted that the ideological placement coefficient is stronger for models 
with the membership variable as the dependent variable than for models with the 
benefit variable as the dependent variable: this is only true for French models. 
These results confinn the influence of ideology on evaluation of European 
integration (see Nelsen et aI., 2001; Hix, 1999b; Ray, 2003a, b). 
Further EU Integration: European Integration Desired Speed Preference 
For British and French samples, the left, centre and right ideological variable is a 
significant predictor of European integration desired speed and the relationship 
conveys that the more the respondents have right-wing ideological opinions, the 
slower they wish European integration to go. These results confirm the influence of 
ideology on evaluation of European integration (see Nelsen et aI., 2001; Ray, 2003a, 
b; Hix, 1999b). 
Age 
Younger people have usually more human capital (better educated) and as such 
should be better placed to seize opportunities pertaining to European market 
liberalisation. 
Evaluation of Current EU membership 
EU Membership and Benefit Dependent Variables 
EU Membership Dependent variable 
For EU membership models with "neither good nor bad" answer, the 15-24 and 25-
39 (each versus 40+) variables tend not to be a significant predictor of the outcome 
variable, EU membership in both French and British models. The direction for the 
former is though different in British versus French samples: the odds in favour of the 
United Kingdom EU membership being regarded as a good thing decrease 
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statistically insignificantly when the respondents are aged 15-24 compared to those 
aged 40+ whereas the odds in favour of France EU membership being regarded as a 
good thing rise statistically insignificantly when the respondents are aged 15-24 
compared to those aged 40+. The direction for the latter (25-39) is the same in both 
British and French samples: the odds in favour of the United Kingdom or France EU 
membership being regarded as a good thing increase statistically insignificantly 
when the respondents are aged 25-39 compared to those aged 40+. 
For EU membership models without "neither good nor bad" answer, the 15-24 
(versus 40+) variable tends to be a significant predictor of the outcome variable, EU 
membership in both French and British models. The direction for the 15-24 variable 
is also the same in British versus French samples: the odds in favour of the United 
Kingdom or France EU membership being regarded as a good thing increase 
significantly when the respondents are aged 15-24 compared to those aged 40+. 
Furthermore while the 25-39 (versus 40+) variable tends to be a significant predictor 
of the outcome variable, EU membership in British models, it tends not to be a 
significant predictor ofEU membership in French models. Nonetheless, in both 
British and French models, the related variable has the same direction, that is to say, 
the odds in favour of the United Kingdom or France EU membership being regarded 
as a good thing increase statistically significantly (UK samples) or statistically 
insignificantly (France samples) when the respondents are aged 25-39 compared to 
those aged 40+. 
EU Benefit Dependent variable 
For EU benefit models with "don't know" answer, the 15-24 (versus 40+) variable 
tends to be a significant predictor of the outcome variable, EU benefit in French 
models whereas it is not a significant predictor in British samples. The direction for 
the related variable is also different in British versus French samples: the odds in 
favour of France being seen as having benefited from EU membership increase 
significantly when the respondents are aged 15-24 compared to those aged 40+ 
whereas the odds in favour of the United Kingdom being regarded as having 
benefited from EU membership being regarded as a good thing decrease statistically 
insignificantly when the respondents are aged 15-24 compared to those aged 40+. 
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For EU benefit models with "don't know" answer, the 25-39 (versus 40+) variable 
tends not to be a significant predictor of the outcome variable, EU benefit in both 
British and French models but the coefficients for this variable have a different 
direction: while the direction is neutral for British samples, the odds in favour of 
France being seen as having benefited from EU membership increase statistically 
insignificantly when the respondents are aged 25-39 compared to those aged 40+. 
For EU benefit models without "don't know" answer, the 15-24 and 25-39 (versus 
40+) variables tend to be significant predictors of the outcome variable, EU benefit 
in French models but the coefficients for these variables are not significant 
predictors in British models. They also have a different direction: while the 
direction is neutral for British samples, the odds in favour of France being seen as 
having benefited from EU membership increase statistically significantly when the 
respondents are aged 15-24 or 25-39 compared to those aged 40+. 
The results obtained in this study in the context of British samples show overall 
limited significant effect for age on current EU membership (only for EU 
membership and not EU benefit) and thus somewhat contradict Hix's (1999b) and 
Inglehart and Rabier's (1978) results but are in line with Janssen's (1991), Anderson 
and Reichert's (1996), and Gabel's (1998a) findings. The findings in this study for 
French samples tend to show more strongly that age influences current EU 
membership and therefore support Hix's (1999b) and Inglehart and Rabier's (1978) 
results. Overall, younger British respondents (15-24) seem more reserved 
(especially with integration of "neither good nor bad" and "don't know" answers) 
towards current EU membership than younger French respondents who tend to be 
more in favour of current EU membership (both compared to older respondents). 
Younger British respondents are more reserved towards European integration than 
older respondents because this generation has been shaped by free market and 
nationhood values fostered by the successive Conservative governments of the 
1980s and 1990s (values also largely adopted by the successive Blair governments) 
with the EU being mainly portrayed by British political actors as threatening those 
very values. The British media and to a lesser extent institutions such as the 
education system - for the latter with the cult of imperial history (up to the second 
world war) rather than contemporary history - have reinforced this. In the French 
context the reverse is true with most mainstream French political actors, media and , 
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national institutions (including the education system) underlining the positive 
influence of the EU on French society, including the preservation of peace in 
Europe. 
Further EU Integration: European Integration Desired Speed Preference 
For British and French samples, the age variable is a significant predictor of 
European integration desired speed. The direction of the coefficient for this variable 
indicates that the older the respondents are, the slower they wish European 
integration to go. It must be underlined that the age coefficients are stronger in 
British models than in French models. "Don't know" answers could not though be 
incorporated in the dependent variable and represent less than I 0% of answers. 
These results are in line with Hix' s (1999b) and Inglehart and Rabier's (1978) 
findings - albeit not the same dependent variable was used in these studies. These 
results may be explained by the fact that younger people have usually more human 
capital, are more cosmopolitan and more open to further European integration. The 
result for British young people and the relative contrast of the result with 
measurement of current EU integration, may be partly explained by the fact that the 
question on desired speed of European integration with a rating scale from 
"standstill" to "runs as fast as possible" is subjective and more likely to elicit 
opinions on the plus side of EU integration. Furthermore British young respondents 
may not also be against the principle itself of further European integration (this fits 
with the cosmopolitan argument) but may be uncertain or against the type of 
European integration they currently witness. 
Gender 
Evaluation of Current EU membership 
EU Membership and Benefit Dependent Variables 
For British samples with "neither good nor bad" answer, the odds in favour of the 
United Kingdom EU membership being judged a good thing increase significantly 
when the respondents are male rather than female. The same is not true (related 
variable is not a significant predictor) with British models without "neither good nor 
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bad" answer. In opposition to British samples, the gender variable is not a 
significant predictor of EU membership variable in French samples with "neither 
good nor bad" answer (or moreover without "neither good nor bad" answer) but the 
coefficient for the related variable has though the same direction as in British 
samples. Furthermore, in both British and French samples with "don't know" 
answer, the odds in favour of the United Kingdom or France being judged as having 
benefited from EU membership rise significantly when the respondents are male 
rather than female. The same is not true (related variable is not a significant 
predictor) with British or French models without "don't know" answer. 
In the case of the United Kingdom, this seems to demonstrate that female 
respondents are more uncertain or in opposition to current EU membership - using 
either EU membership or EU benefit as a dependent variable - than male 
respondents. This is only true for EU benefit dependent variable (which gives a 
more specific evaluation of EU membership) for French samples. The results 
obtained here confirm overall earlier research results (see for example Nelsen and 
Outh, 2000; Carey, 2002). This may be because women tend to be less interested in 
foreign policy, have more compassionate and less competitive values, and are more 
economically vulnerable to economic integration. Thus women in the United 
Kingdom and to a lesser extent in France - more women work in the United 
Kingdom than in France (Eurostat, 2006b) - may view the current EU as bringing 
more competition in the job market and a downward pressure on salaries. 
Further EU Integration: European Integration Desired Speed Preference 
For British samples, the gender variable is not a significant contributor to the 
explanation of European integration desired speed. For French samples, the gender 
variable is also not a significant predictor of European integration desired speed 
(though just outside the significance zone (.050) in model M14). The gender gap 
tends to disappear with measurement of further EU integration, these results 
therefore contradict Nelsen and Outh's (2000) results but the latter did not use the 
same dependent variable - they used an indexed dependent variable. 
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6.3 Conclusion 
In both France and the United Kingdom, in the study period (1992-2001), the level 
of support for current EU membership and further European integration has dropped 
significantly. The drop in support for current EU membership and future EU 
integration is though lower in France than in the United Kingdom - for both 
individual and aggregate level data analyses. A relationship has been found between 
citizens' support for integration and citizens' individual benefits extracted from 
European integration in both the French and British context. Through the study 
period, the utilitarian aspect in the evaluation of current EU membership and further 
European integration has taken more and more importance. In other words, French 
and British individuals in their attitudes towards current EU membership and further 
European integration rely more and more on utilitarian appraisals. Echoing the 
results of hypothesis I, the influence of the socialisation effect on attitudes towards 
the EU is declining in favour of utilitarian appraisals in the study period. 
Individuals who have higher incomes, better education and higher (more 
marketable) occupational skills support more the current EU membership in the 
French and British context - the effect is though weaker in the latter - as these 
individuals are better placed to take advantage of the opportunities arising from the 
current EU membership. The same is true for further European integration for 
France, individuals who have higher incomes, better education and to a lesser extent 
higher occupational skills tend to be in favour of faster European integration as they 
perceive they can benefit from it in terms of investment, business and employment 
opportunities. The same is not true for further European integration for the United 
Kingdom, British individuals with the same socio-economic characteristics appear 
more uncertain of or in opposition to further European integration: thus individuals 
with higher incomes favour a slower European integration; occupational skills show 
no significant effect on attitudes towards further European integration and education 
shows a smaller and more limited effect on attitudes towards further European 
integration. 
Demographic control variables bring further insight on the pattern of support 
towards current EU membership and further European integration. The study of 
demographic variables show that British individuals tend to be more reserved 
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towards current EU membership and further integration than French respondents. In 
the British context, the greater division (and a greater politicisation of the EU issue) 
of political parties, national elites and media on European integration, the 
importance of exclusive national identity and national sovereignty, the preference 
for free market economies and individual responsibility values, and the more 
favourable economic and social situation of the United Kingdom explain this 
relative opposition to especially further European integration. In the French context, 
a political and media environment more in favour of current EU membership and 
further European integration, 110 a relatively low exclusive national identity, a 
socialisation effect still playing a role (especially in further integration) - albeit now 
declining in favour of individual utilitarian appraisals -, and the relatively poor 
national economic and social situation of France with its inherent consequences for 
individuals - although as per results of hypothesis I, European integration (and the 
type of European integration pursued) is partly perceived to contribute to it - explain 
this relative support for current EU membership and further European integration. 
Nevertheless in both the British and French context, support for current EU 
membership can be mobilised when British and French respondents have better or 
the same expectations for the country's economic situation for the year to come, 
have better expectations about the employment situation for the year to come and 
have better expectations for their household financial situation for the year to come. 
Support for further European integration can also be mobilised when British and 
French respondents have better expectations for the country's economic situation for 
the year to come, have better expectations about the employment situation for the 
year to come and have better expectations for their household financial situation for 
the year to come. It must be noted that the coefficients for the related variables are a 
little weaker in British models than in French models, as such support for current 
EU membership and future European integration can be mobilised when British 
individuals have more positive expectations but to a lesser extent than France. 
Whilst the results of hypotheses I and II have demonstrated that the utilitarian 
argument can certainly be a vector of support for current EU membership and future 
110 Although there has been a greater politicisation of the EU iss~~ espec~ally in the second part of the 
1990s but political opposition to the EU tends to come from pohtlcal penphery. 
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European integration in both the French and British context - more so in the former 
-, this vector of support is ultimately delimited by the subsidiarity principle and the 
type of EU favoured by French and British individuals as confirmed by the results of 
hypothesis III. For the former, it is delimited by a preference for a widely integrated 
EU according to a regulated capitalism model with a high level of social protection 
and where the principle of European preference is espoused, and for the latter by a 
penchant for an EU to be a loose intergovernmental association of nations where 
neo-liberalism and free trade rules prevail. This will be discussed in the next 
chapter. 
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7- ANALYSIS OF FINDINGS FOR HYPOTHESIS III 
7.1 Introduction 
In this chapter, the relationship between citizens' inclinations towards a socio-
economic model and citizens' preferences towards European integration (Hypothesis 
III) is tested. The analysis of findings and conclusions for hypothesis III are hence 
presented below. 
7.2 Analysis of Findings for Hypothesis III 
Research Question III: Do inclinations towards a socio-economic model structure 
EU policy preferences of French and British citizens? 
It is hypothesized: 
HIlI Whi,le a preference for 'regulated capitalism' is associated with support for EU 
integration in France, a preference for a 'neo-liberal' socio-economic model is 
associated with opposition to EU integration in the United Kingdom. 
The answers to the following question were used to test hypothesis III: "For each of 
the following areas, do you think that decisions should be made by the (nationality) 
government, or made jointly within the European Union?". This question is asked 
for the following policy areas: regional policy, social inclusion, employment (fight 
against unemployment), environment, scientific research, currency, humanitarian 
aid, foreign policy, immigration and asylum, police, anti-drug, urban and juvenile 
crime prevention, agriculture, defence, culture, health policy and education. In 
Eurobarometer data, note that there are no social inclusion questions from 1992 to 
1997, no regional policy and agriculture questions from 1992 to 1994, no anti-drug 
question in 1992, no police and urban & juvenile crime prevention questions from 
1992 to 1998. The virtue of the related question is that it provides a more fine-
grained measure of preferences for individual policies: in other words it taps policy 
specific, utilitarian support. The question is also available across years. The 
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question does not always give a direction for the policy itselfbut certain policies are 
rooted in political ideology - for example market regulation and redistributive 
policies - especially when tested with left-wing, centrist and right-wing ideological 
views of respondents. The analysis aimed to broadly and primarily examine 
whether French and British individuals with left-wing or centrist or right-wing 
ideological views (including extreme left and right) are in favour or not to transfer 
policies to the EU as a consequence of a preference for a particular socio-economic 
model: as such individuals with extreme left- and right-wing ideological opinions 
have been preserved and integrated with those with left- and right-wing views in the 
analysis. This approach is also justified by statistical reasons. More balanced 
sample sizes are obtained which enable us to detect differences if they exist (thereby 
avoiding Type II errors). Furthermore, the means of individuals interviewed with 
extreme left- or right-wing ideological views are also examined and compared to 
those with left- or right-wing ideological views to see whether they are in favour or 
not of the transfer of policies to the EU. The power of the test lll in this situation 
may not be sufficient - due to very unequal sample sizes - to detect though whether 
the difference is statistically significant. The statistical difference between 
individuals interviewed with extreme left- or right-wing and left- or right-wing 
ideological opinions on the transfer of policies to the EU tends though to be 
generally small which limits the importance of a statistical difference if it arises. 
Note that for the testing with left, centre and right, the ideology variable with the 
harmonised categories ll2 was used. For the testing with individual extreme 
ideological categories, the ideology variable with 10 categories (from 1 (left) to 10 
(right»l13 was used. 
"Don't know" answers were not included in the testing as they always represent 
fewer than 9% of all answers and often much less than that. Integrating "don't 
know" answers in the testing would have also obscured the interpretation of the 
national means, in other words whether citizens were or were not in favour of a 
transfer of a policy to the EU. Furthermore, integrating "don't know" answers in the 
III The power of the test needs to be at least 70% to be acceptable ~nd 80o~ to be good. 
112 Respondents are grouped in tertiles of the approximately one third placmg themselves most left, 
the approximately one third most right, and the centre, for each country. 
113 Categories were regrouped as follows, I to 2 (classified as extreme left), 3 to .f (left), 5 to 6 
(centre), 7 to 8 (right) and 9 to 10 (extreme right). 
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testing does not alter the essence of the results. ANOV As were used rather than 
MANOVAs to test hypothesis III as correlation between DVs varies from -.2 to -.6 
(Tabachnick and Fidell, 2001). To control for familywise Type I error across 
multiple ANOV A tests, a Bonferroni adjustment was used for the main effect 
(Pallant, 200 I). All outputs are free of fixed effects as the standardized residuals 
tend towards zero. Yearly analyses have been also run and very similar results were 
obtained. For post hoc analyses, Tukey test and Games-Howell (the latter where 
necessary) outcomes are reported here. Other post hoc tests such as Bonferroni, 
Gabriel and Hochberg were also run and similar results were found. Statistical 
outputs are incorporated in the appendices numbered 7.1 AB UK -F to 7.17 AB' UK-
F. Note that models incorporating individual extreme ideologies are marked with a 
prime. An example of statistical output relating to Currency Management Policy 
(1992-2001) is shown below (for full output details for the latter, please refer to 
Appendix 7.6 AB UK-F and 7.6 AB' UK-F). 
Between-Subjects Factors 
Value Label N 
France and UK 1.00 France 8407 
variable 2.00 UK 9842 
01 LEFT-RIGHT 1 LEFT 5273 
PLACEMENT - 2 Centre 6932 
Harmonised 3 cat 3 
Right 6044 
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Descriptive Statistics 
Dependent Variable: recod of q30a3 currency (Nat govt or EU decision) without OK as 
middle category 
France and UK variable 01 LEFT-RIGHT Mean 
France LEFT 
Centre 
Right 
Total 
UK LEFT 
Centre 
Right 
Total 
Total LEFT 
Centre 
Right 
Total 
Levene's Test of Equality of Error Variances 
Dependent Variable: recod of q30a3 currency (Nat 
govt or EU decision) without OK as middle cate[Q[ 
F df1 df2 Sig. 
100.394 5 18243 .000 
1.6932 
1.7239 
1.6622 
1.6956 
1.3982 
1.3030 
1.2661 
1.3167 
1.5394 
1.5023 
1.4366 
1.4913 
Tests the null hypothesis that the error variance of the 
dependent variable is equal across groups. 
a. Design: Intercept+frauk+d1.4aa+frauk * d1.4aa 
Std. Deviation N 
.46125 2523 
.44711 3282 
.47306 2602 
.46018 8407 
.48961 2750 
.45962 3650 
.44199 3442 
.46521 9842 
.49850 5273 
.50003 6932 
.49601 6044 
.49994 18249 
294 
Tests of Between-Subjects Effects 
-
-- ---- -- - .. .-.. ---- -. '1~--- --.. -. ·~I •• _. ~ ..... , ~. -- --~.~.~ ....... '--' _ •• ~~ .... __ .- ~~,~~~. I 
Type IV Sum Partial Eta Noncent. Observed 
Source of Squares df Mean Siluare F Sig. Squared Parameter Powera 
Corrected Model 684.258° 5 136.852 644.014 .000 .150 3220.068 1.000 
Intercept 40646.723 1 40646.723 191280.6 .000 .913 191280.625 1.000 
frauk 614.163 1 614.163 2890.210 .000 .137 2890.210 1.000 
d1.4aa 19.054 2 9.527 44.832 .000 .005 89.665 1.000 
frauk * d1.4aa 12.710 2 6.355 29.906 .000 .003 59.811 1.000 
Error 3876.598 18243 .212 
Total 45144.000 18249 
Corrected Total 4560.856 18248 
a. Computed using alpha = .05 
b. R Squared = .150 (Adjusted R Squared = .150) 
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Estimated Marginal Means of recod of q30a3 currency (Nat govt or EU 
decision) without OK as middle category 
f/) 
c 
co 
(1) 
1.80 
1.70 
:E 1.60 
co 
c 
.-
e' 
co 1.50 
:E 
-c 
(1) 
-co E 1.40 
~ 
f/) 
w 
1.30 
1.20 
LEFT Centre Right 
01 LEFT-RIGHT PLACEMENT - Harmonised 3 cat 
France and UK variable 
-- France 
--UK 
2lJ6 
Between-Subjects Factors 
Value Label N 
left/centre/right 1.00 FRA left 2523 
& frauk 2.00 FRA centre 3282 
3.00 FRA right 2602 
4.00 UK left 2750 
5.00 UK centre 3650 
6.00 UK right 3442 
Descriptive Statistics 
Dependent Variable: recod of q30a3 currency (Nat govt or EU 
decision) without DK as middle cate~ ory 
left/centrelrl9..ht & frauk Mean Std. Deviation 
FRA left 1.6932 .46125 
FRA centre 1.7239 .44711 
FRA right 1.6622 .47306 
UK left 1.3982 .48961 
UK centre 1.3030 .45962 
UK right 1.2661 .44199 
Total 1.4913 .49994 
Levene's Test of Equality of Error Variancei 
Dependent Variable: recod of q30a3 currency (Nat 
~ovt or EU decisio~ without DK as middle categor 
F df1 df2 Sig. 
100.394 5 18243 .000 
Tests the null hypothesis that the error variance of 
the dependent variable is equal across groups. 
a. Design: Intercept+ideologyfrauk 
N 
2523 
3282 
2602 
2750 
3650 
3442 
18249 
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Tests of Between-Subjects Effects 
- - -- - - -- - - - - - - - - ----- ----_._-
----w----- -- ---"----- - .. -.. -------- .... --- ----w--J 
Type IV Sum Partial Eta Noncent. Observed 
Source of Squares df Mean S_quare F Sifl· Squared Parameter Powera 
Corrected Model 684.258° 5 136.852 644.014 .000 .150 3220.068 1.000 
Intercept 40646.723 1 40646.723 191280.6 .000 .913 191280.625 1.000 
ideologyfrauk 684.258 5 136.852 644.014 .000 .150 3220.068 1.000 
Error 3876.598 18243 .212 
Total 45144.000 18249 
Corrected Total 4560.856 18248 
a. Computed using alpha = .05 
b. R Squared = .150 (Adjusted R Squared = .150) 
Robust Tests of Equality of Means 
recod of q30a3 currency (Nat govt or EU decision) without OK as 
dl 
- --~-. 
Statistica df1 df2 Sig. 
Welch 646.511 5 8157.691 .000 
Brown-F orsythe 624.366 5 17249.629 .000 
a. Asymptotically F distributed. 
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Multiple Comparisons 
D dent Variabl d of a30a3 (N EU decision) without DK ·ddl ~ ,., , ~ , ~ J 
Mean 95% Confidence Interval 
(I) left/centre/right (J) left/centre/right Difference Std. Lower Upper 
& frauk &frauk (I-J) Error Sig. Bound Bound 
TukeyHSD FRA left FRA centre -.0307 .01221 .119 -.0655 .0041 
FRAri~ht .0310 .01288 .153 -.0057 .0677 
UK left .2950(*) .01271 .000 .2588 .3313 
UK centre .3902(*) .01193 .000 .3562 .4242 
UK right .4271(*) .01208 .000 .3927 .4615 
FRA centre FRAleft .0307 .01221 .119 -.0041 .0655 
FRA riZht .0618(*) .01210 .000 .0273 .0963 
UK left .3258(*) .01192 .000 .2918 .3597 
UK centre .4209(*) .01109 .000 .3893 .4525 
UK right .4578(*) .01125 .000 .4258 .4899 
FRA right FRAleft -.0310 .01288 .153 -.0677 .0057 
FRA centre -.0618(*) .01210 .000 -.0963 -.0273 
UK left .2640(*) .01261 .000 .2281 .2999 
UK centre .3592(*) .01183 .000 .3255 .3929 
UK right .3961 (*) .01198 .000 .3619 .4302 
UK left FRA left -.2950(*) .01271 .000 -.3313 -.2588 
FRA centre -.3258(*) .01192 .000 -.3597 -.2918 
FRA rizht -.2640(*) .01261 .000 -.2999 -.2281 
UK centre .0952(*) .01164 .000 .0620 .1283 
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Mean 95% Confidence Interval 
: 
(I) left/centre/right (I) left/centre/right Difference Std. Lower Upper 
&frauk &frauk (I-I) Error Sig. Bound Bound 
UK right .1321(*) .01179 .000 .0985 .1657 
UK centre FRA left -.3902(*) .01193 .000 -.4242 -.3562 
FRA centre -.4209(*) .01109 .000 -.4525 -.3893 
FRA right -.3592(*) .01183 .000 -.3929 -.3255 
UK left -.0952(*) .01164 .000 -.1283 -.0620 
UK right .0369(*) .01095 .010 .0057 .0681 
UK right FRA left -.4271(*) .01208 .000 -.4615 -.3927 
FRA centre -.4578(*) .01125 .000 -.4899 -.4258 
FRA right -.3961 (*) .01198 .000 -.4302 -.3619 
UK left -.1321(*) .01179 .000 -.1657 -.0985 
UK centre -.0369(*) .01095 .010 -.0681 -.0057 
Games-Howell FRAleft FRA centre -.0307 .01205 .110 -.0651 .0036 : 
FRA right .0310 .01305 .164 -.0062 .0682 
UK left .2950(*) .01310 .000 .2577 .3324 
UK centre .3902(*) .01192 .000 .3562 .4242 
UK right .4271(*) .01188 .000 .3932 .4610 
FRA centre FRA left .0307 .01205 .110 -.0036 .0651 
FRA right .0618(*) .01212 .000 .0272 .0963 
UK left .3258(*) .01217 .000 .2911 .3605 
UK centre .4209(*) .01090 .000 .3899 .4520 
UK right .4578(*) .01085 .000 .4269 .4887 
FRA right FRA left -.0310 .01305 .164 -.0682 .0062 
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Mean 95% Confidence Interval 
(I) left/centre/right (1) left/centre/right Difference Std. Lower Upper 
&frauk & frauk (I-J) Error Sig. Bound Bound 
FRA centre -.0618(*) .01212 .000 -.0963 -.0272 
UK left .2640(*) .01316 .000 .2265 .3015 
UK centre .3592(*) .01200 .000 .3250 .3934 
UK right .3961(*) .01195 .000 .3620 .4301 
UK left FRAleft -.2950(*) .01310 .000 -.3324 -.2577 
FRA centre -.3258(*) .01217 .000 -.3605 -.2911 
FRA right -.2640(*) .01316 .000 -.3015 -.2265 
UK centre .0952(*) .01204 .000 .0608 .1295 
UK right .1321(*) .01200 .000 .0979 .1663 
UK centre FRAleft -.3902(*) .01192 .000 -.4242 -.3562 
FRA centre -.4209(*) .01090 .000 -.4520 -.3899 
FRA right -.3592(*) .01200 .000 -.3934 -.3250 
UK left -.0952(*) .01204 .000 -.1295 -.0608 
UK right .0369(*) .01071 .008 .0064 .0674 
UK right FRA left -.4271(*) .01188 .000 -.4610 -.3932 
FRA centre -.4578(*) .01085 .000 -.4887 -.4269 
FRA right -.3961(*) .01195 .000 -.4301 -.3620 
UK left -.1321(*) .01200 .000 -.1663 -.0979 
UK centre -.0369(*) .01071 .008 -.0674 -.0064 
Based on observed means. 
* The mean difference is significant at the .05 level. 
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7.2.1 Socio-Economic Policies 
Regional policy, social inclusion, employment, environment and scientific research 
are policies that flank the single European market, and can help to distinguish 
regulated capitalism from neo-liberal capitalism. Health and education, albeit being 
under-developed at the EU level, are also policies that can reflect socio-economic 
priorities and as such can help to distinguish regulated capitalism from neo-liberal 
capitalism. The management of the currenci 14 through the setting of interest rates, 
its influence on public expenditure and on the valuation of the currency can also 
reflect socio-economic priorities and is also useful to distinguish regulated 
capitalism from neo-liberal capitalism. In the context of the EU, agriculture through 
its redistributive nature and protection of farmers can also have social virtues and 
can distinguish regulated capitalism from neo-liberal capitalism. It must be, 
moreover, noted that agriculture is one of the oldest and fully fledged EU policies 
and one which has been the focus of acute European political debates, more 
especially between French and British politicians. Finally, the humanitarian aid 
policy and cultural policy, despite being underdeveloped at the European level, are 
policies which can take a social nature and be influenced by a preference for a socio-
economic model and as such can help to distinguish regulated capitalism from neo-
liberal capitalism. In Eurobarometer data, note that there are no social inclusion 
questions from 1992 to 1997 and no regional policy and agriculture questions from 
1992 to 1994. 
Table 7.1: Pattern of Significance and Direction of Socio-Economic Policies 
variable 
Policies Pattern of Significance and Direction 
Social Inclusion French Sample 
Not significant between Centre, left and right and all in 
favour of EU transfer (including respondents with extreme 
left- or right-wing ideological opinions). 
British Sample 
114 The management of the currency moreover became effectively an EU policy for a number of 
countries (including France) in the end of the 1990s. 
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Policies Pattern of Significance and Direction 
Significant between left-centre and right but all favour EU 
transfer (except extreme right (1.45)). Right though 
marginally in favour (mean of 1.51) ofEU transfer. 
British and French Samples 
Significant except between British left and French right or 
centre. French overall significantly more in favour of EU 
transfer than the British. 
Regional Policy French Sample 
Not significant between Centre, left and right and all in 
favour of EU transfer (including respondents with extreme 
left-wing opinions). Respondents with extreme right 
opinions are borderline (1.5032). 
British Sample 
Significant between left and right or centre, and between 
centre and left or right. All in favour of EU transfer but left 
and centre significantly more in favour of EU transfer than 
right (including extreme right and left, the latter though 
relatively borderline (1.5337)). 
British and French Samples 
Significant between British left and French left, right or 
centre, between British centre and French right or centre. 
British left and centre tend to be significantly more in 
favour of EU transfer than French respondents but both 
French and British respondents whatever their ideological 
views favour EU transfer. 
Employment Policy French Sample 
Not significant between Centre, left and right and all in 
favour of EU transfer (including respondents with extreme 
left-wing opinions (1.59) but except respondents with 
extreme right-wing opinions (1.48) who are opposed to EU 
transfer). 
British Sample 
Significant between left and right or centre, and between 
centre and left or right. All not in favour of EU transfer 
(including extreme right (1.29) and left (1.48)) but left 
(1.47) significantly less opposed to EU transfer than centre 
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Policies Pattern of Significance and Direction 
, 
I 
or right. 
British and French Samples 
Significant between French respondents of all political 
opinions and British respondents of all political opinions. 
French significantly more in favour of EU transfer than 
British. 
Environment Policy French Sample 
Not significant between Centre, left and right and all in 
favour of EU transfer (including respondents with extreme 
left- and right-wing opinions). 
British Sample 
Significant between left and right or centre. All in favour of 
EU transfer but left significantly more in favour of EU 
transfer than right or centre (including extreme right and 
left, former though relatively borderline (1.5257». 
British and French Samples 
Significant between French respondents of all political 
opinions and British respondents of all political opinions. 
French significantly more in favour of EU transfer than 
British. 
Scientific Research French Sample 
Not significant between Centre, left and right and all in 
favour of EU transfer (including respondents with extreme 
left- and right-wing opinions). 
British Sample 
Significant between left and right or centre. All in favour of 
EU transfer but left significantly more in favour of EU 
transfer than right or centre (including extreme right and 
left). 
British and French Samples 
Significant between French respondents o~ ~ll poli~ic.al 
opinions and British respondents of all polthcal opllllons. 
French significantly more in favour of EU transfer than 
British. 
Currency French Sample 
Management Policy 
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Policies Pattern of Significance and Direction 
Not significant between Centre and left, and between left 
and right but significant between centre and right but all in 
favour of EU transfer (including extreme left- and right-
wing opinions). 
British Sample 
Significant between left and centre and right. All (including 
extreme right and left) are opposed to EU transfer but left 
significantly less opposed to EU transfer than right or 
centre. 
British and French Samples 
Significant between French respondents of all political 
opinions and British respondents of all political opinions. 
French significantly more likely to favour EU transfer than 
British. 
Health Policy French Sample 
Not significant between left, centre and right, and all 
opposed to EU transfer (including extreme left- and right-
wing opinions). 
British Sample 
Significant between left and centre and right but all 
(including extreme right and left) are opposed to EU 
transfer (difference is though small) but left significantly 
less opposed to EU transfer than right or centre. 
British and French Samples 
Significant between French respondents of all political 
opinions and British respondents of left-wing political 
opinions. British left significantly less likely to oppose EU 
transfer than French of all political views. 
Education Policy French Sample 
Not significant between left, centre and right, and all 
opposed to EU transfer (including extreme left- and right-
wing opinions). 
British Sample 
Significant between left and centre and right but all 
(including extreme right and left) are oPP?sed to EU 
transfer (difference is though small) but nght or even centre 
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Policies Pattern of Significance and Direction 
significantly more opposed to EU transfer than left. 
British and French Samples 
Significant between French respondents of all political 
opinions and British respondents of all political opinions. 
British significantly more likely to oppose EU transfer than 
French of all political views. 
Agriculture Policy French Sample 
Not significant between left, centre and right, and all in 
favour ofEU transfer (right though more marginally, 1.54) 
(including extreme left but excluding extreme right latter 
marginally opposed to EU transfer, mean of 1.4754). 
British Sample 
Significant between left and centre and right but all 
(including extreme right but excluding extreme left, the 
latter marginally in favour of EU transfer (1.5165) but no 
significant difference with left) are opposed to EU transfer 
but right or even centre significantly more opposed to EU 
transfer than left (the latter opposed to EU transfer more 
marginally, 1.49). 
British and French Samples 
Significant between French respondents of all political 
opinions and British respondents of all political opinions. 
French significantly more likely to support EU transfer than 
British of all political views. 
Humanitarian Aid French Sample 
Policy 
Not significant between centre and left, and between left 
and right, and marginally significant between centre and 
right (size of difference is very small): all clearly favour EU 
transfer (including respondents with extreme left- and 
extreme right-wing ideological opinions). 
British Sample 
I 
I 
I 
Significant between left, centre and right (but size of I 
difference is small) but all clearly favour EU transfer 
(including extreme left and extreme right). 
British and French Samples 
Significant between French respondents of all political 
306 
Policies Pattern of Significance and Direction 
opinions. an? British respondents of all political opinions. 
Fr~~ch slgmficantly more likely to support EU transfer than 
Bnhsh of all political views. 
Cultural Policy French Sample 
Not s.ignificant between Centre and left, and between left 
and nght, and marginally significant between centre and 
right (size of difference is very small): all clearly against 
EU transfer (including respondents with extreme left- and 
extreme right-wing ideological opinions). 
British Sample 
, 
Significant between left-centre and right (but size of 
difference is small) but all clearly opposed to EU transfer 
(including extreme left and extreme right). 
British and French Samples 
Significant between French respondents of all political 
opinions and British respondents of right-wing political 
opinions. Significant between French respondents of 
centrist political opinions and British respondents of centrist 
political opinions. Not significant otherwise. French of all 
political opinions significantly less opposed to EU transfer 
than British of right-wing political views, and French of 
centrist political opinions significantly less opposed to EU 
transfer than British of centrist political opinions. 
7.2.1.1 Social Inclusion (1998-2001) 
The term "social inclusion" is a francophone term which appeared in the Mitterrand 
era: its exact meaning, especially in English, may be consequently open to 
interpretation and give rise to two different understandings of the term. The results 
obtained here must be therefore taken with caution. Taking into account the 
ideology of the respondent, French respondents are overall significantly more in 
favour of transferring the social inclusion policy to the EU than British respondents 
but the size of the difference tends to be small. All means are above 1.50 and as 
such all British and French respondents whatever their ideological views (except 
British citizens with extreme right-wing political views) are in favour of transferring 
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the social inclusion policy to the EU. The mean for British individuals with right-
wing ideological views, namely 1.51, is though borderline. 
When examining where the differences occur (see output in appendix 7.lA), there 
are no significant differences between French respondents with left-wing, centrist 
and right-wing ideological views on Europeanizing the social inclusion policy: they 
are all clearly in favour of the Europeanization of the social inclusion policy. There 
are though significant differences between British respondents with left-wing or 
centrist ideological views and those with right-wing ideological views on 
Europeanizing the social inclusion policy: British citizens with right-wing 
ideological opinions are less likely to favour the Europeanization of social inclusion 
policy than those with left-wing or centrist ideological opinions but as pointed out 
above the former are marginally in favour of transferring the social inclusion policy 
to the EU. British respondents with left-wing and even centrist ideological views 
are a little more inclined to favour a Europeanization of the social inclusion policy, 
probably because the EU is perceived as a way to elicit greater social rights but this 
may be partly losing substance at the end of the 1990s as the Labour government 
demonstrated more commitment to social public expenditure. It must be noted that 
there is no significant difference between French interviewees with right-wing 
ideological opinions - or even with centrist ideological views (Games-Howell test 
gives the same result as Tukey test) - and British respondents with left-wing 
ideological opinions on the opportunity to transfer the social inclusion policy to the 
EU. British respondents with right-wing ideological positions remain the most 
reluctant to transfer the social inclusion policy to the EU. The results for French 
respondents may be explained by the fact that although they are critical of the 
current EU deemed to neglect social aspects, they want the EU to adopt a generous 
European social policy as a key priority. I 15 In other words they wish to see the 
establishment of a social Europe. The functionality argument at the European level 
plays here a role in this as in an integrated Europe, the EU may be considered by 
French respondents as best placed to harmonize the level of social protection - at a 
high level - in EU countries and enable European firms to compete on an equal 
playing field within Europe. Although British respondents with left-wing or centrist 
115 As substantiated by polls in the study period, see background chapter (chapter four) on France. 
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political opinions are more inclined to the EU transfer of social inclusion policy with 
a view to acquiring greater social rights, they are also attached to the relatively high 
level of employment and social mobility that they have in the British context. As 
such in line with the political discourse of the leaderships of Labour and Liberal 
Democrat political parties, they are against the elaboration of a too extensive 
European social policy which would damage the relatively healthy British economic 
and social situation. 
It must be noted that French interviewees with extreme left- (1.68) and extreme 
right-wing (1.57) ideological opinions are also in favour of the transfer of the social 
inclusion policy to the EU. There is no significant difference between French 
interviewees with extreme left- and left-wing ideological views and between French 
interviewees with extreme right- and right-wing ideological views. However, the 
weak power of the test (46.9%) - due to very unbalanced sample sizes - does not 
though permit it to detect a difference between French interviewees with right- and 
extreme right-wing ideological opinions, and it is therefore likely that the difference 
is significant but in any case small. 
It must be noted that British interviewees with extreme left-wing (1.60) ideological 
opinions are also in favour of the transfer of the social inclusion policy to the ED. 
There is no significant difference between British interviewees with extreme left-
and left-wing ideological views on the transfer of the social inclusion policy to the 
EU. British interviewees with extreme right-wing (l.45) ideological opinions are 
not in favour of the transfer of the social inclusion policy to the EU but there is no 
significant difference between British interviewees with extreme right- and right-
wing ideological views on this. However, the weak power of the test (40.4%) - due 
to very unbalanced sample sizes - does not though permit it to detect a difference 
between British interviewees with right- and extreme right-wing ideological 
opinions, and it is therefore likely that the difference may be significant but in any 
case small. 
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7.2.1.2 Regional Policy (1995-2001) 
Taking into account the ideology of the respondent, British interviewees - especially 
those with left-wing and centrist political opinions - are overall significantly more in 
favour of transferring the regional policy to the EU than French respondents but the 
size of the difference is though small. All means are well above 1.50 (approaching 
or above 1.60) and as such all British and French respondents whatever their 
ideological views are in favour of transferring the regional policy to the EU. This 
may be explained by the fact that respondents perceive that transferring the regional 
policy at the European level can bring positive externalities or economies of scale -
including the facilitation of trade - but also perhaps by the relative lower perceived 
importance of regional policy compared to for example social policy or employment 
policy for individuals. 
When examining where the differences occur (see output in appendix 7.2A), there 
are no significant differences between French respondents with left-wing, centrist 
and right-wing ideological views on Europeanizing the regional policy: they are all 
clearly in favour of the Europeanization of the regional policy. There are though 
significant differences between British respondents with left-wing ideological views 
and those with right-wing or centrist ideological views on Europeanizing the 
regional policy: British citizens with right-wing ideological opinions are less likely 
to favour the Europeanization of the regional policy than those with left-wing but 
also centrist ideological opinions. Nevertheless as pointed out above the former are 
clearly in favour of transferring the regional policy to the EU. It is likely that British 
Individuals with left-wing and centrist political views think that transferring the 
regional policy to the EU may contribute to an increase in the public expenditure in 
this area. 
It must be noted that French interviewees with extreme left-wing (1.61) ideological 
opinions are also in favour of the transfer of the regional policy to the EU. There is 
no significant difference between French interviewees with extreme left- and left-
wing ideological views on the transfer of the regional policy to the EU. French 
respondents with extreme right-wing (1.5032) political opinions are only very 
marginally in favour of the transfer of the regional policy and there is a significant 
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difference with French interviewees with right-wing political opinions who are 
significantly more in favour of the EU transfer of the regional policy. It must be 
also noted that British interviewees with extreme left-wing (1.67) political opinions 
are in favour of the EU transfer of the regional policy and there is no significant 
difference with British respondents with left-wing political views on this. British 
respondents with extreme right-wing (1.5337) political views are marginally in 
favour of the EU transfer of the regional policy and there is a significant difference 
with British respondents with right-wing political opinions who are significantly 
more in favour of the EU transfer of the regional policy. 
7.2.1.3 Employment Policy (1992-2001) 
Taking into account the ideology of the respondent, French respondents are overall 
significantly more in favour of transferring the employment policy to the EU than 
British ones, and the size of the difference is moderate. French interviewees are in 
favour of the EU transfer of the employment policy whilst British ones are against it. 
The mean for British individuals with left-wing ideological views, namely 1.47, is 
not too far from the mid-point and therefore opposition to the EU transfer for them 
is minimal compared to British respondents with centrist or right-wing political 
vIews. 
When examining where the differences occur (see output in appendix 7.3A), there 
are no significant differences between French respondents with left-wing, centrist 
and right-wing ideological views on europeanizing the employment policy: they are 
all clearly in favour of the Europeanization of the employment policy. There are 
though significant differences between British respondents with left-wing, centrist 
and right-wing ideological views on Europeanizing the employment policy. British 
citizens with right-wing ideological opinions or even centrist ideological opinions 
are significantly more opposed to the Europeanization of the employment policy 
than those with left-wing ideological opinions: they are though all opposed to 
transferring the employment policy to the EU. In other words, British respondents 
with left-wing political views (mean of 1.47) are statistically significantly the least 
opposed to the EU transfer of the employment policy among British respondents. 
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One can infer from this that British respondents, whatever their ideological 
dispositions, are more reluctant to transferring the employment policy at the 
European level than French respondents. It reflects overall the preference of British 
citizens towards neo-liberalism and the belief that the European integration favours a 
more regulated capitalism which would harm the British job market - this belief is 
moreover cultivated by British centre and right-wing political parties but also to a 
lesser extent by the Labour government which criticize the over-regulation and 
inflexibility of job markets favoured by the EU. The reluctance of British 
respondents to transfer the employment policy at the European level must be 
interpreted in the context of a relatively low unemployment (below EU average) and 
greater possibilities of social promotion in the United Kingdom in the study period. 
British respondents may fear that by transferring the employment policy to the EU, 
they will lose from this as instrumentalized by the political discourse of British 
mainstream parties which criticize the excessive economic and social 
interventionism favoured by the EU. The willingness of French respondents to 
transfer this policy to the EU may be explained by the relative failure of French 
successive governments to tackle unemployment and the lack of social mobility but 
also by the belief that European integration - at least an EU which would put 
employment at the core of its economic policies - can help to tackle this issue as 
publicized by mainstream political parties in the second part of the 1990s. The latter 
lobbied partly successfully the EU to integrate growth and employment as important 
priorities for the EU and counterbalance the stability pact requirements. 
It must be noted that in the French context, only respondents with extreme right-
wing views are opposed to the Europeanization of the employment policy 
(respondents with extreme left-wing views are in favour of it), this though 
marginally (mean of 1.48). This may be explained by the fact that the EU is 
portrayed by extreme right political parties as favouring largely unregulated free 
trade and the openness of French (and European) markets to unfair competition from 
low labour costs countries, which harm the French economy and its labour market. 
In the British context, respondents with extreme left- and especially extreme right-
wing views are also opposed to the Europeanization of the employment policy. 
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7.2.1.4 Environment Policy (1992-2001) 
Taking into account the ideology of the respondent, French respondents are overall 
significantly more in favour of transferring the environment policy to the EU than 
British respondents but the size of the difference is small. All means are well above 
1.50 (approaching or above 1.60) and as such all British and French respondents 
whatever their ideological views are in favour of transferring the environment policy 
to the EU. This may be explained by the fact that respondents perceive that 
transferring the environment policy at the European level can bring positive 
externalities or economies of scale but also perhaps by the relative lower perceived 
importance - and perhaps more consensual nature I 16 - of the environment policy 
compared to for example the employment policy for individuals. 
When examining where the differences occur (see output in appendix 7.4A), there 
are no significant differences between French respondents with left-wing, centrist 
and right-wing ideological views on Europeanizing the environment policy: they are 
all clearly in favour of the Europeanization of the environment policy. There are 
though significant differences between British respondents with left- and right-wing 
or centrist ideological views on Europeanizing the environment policy. British 
citizens with right-wing ideological opinions or even centrist ideological opinions 
are significantly less in favour of the Europeanization of the environment policy 
than those with left-wing ideological opinions: they are though all in favour of 
transferring the environment policy to the EU. This may be explained by the fact 
that British individuals with centrist and especially right-wing ideological views 
whilst they perceive the positive externalities that a European environment policy 
can bring, are perhaps more concerned that the EU would bring excessive 
environmental regulations which could harm economic growth and employment. 
The national sovereignty issue particularly for British respondents with right-wing 
political views, and more especially for those with extreme right-wing views, 117 also 
act as a brake on this EU transfer. Furthermore, it should be underlined that 
differences between French individuals with right- and extreme right-wing views, 
116 Albeit the degree of importance of the environment policy may vary between political ideologies. 
117 British individuals with extreme right-wing opinions are marginally in favour of the EU transfer of 
the environment policy (mean of 1.5257). 
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between British individuals with left- and extreme left-wing opinions as between 
British persons with extreme right- and right-wing opinions on the ED transfer of 
the environment policy are statistically significant (support ED transfer significantly 
less but still support it) but the sizes of the difference are small to very small. 
7.2.1.5 Scientific Research Policy (1992-2001) 
Taking into account the ideology of the respondent, French respondents are overall 
significantly more in favour of transferring the scientific research policy to the ED 
than British respondents but the size of the difference is between small and 
moderate. All means are well above 1.50 (in effect above 1.60) and as such all 
British and French respondents whatever their ideological views are in favour of 
transferring the scientific research policy to the ED. This may be explained by the 
fact that respondents perceive that transferring the scientific research policy at the 
European level can bring positive externalities or economies of scale. This policy 
may also be perceived by individuals as more consensual. It must be noted that the 
related policy brings the second highest mean for both nationalities (after the 
humanitarian aid policy), that is to say there are more citizens' dispositions for 
decisions pertaining to scientific research to be taken at the European level. 
When examining where the differences occur (see output in appendix 7.5A), there 
are no significant differences between French respondents with left-wing, centrist 
and right-wing ideological views on Europeanizing the scientific research policy: 
they are all clearly in favour of the Europeanization of this policy. There are though 
significant differences between British respondents with left- and right-wing or 
centrist ideological views on Europeanizing the scientific research policy. British 
citizens with right-wing ideological opinions or even centrist ideological opinions 
are significantly less in favour of the Europeanization of the scientific research 
policy than those with left-wing ideological opinions: they are though all clearly in 
favour of transferring the scientific policy to the ED. This may be explained by the 
fact that British individuals with centrist and especially right-wing ideological views 
whilst they perceive the positive externalities that a European environment policy 
can bring, are perhaps more concerned about the excessive interventionism of the 
ED which could disturb the balance of competitive markets. The national 
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sovereignty issue particularly for British respondents with right-wing political 
views, and more especially British individuals with extreme right-wing views, I 18 
also act as a brake on this EU transfer. Furthermore, it should be underlined that 
differences between French individuals with right- and extreme right-wing views, 
between British individuals with left- and extreme left-wing opinions as between 
British persons with extreme right- and right-wing opinions on the EU transfer of 
the scientific research policy are statistically significant (support EU transfer 
significantly less but still support it) (see appendix 7.5A'). However, the sizes of the 
difference are small: they all support the EU transfer of the scientific research 
policy. 
7.2.1.6 Currency Policy (1992-2001) 
Taking into account the ideology of the respondent, French respondents are overall 
significantly more likely to support the transferring of the currency management 
policy to the EU than British respondents, and the size of the difference is large. 
French respondents whatever their political opinions approve the EU transfer of the 
currency management policy whilst British respondents of whatever political views 
reject it. The socialisation effect, the low exclusive national identity, the support of 
the leaderships of all mainstream political parties for the single currency and 
EMUI19 but also the continued relatively poor economic and social situation in 
France l20 explain the support of French individuals for the EU transfer of the 
currency management policy. The importance of national sovereignty and national 
identity, a limited socialisation effect, the lack of clear support and campaigning of 
the leaderships of mainstream political parties for EMU and the single currenc/ 21 
but also the fear that EMU and a single currency could threaten the relatively good 
economic and social situation in the United Kingdom explain the opposition of 
British individuals to the EU transfer of the currency management policy. 
118 British individuals with extreme right-wing opinions are comparatively less in favour of the EU 
transfer of the scientific research policy (mean of 1.58). 
119 With the integration of growth and employment objectives in the stability pact under French 
insistence. . 
120 The functionality argument is though subject to the EU adopting a currency management policy 
where social aspects are important. . 
121 The leadership of the Conservative Party opposed though clearly EMU and the smgle currency 
from 1997. 
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When examining where the differences occur (see output in appendix 7.6A), there 
are no significant differences between French respondents with left-wing and 
centrist ideological views and between those with left- and right-wing political 
opinions on Europeanizing the currency management policy. However French 
individuals with centrist political views are significantly more likely to approve the 
EU transfer of the currency management policy than those with right-wing political 
views but the size of the difference is small. This is linked to the fact that centre 
political parties such as UDF and to a lesser extent the mainstream left party such as 
PS have taken a more pro-EU and pro-Euro positioning throughout the study period 
than mainstream right political parties such as RPR. Nevertheless, all French 
respondents are all clearly in favour of the Europeanization of this policy. 
Individuals with centrist political views show the highest mean of support for the 
EU transfer of the currency management policy followed respectively by those with 
left-wing political views 122 and those with right-wing political opinions. 123 There 
are though significant differences between British respondents with left- and right-
wing and centrist ideological views on Europeanizing the currency management 
policy. British citizens with right-wing ideological opinions or even centrist 
ideological opinions are significantly more opposed to the Europeanization of the 
currency management policy than those with left-wing ideological opinions: they are 
though all clearly opposed to the transfer of the currency management to the EU. 
Although French respondents with left- or right-wing political opinions are 
significantly more in favour ofEU transfer of the currency management policy than 
those with extreme left- or right-wing political views (the size of the difference is 
though small), they are all in favour of the EU transfer of this policy. British 
interviewees with extreme left-wing opinions are not significantly more opposed to 
the EU transfer of the currency management policy than those with left-wing 
political views whilst British respondents with extreme right-wing opinions are 
significantly more opposed to the EU transfer of the currency management policy 
than those with right-wing political views. As discussed above, all British 
122 It includes here French respondents with extreme left-wing political views who are a little more 
reluctant to the EU transfer of the currency management policy. . 
123 It includes here French respondents with extreme right-wing political views who are a little more 
reluctant to the EU transfer of the currency management policy. 
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respondents are though opposed to the EU transfer of the currency management 
policy. 
7.2.1.7 Health Policy (1992-2001) 
Taking into account the ideology of the respondent, British respondents with left-
wing political views are significantly less likely to oppose the transferring of the 
health policy to the EU than French respondents of all political views (non-
significant otherwise) but the size of the difference is though small. French and 
British respondents whatever their political opinions are in opposition to the EU 
transfer of the health policy. French citizens are not in favour of transferring the 
health policy to the EU as they may perceive that French successive governments 
have relatively better dealt with this policy and that the national level - rather than 
the EU (subsidiarity principle) - may be best placed to cater for this. The 
subsidiarity principle may also apply to explain British reluctance to transfer this 
policy to the EU. The fact that, in the second part of the 1990s, the Labour 
government has also increased its commitment to public services and to the health 
policy in particular,124 has reduced somewhat the appeal that a common EU policy, 
especially for those with left-wing political views, could have on health. 
When examining where the differences occur (see output in appendix 7.7 A), there 
are no significant differences between French respondents with left-wing, centrist 
and right-wing ideological views on Europeanizing the health policy: all French 
respondents are clearly against the Europeanization of this policy. There are though 
significant differences between British respondents with left- and right-wing and 
centrist ideological views on Europeanizing the health policy (the size of the 
difference tends, nonetheless, to be small). British citizens with right-wing 
ideological opinions or even centrist ideological opinions are significantly more 
opposed to the Europeanization of the health policy than those with left-wing 
ideological opinions: they are though all clearly opposed to transferring the health 
policy to the EU. 
124 Including the Labour government's commitment to raise health expenditure further in the post 
200 1 period. 
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French respondents with extreme right-wing political opinions are not significantly 
more opposed to the EU transfer of the health policy than those with right-wing 
political views: they are all against the EU transfer of this policy. Although French 
respondents with extreme left-wing political opinions are significantly more 
opposed to the EU transfer of the health policy than those with left-wing political 
views, the size of the difference is though very small: they are all against the EU 
transfer of this policy. British interviewees with extreme left- or extreme right-wing 
opinions are not significantly more opposed to the EU transfer of the health policy 
than those with left- or right-wing political views: they are all clearly opposed to the 
EU transfer of this policy. 
7.2.1.8 Education Policy (1992-2001) 
Taking into account the ideology of the respondent, British respondents of any 
political opinions are significantly more likely to oppose the transferring of the 
education policy to the EU than French respondents of any political views but the 
size of the difference is though small. French and British respondents whatever their 
political opinions are nevertheless all in opposition to the EU transfer of the 
education policy. French citizens are not in favour of transferring the education 
policy to the EU as they may perceive that French successive governments have 
relatively better dealt with this policy and that the national level- rather than the EU 
(subsidiarity principle) - may be best placed to cater for this. The subsidiarity 
principle may also apply to explain British reluctance to transfer this policy to the 
EU. The fact that, in the second part of the 1990s, the Labour government has also 
increased its commitment to public services and to education in particular,125 has 
reduced somewhat the appeal that a common EU policy, especially for those with 
left-wing political views, could have on education. Furthermore in the British and to 
a lesser extent in the French context (perhaps more so for French citizens with 
centrist and right-wing political opinions), British and French individuals may view 
the relative freedom of education to be potentially threatened by an EU transfer. 
125 Including the Labour government's commitment to raise education expenditure further in the post 
200 I period. 
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When examining where the differences occur (see output in appendix 7.8A), there 
are no significant differences between French respondents with left-wing, centrist 
and right-wing ideological views on europeanizing the education policy: all French 
respondents are clearly against the Europeanization of this policy. There are though 
significant differences between British respondents with left- and right-wing and 
centrist ideological views on Europeanizing the education policy (the size of the 
difference is though small). British citizens with right-wing ideological opinions or 
even centrist ideological opinions are significantly more opposed to the 
Europeanization of the education policy than those with left-wing ideological 
opinions: they are though all clearly opposed to the transfer of the education policy 
to the EU. 
French respondents with extreme right-wing political opinions are not significantly 
more opposed to the EU transfer of the education policy than those with right-wing 
political views,126 they are all against the EU transfer of this policy. Although 
French respondents with extreme left-wing political opinions are significantly more 
opposed to the EU transfer of the education policy than those with left-wing political 
views (the difference size is though very small), they are all against the EU transfer 
of this policy. British interviewees with extreme left- or extreme right-wing 
opinions are not significantly127 more opposed to the EU transfer of the education 
policy than those with left- or right-wing political views: they are all clearly opposed 
to the EU transfer of this policy. 
7.2.1.9 Agriculture Policy (1992-2001) 
Taking into account the ideology of the respondent, British respondents of any 
political opinion are significantly more likely to oppose the transferring of the 
agriculture policy to the EU than French respondents of any political view (the size 
of the difference is though between small and moderate). French respondents of any 
political views are in favour of the EU transfer of the agriculture policy whilst 
126 Due to unbalanced sample sizes, the power of test does not however allow to detect a difference if 
it exists. . . I . I . 
In Due to unbalanced sample sizes between British interviewees with right-WIng Ideo oglca views 
and those with extreme right-wing ideological views, the power oftest does not nonetheless allow to 
detect a difference if it exists. 
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British respondents whatever their political opinions (except extreme left marginally 
in favour) are in opposition to it. A reason which may explain the support of French 
respondents for the EU transfer of the agriculture policy is that they are in favour of 
the French and European preference principle for agricultural products128 with a 
view to satisfying socio-economic goals: that is to say guarantee farmers' income, 
self-sufficiency and protection against unfair global competition from low labour 
cost countries. French interviewees believe that the EU is best placed to fulfil this 
role - subsidiarity principle - although they are increasingly concerned 129 that the 
EU is increasingly eroding the European preference principle by opening French and 
European markets to deemed unfair non-EU competition and therefore reinforcing 
the effects of globalisation as publicized by public figures in the political periphery 
such as Villiers, Chevenement, Le Pen, Hue or Emmanuelli. It follows from this 
that French citizens would like the EU to take a more regulated capitalism path, with 
more interventionism in the agricultural sphere with a view to safeguarding French 
and European socio-economic interests. 
In the context of the United Kingdom, British respondents are opposed to the EU 
transfer of the agriculture policy as they perceive the common agricultural policy 
(CAP) to be counterproductive and artificial- sheltering artificially European 
farmers from international competition - bureaucratic, expensive and not giving 
value to end consumers. It is important to note that British citizens are subject to an 
almost unanimous political discourse of the Conservative Party, the Liberal 
Democrats and, to a lesser extent, the Labour Party which denounces as such the 
CAP as a too interventionist system disturbing market rules and producing 
expensive inefficiencies. These political parties tend to support the idea that 
European agricultural markets should be subject to the law of markets and therefore 
subject to international competition. The role of the EU for them should be purely 
to make sure that free competition occurs and that European farmers are enticed to 
become more competitive. 
When examining where the differences occur (see output in appendix 7.9A), there 
are no significant differences between French respondents with left-wing, centrist 
I2S As reinforced by the political discourse of all main French political parties (including extreme 
ri~ht). 
129 As substantiated by polls in the study period (see Background chapter (chapter four) on France). 
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and right-wing ideological views on Europeanizing the agriculture policy: all French 
respondents support the Europeanization of this policy (respondents with right-wing 
political views nevertheless support it more marginally with a mean of 1.54). There 
are though significant differences between British respondents with left- and right-
wing and centrist ideological views on Europeanizing the agriculture policy (the size 
of the difference tends though to be small). British citizens with right-wing 
ideological opinions or even centrist ideological opinions are significantly more 
opposed to the Europeanization of the agriculture policy than those with left-wing 
ideological opinions: they are though all opposed to the transfer of the agriculture 
policy to the ED but British respondents with left-wing political views oppose it 
more marginally (mean of 1.49). 
French respondents with extreme right-wing political opinions are significantly 
more opposed to the ED transfer of the agriculture policy than those with right-wing 
political views (the size of the difference is however smaU130). French individuals 
with extreme right-wing opinions are though marginally opposed to the EU transfer 
of this policy (mean of 1.47). French respondents with extreme left-wing political 
opinions are not significantly less supportive of the ED transfer of the agriculture 
policy than those with left-wing political views: Both are in favour of the EU 
transfer of this policy. British interviewees with extreme left-wing opinions are not 
significantly more supportive of the ED transfer of the agriculture policy than those 
with left-wing political views, this despite those with extreme left-wing views 
showing a marginally supportive mean (1.5165) for the EU transfer of this policy). 
British respondents with extreme right-wing political opinions are significantly more 
opposed to the ED transfer of the agriculture policy than those with right-wing 
political views (the size of the difference is though small): both British respondents 
with extreme right- and right-wing political opinions are nevertheless opposed to the 
ED transfer of the agriculture policy. 
130 Due to unbalanced sample sizes, the power of the test is quite weak. 
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7.2.1.10 Humanitarian Aid Policy (1992-2001) 
Taking into account the ideology of the respondent, French respondents are overall 
significantly more in favour of transferring the humanitarian aid policy to the ED 
than British respondents but the size of the difference tends to be small. All means 
are well above 1.50 (above 1.60) and as such all British and French respondents 
whatever their ideological views are in favour of transferring the humanitarian aid 
policy to the EU. This may be explained by the fact that respondents perceive that 
transferring the humanitarian aid policy at the European level can bring positive 
externalities or economies of scale but also explained perhaps by the relative lower 
perceived importance - and perhaps more consensual nature - of humanitarian aid 
policy compared to, for example, employment policy for individuals. It must be 
noted that the related policy brings the highest mean for both nationalities, that is to 
say more citizens' dispositions for decisions pertaining to humanitarian aid to be 
taken at the European level. 
When examining where the differences occur (see output in appendix 7.l0A), there 
are no significant differences between French respondents with left-wing and 
centrist and between left- and right-wing ideological views on Europeanizing the 
humanitarian aid policy. There is a significant difference between French 
respondents with centrist and right-wing ideological views on Europeanizing the 
humanitarian aid policy but the size of difference is very small. All French 
respondents are though clearly in favour of the Europeanization of this policy. 
There are though significant differences between British respondents with left-wing, 
centrist and right-wing ideological views on Europeanizing the humanitarian aid 
policy. British citizens with right-wing ideological opinions or even centrist 
ideological opinions are significantly less in favour of the Europeanization of the 
humanitarian aid policy than those with left-wing ideological opinions but the size 
of the difference is small: they are all clearly in favour of transferring the 
humanitarian aid policy to the EU. This may be explained by the fact that British 
individuals with centrist and especially right-wing ideological views whilst they 
perceive the positive externalities that a European humanitarian aid policy can bring, 
are perhaps more concerned about an excessive commitment (British tax payers' 
money management) of the EU in this area. The national sovereignty issue 
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particularly for British respondents with right-wing political views (and more 
especially those with extreme right-wing views) also act as a brake on this EU 
transfer. 
It should be also underlined that there are no significant differences between French 
respondents with extreme left- and left-wing political opinions, and between British 
respondents with extreme left- and left-wing political views on Europeanizing the 
humanitarian aid policy. There are significant differences between French 
interviewees with extreme right- and right-wing political views on Europeanizing 
the related policy but the size of the difference tends to be small. They are all in 
favour of transferring the humanitarian aid policy to the EU. 
7.2.1.11 Cultural Policy (1992-2001) 
Taking into account the ideology of the respondent, French respondents are overall 
significantly less in opposition to transferring the cultural policy to the EU than 
British respondents but the size of the difference is small. All means are well below 
1.50 and as such all British and French respondents whatever their ideological views 
are opposed to transferring the cultural policy to the EU. This may be explained by 
the fact that respondents perceive that transferring the cultural policy at the 
European level would bring limited functionality. The cultural policy of a country 
can also be intimately connected to national identity, which also explains the refusal 
to transfer this policy to the EU. In addition to functionality reasons, for British 
citizens, the link with national identity in this refusal is especially important but 
they, especially those with right-wing political views, may also fear an excessive 
expenditure commitment of the EU in this policy area. In addition to functionality 
reasons, for French respondents of all political opinions, this refusal may be partly 
explained by the link with national identity but also by the fear that the EU 
expenditure commitment in this policy area would be reduced and fear that more 
competitive rules at the EU level would apply to a cultural sector deemed different 
and beyond a market economy mentality. Whilst the results obtained here cannot be 
directly compared to earlier research results as the present study constitutes a new 
line of enquiry, these results somewhat endorse the link between importance of 
national identity and reluctance towards European integration as found by, for 
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example, Carey (2002), Christin and Trechsel (2002), McLaren (2007b) and Marks 
and Hooghe (2003). National identity is though more important in the British 
context than in the French one. 
When examining where the differences occur (see output in appendix 7.11A), there 
are no significant differences between French respondents with left-wing and 
centrist and between left- and right-wing ideological views on Europeanizing the 
cultural policy. There is a significant difference between French respondents with 
centrist and right-wing ideological views on Europeanizing the cultural policy. 
French respondents with right-wing political views are significantly more opposed 
to the Europeanization of this policy than French respondents with centrist political 
views but the size of difference is very small. All French respondents are though 
clearly opposed to the Europeanization of this policy. There are though significant 
differences between British respondents with left-wing or centrist and right-wing 
ideological views on Europeanizing the cultural policy. British citizens with right-
wing ideological opinions are significantly more opposed to the Europeanization of 
the cultural policy than those with left-wing or centrist ideological opinions but the 
size of the difference is small: they are all clearly opposed to transferring the cultural 
policy to the EU. It should be underlined that there are no significant differences 
between French or British respondents with extreme left- and left-wing political 
opinions, and between French or British respondents with extreme right- and right-
wing political views on Europeanizing the cultural policy. They are all in opposition 
to transferring the cultural policy to the EU. 
7.2.2 Foreign Policy, Defence Policy, Immigration and Asylum Policy, Police 
Policy, Anti-Drug Policy and Urban and Juvenile Crime Prevention Policy 
Through the study period, foreign policy, defence policy and immigration and 
asylum policy have become European policies although their developments on the 
EU scene have remained rather embryonic. Police Policy, Anti-Drug Policy and 
Urban & Juvenile Crime Prevention Policy were not European policies as such in 
the study period although there has been increasing cooperation - including the 
sharing of files on criminals - between national polices as encouraged by EU 
institutions. While these policies may not reflect directly socio-economic priorities 
324 
and therefore may not be so useful to distinguish regulated capitalism from neo-
liberal capitalism, the review of the pattern of public opinions on the EU transfer of 
these policies will help to derive whether or not (and why) French and British public 
opinions see a functional value to the EU involvement in these. 
Table 7.2: Pattern of Significance and Direction of Foreign Policy, Defence Policy, 
Immigration and Asylum Policy, Police Policy, Anti-Drug Policy and Urban and 
Juvenile Crime Prevention Policy variable 
Policies Pattern of Significance and Direction 
Foreign Policy 
Defence Policy 
French Sample 
Not significant between Centre, left and right and all in 
favour of EU transfer (including respondents with extreme 
left- and extreme right-wing opinions). 
British Sample 
Significant between left, centre and right. All in favour of 
EU transfer but left or even centre significantly more in 
favour of EU transfer than right (including extreme right and 
extreme left, the former though relatively borderline 
(1.5128)). 
British and French Samples 
Significant between French respondents of all political 
opinions and British respondents of all political opinions. 
French significantly more in favour of EU transfer than 
British. 
French Sample 
Not significant between Centre, left and right and all in 
favour ofEU transfer (including extreme left but barely 
(1.5061) and excluding extreme right (1.4268)) but support 
more marginal especially for right (1.5237). 
British Sample 
Significant between left and centre or right. All opposed to 
EU transfer (including extreme right and extreme left) but 
left significantly less opposed to EU transfer than right. 
British and French Samples 
Significant between French respondents of all political 
Policies Pattern of Significance and Direction 
opinions. an? British respondents of all political opinions. 
French sIgmficantly more in favour of EU transfer than 
British. 
Immigration and French Sample 
Asylum Policy 
Not significant between centre and left and significant 
between right and left or centre (but size of difference is 
small) but all in favour of EU transfer (including extreme 
left and extreme right) (marginal EU transfer support for the 
latter, (1.5088)). 
British Sample 
Significant between left, centre and right. All opposed to 
EU transfer (including extreme right and extreme left, the 
latter marginally against EU transfer (1.4897)) but left 
significantly less opposed to EU transfer than right or even 
centre. 
British and French Samples 
Significant between French respondents of all political 
opinions and British respondents of all political opinions. 
French significantly more in favour of EU transfer than 
British. 
Police Policy French Sample 
Not significant between centre, left and right, and all 
opposed to EU transfer (including extreme left and extreme 
right). 
British Sample 
Significant between left and right and non-significant 
otherwise. All opposed to EU transfer (including extreme 
right and extreme left) but left significantly less opposed to 
EU transfer than right. 
British and French Samples 
Significant between French respondents of all political 
opinions and British respondents of all political opinion~ .. 
French significantly less opposed to EU transfer than Bntlsh. 
Anti-Drug Policy French Sample 
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Policies Pattern of Significance and Direction 
Not significant between centre, left and right, and all in 
favour of EU transfer (including extreme left and extreme 
right). 
British Sample 
Significant between left and centre-right. All favour EU 
transfer (including extreme right and extreme left, the former 
more marginally (1.53)). Left significantly more in favour to 
ED transfer than right or centre. 
British and French Samples 
Significant between French respondents of all political 
opinions and British respondents of all political opinions. 
French significantly more in favour to EU transfer than 
British. 
Urban and Juvenile French Sample 
Crime Prevention 
Policy Not significant between Centre, left and right, and all 
opposed to EU transfer (including extreme left and extreme 
right). 
British Sample 
Significant between left and right and non-significant 
otherwise. All opposed to EU transfer (including extreme 
right and extreme left) but left significantly less opposed to 
EU transfer than right. 
British and French Samples 
Significant between French respondents of all political 
opinions and British respondents of all political opinions. 
French significantly less opposed to EU transfer than British. 
7.2.2.1 Foreign Policy (1992-2001) 
Taking into account the ideology of the respondent, French respondents are overall 
significantly more in favour of transferring the foreign policy to the EU than British 
respondents (the size of the difference is between small and moderate). All means 
3~7 
, 
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are well above 1.50 and as such all British and French respondents whatever their 
ideological views are in favour of transferring the foreign policy to the EU. This 
may be explained by the fact that respondents perceive that transferring the foreign 
policy at the European level can bring positive externalities or economies of scale 
but also perhaps by the relative lower perceived importance of foreign policy 
compared to for example employment policy for individuals. Traditionally citizens 
show more tolerance (and more freedom of action for governments) towards the 
management of foreign policy issues - except in case of war - than towards the 
management of domestic issues. The emergence of important international foreign 
and security issues from 1999 (more powerfully from September 2001) as well as 
the greater integration of the European security and defence policy in the period 
from 1998 to today, are though likely to have increased the salience of foreign, 
security and defence policy issues for national publics. This may make the further 
development and realization of a European foreign, security and defence policy 
more difficult today - especially for particular policy decisions, for example, 
involving the deployment of military troops - as national publics will increasingly 
act as a constraint on the development and realization of the related policy. The 
unanimity rule at the EU level may well reinforce this constraint as national publics 
are provided with ample channels of influence to constrict European integration in 
this field via their respective national governments. 
When examining where the differences occur (see output in appendix 7.12A), there 
are no significant differences between French respondents with left-wing, centrist 
and right-wing ideological views on Europeanizing the foreign policy: they are all 
clearly in favour of the Europeanization of the foreign policy. There are though 
significant differences between British respondents with left-wing, centrist and 
right-wing ideological views on Europeanizing the foreign policy. British citizens 
with right-wing ideological opinions are significantly less in favour of the 
Europeanization of the foreign policy than those with left-wing or even centrist 
ideological opinions but the size of the difference tends to be small: they are though 
all in favour of transferring the foreign policy to the EU. This may be explained by 
the fact that British individuals with right-wing ideological views (and especially 
those with extreme right-wing ideological views) whilst they perceive the positive 
externalities that a European foreign policy can bring, are perhaps more concerned 
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that a common policy in this area could neglect somewhat the link with the USA and 
Commonwealth countries such as Australia and Canada which are converging 
economically and socially with the United Kingdom. The national sovereignty issue 
particularly for British respondents with right-wing political views l3l also acts as a 
brake on this EU transfer. 
It should be underlined that there are no significant differences between French or 
British respondents with extreme left- and left-wing political opinions on 
Europeanizing the foreign policy. There are significant differences between French 
or British respondents with extreme right- and right-wing political views on 
Europeanizing the foreign policy but the size of the difference is small. They are all 
though supporting the EU transfer of the foreign policy. For British individuals with 
extreme right-wing political views, the support for this EU transfer is though 
marginal, mean of 1.5128. 
7.2.2.2 Defence Policy (1992-2001) 
Taking into account the ideology of the respondent, French respondents are overall 
significantly more in favour of transferring the defence policy to the EU than British 
respondents (the size of the difference is between small and moderate). All means 
for French respondents are above 1.50 (except extreme right) and as such all French 
respondents whatever their ideological views are in favour of transferring the 
defence policy to the EU (except those with extreme right-wing political views). 
The EU transfer support for this policy is though more marginal for French 
respondents with right-wing (1.5237) and to a lesser extent left-wing (1.5487) and 
centrist (1.5459) political views. All means for British respondents are below l.50 
and as such all British respondents whatever their ideological views are opposed to 
transferring the defence policy to the EU. In the French context, this may be 
explained by the fact that respondents perceive that transferring the defence policy 
to the European level can bring positive externalities or economies of scale. The 
defence policy is also not seen as a national priority - in a time of peace - compared 
131 And more especially British individuals with extreme right-wing views who are marginally in 
favour of the EU transfer of the foreign policy (mean of 1.5128). 
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to other policies such as employment policy, health and education for individuals. 
However, for French individuals with right-wing political views and more especially 
those with extreme right-wing political views, the EU transfer of the defence policy 
is less popular as the latter is associated with the national sovereignty issue and more 
especially with the preservation of national independence which appeared in the 
political discourse of the FN, MNR and MPF and to a lesser extent in the one of 
RPR. For French individuals with extreme left-wing political views, the EU transfer 
is also less popular as in symbiosis with the discourse of extreme left political 
parties, the defence policy has for them very low importance in the national context 
as in the European context - they moreover favour a policy of demilitarisation. In 
the British context, whilst the perspective of positive externalities or economies of 
scale in the EU transfer of this policy may have some appeal especially for 
individuals with left-wing political opinions, the issue of national sovereignty and 
national independence takes special importance in the refusal to transfer this policy 
to the EU level, more so for individuals with right-wing (including extreme right) 
and centrist political views. The emergence of important international foreign and 
security issues from 1999 (more powerfully from September 2001) as well as the 
greater integration of the European security and defence policy in the period from 
1998 to today, are likely to have increased the salience of foreign, security and 
defence policy issues for national publics This may make the further development 
and realization of a European foreign, security and defence policy more difficult 
today - especially for particular policy decisions, for example, involving the 
deployment of military troops - as national publics will increasingly act as a 
constraint on the development and realization of the related policy. The unanimity 
rule at the EU level may well reinforce this constraint as national publics are 
provided with ample channels of influence to constrict European integration in this 
field via their respective national governments. 
When examining where the differences occur (see output in appendix 7.13A), there 
are no significant differences between French respondents with left-wing, centrist 
and right-wing ideological views on Europeanizing the defence policy: they are all 
in favour of the Europeanization of the defence policy. EU transfer support for the 
related policy is though more marginal for French individuals with right-wing 
political views. There are though significant differences between British 
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respondents with left-wing, and centrist and right-wing ideological views on 
Europeanizing the defence policy. British citizens with right-wing or even centrist 
ideological opinions ideological opinions are significantly more opposed to the 
Europeanization of the defence policy than those with left-wing ideological opinions 
but the size of the difference tends to be small: they are though all opposed to 
transferring the defence policy to the EU. 
It must be noted that there are no significant differences between British respondents 
with extreme left- and left-wing political opinions on Europeanizing the defence 
policy. There are significant differences between French or British respondents with 
extreme right- and right-wing political views, and between French respondents with 
extreme left- and left-wing political views on Europeanizing the defence policy but 
the size of the difference is small. All respondents with extreme left- or extreme 
right-wing political opinions132 are in opposition to the EU transfer of the defence 
policy. 
7.2.2.3 Immigration and Asylum Policy (1992-2001) 
Taking into account the ideology of the respondent, French respondents are overall 
significantly more in favour of transferring the immigration and asylum policy to the 
EU than British respondents (the size of the difference is between moderate and 
large). All means for French respondents are above 1.50 (including extreme right 
but marginal EU transfer support, 1.5088) and as such all French respondents 
whatever their ideological views are in favour of transferring the immigration and 
asylum policy to the EU. All means for British respondents are below 1.50 and as 
such all British respondents whatever their ideological views are opposed to 
transferring the immigration and asylum policy to the EU. The opposition to the EU 
transfer of this policy is though more marginal for British respondents with extreme 
left-wing political views (1.4897). 
French citizens are more willing to transfer the immigration and asylum policies to 
the EU than British respondents as they feel that immigration is mishandled by 
132 French respondents with extreme left-wing political views are however marginally supporting the 
EU transfer of the defence policy. 
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successive French governments 133 and that in virtue of the principle of subsidiarity, 
immigration would be better controlled at the EU level. They feel that the EU - at 
least the type of EU they favour - would put in place a more restrictive and effective 
policy towards immigration from outside the EU than the French one,134 although 
they are critical of some of the agreements in place such as the Schengen agreements 
and its consequences for immigration. Furthermore, the importance of national 
sovereignty and national identity also explains the greater reticence of French 
individuals with right- and extreme right-wing political opinions towards the EU 
transfer of the immigration and asylum policy, although they (those with extreme 
right-wing political views though more marginally so) are in favour to this EU 
transfer. In the British context, British citizens have also placed immigration as one 
of their key concerns in the related period but more especially in the second part of 
the study period. 135 Although British respondents consider that the EU, at least the 
type of EU they favour, can playa role in the control of immigration and asylum in 
virtue of the principle of subsidiarity, 136 the importance of national sovereignty and 
national identity but also partly the mismanagement of illegal immigration in other 
EU countries such as Spain, France and Italy, and the important economic 
immigration of European nationals and residents to the United Kingdom in the study 
period explain their opposition to the EU transfer of this policy. Whilst the results 
obtained here cannot be directly compared to earlier research results as the present 
study constitutes a new line of enquiry, these results somewhat endorse the link 
between anti-immigration sentiments, general hostility towards other cultures and 
reluctance about European integration (De Vreese and Boomgarden, 2005; Kessler 
and Freeman, 2005; Lahav, 2004; Luedtke, 2005 and McLaren, 2002, 2007a) and 
the link between importance of national identity and reluctance about European 
integration (Kaltenthaler and Anderson, 2001; De Vries and Van Kersbergen, 2007; 
Carey, 2002; Hooghe and Marks, 2005; Christin and Trechsel, 2002; 
Kostakopoulou, 2001; McLaren, 2007b; Luedtke, 2005; and Marks and Hooghe, 
2003) especially in the British context. 
133 Throughout the 1990s and early 2000s, French respondents have been unhappy and ~~rried with 
the level of immigration to France. Immigration is one of the key concerns of French cltlzens as 
discussed in the Background chapter (chapter four) on France. 
134 France has one of the most liberal immigration policies in Europe. 
135 See background chapter (chapter four) on the United Kingdom. . . . 
136 One of the priorities of the EU was seen as developing a ~omm~n approach to lmmlgratlOn and 
crime (refer to Background chapter (chapter four) on the Untted Kmgdom). 
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When examining where the differences occur (see output in appendix 7.14A), there 
is no significant difference between French respondents with left-wing and centrist 
ideological opinions on Europeanizing the immigration and asylum policy. There is 
nonetheless a significant difference between French respondents with right- and left-
wing or centrist ideological views on Europeanizing the related policy. Although 
French interviewees with right-wing political views are less likely to support the EU 
transfer of this policy than those with left-wing or centrist political views, the size of 
the difference is small and they are all in favour of the Europeanization of the 
immigration and asylum policy. There are significant differences between British 
respondents with left-wing, centrist and right-wing ideological views on 
Europeanizing the immigration and asylum policy. British citizens with right-wing 
or even centrist ideological opinions are significantly more opposed to the 
Europeanization of the immigration and asylum policy than those with left-wing 
ideological opinions but the size of the difference tends to be relatively small: they 
are though all opposed to transferring the immigration and asylum policy to the EU. 
It should be underlined that there are significant differences between French or 
British respondents with extreme left- and left-wing political opinions and between 
extreme right- and right-wing political opinions on Europeanizing the immigration 
and asylum policy but the size of the difference is small. French respondents with 
extreme left-wing political views and to a lesser extent those with extreme right-
wing political views are supporting the EU transfer of the immigration and asylum 
policy but the support of the latter for this transfer is marginal (1.5088). British 
respondents with extreme right-wing political views and to a lesser extent those with 
extreme left-wing political views are opposed to the EU transfer of the immigration 
and asylum policy but the opposition of the latter to this transfer is marginal 
(1.4897). 
7.2.2.4 Police Policy (1999-2001) 
Taking into account the ideology of the respondent, French respondents are overall 
significantly less opposed to transferring the police policy to the EU than British 
respondents (the size of the difference is moderate). All means for French 
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respondents are below 1.50 (including extreme right and left) and as such all French 
respondents whatever their ideological views are opposed to transferring the police 
policy to the EU. All means for British respondents are below 1.50 and as such all 
British respondents whatever their ideological views are opposed to transferring the 
police policy to the EU. The reluctance of French and British respondents to 
transfer the police policy to the EU can be explained by national sovereignty 
concerns as police power is traditionally associated with the duty of the state. It can 
also be explained by the fact that respondents perceive crime policing to be best 
exercised at the national level rather than at the EU level. The role of the EU in this 
policy area is not completely denied as the EU is seen in principle as being able to 
help fight crime. 137 However the permeability of European borders - partly 
concomitant upon the principle of free movements of people, services and goods -
and the Schengen agreements implementationl38 are perceived by respondents as 
contributing to crime and law and order issues in both these nations. These two 
issues are somewhat instrumentalised as such by French political parties 
(particularly non-mainstream ones but also factions within mainstream parties) and 
by British political parties (both mainstream and non-mainstream ones). 
When examining where the differences occur (see output in appendix 7.15 A), there 
is no significant difference between French respondents with left-wing, centrist and 
right-wing ideological opinions on Europeanizing the police policy: they are all 
against the Europeanization of the police policy. There are significant differences 
between British respondents with left- and right-wing ideological views on 
Europeanizing the police policy. British citizens with right-wing ideological 
opinions are significantly more opposed to the Europeanization of the police policy 
than those with left-wing ideological opinions but the size of the difference tends to 
be relatively small: they are though all opposed to transferring the police policy to 
the EU. 
French respondents with extreme right-wing political opinions are not significantly 
more opposed to EU transfer of the police policy than those with right-wing political 
views, they are both against the EU transfer of this policy. French respondents with 
137 See background chapter (chapter four) on France and the United Kingdom. 
138 Or potential full implementation in the British context. 
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extreme left-wing political opinions are also not significantly more opposed to the 
EU transfer of the police policy than those with left-wing political views, 139 they are 
all against the EU transfer of this policy. British interviewees with extreme right-
wing political opinions are not significantly more opposed to the EU transfer of the 
police policy than those with right-wing political views: they are all clearly opposed 
to the EU transfer of this policy. British interviewees with extreme left-wing 
opinions are significantly more opposed to the EU transfer of the police policy than 
those with left-wing political views but the difference is small: they are all clearly 
opposed to the EU transfer of this policy. 
7.2.2.5 Anti-Drug Policy (1993-2001) 
Taking into account the ideology of the respondent, French respondents are overall 
significantly more in favour of transferring the anti-drug policy to the EU than 
British respondents (the size of the difference is between small and moderate). All 
means are above 1.50 and as such all British and French respondents whatever their 
ideological views are in favour of transferring the anti-drug policy to the EU. This 
may be explained by the fact that respondents perceive that the fight against drugs 
can be tackled more efficiently and effectively at the European level than at the 
national level. 
When examining where the differences occur (see output in appendix 7.16A), there 
are no significant differences between French respondents with left-wing, centrist 
and right-wing ideological views on Europeanizing the anti-drug policy: they are all 
clearly in favour of the Europeanization of this policy. There are though significant 
differences between British respondents with left-wing and centrist or right-wing 
ideological views on Europeanizing the anti-drug policy. British citizens with 
centrist or right-wing ideological opinions are significantly less in favour of the 
Europeanization of the anti-drug policy than those with left-wing ideological 
opinions but the size of the difference tends to be small: they are though all in favour 
of transferring this policy to the EU. This may be explained by the fact that British 
individuals with centrist and right-wing ideological views (and especially those with 
\39 Due to unbalanced sample sizes, the low power of the test, namely 33%, does not though enable 
us to detect any difference if it exists. 
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extreme right-wing ideological views) whilst they perceive the functional benefit of 
a European policy in this field, are perhaps concerned that a common policy in this 
area could be too liberal. The national sovereignty issue particularly for British 
respondents with centrist and right-wing political views 140 also acts as a brake on 
this EU transfer. 
It should be underlined that there are no significant differences between French or 
British respondents with extreme left- and left-wing political opinions on 
Europeanizing the anti-drug policy. There are significant differences between 
French or British respondents with extreme right- and right-wing political views on 
Europeanizing this policy but the size of the difference tends to be relatively small. 
They are all though supporting the EU transfer of the anti-drug policy. For British 
individuals with extreme right-wing political views, the support for the EU transfer 
of this policy is though more marginal (mean of 1.53). 
7.2.2.6 Urban and Juvenile Crime Prevention Policy (1999-2001) 
Taking into account the ideology of the respondent, French respondents are overall 
significantly less opposed to transferring the Urban and Juvenile Crime Prevention 
policy to the EU than British respondents (the size of the difference is between small 
and moderate). All means for French respondents are below 1.50 (including 
extreme right and left) and as such all French respondents whatever their ideological 
views are opposed to transferring the Urban and Juvenile Crime Prevention policy to 
the EU. All means for British respondents are below 1.50 and as such all British 
respondents whatever their ideological views are opposed to transferring the related 
policy to the EU. The reluctance of French and British respondents to transfer the 
Urban and Juvenile Crime Prevention policy to the EU can be explained by national 
sovereignty concerns as police power is traditionally associated with the duty of the 
state. It can also be explained by the fact that respondents perceive crime prevention 
policing to be best exercised at the national level rather than at the EU level. The 
role of the EU in this policy area is not completely denied as the EU is seen in 
principle as being able to help fight crime. 141 However the permeability of 
140 And more especially British individuals with extreme right-wing ideological views. 
141 See background chapter (chapter four) on France and the United Kingdom. 
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European borders - partly concomitant upon the principle of free movements of 
people, services and goods - and the Schengen agreements implementation 142 are 
perceived by respondents as contributing to crime and law and order issues in both 
these nations. These issues are somewhat instrumentalised as such by French 
political parties (particularly non-mainstream ones but also factions within 
mainstream parties) and by British political parties (both mainstream and non-
mainstream ones). 
When examining where the differences occur (see output in appendix 7.17 A), there 
is no significant difference between French respondents with left-wing, centrist and 
right-wing ideological opinions on Europeanizing the Urban and Juvenile Crime 
Prevention policy: they are all against the Europeanization of this policy. There are 
significant differences between British respondents with left- and right-wing 
ideological views on Europeanizing the Urban and Juvenile Crime Prevention 
policy. British citizens with right-wing ideological opinions ideological opinions 
are significantly more opposed to the Europeanization of the Urban and Juvenile 
Crime Prevention policy than those with left-wing ideological opinions but the size 
of the difference tends to be relatively small: they are though all opposed to 
transferring this policy to the EU. Furthermore, French respondents with extreme 
right- or extreme left-wing political opinions are not significantly more opposed to 
EU transfer of the Urban and Juvenile Crime Prevention policy than those with 
right- or left-wing political views: they are all against the EU transfer of this policy. 
British interviewees with extreme right- or extreme left-wing opinions are not 
significantly more opposed to the EU transfer of the Urban and Juvenile Crime 
Prevention policy than those with right- or left-wing political views: they are all 
clearly opposed to the EU transfer of this policy. 
7.3 Conclusion and Synthesis 
Inclinations towards a socio-economic model do structure EU policy preferences for 
French and British citizens. As demonstrated in the conclusions of the testing of 
hypothesis I and II, French and British individuals have experienced a significant 
142 Or potential full implementation in the British context. 
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drop in the level of support for the current EU membership and further European 
integration (drop though lower for French individuals) in the study period (1992-
2001), this due to a discontent with the outputs and political direction of the EU. 
This discontent is the consequence of utilitarian appraisals and ultimately the mark 
of the type of EU favoured by French and British nationals when interpreted in the 
national political, historical, economic, social and societal context. Whilst the 
results of the current research cannot be directly compared to earlier research results 
as the present study constitutes a new line of enquiry, these results endorse the fact 
that the national political, historical, economic, social and societal environment 
helps shape public opinion's views towards European integration and therefore 
confirm, for example, Voessing's (2005) and Ciftci's (2005) findings. The present 
results also support the fact that certain welfare states - such as the British more 
liberal welfare state - are less accepting of EU integration and therefore substantiate, 
for example, Brinegar and Jolly's (2005) and Hooghe and Marks' (2005) findings. 
Whilst the EU is criticized in the French context - in much of the political discourse 
of the left, centre and right - for promoting an excessive laissez-faire, free market 
economic policy opened to competition from low labour cost countries which 
endangers French jobs and social protection, French citizens with left-wing, centrist 
but also right-wing ideological opinions are though in principle in favour of 
transferring a range of policies such as employment, immigration and political 
asylum, social inclusion, environmental, scientific research, agriculture, currency 
management, defence, humanitarian aid, anti-drug, regional and foreign policies to 
the EU. On the evidence examined here and in the work of other authors (including 
polls), it seems plausible that they perceive that the EU - at least the EU model type 
they favour - may be best able to deal with these policies - subsidiarity principle -
and that French successive governments have failed to deal with some of these. 
French citizens subject this competency transfer to the EU adopting a more 
regulated capitalism path, with more interventionism in the economic and social 
sphere, privileging employment and social aspects including the principle of 
European preference. It is revealing to note that French citizens are not in favour of 
transferring health, education and cultural policies to the EU as they may perceive 
that French successive governments have relatively better dealt with these and that 
the national level may be best placed to cater for these. French nationals are also 
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opposed to the EU transfer of police and urban & juvenile crime prevention policies 
as they may perceive that the national level may be best placed to provide for these. 
This needs however to be further investigated. 
British opposition to European integration reflects somewhat a vision of the EU as a 
too interventionist, bureaucratic, over-regulated, somewhat uncompetitive and 
inflexible economic entity. The political role of the EU is also contested. In this 
perspective, the EU is deemed to threaten British economic growth and social 
progress accomplished throughout the study period as reinforced by the political 
discourse of much of the right but also partly of the centre and left. The importance 
of national sovereignty, a limited socialisation effect and a strong exclusive feeling 
of national identity bolster this opposition to European integration. In line with this, 
British respondents are opposed to the transfer to the EU of a number of policies 
such as immigration and political asylum, health, education, currency management, 
police and urban & juvenile crime prevention, employment, defence, cultural 
(policy), agriculture and social inclusion (the latter only for individuals with extreme 
right-wing ideological views). British citizens' opposition to the European Union is 
not a total opposition to any form of European Union but is grounded on a 
preference for an EU to embrace free market policies and cooperation between 
independent nation-states rather than supra-nationalism with its corollary of a super-
state. In virtue of the subsidiarity principle, British nationals with left-wing, centrist 
and right-wing political views thus support the competency transfer to the EU of 
policies such as environment, scientific research, humanitarian aid, regional, foreign, 
anti-drug and social inclusion policies. 143 
French and British Overall Conclusions 
It was hypothesized: 
HIlI While a preference for 'regulated capitalism' is associated with support for EU 
integration in France, a preference for a 'neo-liberal' socio-economic model is 
associated with opposition to EU integration in the United Kingdom. 
I·B Individuals with right-wing ideological opinions wish to transfer the social inclusion policy only 
very marginally to the European level. 
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Hypothesis III is accepted in the French context. There is therefore a relationship 
between citizens' preference for regulated capitalism and citizens' support for 
integration. French individuals largely irrespective of their left-wing, centrist or 
right-wing political opinions 144 are favourable to transferring a range of policies to 
the EU, from agriculture to scientific research, including employment, immigration 
and political asylum, social inclusion, environmental, currency management, 
defence, humanitarian aid, anti-drug, regional and foreign policies. Many of these 
policies in the French context reflect socio-economic priorities and inscribe 
themselves into the pursuit of regulated capitalism. Some of these policies have a 
redistributive nature - such as agriculture, social inclusion and regional policy -
some of these can have a central role in regulating markets for social purposes such 
as employment and currency management, while others such as environment 
protection, scientific research, anti-drug policy and humanitarian aid, whilst perhaps 
more consensual, can reflect a social agenda. French nationals whatever their 
ideological views are opposed to the EU transfer of health, education and cultural 
policies as they may perceive that French successive governments have relatively 
better dealt with these policies and that the national level- rather than the EU 
(subsidiarity principle) - may be best placed to cater for these. Furthermore, the EU 
transfer disapproval for the cultural policy may be partly explained by its link with 
national identity but also by the fear that the EU expenditure commitment in this 
policy area would be reduced. Finally, it is partly explained by the fear that more 
competitive rules at the EU level would apply to a cultural sector deemed different 
and beyond market economy mentality. 
Hypothesis III is accepted in the British context. There is a relationship between 
citizens' preference for neo-liberalism and citizens' opposition to integration. In 
virtue of a preference for neo-liberalism and the United Kingdom's relatively 
successful national outputs in the study period (but also importance of national 
sovereignty, national identity and a limited socialisation effect), British individuals 
largely irrespective of their left-wing, centrist or right-wing political opinions 1~5 are 
144 Differences between those with extreme left- and left-wing opinions or between those with 
extreme right- and right-wing political opinions also tend to be small. .. 
145 British individuals with left-wing political opinions tend to be however slgmficantly less opposed 
to the EU transfer of policies than those with right-wing or centrist political views. Differences 
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opposed to transferring a range of policies to the EU, from agriculture to 
immigration and political asylum, including employment, currency management, 
health, education, cultural, defence and social inclusion policies (the latter only for 
individuals with extreme right-wing ideological views). British nationals are in 
favour of transferring social inclusion (except the above), scientific research, 
humanitarian aid, anti-drug, foreign and regional policies to the EU as they perceive 
a functionality argument in doing so. Scientific research, humanitarian aid, foreign 
and regional policies are perceived to be also relatively less important and perhaps 
more consensual than other policies such as for example employment and currency 
management. British individuals with right-wing, centrist and to a lesser extent left-
wing political opinions are however concerned about the excessive interventionism 
and financial commitment that the EU may have in these fields, which could disturb 
the balance of competitive markets and in tum affect growth and employment. This 
divergence of views between French and British citizens is the consequence of a 
different perception of what the EU should be, in other words a divergence on the 
type of EU model they favour. British nationals are more in favour of neo-
liberalism rather than regulated capitalism, this affecting their opinions on the 
process of European integration. 
The willingness of French respondents to transfer the employment and currency 
management policies to the EU146 may be explained by the relative failure of French 
successive governments to address the continued relatively poor economic and 
social situation in France, more specifically the relatively high unemployment and 
lack of social mobility. It may also be explained by the belief that European 
integration - at least an EU which would put employment and social aspects at the 
core of its economic policies - can help to tackle this issue as publicized by French 
mainstream political parties in the second part of the 1990s, which lobbied partly 
successfully the EU to integrate growth, employment and social aspects as important 
priorities for the EU and counterbalance the stability pact requirements. The 
between those with extreme left- and left-wing opinions or between those with extreme right- and 
right-wing political opinions also tend to be. smalL.. . . 
146 Only French respondents with extreme nght-wmg VIews are margmally agamst the EU transfer of 
the employment policy. 
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functionality argument147 assisted by the socialisation effect and a low exclusive 
national identity explain the support of French individuals for the EU transfer of the 
related policies. British citizens with right-wing ideological opinions or even 
centrist ideological opinions are significantly more opposed to the Europeanization 
of the employment and currency policies than those with left-wing ideological 
opinions: they are though all opposed to transferring the employment and currency 
management policies to the EU. Whatever their ideological dispositions, British 
nationals are also more reluctant to transferring the employment and currency 
policies at the European level than French ones. This refusal to transfer those 
policies to the EU reflects for them the perceived lack of functionality of doing so at 
the European level, the importance of national sovereignty and national identity, a 
limited socialisation effect, and the lack of political party support. This refusal to 
transfer these policies to the EU is anchored in the overall preference of British 
citizens for neo-liberalism and the belief that the excessive economic and social 
interventionism of the EU would jeopardize the relatively healthy state of the British 
economy as instrumentalized by the political discourse of British mainstream 
parties. 
French respondents of any political views are in favour of the EU transfer of the 
agriculture policy.148 A reason which may explain the support of French 
respondents for the EU transfer of the agriculture policy is that they are in favour of 
French and European preference principle for agricultural products - as reinforced 
by the political discourse of all main French political parties (including extreme 
right) - with a view to satisfy socio-economic goals: that is to say guarantee 
farmers' income, self-sufficiency and protection against unfair global competition 
from low labour cost countries. French interviewees believe that the EU is best 
placed to fulfil this role - subsidiarity principle -. Nonetheless they are increasingly 
concerned 149 that the EU is increasingly eroding the European preference principle 
by opening French and European markets to deemed unfair non-EU competition and 
therefore reinforcing the effects of globalisation as publicized by public figures in 
147 EU considered as best able to tackle employment, management of the currency and the social 
agenda (subsidiarity principle). ... . . .. 
148 Except French respondents with extreme nght-wmg polItical VIews who are margmally agamst the 
EU transfer of the agriculture policy. 
149 As substantiated by polls in the study period (see Background chapter on France). 
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the political periphery such as Villiers, Chevenement, Le Pen, Hue or Emmanuelli. 
It follows from this that French citizens would like the EU to take a more regulated 
capitalism path, with more interventionism in the agricultural sphere with a view to 
safeguard French and European socio-economic interests. Contrary to French 
respondents, British respondents are overall in opposition to the EU transfer of the 
agriculture policy.15o British respondents are opposed to the EU transfer of the 
agriculture policy as they perceive the common agricultural policy (CAP) to be 
counterproductive and artificial - sheltering artificially European farmers from 
international competition -, bureaucratic, expensive and not giving value to end 
consumers. It is important to note that British citizens are subject to an almost 
unanimous political discourse of the Conservative Party, the Liberal Democrats and 
to a lesser extent the Labour Party which denounces as such the CAP as a too 
interventionist system disturbing market rules and producing expensive 
inefficiencies. These political parties tend to support the idea that European 
agricultural markets should be subject to the law of markets and therefore subject to 
international competition. The role of the EU for them (especially for those with 
right-wing and centrist views) should be purely to make sure that free competition 
occurs and that European farmers are enticed to become more competitive. British 
citizens with left- and especially extreme left-wing opinions may be though partly 
seduced by a common European agricultural policy which would give some 
guarantees of income to farmers. 
French individuals of any political opinions approve the EU transfer of the social 
inclusion policy. This may be explained by the fact that although they are critical of 
the current EU as deemed to neglect social aspects, they want the EU to adopt a 
generous European social policy as a key priority.15l In other words, they wish to 
see the establishment of a social Europe. The functionality argument at the 
European level plays here a role in this as in an integrated Europe, the EU may be 
considered by French respondents as best placed to harmonize the level of social 
protection - at a high level - in EU countries and enable European firms to compete 
on an equal playing field within Europe. If British respondents with left-wing or 
150 Except British respondents with extreme left-wing ideological opinions who are marginally in 
favour of the EU transfer of the agriculture policy. 
151 As substantiated by polls in the study period, see background chapter (chapter four) on France. 
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centrist political opinions also see a functionality argument in the ED transfer of the 
social inclusion policy and are more inclined towards it - with a view to acquiring 
greater social rights -, they are, like British respondents with right-wing political 
views, opposed to an extensive European social policy which would damage the 
relatively healthy British economic and social situation. It is an important point of 
divergence between the types of ED favoured by French and British respondents. 
French respondents of any ideological views support the ED transfer of the regional 
policy (those with extreme right-wing views more marginally). This may be 
explained by the fact that respondents perceive that transferring the regional policy 
at the European level can bring positive externalities or economies of scale -
including the facilitation of trade - and as such the ED level may be considered as 
best to deal with the regional policy especially in the context of one common 
European market (subsidiarity principle). The relative lower perceived importance 
of the regional policy - and perhaps its more consensual nature - compared to, for 
example, social policy or employment policy for French individuals, may also 
justify this transfer. British individuals of any political views also back the ED 
transfer of this policy for the same reasons although British individuals with left-
wing and centrist political views do more so as they may think that transferring the 
regional policy to the ED may contribute to increasing the public expenditure in this 
area. 
The ED transfer of the humanitarian aid, scientific research and environment 
policies is also approved by French respondents of any ideological views as the ED 
is perceived to be best to deal with issues pertaining to these policies. The latter are 
also deemed less important compared to policies such as, for example, employment 
152 h l' B" h and currency management and perhaps more consensual. In t e same me, ntIs 
individuals of all opinions approve this transfer of policies for the same reasons but 
they, particularly those with right-wing and centrist views, are more reluctant to 
transfer these at the ED level as they are concerned about the excessive 
interventionism and financial commitment that the ED may have in these fields, 
which could disturb the balance of competitive markets and in tum affect growth 
152 Albeit the degree of importance of humanitarian aid, scientific research and environment policies 
may vary between political ideologies. 
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and employment. This divergence of views between French and British citizens is 
the consequence of a different perception of what the EU should be, in other words 
divergence on the type of EU they favour. 
French citizens are not in favour of transferring the education and health policies to 
the EU as they may perceive that French successive governments have relatively 
better dealt with these policies and that the national level- rather than the EU (in 
virtue of the subsidiarity principle) - may be best placed to cater for these. The 
subsidiarity principle may also apply to explain British reluctance to transfer these 
policies to the EU. The fact that, in the second part of the 1990s, the Labour 
government has also increased its commitment to public services and to education 
and health in particular,153 has reduced somewhat the appeal that a common EU 
policy, especially for those with left-wing political views, could have on education 
and health. Furthermore, in the British and to a lesser extent in the French context 
(perhaps more so for French citizens with centrist and right-wing political opinions), 
British and French individuals may view the relative freedom of education to be 
potentially threatened by an EU transfer. 
French and British nationals are opposed to the EU transferring of the cultural policy 
as they perceive that transferring the cultural policy at the European level would 
bring limited functionality. In addition to functionality reasons, for British citizens, 
the link with national identity in this refusal is especially important but they, 
especially those with right-wing political views, may also fear an excessive 
expenditure commitment of the EU in this policy area. In addition to functionality 
reasons, for French respondents of all political opinions, this refusal may be partly 
explained by the link with national identity but also by the fear that the EU 
expenditure commitment in this policy area would be reduced. The fear that more 
competitive rules at the EU level would apply to a cultural sector deemed different 
and beyond a market economy mentality, may also partly explain this refusal. 
British and French respondents whatever their ideological views are in favour of 
transferring the foreign policy to the EU because of the functionality its offers at the 
European level but also because of its relatively lower importance compared to other 
153 Including the Labour Government's commitment to raise public services expenditure further in the 
post 2001 period. 
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policies such as for example employment, education or health. Traditionally 
citizens also show more tolerance (and more freedom of action for governments) 
towards the management of foreign policy issues - except in the case of war - than 
towards the management of domestic issues. 154 British individuals with right-wing 
ideological views (and especially those with extreme right-wing ideological views) 
and to a lesser extent those with centrist ideological views are less inclined to this 
transfer than British citizens with left-wing ideological opinions. The rationale 
behind this is that whilst they perceive the positive externalities and economies of 
scale that a European foreign policy can bring, they are perhaps more concerned that 
a common policy in this area could neglect somewhat the link with the USA and 
Commonwealth countries such as Australia and Canada which are converging 
economically and socially with the United Kingdom. The national sovereignty issue 
particularly for British respondents with right-wing political views 155 also acts as a 
brake on this EU transfer. 
French respondents are in favour of transferring the defence policy to the EU, except 
those with extreme right-wing views opposing this transfer, and those with right-
wing political opinions or with extreme left-wing political opinions supporting the 
EU transfer more marginally. The perceived functionality of the related policy at 
the European level justifies this as the fact that the defence policy is also not seen as 
a national priority - in a time of peace - compared to other policies such as 
employment policy, health and education for individuals. For French individuals 
with right-wing political views and more especially those with extreme right-wing 
political views, the EU transfer of the defence policy is nevertheless less popular as 
the latter is associated with the national sovereignty issue and more especially with 
the preservation of national independence. These issues are instrumentalised in the 
political discourse of extreme right- and right-wing parties such as FN, MNR, MPF 
and to a lesser extent RPR. For French individuals with extreme left-wing political 
views, the EU transfer is also less popular as in symbiosis with the discourse of 
154 The harsher current international political climate may have though contributed to restrict the 
freedom of action granted to national governments on the management of foreign policy iss~es, and 
by extension may itself constrain the further develop~ent and r~alizati?~ of a European forelg~. 
security and defence policy today - especially for partIcular pohcy declSlons. Nevertheless, thIS 
needs to be further investigated. 
155 And more especially British individuals with extreme right-wing views, who are marginally in 
favour of the EU transfer of the foreign policy (mean of 1. 5128). 
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extreme left political parties, the defence policy has for them very low importance in 
the national context as in the European context - they moreover favour a policy of 
demilitarisation. As far as British respondents are concerned, whatever their 
ideological views, they are opposed to transferring the defence policy to the EU. In 
the British context, whilst the perspective of positive externalities or economies of 
scale in the EU transfer of this policy may have some appeal especially for 
individuals with left-wing political opinions, the issue of national sovereignty and 
national independence takes special importance in the refusal to transfer this policy 
at the EU level, more so for individuals with right-wing (including extreme right) 
and centrist political views. 
French respondents whatever their ideological views are in favour of transferring the 
immigration and asylum policy to the EU 156 while all British respondents whatever 
their ideological views are opposed to transferring the immigration and asylum 
policy to the EU. 157 French citizens are more willing to transfer the immigration and 
asylum policies to the EU than British respondents as they feel that immigration is 
mishandled by successive French governments 158 and that in virtue of the principle 
of subsidiarity, immigration would be better controlled at the EU level. They feel 
that the EU - at least the type of EU they favour - would put in place a more 
restrictive and effective policy towards immigration from outside the EU than the 
French one,159 although they are critical of some of the agreements in place such as 
the Schengen agreements and its consequences on immigration. Furthermore the 
importance of national sovereignty and national identity also explains the greater 
reticence of French individuals with right- and extreme right-wing political opinions 
towards the EU transfer of the immigration and asylum policy, although they (those 
with extreme right-wing political views though more marginally so) are in favour to 
this EU transfer. In the British context, British citizens have also placed 
immigration as one of their key concerns in the related period but more especially in 
156 Including French respondents with extreme right-wing views but more marginal support for the 
EU transfer of the immigration and asylum policy for them. . .. 
157 Including British respondents with extreme left-wing political views but more margmal oppOSition 
to the EU transfer of the immigration and asylum policy for them. . . 
158 Throughout the 1990s and early 2000s, French respondents have been unhappy and ~.orned With 
the level of immigration to France. Immigration is one of the key concerns of French citizens as 
discussed in the Background chapter (chapter four) on France. 
159 France has one of the most liberal immigration policies in Europe. 
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the second part of the study period. 160 Although British respondents consider that 
the EU, at least the type of EU they favour, can playa role in the control of 
immigration and asylum in virtue of the principle of subsidiarity, 161 the importance 
of national sovereignty and national identity but also partly the mismanagement of 
illegal immigration in other EU countries such as Spain, France and Italy, and the 
important economic immigration of European nationals and residents to the United 
Kingdom in the study period explain their opposition to the EU transfer of this 
policy. 
French and British respondents whatever their political opinions (including those 
with extreme political views) are opposed to the transfer of police and urban & 
juvenile crime prevention policies to the EU. French nationals are though 
significantly less opposed to this transfer than British ones. The reluctance of 
French and British respondents to transfer the related policies to the EU can be 
accounted for by national sovereignty concerns as police and urban & juvenile crime 
prevention policies are traditionally associated with the duty of the state. It can also 
be explained by the fact that respondents perceive crime fighting and prevention 
policing to be best exercised at the national level rather than at the EU level. The 
role of the EU in this policy area is not completely denied as the EU is seen in 
principle as being able to help fight crime. 162 However the permeability of 
European borders - partly concomitant upon the principle of free movements of 
. I . 163 people, services and goods - and the Schengen agreements Imp ementatlon are 
perceived by respondents as contributing to crime and law and order issues in both 
these nations. These two issues are somewhat instrumentalised as such by French 
political parties (particularly non-mainstream ones but also factions within 
mainstream parties) and by British political parties (both mainstream and non-
mainstream ones). 
160 See background chapter (chapter four) on the United Kingdom. . . . 
161 One of the priorities of the EU was seen as developing a common approach to ImmlgratlOn and 
crime (refer to Background chapter (chapter four) on the United Kingdom). 
162 See background chapter (chapter four) on France and the United Kingdom. 
163 Or potential full implementation in the British context. 
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Finally, French and British respondents whatever their political opinions 164 favour 
the transfer of the anti-drug policy to the EU. French nationals are though 
significantly more in favour of this transfer than British ones. The willingness of 
French and British respondents to transfer the related policy may be vindicated by 
the fact that respondents perceive that the fight against drugs can be tackled more 
efficiently and effectively at the European level than at the national level. The 
significant lower support of British individuals with centrist and right-wing political 
views for the EU transfer of the anti-drug policy compared to those with left-wing 
political opinions may be explained by the fact that the former (and especially those 
with extreme right-wing ideological views) whilst perceiving the functional benefit 
of a European policy in this field, are perhaps concerned that a common policy in 
this area could be too liberal. The national sovereignty issue, particularly for British 
respondents with centrist and right-wing political views,165 also acts as a brake on 
this EU transfer. 
164 I I d'ng French and British respondents with extreme political views. Neverthe~ess the support 
for t~~ ~~ transfer of the anti-drug policy is more marginal for British individuals wlth extreme 
ri~ht-wing views. . . . . II . 
165 And more especially British individuals with extreme nght-wmg Vlews, who are margma yIn 
favour of the EU transfer of the anti-drug policy (mean of l.53). 
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8- CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS 
The present research forms a break with much of the previous research into public 
opinion on European integration, which followed a holistic, cross-national approach 
at the aggregate or individual level with a view to uncovering cross-national vectors 
of explanation. Whilst this type of approach is itself useful and valuable for 
identifying common denominators of EU support and informing national and EU 
decision makers, it does not take adequate account of the cultural historical , , 
economic, social, and political specificities of each nation, which can be the key to 
explaining public opinion about EU integration. The environmental context of each 
nation nevertheless contributes greatly to shaping opinion (see for example Taggart, 
2006; Voessing, 2005). The present research acknowledged this by carrying out a 
comprehensive comparative analysis of French and British public opinion on the EU 
in a period of significant changes brought out by European integration (that is to say 
from 1992 to 2001). It examined in particular the effects of national and individual 
utilitarian appraisals on EU support and considered whether attachments to different 
socio-economic models structure the policy preferences of French and British 
citizens with regard to the EU. 
Besides the novelty of doing a Franco-British comparative study in the period from 
1992-2001 - relying on creative hypotheses - the present thesis corrects some 
previous distortions, offers a more rigorous treatment of the effect of utilitarian 
explanations on EU support than past research has done and provides some 
methodological enhancements. Thus, the effect of utilitarian explanations is 
considered in relation to evaluations of both current EU membership and further 
European integration at both the individual and aggregate data levels. Current EU 
membership is gauged through the use of both EU benefit and membership 
dependent variables which provide a more precise and discriminating appraisal of 
current EU membership support, capturing in the process a fuller range of 
underlying attitudes. 
The utilization of the seven point future integration dependent variable specifies 
views in a more precise way than the dependent variables used in other studies. 
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Where possible, middle category answers ("don't know" and "neither good nor 
bad") are also integrated in the statistical treatment. While this has provided some 
methodological enhancements from what has been done previously, it does not take 
full account of the "don't know" answers. Given the modelling of "don't know" in 
the present analysis, this does not lead to major distortions in the results but 
nevertheless the full treatment of "don't know" answers can be a fruitful line of 
enquiry in its own right for future research. The mixture of aggregate and individual 
data level analyses involving a range of diverse data, combined with the mutual 
reinforcement and complementarity of hypotheses tested in the study, is not only 
suited to the objectives and purpose of the research but also enhances its validity. 
Moreover, the present analysis incorporates not only the study of attitudinal patterns 
(that is to say, citizens' perceptions regarding European and national economic, 
social and political factors) but also assessment of the relationship between actual 
data and support for integration. Finally, another benefit of the current research is 
that it encompasses meticulous and exhaustive statistical modelling and subsumes 
original variables (or new ways of operationalising variables) in the analysis: for 
example integration of immigration, crime, bureaucracy and tax burden in 
hypothesis I, incorporation of varied subjective economic performance evaluation 
variables in hypothesis II, and integration of a comprehensive range of policies 
operationalised in a novel manner with directional content of policies in hypothesis 
III. 
The present research has confirmed earlier findings (for example Gabel, 1998a; 
Sanchez-Cuenca, 2000; Eichenberg and Dalton,1993; Anderson and Kaltenthaler, 
1996; Kritzinger, 2003 and Angelucci, 1993) that utilitarian appraisals playa role in 
forming public opinion about the EU and that citizens use national proxies to 
express attitudes towards the EU. However, what the present research has shown is 
that in a context of increased visibility and politicisation of the EU in France and the 
United Kingdom in the period from 1992 to 2001, utilitarian appraisals about the EU 
have assumed increasing importance in moulding citizens' attitudes towards the EU, 
increasingly eroding affective EU support - especially in the case of France where 
the latter is more developed. The socialisation theory as an explanation of public 
support for EU membership and to a lesser extent for further EU integration is 
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therefore losing weight and giving way to economic, social and societal assessments 
of how the EU is affecting nation states and individuals. The significant drop in the 
level of support for current EU membership and further integration in France and the 
United Kingdom in the study period - the fall has though been greater in the United 
Kingdom than in France - is the result of discontent with the perceived contribution 
of the EU to the national and individual economic and social situations. This is a 
reflection of the fact that both countries favour a change of political direction in the 
EU to cater for their own policy concerns. 
Thus if the level of support for the incumbent government, the socialisation effect 
and the relatively low sense of exclusive national identity among French citizens 
partly explain French public support for current EU membership and further 
integration, the effect of socialisation on EU support is nevertheless giving way to 
national economic and social assessments, as underlined above. French citizens are 
preoccupied by the persistent problems of their country, and perceive the EU, and 
more particularly a neo-liberal EU, as contributing to those problems. These 
perceptions feed on, and into, a growing politicisation and protest in relation to 
European integration. 
Nevertheless, regarding the results of hypothesis III, French citizens with left-wing, 
centrist or even right-wing ideological opinions are in principle in favour of 
transferring policies such as employment, immigration and asylum, social inclusion, 
environment, scientific research, agriculture, currency management, defence, 
humanitarian aid, anti-drug, regional and foreign policies to the EU. On the 
evidence examined and in the work of other authors (including polls), it seems 
probable that they view the EU - at least the EU model that they favour - as best 
able to deal with these policies, 166 while they see successive French governments as 
having failed to deal effectively with some of them. French citizens would like the 
EU to move towards a more regulated model of capitalism, with more 
interventionism in the economic and social spheres. However, French citizens are 
not in favour of transferring health, education and cultural policies to the EU, 
perhaps because they perceive that French governments have dealt relatively better 
with these and that the national level may be most appropriate for them. French 
166 This is tantamount to the subsidiarity principle. 
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nationals are also opposed to transferring police and urban & juvenile crime 
prevention policies to the EU, which likewise implies an assumption that the 
national level is best placed to provide for these. However, this needs further 
investigation. 
British opposition to further integration and to a lesser extent to current EU 
membership to some extent reflects a perception of the EU as an excessively 
interventionist, bureaucratic, over-regulated, somewhat uncompetitive and inflexible 
economic entity. The political role of the EU is also contested. In this stance, the 
EU is deemed to threaten British economic growth and social progress accomplished 
throughout the study period. This view is reinforced by the political discourse of 
much of the right but also partly of the centre and left. The importance of national 
sovereignty, a limited socialisation effect and a strong exclusive feeling of national 
identity bolster opposition to further integration and to a lesser extent the current 
EU. British citizens' opposition to the European Union is not a total opposition to 
any form of European Union but is grounded on a preference for an EU embracing 
free market policies and co-operation between independent nation-states rather than 
supra-nationalism with its corollary of a superstate. 
In this perspective, British political discourse in the media 167 tends to underline the 
opportunities that the single European market offers British firms: for example, in 
terms of employment. Firms can benefit in the United Kingdom from a more 
favourable, competitive, company- and job-friendly environment and as such can 
benefit from the single European market. The results of Hypothesis III demonstrate 
that British respondents do not wish to transfer competency to the EU in a number 
of policy areas, such as immigration and asylum, health, education, police, urban 
and juvenile crime prevention, currency management, employment, defence, culture, 
agriculture and social inclusion (though the latter opinion is held only by individuals 
with extreme right-wing views). Yet, largely irrespective of their ideological 
leanings, British nationals support, in virtue of the subsidiarity principle, the 
167 Especially regarding the role of the incumbent government in the management of the EU at the 
time. 
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competency transfer to the ED of policies such as environment, scientific research, 
humanitarian aid, anti-drug, regional, foreign and social inclusion policies. 168 
The results of the present research have highlighted the fact that much of the earlier 
research (for example Sanchez-Cuenca, 2000; Gabel, 1998a and Hix, 2007) has 
offered too simple a view of the relationship between citizens and the EU. The 
nature of ED support itself - current EU membership and further European 
integration examined separately - the specific policy aspect considered - for 
example crime level, unemployment and corruption - and the domestic environment 
in which these are interpreted and connected, have not been considered sufficiently. 
Although individuals may not have a sophisticated knowledge of the EU, they are 
able to use information shortcuts from their social and political environment to 
express their attitudes towards the EU. 
The literature has perhaps over-emphasized the influence of political parties on 
voters. The growing visibility and impact of the EU on citizens in the 1990s have 
also increasingly enabled citizens to be less dependent on party cues and to see for 
themselves the policy consequences of European integration. The utilitarian 
argument can certainly be a vector of support for current EU membership and future 
European integration in both the French and British contexts - more so in the former 
- but this vector of support is ultimately circumscribed by the subsidiarity principle 
and the type of EU model favoured by French and British individuals. The French 
prefer a widely integrated EU based on a regulated capitalism model with a high 
level of social protection and where the principle of European preference is 
espoused. The British preference is for the EU to be a loose intergovernmental 
association of nations where neo-liberalism and free trade rules prevail. 
The present research has political implications, policy implications and some 
predictive value. Among the main political implications of this research is that the 
ED is increasingly evaluated according to an obligation of (good) economic and 
social results in the eyes of the British and French citizens, which should materialize 
at the national level so as to elicit public support for current EU membership and 
further integration. This implication is even more important and perhaps more 
168 Individuals with right-wing ideological opinions wish to transfer the social inclusion policy only 
very marginally to the European level. 
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worrying in the British context as ED entry and continued membership have been 
primarily justified by the economic argument. Lack of economic and social 
achievements may threaten further European integration - as was demonstrated in 
the 2005 referendum failure on the European constitution in France l69 (Ipsos-Le 
Figaro, 29 May 2005). The results of the present research also give some credence 
to the CIA's prediction (2005) that the ED may even splinter or disintegrate in the 
long term if it is perceived as failing to generate economic and social progress. 
Another political implication of the present research is that British pro-European 
politicians need to counterbalance the economic argument that they developed for 
continued ED participation by working with other actors in the education, media, 
sport and commercial fields, and more generally with civil society, to argue the case 
for European integration not just on pragmatic grounds but also as a positive value. 
This would require espousing the notion of compatibility of British collective 
identity with the European one and the European democratic ideal. In the French 
context, if the socialisation effect - including the compatibility and affective link of 
French identity with the European one - provides some cushioning effect for poor 
economic and social results on public EU support, EU and national decision-makers 
ought to reflect on actions which may undermine that effect: the potential entry of 
Turkey into the ED is one illustration of this as it is seen not just as a threat to the 
economy and society of France and the ED but also as an identity threat (Ipsos-Le 
Figaro, 27 September 2004; Ipsos-Le Figaro, 9 December 2002; Ipsos-Canal Ipsos, 
10 December 2001). The scope and nature of affective EU support may be, 
moreover, an interesting area for future research in its own right. 
The importance of the utilitarian element in public ED support points to the need for 
a result-oriented and democratically-led EU. Public consultation on EU policy 
should therefore occur more often and take multiple forms, from the elaboration of 
the policy to its implementation and monitoring. Respecting the principle of 
subsidiarity is particularly important in this area and inherently connected with a 
result-oriented ED. 
169 The rejection of the EU constitution was also linked to a French preference for a constitution 
giving more space to social aspects. 
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In tenns of policy implications, this dissertation has demonstrated that French and 
British citizens back two different types of EU which are at odds with the concept of 
one integrated Europe with common objectives and policies applying to all 
simultaneously or at different time periods - a multi-speed Europe is therefore 
unpropitious here. A multi-track Europe and especially an a la carte Europe appear 
more relevant to the French and British contexts. An a la carte Europe seems to fit 
the British public preference best as it is a more minimalist, intergovernmental mode 
of integration, but a multi-track Europe also offers some appeal for policies where 
there are strong utilitarian grounds for integrating a particular policy at the European 
level (see for example Stubb,1996; Koellicker, 2001 for a categorisation of 
differentiated integration). A multi-track mode of European integration is suitable to 
the French context as it can enable France to proceed further along the line of 
economic and social integration as wished by public opinion without being 
prevented from doing so or slowed down by the regular decision-making structure of 
the Union or by particular unwilling nations. 
Although differentiated integration could help to deal with the differences between 
French and British aspirations, the results of this research highlight the difficulty of 
reconciling the French preference for regulated capitalism with the British one for 
neo-liberalism and free trade rules at the EU level (coupled with different integration 
arrangements), although the problem is moderated by the utilitarian element. 
Managing the gap between the two sets of national preferences at the EU level thus 
translates into concrete policy choices: for example, European protectionism versus 
unhampered free trade; expansionary or contractionary public expenditure; strict or 
soft market regulations; flexible labour market or not; or even foreign policy where 
the relationship with the United States is a subject of debate. 
In the 1990s, the EU-related changes in national policies towards more deregulation, 
liberalisation - in for example financial markets, telecommunications, air transport 
and to a lesser extent in agriculture - and (greater) macro-economic discipline 
affected France relatively more than the United Kingdom. They were often in place 
in the UK before EU intervention and were also inspired partly by the UK's own 
experience. These changes have, nevertheless, been counterbalanced by the 
emergence of a European social policy (based on the social chapter and the focus on 
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growth, employment and anti-discrimination measures in European policies) partly 
influenced by France's experience. Overall, though, France underwent greater 
changes in policies and practices as a result of EU actions than the United Kingdom. 
Yet, British public opinion still perceives the EU as undemocratic, bureaucratic, too 
interventionist, and value disenhancing. Thus, in effect, the British public sees these 
changes as not far-reaching enough, whilst French public opinion sees the EU as too 
liberal, deregulated and excessively open to world competition and perceives these 
changes as contributing to France's economic and social problems. The EU seems 
therefore to be caught between incompatible sets of national preferences, so that the 
direction of integration to some extent displeases both British and French public 
opinion. This could itself threaten the sustainability of the EU (and lead to its 
fragmentation) in the long term, especially if it is not seen to produce positive 
national economic and social results which could soothe discontent. 
Future research may extend the current research into the post 2001 period and apply 
it to other specific national and even regional contexts. Today's polls (FT-Harris, 14 
March 2007, 25 January 2007) seem nevertheless to confirm the importance of the 
utilitarian dimension in EU attitudes and suggest a preference for different types of 
EU model across nations. Thus, according to these polls, there is still relatively 
strong discontent with the output of the EU in France and the UK, as well as in other 
EU countries such as Germany, Italy and to a lesser extent Spain. Yet there is a 
willingness among French, Italian, Spanish, German and to a lesser extent British 
publics to support greater EU involvement in the economic and social spheres, 
although preferences concerning the nature and scope of this involvement may vary 
from one national public to another - especially between France and the United 
Kingdom. 
Given the primacy of the utilitarian dimension in public opinion and the problem of 
compatibility between the models of integration favoured by different national 
publics, EU policy makers need to devise flexible modes of integration which satisfy 
both national publics but also achieve positive outcomes in the economic and social 
spheres. The interaction between these two legitimators of European integration is 
made more complex by two factors. Firstly, the relationship between performance 
and European integration model type is one of only partial compensation between 
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each element as both are complementary to the legitimacy of the EU for national 
publics. Thus a deficiency in the type of integration model followed can be partly 
offset by performance, and vice versa. Secondly, the relationship between the 
related criteria of EU legitimacy is one of partial displacement for national public 
opinion: resolving a legitimacy deficit in one area can displace the problem onto 
another - thus resolving a performance problem by extending the EU's scope into 
adjacent functional areas or increasing the use of majority voting in the council of 
ministers may exacerbate a legitimacy deficit in the type of European integration 
model favoured by national publics. Managing the EU justification criteria is made 
even more difficult by the fact that the size of the EU's membership and the scope of 
the EU's authority continue to change. The management of these dilemmas requires 
skilful public policies with national populations - rather than intra-European elites-
as the addressees of legitimacy claims. 
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Appendix 1.1 
Table 1.1: EU Membership: Good Thing - Bad Thing 1992-2001 
France and UK variable * Q18 EU MEMBERSHIP· GOOD/BAD Crosstabulation 
Q18 EU MEMBERSHIP - GOOD/BAD 
Neither good 
a good thing nor bad A bad thing Total 
France and France Count 5180 2969 1388 9537 
UK variable % within France 
and UK variable 54.3% 31.1% 14.6% 100.0% 
% of Total 24.6% 14.1% 6.6% 45.3% 
UK Count 4941 3661 2898 11500 
% within France 
43.0% and UK variable 31.8% 25.2% 100.0% 
% of Total 23.5% 17.4% 13.8% 54.7% 
Total Count 10121 6630 4286 21037 
% within France 
48.1% 31.5% 20.4% 100.0% and UK variable 
% of Total 48.1% 31.5% 20.4% 100.0% 
Source: Eurobarometer 
Table 1.2: Country Benefit From EU Membership 1992-2001 
France and UK variable * benefit variable with dk as middle category Crosstabulation 
benefit variable with dk as middle 
cate~ory 
benefitted dk not benefitted Total 
France and France Count 4609 2095 3301 10005 
UK variable % within France 33.0% 100.0% 
and UK variable 46.1% 20.9% 
% of Total 20.0% 9.1% 14.4% 43.5% 
UK Count 4650 2769 5576 12995 
% within France 35.8% 21.3% 42.9% 100.0% 
and UK variable 
% of Total 20.2% 12.0% 24.2% 56.5% 
Total Count 9259 4864 8877 23000 
% within France 40.3% 21.1% 38.6% 100.0% 
and UK variable 
% of Total 40.3% 21.1% 38.6% 100.0% 
Source: Eurobarometer 
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Table 1.3: Support for the Euro 1992-2001 
France and UK variable * Q31 EU PROPOSALS: SINGLE CURRENCY Crosstabulation 
031 EU PROPOSALS: SINGLE 
CURRENCY 
For DK Against Total France and France Count 6284 716 3004 10004 UK variable % within France 
and UK variable 62.8% 7.2% 30.0% 100.0% 
% of Total 27.4% 3.1% 13.1% 43.6% 
UK Count 3862 1625 7466 12953 
% within France 
and UK variable 29.8% 12.5% 57.6% 100.0% 
% of Total 16.8% 7.1% 32.5% 56.4% 
Total Count 10146 2341 10470 22957 
% within France 
44.2% 10.2% 45.6% 100.0% and UK variable 
% of Total 44.2% 10.2% 45.6% 100.0% 
Source: Eurobarometer 
Table 1.4: Support for EU Enlargement 2000-2001 
France and UK variable * Q31 EU PROPOSALS: ENLARGEMENT Crosstabulation 
031 EU PROPOSALS: 
ENLARGEMENT 
For DK Aqainst Total 
France and France Count 743 297 966 2006 
UK variable % within France 
37.0% 14.8% 48.2% 100.0% 
and UK variable 
% of Total 16.1% 6.4% 21.0% 43.5% 
UK Count 945 756 900 2601 
% within France 36.3% 29.1% 34.6% 100.0% 
and UK variable 
% of Total 20.5% 16.4% 19.5% 56.5% 
Total Count 1688 1053 1866 4607 
% within France 36.6% 22.9% 40.5% 100.0% 
and UK variable 
% of Total 36.6% 22.9% 40.5% 100.0% 
Source: Eurobarometer 
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Table 1.5: Enlargement, Priority for the EU 1997-2001 
France and UK variable 1< Q31bb EU PRIORITIES: NEW MEMBER COUNTRIES Crosstabulation 
031bb EU PRIORITIES: NEW 
MEMBER COUNTRIES 
Priority DK Not a priority Total 
France and France Count 907 331 3767 5005 
UK variable % within France 
and UK variable 18.1% 6.6% 75.3% 100.0% 
% of Total 7.9% 2.9% 32.7% 43.5% 
UK Count 1947 1082 3473 6502 
% within France 
29.9% 16.6% 53.4% 100.0% 
and UK variable 
% of Total 16.9% 9.4% 30.2% 56.5% 
Total Count 2854 1413 7240 11507 
% within France 
24.8% 12.3% 62.9% 100.0% 
and UK variable 
% of Total 24.8% 12.3% 62.9% 100.0% 
Source: Eurobarometer 
Table 1.6: Desired European Unification Speed 1992-2001 
Statistics 
021 EUROP UNIFICATION SPEED - PREFERENCE 
France N Valid 9095 
Missing 910 
Mean 3.20 
Std. Deviation 1.690 
Minimum 1 
Maximum 7 
UK N Valid 10655 
Missing 2347 
Mean 3.92 
Std. Deviation 1.874 
Minimum 1 
Maximum 7 
Source: Eurobarometer 
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Scale reliability analysis with "don't know" answer in benefit variable 
Reliability Statistics 
Cronbach's 
Alpha Based 
on 
Cronbach's Standardized 
Alpha Items N of Items 
.832 .856 2 
Item Statistics 
Mean Std. Deviation N 
benefit var with DK 1.6582 .25292 120 
q17aa DV: good thing 1.4814 .18459 120 
Inter-Item Correlation Matrix 
benefit var q17aa DV: 
with DK good thing 
benefit var with DK 1.000 .748 
q17aa DV: good thing .748 1.000 
The covariance matrix is calculated and used in the analysis. 
Item-Total Statistics 
Scale Corrected Squared Cronbach's 
Scale Mean if Variance if Item-Total Multiple Alpha if Item 
Item Deleted Item Deleted Correlation Correlation Deleted 
benefit var with DK 1.4814 .034 .748 .560 
q17aa DV: good thing 1.6582 .064 .748 .560 
a. The value is negative due to a negative average covariance among items. This violates reliability 
model assumptions. You may want to check item codings. 
Scale Statistics 
Mean Variance Std. Deviation N of Items 
3.1396 .168 .40977 2 
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Scale reliability analysis without "don't know" answer in benefit variable 
Reliability Statistics 
Cronbach's 
Alpha Based 
on 
Cronbach's Standardized 
Alpha Items N of Items 
.851 .868 2 
Item Statistics 
Mean Std. Deviation N 
q17aa DV: good thing 1.4814 .18459 120 
benefit variable 
without OK 1.3027 .14222 120 
Inter-Item Correlation Matrix 
benefit 
q17aa DV: variable 
good thin~ without OK 
q17aa DV: good thing 1.000 .767 
benefit variable 
.767 1.000 without OK 
The covariance matrix is calculated and used in the analysis. 
Item·Total Statistics 
Scale Corrected Squared Cronbach's 
Scale Mean if Variance if Item-Total Multiple Alpha if Item 
Item Deleted Item Deleted Correlation Correlation Deleted 
q17aa DV: good thing 1.3027 .020 .767 .588 
benefit variable 
without DK 1.4814 .034 .767 .588 
a. The value is negative due to a negative average covariance among items. This violates reliability 
model assumptions. You may want to check item codings. 
Scale Statistics 
Mean Variance Std. Deviation N of Items 
2.7841 .095 .30750 2 
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Appendix 3.2 
Scale reliability analysis with "don't know" answer in benefit variable 
Reliability Statistics 
Cronbach's 
Alpha Based 
on 
Cronbach's Standardized 
France and UK variable Alpha Items N of Items 
France 
.662 .671 2 
UK 
.745 .749 2 
Item Statistics 
France and UK variable Mean Std. Deviation N 
France 018 EU MEMBERSHIP 
1.6024 .72845 9537.32 
- GOOD/BAD 
benefit variable with dk 
1.8609 .89000 9537.32 
as middle category 
UK 018 EU MEMBERSHIP 1.8223 .80627 11496.51 
- GOOD/BAD 
benefit variable with dk 
2.0641 .91334 11496.51 
as middle category 
Inter-Item Correlation Matrix 
018 EU benefit 
MEMBERS variable with 
HIP - dk as middle 
France and UK variable GOOD/BAD category 
France 018 EU MEMBERSHIP 1.000 .504 
- GOOD/BAD 
benefit variable with dk 
.504 1.000 
as middle category 
UK 018 EU MEMBERSHIP 
- GOOD/BAD 
1.000 .598 
benefit variable with dk 
.598 1.000 
as middle category 
The covariance matrix is calculated and used In the analYSIS. 
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Item-Total Statistics 
Scale Corrected Squared Cronbach's 
Scale Mean if Variance if Item-Total Multiple Alpha if Item 
France and UK variable Item Deleted Item Deleted Correlation Correlation Deleted 
France 018 EU 
a 
MEMBERSHIP - 1.8609 .792 .504 .254 
GOOD/BAD 
benefit variable 
a 
with dk as middle 1.6024 .531 .504 .254 . , 
category I 
UK 018 EU 
a 
MEMBERSHIP - 2.0641 .834 .598 .358 
GOOD/BAD 
benefit variable 
a 
with dk as middle 1.8223 .650 .598 .358 
category 
-
a. The value is negative due to a negative average covariance among items. This violates reliability model assumptions. 
You may want to check item codings. 
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Scale Statistics 
France and UK variable Mean Variance Std. Deviation N of Items 
France 3.4633 1.977 1.40596 2 
UK 3.8864 2.365 1.53799 2 
Scale reliability analysis without "don't know" answer in benefit variable 
Reliability Statistics 
Cronbach's 
Alpha Based 
on 
Cronbach's Standardized 
France and UK variable Alpha Items N of Items 
France .664 .703 2 
UK .712 .772 2 
Item Statistics 
France and UK variable Mean Std. Deviation N 
France 018 EU MEMBERSHIP 1.59 .750 7738.22 
- GOOD/BAD 
019 EU MEMBERSHIP 1.41 .493 7738.22 
- COUNTRY BENEFIT 
UK 018 EU MEMBERSHIP 1.84 .837 9636.78 
- GOOD/BAD 
019 EU MEMBERSHIP 1.54 .499 9636.78 
- COUNTRY BENEFIT 
Inter-Item Correlation Matrix 
018 EU 019 EU 
MEMBERS MEMBERSHIP 
HIP - - COUNTRY 
France and UK variable GOOD/BAD BENEFIT 
France 018 EU MEMBERSHIP 1.000 .542 
- GOOD/BAD 
019 EU MEMBERSHIP 
- COUNTRY BENEFIT .542 
1.000 
UK 018 EU MEMBERSHIP 1.000 .629 
- GOOD/BAD 
019 EU MEMBERSHIP 
- COUNTRY BENEFIT .629 
1.000 
. . The covariance matnx IS calculated and used In the analYSIS . 
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Item-Total Statistics 
Scale Corrected Squared Cronbach's 
Scale Mean if Variance if Item-Total Multiple Alpha if Item 
France and UK variable Item Deleted Item Deleted Correlation Correlation Deleted 
France Q18 EU 
a 
MEMBERSHIP - 1.41 .243 .542 .294 
GOOD/BAD 
Q19 EU 
MEMBERSHIP - a 
COUNTRY 1.59 .563 .542 .294 
BENEFIT 
UK Q18 EU 
a 
MEMBERSHIP - 1.54 .249 .629 .395 
GOOD/BAD 
Q19 EU 
MEMBERSHIP - a 
COUNTRY 1.84 .700 .629 .395 
BENEFIT 
a. The value is negative due to a negative average covariance among items. This violates reliability model assumptions. 
You may want to check item codings. 
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Scale Statistics 
France and UK variable Mean Variance Std. Deviation N of Items 
France 3.00 1.207 1.098 2 
UK 3.37 1.473 1.214 2 
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Table 4.6: Public Opinion's perceptions about the EU Action on specific policies in 
1992 and 1994 
The EU has positive effects or negative ones on: 
Positive(% ) Negative(%) 
1994 1994 19921 
19921 
Environment protection 62 24 
Peace and security in 51 75 38 16 
Europe 
Organisation of world trade 49 33 
Drug fighting 46 41 
Youth training 44 42 
Economic growth return 43 38 
Fight against unemployment 25 31 61 56 
Future of agriculture 22 25 66 62 
Control of immigration at 25 33 63 52 
the Borders 
Fight against terrorism & 34 47 
security 
Economic health of 50 38 
companies 
Standard of living 42 36 
Social security & pensions 27 51 
system 
Source: Ifop-L'Express (30 April 1994) and Ifop-Capital (3 Sept 1992) 
Note1: For the survey in 1992, people interviewed were asked to consider the long 
tenn positive and negative effect of Maastricht and opening of European borders -
single market - on specific policies above. 
Table 4.7: Public Opinion's perceptions about the EU Action on specific policies in 
1996 
EU has been rather positive or negative for: 
Positive Negative Neither No Opinion 
Maintain peace 53 31 12 4 
Environment 50 25 15 10 
protect 
Economic 32 46 13 9 
development 
Price stability 26 49 16 9 
Youth training 25 45 20 10 
Everyday life 18 29 48 5 
Social rights 17 53 19 11 
defence 
Create Jobs 11 67 17 5 
Source: BVA-Le Point (25 March 1996) 
Table 4.8: Public Opinion's perceptions about the EU Action on specific policies in 
1999 
Concerning each of the following domains, would you say that the action of the EU 
has: 
Rather positive Rather negative Neither No 
.. 
effects % effects % one nor OpInIOn 
the other % 
% 
Environment 74 22 2 2 
Protection 
Economic 60 34 3 3 
Growth 
Youth training 59 34 4 3 
& education 
Peace in 55 41 2 2 
Europe 
Kosovo 48 43 4 5 
conflict 
Resolution 
Social 47 46 4 3 
Protection 
Unemployment 36 57 4 3 
Reduction 
Immigration 36 57 3 4 
Control 
Tax decrease 30 59 5 6 
Agriculture 27 68 2 
3 
Future 
Source: Ifop-Nouvel Observateur (8 May 1999) 
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T bl 4 9 P bl' 0 " 'S £ a e , , u IC )pIllIOn s upport or the Single European Currency 
In favour or opposed to a single European currency? (in %) 
Dec 1991 1 March 19922 October 1993J Dec 19954 
In favour 75 68 49 58 
Opposed 21 23 34 
No Opinion 4 9 8 
Oct 19965 Apr 1997) Oct 19985 May 2000° 
In favour 54 49 58 65 
Opposed 39 44 36 33 
No Opinion 7 7 6 2 
I, Source, BVA-Le Monde (5 December 1991) , Ipsos (3 March 1992) ,Ifop-
L 'Express (2 October 1993)3; Louis Harris-Votre Dimanche (19 December 1995t; 
Sofres-L'Expansion (5 December 1998)5; CSA-Liberation (28 June 2000)6 
T bl 4 lOP bI' 0 " 'V' b h S' 1 E a e u IC 'pIllIon s Iews a out t e Illgle uropean C urrency 
Does the single European currency evoke for you something very or rather positive, 
something rather negative or very negative?: 
Nov 19981 Feb 19991 Feb 20002 May 2000'" Sept 2001-' 
(%) 
Very positive 15 15 13 11 13 
Rather positive 54 56 46 43 46 
Total positive 69 71 59 54 59 
Rather 20 19 24 30 24 
negative 
Very negative 5 5 12 10 12 
Total negative 25 24 36 40 36 
6 5 5 6 5 No Opinion 
1 ,2, Source: Ipsos-AFP (10 March 1999) ; Ipsos-AFP (6 June 2000) , Ipsos-AFP (10 
3 December 2001) 
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Table 4.11: Public Opinion's Views about the Single European Currency Impact on 
S 'fi I . 1996 )peCI IC ssues III 
Positive or negative consequences of Euro on: 
Positive Negative None 
French exports abroad 62 28 2 
Consumption 46 40 7 
Inflation level 44 41 4 
Interest rates 43 41 3 
Purchasing power 39 44 10 
Everyday life 38 41 15 
Savings protection 34 47 7 
Unemployment level 33 50 10 
Independence of France's 34 56 3 
economic policy 
Social protection 30 53 8 
Pensions 28 50 11 
Source: Ifop-Geopolitique (3 April 1996) 
Table 4.12: Public Opinion's Views about the Single European Currency Impact on 
S 'fi I . 1998 ;peci IC ssues III 
In you opinion, the establishment of the euro will have the following consequences? 
Yes, probably - No, certainly not : 
Yes No Opinion No 
A greater stability of the currency 70 13 17 
A greater dynamism for the 
French economy 62 11 27 
Concerns ('tracas') in the 74 3 23 
everyday Life of people 
Extra sacrifices for people like 
Yourself 61 7 32 
The loss of decision power of the 
French government 58 9 33 
The loss of identity of France 52 5 43 
A domination risk of Germany 44 11 45 
Easier travels 89 4 7 
Easier commercial exchanges 87 5 8 
Source: Sofres-L'ExpanslOn (5 December 1998) 
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Table 4.13: Public Opinion's Views about the Single European Currency Impact on 
S 'fi I . 1998 )peci IC ssues III 
Do you think the establishment of the euro will have positive, negative or no effect 
on: 
Positive Negative No effect 
Employment 29 24 35 
Salaries 16 28 43 
Source: Sofres-L'Expansion (5 December 1998) 
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T bl 4 14 EU M b h" a e " em ers Ip 
If there were a referendum now on whether Britain should stay in or get out of the 
European Union, how would you vote? 
Base: All All expressing an opinion 
Stay in Get out Don't Stay in Get out 
% % Know % % 
% 
1975 67 33 
referendum 
result 
1991 60 29 11 67 33 
1992 52 35 13 60 40 
Oct 1993 46 39 15 54 46 
April 1994 52 36 12 59 41 
May 1996 44 39 17 53 47 
Nov 1996 44 40 16 52 48 
April 1997 40 40 19 50 50 
25-28 April 44 41 15 52 48 
1997 
October 1997 44 37 19 54 46 
November 49 35 16 58 42 
1997 
June 1998 47 40 13 54 46 
May 1999 44 39 17 53 47 
June 1999 41 37 22 53 47 
October 1999 51 41 8 55 45 
June 2000 53 32 15 62 38 
September 43 46 11 48 52 
2000 
November 49 44 7 53 47 
2000 
15-21 March 39 42 19 48 52 
2001 
30 April-l 48 43 9 53 47 
May 2001 
22 May 2001 43 41 16 51 49 
Source: Ipsos Mon (2003) 
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T bl 4 15 J .. th E a e . : ommg e uro 
If there were a referendum now on whether Britain should be part of a Single 
European Currency, how would you vote? 
Base: All All expressing an opinion 
In favour Against Don't In favour Against 
% % Know % % 
% 
22-23 Nov 1991 33 54 13 38 62 
17-21 Nov 1994 33 56 11 37 63 
26-27 Jun 1995 29 60 11 33 67 
1996 
23-26 May 1996 23 60 17 28 72 
27-29 Nov 1996 22 64 14 26 74 
1997 
15 April 1997 22 58 19 28 72 
22-23 April 1997 27 54 19 33 67 
25-28 April 1997 25 60 15 29 71 
2-7 October 1997 27 54 19 33 67 
30 Oct-4 Nov 1997 30 52 18 37 63 
1998 
15-20 Jan 1998 32 52 16 38 62 
12-17 March 1998 30 54 15 36 64 
14-19 May1998 31 54 16 36 64 
23-28 July 1998 33 50 17 40 60 
24-30 Sept 1998 30 49 20 38 62 
3-9 Dec 1998 29 53 18 35 65 
1999 
14-20 Jan 1999 33 51 16 39 61 
25 Feb-3 March 32 52 15 38 62 
1999 
19-22 March 1999 31 56 13 36 64 
29 Apr-4 May 31 53 15 37 63 
1999 
10-11 Jun 1999 24 57 18 30 70 
8-13 Jul1999 27 58 15 32 68 
2-7 Sept 1999 30 56 14 35 65 
10-13 Sept 1999 31 53 16 37 63 
11-18 Nov 1999 27 56 17 33 67 
2000 
13-18 Jan 2000 29 56 14 34 66 
24 Feb-2 March 26 58 15 31 69 
2000 
11-16 May 2000 25 60 14 29 71 
22-27 Jun 2000 25 61 14 29 71 
13-18 Jul2000 31 51 17 38 62 
14-19 Sept 2000 27 56 17 33 67 
16-21 Nov 2000 22 61 16 26 74 
410 
If there were a referendum now on whether Britain should be part of a Single 
European Currency, how would you vote? 
Base: All All expressing an opinion 
In favour Against Don't In favour Against 
% % Know % % 
% 
2001 
25-30 Jan 2001 26 57 17 31 69 
19-23 Apr 2001 25 61 14 29 71 
10-12 May 2001 28 57 15 33 67 
31 May-2 Jun 2001 29 60 11 33 67 
14-19 Jun 2001 25 55 20 31 69 
30 Aug-4 Sept 25 57 17 30 70 
2001 
25-30 Oct 2001 26 57 17 31 69 
Source: Ipsos Mon (2005a) 
T bl 4 16 J "" th E a e " : ommg e "hG uro WIt ovemment u rge 
If the government were to strongly urge that Britain should be part of a Single 
European Currency, how would you vote? 
Base: All All expressing an opinion 
In favour Against Don't In favour Against 
% % Know % % 
% 
1997 
30 Oct-4 Nov 1997 38 47 15 45 55 
1998 
15-20 Jan 1998 38 47 14 45 55 
12-17 March 1998 36 51 13 41 59 
14-19 May1998 36 50 14 42 58 
23-28 July 1998 39 46 16 46 54 
24-30 Sept 1998 37 44 18 46 54 
3-9 Dec 1998 34 49 16 41 59 
1999 
14-20 Jan 1999 38 47 15 45 55 
25 Feb-3 March 37 49 14 43 57 
1999 
29 Apr-4 May 36 50 14 42 58 
1999 
1 0-11 J un 1999 31 50 19 38 62 
8-13 Jul 1999 32 54 14 37 63 
2-7 Sept 1999 33 53 13 38 62 
10-13 Sept 1999 37 49 14 43 57 
11-18 Nov 1999 31 51 17 38 62 
411 
If the government were to strongly urge that Britain should be part of a Single 
European Currency, how would you vote? 
Base: All All eXRressing an opinion 
In favour Against Don't In favour Against 
% % Know % % 
% 
2000 
13-18 Jan 2000 34 53 12 39 61 
24 Feb-2 March 30 56 14 35 65 
2000 
11-16 Ma~ 2000 29 57 l3 34 66 
22-27 Jun 2000 28 59 l3 32 68 
13-18 Jul2000 37 47 15 44 56 
14-19 Sept 2000 31 53 16 37 63 
16-21 Nov 2000 27 57 16 32 68 
2001 
25-30 Jan 2001 30 53 17 36 64 
19-23 Apr 2001 29 58 12 33 67 
14-19 Jun 2001 30 53 17 36 64 
30 Aug-4 Sept 29 55 16 35 65 
2001 
25-30 Oct 2001 31 53 15 37 63 
Source: Ipsos Mon (2005b) 
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